Better Never to Have Been argues for a number of related, highly provocative, views: (1) Coming into existence is always a serious harm. (2) It is always wrong to have children. (3) It is wrong not to abort fetuses at the earlier stages of gestation. (4) It would be better if, as a result of there being no new people, humanity became extinct. These views may sound unbelievable--but anyone who reads Benatar will be obliged to take them seriously.
Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence
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Book Description
Editorial Reviews
Review
This isn't a new book, but it is generating increasing discussion in university departments and elsewhere: hence this review... If you enjoy an ethical challenge, then read this book. Malcolm Torry, Triple Helix For those who admire really careful and imaginative argumentation, and are interested in either issues of life and death, or the foundations of morality, it's a must read Harry Brighouse, Out of the Crooked Timber Benatar's discussion is clear and intelligent. Yujin Nagasawa MIND [this] volume has the great merit of raising a very basic issue (the intrinsic value of human existence), which is usually assumed but rarely discussed in philosophical terms. Thus, it may be hoped that this book will encourage a thoughtful and rich exchange of ideas on such a fundamental question. Roberto Andorno, Medical Health Care and Philosophy Journal
About the Author
David Benatar is at University of Cape Town.
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166 of 176 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars
Moral philosophy at its best: intelligent, controversial and brutally honest
March 25, 2008
By Philonous
Format:Hardcover
In this remarkable book, the South African philosopher David Benatar attempts to solve, in a most unusual way, some related moral problems concerning matters of life and death. Benatar claims, inter alia, that deliberate procreation is immoral; that abortion is morally mandatory if possible before approximately 30 weeks of gestation; and that the morally optimal size of the human population is ZERO. On the face of it, this may strike the reader as absurd, or even insane, but Benatar is most certainly not a madman, as any reader who gives this book a fair chance will soon acknowledge.
The above-mentioned conclusions all follow more or less straightforwardly from Benatar's main thesis, which is almost literally expressed in the title of the book: For any conscious being (whether human or non-human) it would have been better never to exist, since coming into being is always an overall harm, and thus worse than non-existence, for that being (though not necessarily for other already existing beings, e.g. parents and siblings). Benatar argues for this astounding thesis by drawing attention to an alleged asymmetry between pain and pleasure (both understood broadly): Non-existence implies the absence of both pains and pleasures, but whereas the absence of the pains is something good, it is not the case that the absence of the pleasures is bad or something to be deplored. A potential person is not deprived of anything, claims Benatar, by not being brought into existence.
Some immediate, but confused, objections can be dismissed easily. One example is the objection that life must be an overall good for a person, unless that person is willing to commit suicide. Benatar is at pains to point out the important distinction between judging that a possible life should not be started and judging that an actual life should not be continued. Thus, Benatar's argument does not commit him to the view that we are morally obligated to kill ourselves and/or each other. On the contrary, he quite explicitly denounces such a view (chapter 7), but this is, strangely, lost on several of the book's reviewers.
But is the alleged asymmetry a real asymmetry or only an apparent one? Benatar's argument for the reality of the asymmetry is a lot stronger than many will admit, but it is not quite as strong as he himself seems to think. At bottom, Benatar's argument is a coherence argument: Unless we accept the asymmetry, we cannot make sense of some of our other deeply held convictions, most notable, perhaps, the conviction that "while there is a duty to avoid bringing suffering people into existence, there is no duty to bring happy people into being" (p. 32). However, an argument of this kind is obviously double-edged and able to cut both ways. An opponent might be willing to bite the bullet and, while rejecting asymmetry, accept that we DO have a duty to bring happy people into being. Benatar is aware of this possibility but dismisses it because he thinks it is based on the assumption that people only have derivative value as "mere means to the production of happiness" (p. 37). This, however, is much too quick. The (imaginary) opponent does not need to absurdly abstract the happiness from the person and see the latter as being nothing but a necessary condition, without any inherent value, for the existence of the former. Rather, the question is whether a happy person, considered as a whole, has intrinsic positive value seen from the moral point of view. If this is the case, as I think it is, then it might reasonably be claimed that the possible existence of a happy person provides us with a moral reason to (try to) bring that possible person into existence. But this moral reason is, of course, by no means decisive. It might be overruled by other moral reasons pointing in the opposite direction, e.g. the reasons provided by any kind of pain experienced by the possible person, in case he/she is given life.
