Customer Reviews

Battles of the Thirty Years War: From White Mountain to Nordlingen, 1618-1635 (Contributions in Military Studies)

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On the one hand, this book fills a gaping hole in the literature of English language military history, something that those who study this period know all too well. Guthrie has provided us with orders of battle for major and minor acions, as well as descriptions of battles presented in a level of detail previously unheard of.

On the other hand, it is not the scholarly presentation some might hope for. The author makes statements, many controversial, that are not even footnoted. In fact, the footnotes, when they are there, are explanatory, and cite no source. This is most regretable as many of the authors, assertions, besides being most interesting, have been challenged or questioned by scholars on the subject, yet we have no way of understanding what led the author to his views. A fairly extensive, multi-language bibliography is however, included in the back.

I was especially disappointed with Guthrie's failure to take into account some of the latest research, especially that of Richard Brzezinski, concerning the tactics and quality of the Swedish and League cavalry. Guthrie persists in repeating the outdated, IMO, view that the League/Imperial cavalry used the caracole as their primary method of attack, while the Swedes charged with swords drawn.

This book has received some mixed reviews on internet discussion boards. For all its flaws it is still a must have, mainly because nothing like it exists in the English language. Primary source material is lacking on the Thirty Years War anyway, and controversy is inevitable. I prefer to welcome this effort by Guthrie and look foreward to his future works.

This is an excellent `Wargamers Guide' to the first half of the Thirty Years' War. The chapters are:
P001: Breitenfeld and the Thirty Years War
P047: The Battle of the White Mountain: First Battle of the Thirty Years War
P083: The 1622 Campaign: The Battle of Wimpfen
P105: The Battle of Stadtlohn: The End of the German War
P117: The Danish War: Dessau and Lutter
P149: Gustavus's Run of Victory: From Stettin to the Lech
P187: Gustavus versus Wallenstein, 1632: Alte Veste and Lutzen
P233: The War in Westphalia, 1632-33
P259: The Battle of Nordlingen: From Lutzen to the Peace of Prague
PP297-335: Glossary, Bibliography, Index, Index of Units

The chapters cover the associated campaigns, not just the titular battle. Each chapter is broken down into sections, and has a list of sources, extensive appendices and notes, and a map or two, usually of the relevant battle(s), and sometimes of the campaigning area. The appendices contain exhaustive army lists with microscopic details. Here is a breakdown of chapter 3, for example:
The 1622 Campaign: The Battle of Wimpfen
1622 Strategy; The Action of Mingolsheim, April 27, 1622; To Wimpfen; The Commanders; The Armies; The Battle of Wimpfen, May 6, 1622; Later Operations; 1622 Chronology.
Sources
"English accounts of Wimpfen and Hochst are limited to Gindley and Dodge. The principal German source is Wertheim, however Heilmann and Villermont are worth a look".
Appendix A: The Weingarten Action
(description)
Appendix B: Mingolsheim (or Wiesloch)
Army list (Tilly's) with the following column headings:
Unit name; Companies (number of); Estimated Strength; Loss; Notes. (This is the standard layout for all army lists)
Appendix C: Tilly and Cordoba at Wimpfen
(description of forces plus army lists)
Appendix D: The Baden Army
Army list
Appendix E: The Battle of Hoschst. June 20, 1622
Army lists for Christian of Brunswick's army; Cordoba's Corps; Caracciolo's Corps; Tilly's Army (including Anholt); (followed by two pages in small type on) The Action.
Appendix F: Catholic Forces, 1622
(two small paragraphs)
Appendix G: Mansfield's Army
Army list (almost a page of small type)
Appendix H: Battle of Fleurus, August 29, 1622
Army list and description
Two maps - Wimpfen and Hochst
Notes.
As you can see, microscopic detail.

The opening chapter of Breitenfeld also gives a breakdown of the armies and their tactics - see sections "Tilly's Art of War" and "The Military Reforms of Gustavus Adolphus"; the second chapter fills in the "Background of the War". The military detail in the first chapter is essential to anyone studying (or wargaming) the Thirty Years' War (the author however dispenses with the apostrophe). I wish I had had this information thirty years ago when I started wargaming the period. Many writers on battle tactics dismissed the `caracole' or mounted firearms tactics as being useless; here the author, taking the contemporary writers at their word, has managed to explain how and why they actually worked - until changes in tactics and technology did render them ineffective. He also points out that "push of pike" was actually with the pointy end, and not as so many re-enactors claim, by shoving with the upright stock. No doubt Health and Safety officers were the first casualties back in the 17th century.

"The basic premises of pre-Gustavian strategy are sufficiently unfamiliar as to render activities incomprehensible; even historians (who should know better) too often condemning apparent incompetence, over-caution, and cowardice. Actually these strange manoeuvres fell within the constraints of then-contemporary strategy, which was very different from that of Frederick the Great, Napoleon, or even Marlborough" (p84).

