Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence [Paperback]

David Benatar (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: September 15, 2008 | ISBN-10: 0199549265 | ISBN-13: 978-0199549269

Most people believe that they were either benefited or at least not harmed by being brought into existence. Thus, if they ever do reflect on whether they should bring others into existence---rather than having children without even thinking about whether they should---they presume that they do them no harm. Better Never to Have Been challenges these assumptions. David Benatar argues that coming into existence is always a serious harm. Although the good things in one's life make one's life go better than it otherwise would have gone, one could not have been deprived by their absence if one had not existed. Those who never exist cannot be deprived. However, by coming into existence one does suffer quite serious harms that could not have befallen one had one not come into existence. Drawing on the relevant psychological literature, the author shows that there are a number of well-documented features of human psychology that explain why people systematically overestimate the quality of their lives and why they are thus resistant to the suggestion that they were seriously harmed by being brought into existence. The author then argues for the 'anti-natal' view---that it is always wrong to have children---and he shows that combining the anti-natal view with common pro-choice views about foetal moral status yield a "pro-death" view about abortion (at the earlier stages of gestation). Anti-natalism also implies that it would be better if humanity became extinct. Although counter-intuitive for many, that implication is defended, not least by showing that it solves many conundrums of moral theory about population.

Editorial Reviews

Review

This isn't a new book, but it is generating increasing discussion in university departments and elsewhere: hence this review... If you enjoy an ethical challenge, then read this book. Malcolm Torry, Triple Helix For those who admire really careful and imaginative argumentation, and are interested in either issues of life and death, or the foundations of morality, it's a must read Harry Brighouse, Out of the Crooked Timber Benatar's discussion is clear and intelligent. Yujin Nagasawa MIND

About the Author

David Benatar is currently Senior Lecturer in the Philosophy Department at the University of Cape Town, South Africa. He received his Ph.D. from that university, did post-doctoral work at the University of Wisconsin-Madison from 1993 to 1995, and was Visiting Assistant Professor at the College of Charleston, South Carolina, from 1995 until 1997. His teaching and research interests are in moral philosophy and related areas. In 1999 he was awarded the University of Cape Town's Distinguished Teacher Award.

Product Details

• Paperback: 256 pages
• Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA (September 15, 2008)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0199549265
• ISBN-13: 978-0199549269
• Product Dimensions: 5.3 x 0.6 x 7.9 inches
• Shipping Weight: 10.6 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 3.7 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (23 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #438,520 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Most Helpful Customer Reviews

167 of 177 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars Moral philosophy at its best: intelligent, controversial and brutally honest March 25, 2008

By Philonous

Format:Hardcover

In this remarkable book, the South African philosopher David Benatar attempts to solve, in a most unusual way, some related moral problems concerning matters of life and death. Benatar claims, inter alia, that deliberate procreation is immoral; that abortion is morally mandatory if possible before approximately 30 weeks of gestation; and that the morally optimal size of the human population is ZERO. On the face of it, this may strike the reader as absurd, or even insane, but Benatar is most certainly not a madman, as any reader who gives this book a fair chance will soon acknowledge.

The above-mentioned conclusions all follow more or less straightforwardly from Benatar's main thesis, which is almost literally expressed in the title of the book: For any conscious being (whether human or non-human) it would have been better never to exist, since coming into being is always an overall harm, and thus worse than non-existence, for that being (though not necessarily for other already existing beings, e.g. parents and siblings). Benatar argues for this astounding thesis by drawing attention to an alleged asymmetry between pain and pleasure (both understood broadly): Non-existence implies the absence of both pains and pleasures, but whereas the absence of the pains is something good, it is not the case that the absence of the pleasures is bad or something to be deplored. A potential person is not deprived of anything, claims Benatar, by not being brought into existence.

Some immediate, but confused, objections can be dismissed easily. One example is the objection that life must be an overall good for a person, unless that person is willing to commit suicide.... Benatar is at pains to point out the important distinction between judging that a possible life should not be started and judging that an actual life should not be continued. Thus, Benatar's argument does not commit him to the view that we are morally obligated to kill ourselves and/or each other. On the contrary, he quite explicitly denounces such a view (chapter 7), but this is, strangely, lost on several of the book's reviewers.