This latter observation is important, because it means that Benatar's substantive conclusions might be correct even if we reject his claims about the alleged asymmetry. It might be the case that most, or even all, lives as a matter of fact contain more bad than can be compensated for by the actual amount of good in those lives, and exactly this view, a kind of fall back position, is what Benatar defends in the most interesting chapter of the book (chapter 3). Drawing on empirical research in social psychology, Benatar builds a strong argument to the effect that people are unreliable judges when assessing the quality of their own lives. He proceeds to show, in my opinion rather convincingly, that the quality of most people's lives is actually very bad, and that this is the case whether one adopts a hedonistic, a preference-theoretical, or an objective account of the nature of "the Good". Whether we like it or not, we do have many moral reasons, certainly more than most people realize, to STOP bringing new people into existence. Anyone who thinks that these reasons can be trumped by moral reasons for procreation has a big philosophical task on his/her hands.
Generally, the book is an easy read, thanks to the clarity of Benatar's exposition of the problems, the theories, and the arguments presented. One important upside of this is that readers without an education in philosophy should be able to learn a lot from Benatar's stimulating discussion. Unfortunately, not many will. Benatar is under no illusions that his readers will accept his stance or at least consider his arguments without much prejudice. This is a pity, because neither dubious appeals to common sense nor unfair arguments ad hominem will make Benatar's arguments bad and his conclusions false, contrary to what some of this book's reviewers seem to be thinking. Just as reciting the Lord's Prayer cannot refute Atheism, a rational refutation of Benatar, if possible, must be based on some serious philosophical work.
Lest wishful thinking should completely guide our actions and determine our conception of morality, philosophy should always challenge our most fundamental assumptions, and it should do so rationally, honestly, without self-deception or fear of the truth. In this work Benatar satisfies these desiderata, and that is why "Better Never to Have Been" merits attention. It deserves to be read and thought about carefully and with an open mind, and it deserves to be discussed in a serious, fair and intelligent manner. It is a very important book.
The above-mentioned conclusions all follow more or less straightforwardly from Benatar's main thesis, which is almost literally expressed in the title of the book: For any conscious being (whether human or non-human) it would have been better never to exist, since coming into being is always an overall harm, and thus worse than non-existence, for that being (though not necessarily for other already existing beings, e.g. parents and siblings). Benatar argues for this astounding thesis by drawing attention to an alleged asymmetry between pain and pleasure (both understood broadly): Non-existence implies the absence of both pains and pleasures, but whereas the absence of the pains is something good, it is not the case that the absence of the pleasures is bad or something to be deplored. A potential person is not deprived of anything, claims Benatar, by not being brought into existence.
Some immediate, but confused, objections can be dismissed easily. One example is the objection that life must be an overall good for a person, unless that person is willing to commit suicide. Benatar is at pains to point out the important distinction between judging that a possible life should not be started and judging that an actual life should not be continued. Thus, Benatar's argument does not commit him to the view that we are morally obligated to kill ourselves and/or each other. On the contrary, he quite explicitly denounces such a view (chapter 7), but this is, strangely, lost on several of the book's reviewers.
