Customer Reviews

A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and the Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam

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3 star:		(9)
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1 star:		(9)

 

 

Author Lewis Sorley has done all Americans, especially Vietnam veterans, a service by producing this meticulously researched, balanced study of the Vietnam War's final (post-Westmoreland) years. I served almost four years in Vietnam between January 1971 and the fall of Saigon on 30 April 1975. I rarely review books about the war because too many of them evoke the sentiment, "If that was Vietnam, where was I?" But as one who fought the Vietcong guerrillas and struggled to ferret out their shadow government, who felt the fury of the NVA's 1972 Easter Offensive, and who ultimately left Vietnam on a marine helicopter from the embassy roof, I can say without qualification that author Sorley has got it right. He is on the mark when he points out the success of Cambodian sanctuary raids in 1970 and the long-overdue, successful emphasis on pacification pushed by General Abrams and Ambassador Bunker. He is equally correct in his statement that, by late 1972, it was our war to lose as Hanoi's legions faltered in disarray in the wake of the 13-division attack on South Vietnam that had been launched to bolster sagging revolutionary morale in the South. I served in a province that, under the Westmoreland strategy, was a revolutionary hotbed, where a simple trip to pick up the mail was an invitation to ambush. When Abrams, Colby, Vann, and Bunker got their hands on the throttle, this same province became a different place, with significant increases in security, massive morale problems and defections among the Vietcong cadre who had once ruled the countryside, and a significant economic upturn. This was the Vietnam of Sorley's "Better War." Sadly, as some of the reviews of this fine work demonstrate, the truth about that tragic war is too painful to some aging, unreconstructed members of the antiwar movement, some of whom cannot, 25 years later, admit that their love affair with the feisty Vietcong was misplaced, or that their country's men and women in arms had sown the seeds of victory under General Abrams. Bravo Sorley!

We have been repeating certain truisms ad nauseum for the past twenty five years: "It was a civil war"; "The South Vietnamese fought reluctantly"; "The North Vietnamese fought a popular war"; "US tactics were ineffective." The Vietnam War has become a cliché in our historical memory.

Lewis Sorley deflates each and every one of these truisms and helps to tell the real and much more tragic story of the Vietnam War. Through a thorough analysis of America's command strategy under Abrams he shows how Americans came to understand the war as it was and fought much more effectively. Sorley's experience as a military historian helps him to explain the course of the war on the battlefield, particularly the outcome of the Easter Invasion. Lacking the leftist biases of many Vietnam War historians also allows him to discuss the unsavory side of the Communist struggle - and the fact that they were just as dependent on their patrons as South Vietnam was on us. Additionally, his use of Communist sources details just how effectively the Allies fought after 1968.

I picked up this book believing that we should have stayed out of Vietnam. I put it down feeling that our abandonment of the South was perhaps the most profound act of cowardice in American history. Sorley's book captures the tragedy of this abandonment - and the lost possibilities for millions of South Vietnamese, Laotians, and Cambodians, too many of whom did not survive long after the "liberation".

As one who served two tours with the 1st Air Cavalry Division in Vietnam, I concur with Dr. Sorley's thesis that we won the Vietnam War and then let the victory slip through our fingers by not living up to the pledges we made to the South Vietnamese Government. But there were earlier opportunties to have won a military victory as well. If we had been allowed to pursue the NVA in Cambodia right after the first and second battles of the Ia Drang in 1965 and 1966, respectively, we could have forced Hanoi to the negotiating table much earlier. While I too hold the late, great General Creighton Abrams and his approach to Vietnamization of the war in high regard, I think General Westmoreland deserves equal respect. If General Westmoreland had been given the geographical latitude he needed to prosecute a war of annihiltion, Westy would not have been forced to fight a war of attrition -- something Americans do not fight well at all. Nevertheless, Dr. Sorley brings to this book the same kind of dogged and thorough research that he brings to all of his writings. Clearly, a five-star addition to my personal library Wm. Hamilton, Ph.D.

"A Better War" is one of two best books about the second half of the American military's involvement in Vietnam (1969-1973). It deals with the Vietnamization of the war, focusing on General Abrams' "clear and hold" approach as opposed to "search and destroy" tactics by General Westmoreland. I am biased because my father had served in the South Vietnamese military and this book is the ONLY work I could find that provides the facts, the successes and failures of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN).
After running on a platform to end the protracted conflict, Nixon won the Oval Office at the height of the war in 1968. National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger began direct secret negotiations with the North Vietnamese behind the Saigon government's back.
In 1965 the United States had taken over conduct of the war, with troop strength peaking at 560,000. Before that, the South Vietnamese had fought the brewing war themselves, with the help of American advisers who were first dispatched by President John F. Kennedy. South Vietnam also had a young but capable air force, along with a navy, Airborne troops, Rangers and Marines.
The South Vietnamese military hurriedly expanded its capabilities with the goal of replicating the military philosophy, tactics and structure of their great ally. Unfortunately, this meant inheriting the associated cost, complexity and continued dependence on the United States.
South Vietnam's military was tested in the biggest battles of the war, larger than anything U.S. ground troops had faced in previous years: Lam Son 719 (the incursion into Laos), the Easter Offensive (the largest battle of the war and one where the South Vietnamese withstood a 120,000-man assault, albeit with the help of U.S. advisers and air power), and the final offensive by the North in 1975.
In January 1973, the Paris Peace Accords were signed; Kissinger took home the Nobel Peace Prize while his co-recipient and North Vietnamese counterpart rightfully declined. Three key provisions (or concessions) in the accords would contribute to the fall of Saigon. First, the North Vietnamese were allowed to keep 150,000 soldiers in the south. Second, the United States would retaliate if North Vietnam violated the accords. Finally, and most important, the United States would continue to aid South Vietnam unconditionally. The latter two provisions would never happen.
America's withdrawal from Vietnam took place over four years. Two years later Saigon fell to a modern army, armed to the teeth with the latest Soviet-bloc weaponry.
Had the war continued, one thing was certain about Vietnamization--the killing and dying would only be borne by Vietnamese, including those from my generation.

