Customer Reviews

Before Stalingrad: Barbarossa, Hitler's Invasion of Russia 1941 (Battles & Campaigns)

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The Nazi-Soviet War may finally be getting its due in western military history. For decades theaters of secondary and tertiary importance have received the lion's share of attention in English-language literature. For example, the comparative sideshow in North Africa held the advantage because half the armies involved were British/Commonwealth or American, sources in English were readily available, familiar and flamboyant personalities like Rommel and Churchill were involved, the fighting was episodic, orderly and easy to follow (like American baseball), absence of murderous Nazi racial and occupation policies there allowed study without forcing a moral stance, etc. Except for the part about flamboyant personalities, the Nazi-Soviet War possessed none of these features.

Historiography of that theater has passed through numerous "generations." First came the German memoirs; after all, no one else in the west knew much about that war. Then followed the standard general works by authors like John Erickson and Earl Ziemke; they overturned the earlier bias that only Soviet hordes led by unschooled generals stood between Germany and victory.

David Glantz, a retired US Army colonel, has been at the forefront of a new generation. Especially after the collapse of the USSR he has seemingly been on a one-man mission to mine ex-Soviet/Russian archives and sources and bring them to light for the western historian interested in WW II's penultimate theater. However, until recently his works have been limited to a specific place and time during the Nazi-Soviet War. These earlier works were also usually extremely detailed, technical and not at all edited for the general military-history reader. The only previous exception to this trend was his _When Titans Clashed_, co-written with Jonathan House, an overview of the entire four-year struggle.

Glantz's _Before Stalingrad_ is a re-issued paperback version of his hardcover and large format _Barbarossa_, published in 2001. Both books cover the fighting in 1941: Hitler's invasion on 22 June through Stalin's counter-offensives that December. They are more accessible and are written and edited for a more general audience than the bulk of Glantz's catalog, possibly in this case mainly serious military historians and students of WW II in particular. However, _Before Stalingrad_ could serve as one's first book on Operation Barbarossa without losing the reader in minutia.

Both books begin with a background chapter on armies, equipment, plans and doctrine. Glantz then breaks down the fighting according to major operations and, where appropriate, strategic machinations in the headquarters of both dictators. Although in hindsight we know the Nazis did not conquer Moscow, Glantz keeps the issue in doubt until near the end. Both contain scholarship of a high order, complete with helpful and thorough endnotes (although personally I prefer footnotes). Errors are so minor and so few that they don't deserve further mention. Appendices include "usual suspects" of Fuehrer Directives plus some Soviet planning documents and an excellent order of battle of forces arrayed on Barbarossatag.

Glantz does not skimp on analysis, either. At the end of each chapter are his "Reflections" and the book closes with a strong concluding chapter. He deals with Barbarossa's greatest controversy by stating that in late summer the Germans had little choice other than to deal with the Soviet threat around Kiev before turning on Moscow (Hitler knew such was the case months before the campaign began). He places fault for the campaign's ultimate failure on German strategic (and logistic) overstretch plus Soviet recuperative powers and climbing learning curve. Operationally we witness Barbarossa's death by a thousand cuts. With fewer that 200 pages of actual narrative, however, one will find almost no mention of tactical engagements.

One regrets Glantz did not add a new forward or preface to _Before Stalingrad_ to update the reader on recent scholarship since the publication of _Barbarossa_. For some reason, the publisher assembled all maps in one section near the end of the book instead of spacing them throughout as in the earlier effort. The maps are greatly improved over those in Glantz's Frank Cass and self-published works (although much smaller in the paperback volume) but I believe the massive campaign deserves more of them. Bottom Line: either book is a "must have" for the serious student of Operation Barbarossa.

The German Offensive against Russia in 1941 (Barbarossa) saw Germany defeat Soviet Army after Soviet Army leading to the Russians losing in excess of four millions men. Despite those successes the German invasion stalled before Moscow and in the next few years the Russians were able to win what became a battle of attrition.

The German defeat was catastrophic and led to the absorption of East Prussia and a hundred-mile corridor by Poland and the creation of a Soviet Satellite in what was left of Eastern Germany. Not surprisingly the German Generals who held command positions in the war were eager to shift blame from themselves for this disaster. In reality they were responsible. The German military badly underestimated the size of the Soviet Army, the strength of Soviet industry and the fact that Stalin was a far more determined and tougher leader than Hitler.