But is the alleged asymmetry a real asymmetry or only an apparent one? Benatar's argument for the reality of the asymmetry is a lot stronger than many will admit, but it is not quite as strong as he himself seems to think. At bottom, Benatar's argument is a coherence argument: Unless we accept the asymmetry, we cannot make sense of some of our other deeply held convictions, most notable, perhaps, the conviction that "while there is a duty to avoid bringing suffering people into existence, there is no duty to bring happy people into being" (p. 32). However, an argument of this kind is obviously double-edged and able to cut both ways. An opponent might be willing to bite the bullet and, while rejecting asymmetry, accept that we DO have a duty to bring happy people into being. Benatar is aware of this possibility but dismisses it because he thinks it is based on the assumption that people only have derivative value as "mere means to the production of happiness" (p. 37). This, however, is much too quick. The (imaginary) opponent does not need to absurdly abstract the happiness from the person and see the latter as being nothing but a necessary condition, without any inherent value, for the existence of the former. Rather, the question is whether a happy person, considered as a whole, has intrinsic positive value seen from the moral point of view. If this is the case, as I think it is, then it might reasonably be claimed that the possible existence of a happy person provides us with a moral reason to (try to) bring that possible person into existence. But this moral reason is, of course, by no means decisive. It might be overruled by other moral reasons pointing in the opposite direction, e.g. the reasons provided by any kind of pain experienced by the possible person, in case he/she is given life.

This latter observation is important, because it means that Benatar's substantive conclusions might be correct even if we reject his claims about the alleged asymmetry. It might be the case that most, or even all, lives as a matter of fact contain more bad than can be compensated for by the actual amount of good in those lives, and exactly this view, a kind of fall back position, is what Benatar defends in the most interesting chapter of the book (chapter 3). Drawing on empirical research in social psychology, Benatar builds a strong argument to the effect that people are unreliable judges when assessing the quality of their own lives. He proceeds to show, in my opinion rather convincingly, that the quality of most people's lives is actually very bad, and that this is the case whether one adopts a hedonistic, a preference-theoretical, or an objective account of the nature of "the Good". Whether we like it or not, we do have many moral reasons, certainly more than most people realize, to STOP bringing new people into existence. Anyone who thinks that these reasons can be trumped by moral reasons for procreation has a big philosophical task on his/her hands.

Generally, the book is an easy read, thanks to the clarity of Benatar's exposition of the problems, the theories, and the arguments presented. One important upside of this is that readers without an education in philosophy should be able to learn a lot from Benatar's stimulating discussion. Unfortunately, not many will. Benatar is under no illusions that his readers will accept his stance or at least consider his arguments without much prejudice. This is a pity, because neither dubious appeals to common sense nor unfair arguments ad hominem will make Benatar's arguments bad and his conclusions false, contrary to what some of this book's reviewers seem to be thinking. Just as reciting the Lord's Prayer cannot refute Atheism, a rational refutation of Benatar, if possible, must be based on some serious philosophical work.

Lest wishful thinking should completely guide our actions and determine our conception of morality, philosophy should always challenge our most fundamental assumptions, and it should do so rationally, honestly, without self-deception or fear of the truth. In this work Benatar satisfies these desiderata, and that is why "Better Never to Have Been" merits attention. It deserves to be read and thought about carefully and with an open mind, and it deserves to be discussed in a serious, fair and intelligent manner. It is a very important book. Read more ›

42 of 46 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars Philosophy at its best. December 4, 2010

By J. Fh

Format:Hardcover|Amazon Verified Purchase

Applied Ethics. Very argumentative. Benatar has caused turmoil in some philosophical circles. He's been read by people in Cambridge, Oxford, Princeton and other great knowledge centers. His ideas are indeed a threat to many of our naive assumptions. He criticizes common moral conclusions using premises that are generally accepted. He assumes for example that the reader agrees that:

1) it is wrong to bring someone into the world if that is going to cause that person too much pain.
e.g. If you are sure that person is going to have AIDS or live in extreme poverty, so that she will suffer an immensely excruciating pain.

He, then, argues that:

2) All lives, even the best ones are very bad. So you know, for sure, that by bringing someone to life, that person is going to suffer so much pain. Far more than pleasure.

3) Therefore, it is wrong to procreate.

Further conclusions:

In this line of thought, abortion, for instance, in the early stages of pregnancy is not only right, but morally mandatory. In addition, he establishes a very important difference between "lives worth continuing" and "lives worth starting", arguing that we are not morally obliged to kill ourselves. Absolutely not. But since by bringing someone into life I will expose this person to serious harm, it is best not to bring anyone into life.