But is the alleged asymmetry a real asymmetry or only an apparent one? Benatar's argument for the reality of the asymmetry is a lot stronger than many will admit, but it is not quite as strong as he himself seems to think. At bottom, Benatar's argument is a coherence argument: Unless we accept the asymmetry, we cannot make sense of some of our other deeply held convictions, most notable, perhaps, the conviction that "while there is a duty to avoid bringing suffering people into existence, there is no duty to bring happy people into being" (p. 32). However, an argument of this kind is obviously double-edged and able to cut both ways. An opponent might be willing to bite the bullet and, while rejecting asymmetry, accept that we DO have a duty to bring happy people into being. Benatar is aware of this possibility but dismisses it because he thinks it is based on the assumption that people only have derivative value as "mere means to the production of happiness" (p. 37). This, however, is much too quick. The (imaginary) opponent does not need to absurdly abstract the happiness from the person and see the latter as being nothing but a necessary condition, without any inherent value, for the existence of the former. Rather, the question is whether a happy person, considered as a whole, has intrinsic positive value seen from the moral point of view. If this is the case, as I think it is, then it might reasonably be claimed that the possible existence of a happy person provides us with a moral reason to (try to) bring that possible person into existence. But this moral reason is, of course, by no means decisive. It might be overruled by other moral reasons pointing in the opposite direction, e.g. the reasons provided by any kind of pain experienced by the possible person, in case he/she is given life.
This latter observation is important, because it means that Benatar's substantive conclusions might be correct even if we reject his claims about the alleged asymmetry. It might be the case that most, or even all, lives as a matter of fact contain more bad than can be compensated for by the actual amount of good in those lives, and exactly this view, a kind of fall back position, is what Benatar defends in the most interesting chapter of the book (chapter 3). Drawing on empirical research in social psychology, Benatar builds a strong argument to the effect that people are unreliable judges when assessing the quality of their own lives. He proceeds to show, in my opinion rather convincingly, that the quality of most people's lives is actually very bad, and that this is the case whether one adopts a hedonistic, a preference-theoretical, or an objective account of the nature of "the Good". Whether we like it or not, we do have many moral reasons, certainly more than most people realize, to STOP bringing new people into existence. Anyone who thinks that these reasons can be trumped by moral reasons for procreation has a big philosophical task on his/her hands.
Generally, the book is an easy read, thanks to the clarity of Benatar's exposition of the problems, the theories, and the arguments presented. One important upside of this is that readers without an education in philosophy should be able to learn a lot from Benatar's stimulating discussion. Unfortunately, not many will. Benatar is under no illusions that his readers will accept his stance or at least consider his arguments without much prejudice. This is a pity, because neither dubious appeals to common sense nor unfair arguments ad hominem will make Benatar's arguments bad and his conclusions false, contrary to what some of this book's reviewers seem to be thinking. Just as reciting the Lord's Prayer cannot refute Atheism, a rational refutation of Benatar, if possible, must be based on some serious philosophical work.
Lest wishful thinking should completely guide our actions and determine our conception of morality, philosophy should always challenge our most fundamental assumptions, and it should do so rationally, honestly, without self-deception or fear of the truth. In this work Benatar satisfies these desiderata, and that is why "Better Never to Have Been" merits attention. It deserves to be read and thought about carefully and with an open mind, and it deserves to be discussed in a serious, fair and intelligent manner. It is a very important book.
42 of 46 people found the following review helpful
By J. Fh
Format:Hardcover|Amazon Verified Purchase
Applied Ethics. Very argumentative. Benatar has caused turmoil in some philosophical circles. He's been read by people in Cambridge, Oxford, Princeton and other great knowledge centers. His ideas are indeed a threat to many of our naive assumptions. He criticizes common moral conclusions using premises that are generally accepted. He assumes for example that the reader agrees that:
1) it is wrong to bring someone into the world if that is going to cause that person too much pain.
e.g. If you are sure that person is going to have AIDS or live in extreme poverty, so that she will suffer an immensely excruciating pain.
He, then, argues that:
2) All lives, even the best ones are very bad. So you know, for sure, that by bringing someone to life, that person is going to suffer so much pain. Far more than pleasure.
3) Therefore, it is wrong to procreate.
Further conclusions:
In this line of thought, abortion, for instance, in the early stages of pregnancy is not only right, but morally mandatory. In addition, he establishes a very important difference between "lives worth continuing" and "lives worth starting", arguing that we are not morally obliged to kill ourselves. Absolutely not. But since by bringing someone into life I will expose this person to serious harm, it is best not to bring anyone into life.
Arguments to defend 2:
1) Pleasures and the hedonistic project are condemned to defeat, since any pleasures you have will not be able to undo the pain you will necessarily suffer.