Most of the memoirs written by the German Generals tends to suggest that if some different decisions had been made in 1941 victory might have been Germany's. If the assault on Moscow had been made earlier, if parts of Army Group Centre had not been sent south to grab the Ukraine then the outcome might have been different. In general terms this view of history dominated critical thinking up recently. With the collapse of communism it has been possible to write history in a different way with a more quantitative base than the earlier anecdotal approach of memoirs. Glantz is one of the leading historians to write about the East Front and his work is solidly based on Soviet and German material.

Glantz sets himself the task to see if Barbarossa could have been won. His conclusion is simple, it could not have been. The earlier discussions about the timing of the drive on Moscow and all of the previous issues raised in writing about the war were smoke and mirrors. The simple reality is that the Germans bit off more than they could chew. Their forces were not large enough and they had at that point not engaged in gearing up production to cover losses of men and material. More specifically they were poorly equipped with transport. The German Army that invaded Russia was dependent on horse drawn transport and the railway system. The size of Russia meant that it struggled to keep its forces equipped, supplied with ammunition and parts to repair its vehicles. The Soviet system was run by Stalin a person of total ruthlessness and he was able to form army after army each time there was a defeat so that by December 1941 the initiative had swung to the Russians and it was clear that Germany could not win.

Glantz says that the earlier debates simply miss the most basic reality of the campaign. If the Germans had captured Moscow in 1941 it would not have won them the war. The Soviets had been able to raise fresh armies of five million men despite the loss of over 4 million in the earlier months. Those five million would have taken Moscow back with no major problems and the Germans would have still lost a war they had not prepared for.

This book is typical of the work by David Glantz on the East Front battles of WWII--that is, it is excellent. For anyone looking to get a good introduction to the opening stages of the epic struggle between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, this is a good starting point. Glantz provides his trademark level of detail on the opposing forces' "orders of battle" and command structure, especially in the appendices that are provided and his analysis of why each battle occured as it did as well as the implications for the correlation of forces is quite good.

Two minor complaints and a quibble:

1. The book, outside of the Leningrad and Kiev chapters, is heavily skewed toward coverage of the central front. The last half of the book speaks mostly of the battles between Army Group Centre and the Soviet forces protecting Moscow and then each chapter has a short section on "the flanks" that quickly summarizes what was happening with Army Groups North and South. The book is not packaged as being focused on ACG and so this is confusing. Also there was enough action in the flank sectors in October and November, that this approach is not merited by events.

2. The book is somewhat short and superficial compared to Glantz' other work in this area. It should suffice as an excellent intro to the topic, but anyone wishing to delve more deeply than this would want to continue on to "The Battle for Leningrad" or "Colossus Reborn" etc.

3. The quibble: as I've seen in other Glantz books, there is little attention paid to presentation details. In particular, the maps in the appendices, while containing great information, are horribly presented. The text is too small to read and the graphics and color-schema are non-existent. One should not have to get out a magnifying glass to read a map in order to follow along with a battle description.

These points describe why I gave the book 4 stars as opposed to 5 though and should not be construed as a negative review of the book overall. This is a really good book and indicative of what those of us who study this niche already know--Glantz is a reliable source for excellent, thorough, and accessible analysis--and this book is no exception to this.

This is not a book that goes into great detail about individual battles or skirmishes. It does, however, provide an extremely detailed account of the horrendously, seemingly impossible task Stavka faced in dealing with the German onslaught. Glantz provides readers with mind-numbinlgy detailed summaries of armies created on paper only to be slaughtered on the field, of Fronts being designated by desperate planners only to be shattered, and of Generals placed at the heads of armies only to be sacked, or worse, when they, almost, inevitably failed to win victories.

The huge amount of data Glantz provides is almost impossible to keep track of. This book was slow going for me. More maps, higher quality maps, and more charts and tables would have been welcome. The nearly frequent typographical errors were annoying. The excellent endnotes were sometimes hard to locate. I would have preferred footnotes.