Arguments to defend 2:

1) Pleasures and the hedonistic project are condemned to defeat, since any pleasures you have will not be able to undo the pain you will necessarily suffer.

2) Pain is part of the structure of the world and by bringing someone into life you are, ipso facto, exposing that person to serious harm.... We entirely overlook the daily discomforts of daily life, even though they are so pervasive. Even the best lives are very bad, because our pleasures or moments of desire fulfillment are so few compared to the common negative states we constantly experience everyday. And this, in a healthy common life, not to say someone who has a terminal disease or something worse.

3) Happiness is but a temporary absence of suffering, satisfaction is the ephemeral fulfillment of desire.
e.g. After one has eaten or taken liquid, bowel and bladder discomfort ensues quite naturally and we have to seek relief. There are moments or even periods of satisfaction, but they occur against a background of dissatisfied striving.

All that said, if you had never existed, you would not feel pain, nor die everyday, constantly, bit by bit. Therefore, someone who hasn't been brought to life, who technically isn't even a person yet, is in clear advantage to someone who came into being. Ergo, it is wrong to bring someone to life.

I believe this book will become a philosophical classic, probably not as much as Nagel's Mortal Questions, but perhaps something close to it. He's certainly an author I liked to read. His book is very clear. It is important to mention that he does not assume prior philosophical knowledge from the reader and that the book is very concise.

I highly recommend it.

I sincerely hope my review was of some aid. Please don't forget to vote in case this review was helpful to you. Read more ›

27 of 38 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars Breaking parochial borders March 21, 2010

By Garrett Temple

Format:Paperback|Amazon Verified Purchase

Insightful, intelligent, and honest. This book is the handiwork of a true libertarian and is the definitive work on the subject of antinatalism thus far. It can be somewhat tedious at times. However, due to the nature of the subject matter and the magnitude of the possible outcomes (vast amounts of harm), repetition of the message is necessary.

Dr. Benatar successfully (in my opinion) exposes the true nature of the human ego and reveals it as veiled megalomania. Human beings seem to have cold indifference to those they "love", treating them as possessions and mere means rather than as sovereign individuals... and this phenomenon extends to non-humans as well. This book is a wonderful read if you are already seasoned in philosophy, or just starting out.

Remember to push your ego aside when you read this book. Do not simply dismiss it on an emotional whim.

"If children were brought into the world by an act of pure reason alone, would the human race continue to exist? Would not a man rather have so much sympathy with the coming generation as to spare it the burden of existence? Or at any rate not take it upon himself to impose that burden upon it in cold blood." Arthur Schopenhauer

17 of 24 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars Don't Have Children - It's Immoral December 29, 2010

By Can't Think of a Good Pen Name

Format:Paperback

A devastating critique of people's intuitive feeling that bearing children is a morally unproblematic enterprise. Never shrill or hasty in reaching his conclusions, Professor Benatar calmly and systematically lays out his arguments and anticipates and reacts to all feasible counter arguments in a manner that suggests he ruminated on these issues for a considerable amount of time and with a clarity of thought that is lacking in most people's ideas about these highly important issues. He never resorts to appeals to emotion or ad-hominim attacks (as many of his opponents seem to do) and he uses no red herrings or other intellectual sleights of hand in order to lend credence to his views. The thrust of his argument is that as:

i) non-existent people are not deprived of the goods in life (happiness, joy, elation et cetera)
ii) non-existent people never suffer or feel any distress and
iii) even the most charmed of lives contain inevitable degrees of pain and suffering

there is an imbalance between the value of being born as opposed to the value of never having come into existence. As long as you accept the three premises above (and Benatar provides more than ample reasons for doing so) one is inexorably led to the conclusion that life confers no advantage over non-existence whilst non-existence DOES confer an advantage over existence. My hat off to you, Mr Benatar sir, this should be compulsory reading for every school student in the world! But of course his compassionate words of wisdom will fall on deaf ears for the most part...."Why don't you off yourself if life is so bad you pessimistic weirdo" the less eloquently spoken rabble might inquire of Benatar. However, making this kind of attack would be to really miss the point of his argument.... Would you like me to elaborate? If so, I cordially invite you to read this seminal work and see where his arguments take you. 5 stars! Read more ›