2) Pain is part of the structure of the world and by bringing someone into life you are, ipso facto, exposing that person to serious harm. We entirely overlook the daily discomforts of daily life, even though they are so pervasive. Even the best lives are very bad, because our pleasures or moments of desire fulfillment are so few compared to the common negative states we constantly experience everyday. And this, in a healthy common life, not to say someone who has a terminal disease or something worse.
3) Happiness is but a temporary absence of suffering, satisfaction is the ephemeral fulfillment of desire.
e.g. After one has eaten or taken liquid, bowel and bladder discomfort ensues quite naturally and we have to seek relief. There are moments or even periods of satisfaction, but they occur against a background of dissatisfied striving.
All that said, if you had never existed, you would not feel pain, nor die everyday, constantly, bit by bit. Therefore, someone who hasn't been brought to life, who technically isn't even a person yet, is in clear advantage to someone who came into being. Ergo, it is wrong to bring someone to life.
I believe this book will become a philosophical classic, probably not as much as Nagel's Mortal Questions, but perhaps something close to it. He's certainly an author I liked to read. His book is very clear. It is important to mention that he does not assume prior philosophical knowledge from the reader and that the book is very concise.
I highly recommend it.
I sincerely hope my review was of some aid. Please don't forget to vote in case this review was helpful to you.
1) it is wrong to bring someone into the world if that is going to cause that person too much pain.
e.g. If you are sure that person is going to have AIDS or live in extreme poverty, so that she will suffer an immensely excruciating pain.
He, then, argues that:
2) All lives, even the best ones are very bad. So you know, for sure, that by bringing someone to life, that person is going to suffer so much pain. Far more than pleasure.
3) Therefore, it is wrong to procreate.
Further conclusions:
In this line of thought, abortion, for instance, in the early stages of pregnancy is not only right, but morally mandatory. In addition, he establishes a very important difference between "lives worth continuing" and "lives worth starting", arguing that we are not morally obliged to kill ourselves. Absolutely not. But since by bringing someone into life I will expose this person to serious harm, it is best not to bring anyone into life.
Arguments to defend 2:
1) Pleasures and the hedonistic project are condemned to defeat, since any pleasures you have will not be able to undo the pain you will necessarily suffer.
2) Pain is part of the structure of the world and by bringing someone into life you are, ipso facto, exposing that person to serious harm. We entirely overlook the daily discomforts of daily life, even though they are so pervasive. Even the best lives are very bad, because our pleasures or moments of desire fulfillment are so few compared to the common negative states we constantly experience everyday. And this, in a healthy common life, not to say someone who has a terminal disease or something worse.
3) Happiness is but a temporary absence of suffering, satisfaction is the ephemeral fulfillment of desire.
e.g. After one has eaten or taken liquid, bowel and bladder discomfort ensues quite naturally and we have to seek relief. There are moments or even periods of satisfaction, but they occur against a background of dissatisfied striving.
All that said, if you had never existed, you would not feel pain, nor die everyday, constantly, bit by bit. Therefore, someone who hasn't been brought to life, who technically isn't even a person yet, is in clear advantage to someone who came into being. Ergo, it is wrong to bring someone to life.
I believe this book will become a philosophical classic, probably not as much as Nagel's Mortal Questions, but perhaps something close to it. He's certainly an author I liked to read. His book is very clear. It is important to mention that he does not assume prior philosophical knowledge from the reader and that the book is very concise.
I highly recommend it.
I sincerely hope my review was of some aid. Please don't forget to vote in case this review was helpful to you.
27 of 38 people found the following review helpful
Format:Paperback|Amazon Verified Purchase
Insightful, intelligent, and honest. This book is the handiwork of a true libertarian and is the definitive work on the subject of antinatalism thus far. It can be somewhat tedious at times. However, due to the nature of the subject matter and the magnitude of the possible outcomes (vast amounts of harm), repetition of the message is necessary.
Dr. Benatar successfully (in my opinion) exposes the true nature of the human ego and reveals it as veiled megalomania. Human beings seem to have cold indifference to those they "love", treating them as possessions and mere means rather than as sovereign individuals... and this phenomenon extends to non-humans as well. This book is a wonderful read if you are already seasoned in philosophy, or just starting out.