David M. Glantz's book, Before Stalingrad rewrite the operational history of the German invasion of Soviet Union between June to December of 1941. Glantz's approach is to informed the reader that it took more then German's missteps and mother nature that determined the outcome of the 1941 campaign but the Soviet's efforts and mobilization of fresh units that also had a major hand. One of the major factors of German failure according to Glantz was the appearance of fresh Soviet reserves units that defied the German intelligence service. One point Glantz really wanted to make was that the German efforts toward Kiev wasn't an error by Hitler but an necessary objective to ensure any chance of German victory in Moscow if there was to be one. He cites the huge amount of Soviet troops trapped around Kiev, wide open flanks that the Germans will be exposing and fresh Soviet units waiting for the Germans in front of Moscow before many of them were expended in premature Soviet offensives that allowed Germans to advanced toward Moscow. I believed there is many merits to his line of arguement if we looked at German's efforts at Rostov and its consequences.

The main angle of study seem to be centered around central operation of the campaign, Soviet responses to Army Group Center seem to highlights the book's main theme. I think the author chooses this approach since this was where the campaign of 1941 was ultimately decided.

The book appears to be well written and well researched with plenty of Soviet material. Its an operational study of the 1941 campaign and looked closely from the Soviet point of view as all of Glantz's books. Its a short book and far more simply written then many of Glantz's other works. It could have used more maps and a more clearer order of battle table.

The book come highly recommended to those interested in this subject matter.

This book will remain best account on Barbarossa:Hitler's invasion of Russia.As we know Barbarossa marked the beginning of biggest land campaign in the History of Warfare.For a long time Barbarossa has continued to fascinate Historians and layman alike.As a result it came to be shrouded in a fog of falsehoods and half-truths.Thanks to the author this stands dispelled.Author shows why Wehrmacht despite its immense qualitative edge over Red Army failed to destroy Russia;capture Moscow.

It must be remembered when Hitler invaded Russia Stavka[ General Staff] had not fully recovered from the damage inflicted upon it by Stalinist purge.Besides Red Army was in the midst of a re-organisation designed to reform its force structure,leadership,training ,equipment,tactics.Many foreign observers thought the country was saddled by a hollow,defunct military establishment and defeat appeared imminent.Against such overwhelming odds Russia survived and ultimately triumphed.Since then many academics have argued Rasputitsa[Oct rains which turn Russian countryside into a sea of mud]harsh winter combined to thwart Wehrmacht when it stood at gates to Moscow.This book,however questions this view.

Wehrmacht's unprepardeness to fight in Russian winter certainly contributed to German defeat.Primary reason leading to German failure lay in the fact Wehrmacht miscalculated Red Army's strength precisely reserves which it could bring from the depths of the country.This helped Stavka to raise fresh divisions from scratch,enabling the erection,of several lines of resistance astride invader's path,as Red Army quickly replenished its losses.New divisions launched incessant counter-attacks;for the Germans struggle started with Battle of Smolensk.Though these attacks were smashed it imposed tremendous attrition upon Wehrmachtso much so when it reached the gates to Moscow German strength ebbed,eroded considerably.Now on the approaches to Moscow Germans encountered fresh Russian resistance.Appearance of T-34 tanks in large numbers -impervious to German anti-tank guns- stunned Nazis.This shows how much they underestimated Russian colossus;exposes faulty nature of German intelligence prelude to Barbarossa.

Germans could hope overcoming this final barrier only by bringing in fresh troops,rearming and refuelling their emasculated armoured spearheads.This was not possible because of poor quality Russian roads and failure to put int operational use of Russian railway network.The errors further aggravated by Hitler's failure to moblise German economy for 'TotalWar'.Army Group Centre launched its final bid to seize Moscow without receiving any reinforcements.

Author has demolished the view of some Historians that Moscow could have been taken had Hitler not diverted Gen Guderian's Second Panzer Group toward Kiev.Fact is after reduction Smolensk pocket considerable Soviet forces remained which barred the road to Moscow.This prompted Hitler go for a easy prey.This manoeuvre in turn created conditions for a successful start of the offensive along Moscow axis[operation Typhoon]

Account of Barbarossa is incomplete without stressing the contribution of Richard Sorge,Soviet spy attached to the German embassy in Tokyo.After all where did Stalin find forces which barred German road to Moscow? Fro the Far East thanks Sorge's intelligence that Japan was going to attack US which helped Soviet leader ruthlessly denudeFar Eastern front rush Siberians to defend Moscow.Later Marshal Zhukov used Siberians divisions to launch Moscow counter-offensive.An author of Glantz's stature has remained silent about this,and I find hard to digest.