"In view of the universal condemnation accorded the caracole for the last 350 years, it is necessary to point out the virtues of the tactic - if only as a reminder that Tilly, Maurice, and their contemporaries were not "blind idiots". The caracole, as opposed to the cavalry charge with cold steel, was "un-aggressive" in that "instead of relying upon the impact of the mass...reduced, in battle, to a debilitated popping of pistols" In the words of Roberts, "...the whole performance was nearly as futile as it was elaborate." Yet, the caracole had struggled against cold steel throughout the16th century and come off the victor. Why?
As Du Picq, Keegan, Griffith, and others have pointed out, the real force of a cavalry charge is moral, not physical. Sword and lance are inefficient killing instruments; even the most casual exchange of fire will produce more losses than a mounted melee. Cold steel may break and scatter a unit; it will not produce many casualties. Similar considerations governed the replacement of pike by musket.
Charging cavalry do not crash in to each other like medieval knights at a tournament. There are, in fact four main outcomes to a cavalry collision: First, one or the other side will break before contact. The victor may pursue. If the defender withdraws to safety in good order, and the attacker does not pursue, it is simply "bounced". Second, both halt at a distance, often a very short one. They may skirmish, exchange shots, or disengage. Third, the two may open ranks and actually pass through each other, trading sword strokes in passing. Fourth, the two come together and stop, striking with cold steel. They may even become intermingled in a wild "Hollywood style" melee. After 5-15 minutes, the loser may break and rout, or both may lose interest and separate. During the 18th and 19th centuries, the first result was by far the most common, the fourth the least. The situation was somewhat different in 1600. The deep formations favoured by Tilly had a double effect on morale. As only 10% of the men were in the first rank, these would be the men least likely to shrink from contact. Further, the multiple ranks behind inhibited withdrawal. As has been pointed out by Du Picq and Keegan, in such masses, the men in front cannot flee until the men behind do. Second, the heavy armour worn by the first rank made contact rather less dangerous. Thus the pre-contact rout first case was less common in 1615 than 1815. Similarly, the depth of formations made case three less likely as well (although there were examples). The caracole was predicated on one and two constituting the norm. By the time the aggressor had closed to pistol range, a weaker unit would probably already have broken. If it stood (i.e. case two), a well executed caracole might expect to send a wavering unit over the edge. If it was sufficiently prepared to stand and return fire, then cold steel would probably not have broken it either. Even then, the pistols would inflict loss. If the enemy did waver under fire, the cuirassiers could draw their "armour-smashers" and finish him. The morale impact of arkebusiers [the author's annoying term for mounted arquebusiers, which, conventionally, should be Harquebusiers, I believe] was less because they fired at a much longer range: 50 meters as opposed to 10.
The caracole did have very real drawbacks. The "moral impact" was less than that of a charge with sword or lance. Troops accustomed to caracole were often reluctant to close (i.e. cases three and four), and could be intimidated by opponents who did. Also the wheeling manoeuvres rendered a formation vulnerable to counterattack. On the plus side, a slow trot was much easier to control than the flat-out gallop. Even after the caracole was discarded, such generals as Conde, Montecuccoli, and Cromwell preferred to trot" (pp12-13).

Breitenfeld (pp27-28):
"...At 2:00, Pappenheim ordered his wing to advance. The cuirassiers moved at a brisk trot, "with considerable impetus," the arkebusiers [sic] and Holstein in close support... The "moral force" of 3,800 heavy cavalry seemed irresistible, especially since Gustavus chose to meet them at the halt. Most horse would have wavered, and understandably. But the king had prepared his men well, and these were the pick. At precisely the right moment - Pappenheim's first rank had already fired, and the caracole was halted - every Swede discharged his weapon, 860 muskets and 2450 pistols. The moral shock was all out of proportion to the actual impact (perhaps 150 hits on 2500 men). The Swedish cavalry sallied forth to "bounce" the disordered Imperials. A few swords crossed and some pistols flashed, but no real contact was made. The musketeers poured in a second volley. The Imperials disengaged and slowly faded back from the barrier of steel and fire. Pappenheim's "charge" had been "repelled" - that is, the Swedes had survived the first caracole. Their elation was palpable... With obstinate valour, Pappenheim moved farther around the flank and came back, again and again, seven "charges" in all... After the failure of the seventh caracole, around 4:00 P.M., Pappenheim's cuirassiers were exhausted, disorganized, and loosely strung out along the length of the Swedish flank." A "flat-out charge" by fresh Swedish cavalry eventually broke the Imperialist horse.

I have quoted the above at length because of its importance to me. His analysis of infantry tactics and deployment is also excellent, and makes the "incomprehensible" comprehensible, and you feel that the people of the time really did know what they were doing after all.

The maps are clear and informative, and there are many battle-maps that I have never seen before, even of significant or famous battles, Lutter in particular.


I have used the term `Wargamers Guide' to describe this book, and some of you may consider that to be a demeaning description. I have been a wargamer for thirty years, and so I wouldn't find it so. However, the author does use American colloquialisms, He refers to Mansfield as a "notorious Merc" for example, and of Pappenheim's expedition to Maastricht to aid the Spanish "...To add insult to injury, the Spaniards stiffed him on the bill!", which could have a completely different meaning to an English speaker of the time, a bill being a pole-arm. He also uses modern-sounding abbreviations when referring to units, and inconsistently uses people's titles as surnames, Bernhard Saxe-Weimar in particular, instead of Bernhard OF Saxe-Weimar. In his description of the Spanish tercios, he has also overlooked the Anglo-Dutch victory of Nieuport in 1600. Little things like this makes the book feel slightly `amateur', hence the `Wargamers Guide' description.

I read a library copy, but I will be waiting to pounce on a cheap copy when one appears.

Further reading:
An Apprenticeship in Arms: The Origins of the British Army 1585-1702 An `academic' study of the contemporary scene in Britain.
Exercise of Arms: Warfare in the Dutch Revolt (1568-1648) (History of Warfare) A collection of essays on the Dutch army reforms that inspired Gustavus' reforms.
Pike and Shot Tactics 1590-1660 (Elite) A general guide, with nice pictures.

This book and its companion volume are an excellent addition to anyone interested in military history. The scope of Guthrie's work is limited in discussion of the tertiary theaters during this conflict, but this only serves to pique the reader's interest. Political causes for each campaign are only briefly described. The real value of this volume is the detail regarding unit strengths, positions, composition, and command quality and control. The reader is guided into a better grasp of the tactical and strategic evolutions of each phase of the war. Highly recommended to those requiring more than the usual cursory synopsis of early 17th century warfare.