Remember to push your ego aside when you read this book. Do not simply dismiss it on an emotional whim.
"If children were brought into the world by an act of pure reason alone, would the human race continue to exist? Would not a man rather have so much sympathy with the coming generation as to spare it the burden of existence? Or at any rate not take it upon himself to impose that burden upon it in cold blood." Arthur Schopenhauer
Dr. Benatar successfully (in my opinion) exposes the true nature of the human ego and reveals it as veiled megalomania. Human beings seem to have cold indifference to those they "love", treating them as possessions and mere means rather than as sovereign individuals... and this phenomenon extends to non-humans as well. This book is a wonderful read if you are already seasoned in philosophy, or just starting out.
Remember to push your ego aside when you read this book. Do not simply dismiss it on an emotional whim.
"If children were brought into the world by an act of pure reason alone, would the human race continue to exist? Would not a man rather have so much sympathy with the coming generation as to spare it the burden of existence? Or at any rate not take it upon himself to impose that burden upon it in cold blood." Arthur Schopenhauer
Most Recent Customer Reviews
5.0 out of 5 stars
Important and original
Benatar presents a surprising, original argument on a topic that has not been adequately addressed since the recent-ish invention of effective birth control and safe abortion. Read more
Published 1 day ago by glorified lungfish
4.0 out of 5 stars
Somwhat confused
While being a thoroughly interesting and challenging read, I was consistently bothered by one point. Read more
Published 1 month ago by purplebongos
5.0 out of 5 stars
Brilliant, compassionate, intelligent book
It is a rare to find someone with extraordinary perceptive abilities to be fully aware of what existence means and how much suffering it entails and furthermore to put their own... Read more
Published 1 month ago by stopohno
5.0 out of 5 stars
He says what no one else has the guts to say
Excellent read about the harsh realities of our existence and what we should do about it. He takes an intellectually arrogant tone against breeders and optimists, who either put no... Read more
Published 2 months ago by Eric
1.0 out of 5 stars
art for the sake of art
It was recommended to me by someone...then I've realized that the person who recommended it to me had a problem... Read more
Published 2 months ago by Matata
4.0 out of 5 stars
The Book That Sold Me On Antinatalism
I absolutely love this book. It was recommended to me by a fellow childfree friend and I just had to check it out. Read more
Published 4 months ago by Bagpipe Player
1.0 out of 5 stars
"Abject Failure of a Book!" Says fellow Anti-natalist
DO NOT BUY THIS BOOK.
Regardless of philosophical stance, either pro or con, yes or no to life, DO NOT BUY THIS BOOK. Read more
Regardless of philosophical stance, either pro or con, yes or no to life, DO NOT BUY THIS BOOK. Read more
Published 4 months ago by Paul E. Lovrien
1.0 out of 5 stars
Retarded Beyond Words
This is the dumbest book I've ever had the misfortune of reading a part of. Anyone who thinks this book is valid should get some guts and kill themselves. Read more
Published 7 months ago by D. Kelley
5.0 out of 5 stars
Courageous
David Benatar is a philosopher. This book on natalism and his later work on sexism against males (The Second Sexism) are precisely what a public abused by rhetoric about "planned... Read more
Published 10 months ago by Hu(man)
1.0 out of 5 stars
I couldn't agree more:
I would indeed be suffering less at this moment if David Benatar had never existed. So did I understand the argument, and is the prize for that eternal oblivion...?
Published 12 months ago by Expat Mommy
Citations (learn more)
This book cites 55
books:
See all 55 books this book cites
- Reasons and Persons (Oxford Paperbacks) by Derek Parfit on 19 pages
- Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society by Ronald Inglehart on 5 pages
- Practical Ethics by Peter Singer on page 33, page 202, and Back Matter
- Death by Government by R. J. Rummel on page 90, page 91, and Back Matter
- The World As Will and Representation, In Two Volumes: Vol. I by Arthur Schopenhauer on page 76, page 89, and Back Matter
See all 55 books this book cites
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