Despite this drawback this book will remain an indispensible source for those who want to know why Barbarossa ended in a fiasco.

This is a concise, strategic overview of the Barbarossa campaign. Unlike many other works by David Glantz, this is a relatively light tome that can easily be read in 2-3 sittings and is more of a popular work and not a scholarly work. Don't get me wrong, there is a lot of detail, and the text is well-documented and footnoted, but as you can devine from some of the other reviews, this work is more readable compared with some of Glantz's denser tomes. This book has many of the same strengths and weaknesses of Glantz other works. There is an incrdible amount of detail packed tightly into well-worded prose. On the other hand, Glantz is so pro-Soviet that you wonder how the Germans advanced 10 miles into the Soviet Union with all the hyperbole.

Beyond the purely historical details, Glantz weighs in on the question of whether Barbarossa was winnable from the German perspective, and whether Guderian's right turn to Kiev was strategically necessary or a fatal loss of time and dissipation of strength as many have argued that it was. Glantz concludes that the Germans could not have marched on Moscow without the destruction of the Soviet armies in and around Kiev for two reasons. First, it would not have been possible for Army Group Center to advance on Moscow with such a strong force on it's right flank. Second, and more importantly, the Soviet armies covering Moscow uselessly dissipated their strength in foolish counterattacks trying to save their comrades trapped in Kiev. The Germans would not have been able to advance so easily to the gates of Moscow had this force (of roughly equal size to the armies annihilated in Kiev) not destroyed itself. Thus Glantz concludes that the right turn by Guderian was critical, the Germans could not have taken Moscow even if they simply bypassed the armies in Kiev.

Was Barbarossa winnable in one campaign? The German General Staff and Hitler thought so. Glantz says no. The strategic depth of the Soviet Union and the ability to replace destroyed armies one after the other meant that the Soviet Union could only be defeated in a long campaign. I think that Glantz arguments are compelling. The lessons of Poland and France did not necessarily appy to the Soviet Union. My personal view is that the war was won or lost in 1942 with the success or failure of Operation Edelweiss.

The bottom line is that this is about the best concise history of Barbarossa around, and if you can ignore Glantz's favoritism, definitely worth the money. Finally, do not be mislead by the title of the book. I initially thought that this volume covered the first two years of the war in the East (i.e. up to Stalingrad), it does not. The narrative ends as the Soviet Winter offensive of 1941-42 peters out.

There were two schools of thought in 1941 and those theories have persisted until today and probably will for a long time to come. The most popular theory, propagated by Guderian, Halder, Bock and other generals was that the German advance toward Moscow should have continued without delay once penetration of the Dvina-Dniepr defense zone was achieved and to allow Guderian to move directly toward Tula. Hitler saw a chance to destroy many armies near Kiev and sent Guderian's panzers south to support AGS in taking the important city and its surrounding area. To make matters worse Hitler sent other elements of AGC northward to help capture Leningrad leaving AGC little opportunity to advance. The proponents of this direct theory suggests the delay of Guderian in going to Kiev and the time required to reinforce AGC for the assault lost the battle for Moscow and the war. The other school believes, like Hitler, that the Germans had a better chance of taking Moscow by eliminating the armies protecting Kiev and eliminating the eventual flank attacks on Guderian's long axis of advance if those armies hadn't been destroyed. Mr Glantz doesn't believe Bock could have taken and kept Moscow during the winter months regardless of the battle plan but believes the Germans' best chance of victory was by sending Guderian to Kiev and eliminating a million men from Russian rosters.

The author presents a competent prewar situational report on the political and military envirnoment and the combat readiness of both sides before providing an operational summary of Operation Barbarossa, Operation Typhoon and the Russian Counter attack that started in early December.

