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The Bells of Victory: The Pitt-Newcastle Ministry and Conduct of the Seven Years' War 1757-1762

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This is an analysis of the Seven Years War from the point of view of the British Administration - chiefly the Pitt-Newcastle Ministry. It is a hugely rewarding read. As a major result of the war was the destruction of the French colony in Canada, many books have taken this struggle as the prime focus (e.g. Fred Anderson's magnificent `The Crucible of War'), however in Middleton's analysis we see how European centric the struggle actually was. Britain's primary (as in most costly) struggle with France was fought on German territory, King George II was also the Elector of Hanover and pressed vigorously for European action. Pitt, in opposition, sided with the faction was opposed Britain's intervention on the European continent. Pitt's view was that the struggle with France should concentrate on destroying France's trade by occuping French colonies, thereby increasing British trade and colonies. Therefore Pitt backed a strong navy and minimal European involvement. In this he foreshadowed the `Splendid Isolation' policy of the British Empire in the 19th Century.
The book shows Pitt as every bit as calculating as his contemporaries. He is seen to play to George II's faction by backing enormous British funding of armies in Europe while trying to maintain his former position by limiting the number of actual British troops sent (i.e. funding mercenaries). He is seen initially to pander to Spanish demands when he first comes to power, only to use these same demands as a pretext for resignation later when it seems more advantageous for him.
Through all this Middleton holds that Pitt was less a strategist than a forceful opportunist. His basic policy of a strong navy yielded great results against an enemy (France) who was torn between the need for a strong army (to maintain and expand its European influence) and a strong navy (to maintain and expand its colonies and trade). Other policies - European intervention and alliances and so forth, waxed and waned as circumstances dictated.
Middleton gives Pitt's contemporaries their due - they have been overshadowed by his legacy, but they are seen as his equals and perhaps more diplomatically skilful in some cases - in particular the Duke of Newcastle, long derided as vacillating and spiteful, is given a more careful analysis as a major force in the administration. The interaction among the members of the Ministry, and between them and the various royals - the King, the Prince of Wales and the Duke of Cumberland is well described and shows the complexity and constraints of wielding power in Georgian Britain.
Overall this is a serious and rewarding read for anyone interested in the development of the early British Empire.

Richard Middleton convincingly argues in this well written book that the influence of Pitt during the war has been hyped. Pitt showed no system for winning the war and his descents on the French coast were political expedients to avoid sending troops to Germany. Pitt was not Prime Minister as the office did not exist. Instead he worked as one of two secretaries of state, who, along with the Treasury, made up the ministry. The book focuses on the politics and administration of the war, and not on the battles and campaigns themselves. Interestingly, the author shows how historians before the early 1900s were sloppy, and how modern historians often rely on their work without doing their own proper investigation.