Hitler over confident from past victories thought Russia would be another quick victim. The Barbarossa plans weren't as thorough as they could have been. The preparations for war and Wehrmacht combat and logistical status weren't up to a long war and German intelligence completely missed the size of Russia's tank inventory or the capability of producing large numbers of tanks and planes. Stalin confident in his peace agreement with Hitler and his "uncanny" ability to judge people and control situations believed he had two years before Germany would strike and therefore took a slow, cautious approach to mobilization, reequipping his Army and building defenses. The military purges were continuing as well but at a slower pace and the military command structure was now being run by cronies of Stalin and for the most part incompetent to defend against Blitzkrieg. Both sides were over confident with their own abilities while underestimating their opponent. Both sides would pay dearly for that miscalculation.
While presenting a concise operational overview of the key battles of Barbarossa with the primary emphasis on AGC which will support the author's contentions that despite the massive victories by the Germans (Minsk, Smolensk, Kiev, Uman, Vyazma, Bryansk and others) the Germans were paying too high a price in lost panzers, men and equipment against a determined foe that had an unending supply of men. It will also be shown that the Germans had to fight the poor road conditions, a different rail guage, rainy weather, freezing weather, tough terrain and the ever present partisan action.

In addition to the narrative, each chapter contains a summary that concisely focuses on the progress of the German Army and the battlefield costs to both sides. It will also be shown that the contentious atmosphere of Hitler and his commanders were rising with each passing month. It will also be shown that the Germans didn't have a definite war plan and that Hitler was making it up as he went and further east the Wehrmacht went the worse the conditions got. On the other hand it will show Stalin's poor command abilities and his desire to constantly attack the enemy when his armies weren't prepared along with his constant intimidation of the military commanders would cost millions of men. Mr Glantz also shows that new younger, more qualified Russian officers were being promoted to command level as well as Stalin was finally learning from his mistakes.

The final chapter is the overall Conclusions and it covers all the angles, all the bases to the question of capturing Moscow and defeating Russia in 1941. Mr Glantz feels that Germany couldn't have taken Moscow in 1941 and as such with Russia's mobilization capacity would never be able to take Moscow or defeat Russia. His arguments are excellent and convincing. Despite the catastrophes of the first six months, Russia's mobilization and industrial output was kicking in while Germany's was dwindling. With the front line now east of the Dniepr and supplies arriving late, battling rainy and then freezing weather and a influx of new Russian reserve armies moving to defend Moscow, Germany had little chance of taking and keeping Moscow even if they had moved directly on the capital from Smolensk.
I find it fascinating, imaging how Operation Typhoon would have developed with the direct approach from Smolensk. I would think the German forces on the central and northern axis would have advanced further than they actually did but Guderian would have had greater difficulties and would have been forced to fall back to save itself from destruction and to protect its flanks. Falling back would mean Typhoon would fail. Mr Glantz clearly points out Germany didn't have sufficient panzers, equipment and men to invade a country as big as Russia with a population of more than twice Germany's. For each mile eastward the Germans advance their front line was growing and their defenses were thinning. By December the Wehrmacht was exhausted, half of their panzers had been destroyed, had suffered too many casualties and freezing weather was setting in and the Army wasn't prepared for it.

There are only eight maps but they were well chosen. Since this book is a summary, trying to prove the feasibility of taking Moscow and not a typical comprehensive coverage of a particular battle like Leningrad, Stalingrad or Kursk, many maps weren't necessary. The series of maps showed two things. The first was the progress of the German advance at different times in the campaign. The second series and from my perspective more interesting was the disposition of Russian Armies at the start of the war as well as the activation and insertion of new armies on a monthly basis. Overcoming the stiff resistance at Smolensk, the German generals thought the Russian resistance would be minimal but these maps and the corresponding table clearly show the timely insertion of new forces that would be able to stop Bock and would refute that German estimate.
The author also provides an impressive 46 page Notes section for those wanting further tactical information or research. There is also an extensive Appendix that includes important documents for both sides as well as a detailed Orders of Battle. There are 41 photos; most are from the Russian perspective.

There are a number of books that try to answer this quandary as to whether the Germans could take Moscow but this is the best effort to date. If you want to know about Hitler and Stalin in regards to Barbarossa, their individual war doctrine ideology and the problems and advantages each side had in prosecuting the early months of the war and how Germany had little chance of winning the war then this book is for you. Its highly recommended.

Of the three books I have so far read from Glantz, this one is for sure the best and easiest to read. (OK, also the shortest.) I personally very much enjoyed this book, and also found a lot of new information in it.

Like all of Glantz' books, this one also tells its story with authority. However, the focus is on the large scale, strategic operations and the high command, and therefore does not make for interesting reading.