I am writing in response to the many critical reviews of this book, as to the actual book. Many reviewers call this revisionist history, and claim that Lewis Sorley's admiration for General Abrams biases the work. Sorley is obviously a great fan of General Abrams, but hey, most people who knew him were fans of his. He was a great soldier, leader, and General. I studied guerrilla warfare before I went to Vietnam (1966-1967). I was part of the Westmoreland multi-battalion offensive actions against the communist forces. I returned to Vietnam (1970-1971) to experience the Abrams emphasis on population security and control. Both type operations are necessary to successfully win a guerrilla war, but Abrams emphasis was clearly the better long term strategy. I suspect that most of the critical comments about this book are written by those most against America's presence in Vietnam. I my opinion, Sorley speaks the truth here. He has done a masterful job of presenting the way the war was fought after the 1968 Tet offensive. Like it or not, that is the way it really was. It is a story that not enough people have heard.

"A Better War" is a good book, and, surprisingly at this late date, one that needed to be written. It had flaws, however, and I can't help but imagine that his editors could have served Mr. Sorley better.

For example, I agree with some of the other reviewers that the use of italics in quotations from recordings of General Abrams made the process of reading the book less than smooth. While the technique imparts some information, it was, in my reading, difficult to wade through.

All in all, however, the book's thesis is unassailable. The performance of the U.S. Military in Vietnam was impressive and, within the guidelines created for it by the civilian leadership in Washington, incredibly successful. By the end of American involvement, South Vietnam was a nation, viable and remarkably secure given the efforts of the North and it's allies to destroy it. Had the United States insisted upon the North's compliance with the agreements they made, South Vietnam would be with us today, as would millions of Vietnamese, Laotian and Cambodian victims of communism.

Whether or not Mr. Sorley adequately treats the beliefs, predictions and arguments of the war's opponents casts no shadow on this undeniable fact. Nor was it his intention to explicate all of the arguments for or against American involvement in the war. Mr. Sorley's point is that South Vietnam did not fall because the American and South Vietnamese military could not win an "unwinnable" war. South Vietnam fell because of the failure of the United States to live up to the promises it made to provide aid to a sovereign ally in its defense against aggression from a Soviet client state.

Is it too much to ask that, after 25 years, even those of us who opposed the war at the time face the facts? "A Better War" gives us an opportunity to come clean and finally learn the "lesson of Vietnam."

The negative reviews you read here, while no doubt sincere, are written by people who have rejected the conclusions of this book before they read a single word between the covers. Critical reading of this work may well uncover a bias by the author, but read through that to the facts below and you will draw the same conclusions that the author drew - unless you've rejected them prior to the reading. This work adds immeasurably to understanding a period of our history that has been glossed over by those who seek an easy answer to what happened in South East Asia. I would also recommend Dereliction of Duty to understand the critical 1964 to 1965 period and Stolen Valor for insight into the many myths that have promulgated since the war's end.

I started reading this book prior to 11 September 2001 and just finished it. If for no other reason, this book should be read and examined in light of the recent mobilization of Reserves and deployment of service members to participate in the campaign against terrorism. It is clear to me that members of the Armed Services will be called upon to fight enemies that include both state and non-state actors that have the capability to cause immense harm to U.S. interests within this country and abroad.
I have suffered through numerous editorials that proclaim the best U.S. strategy, most by people who couldn't lead a cow to pasture. Few seem to realize what it takes to mount a serious campaign and the level of intelligence and foresight that is required from all facets of government to properly execute actions across the spectrum of government power. This book highlights the constraints faced during the Vietnam War and the remarkable job that was done without the help of anyone on U.S. soil.
A clear case is made within the book that several elements of our national power were never adequately employed. In fact, the diplomatic, informational, military and economic facets of our national power actually fought AGAINST each other.
Prior to 11 September 2001, the American government had been waging an ineffective fight against terrorism. Much like Vietnam, it was not a fight that the American public backed to any significant degree. Unlike Vietnam, it was not one that people protested against, the Congress fought against or the media attempted to subvert to prove their "credibility". Within hours after the attack on the U.S., this changed.
So how is this book relevant to today? The problems that we faced in conducting the war in Vietnam will be faced again as we prosecute this campaign. There is no pure diplomatic, informational, military or economic solution to the problem. All must share in the planning and the execution to understand the affects of each action. Today's military leadership has learned some hard lesons through the past 50 years. Sorley states, "every military leader is taught early on to make what is called an 'estimate of the situation,' the heart of which is consideration of what enemy course of action might be provoked by various friendly courses of action, with similar calculations performed for a range of alternative courses of action. Such calculations are the essence of modern wargaming as well, and often have significant impact on how the commander uses the force at his disposal." The difference today is that the military leadership understands that each application of military power will impact on the other elements of power and all must be combined to find the best course of action and to be prepared for the enemy response.
In addition, at least temporarily, the American public, Congress and media are solidly behind the President as he begins the campaign. Can it be maintained?

The fact that Sorley's reviewers are so strongly pro or con must mean he's on to something. I'm not an expert, but have read many books on Vietnam, including both of McNamara's. This book differs from the great majority of Vietnam books by concentrating on the later years of the war. Sorley's assertion that by 1972 90-some percent of the countryside was under RVN control is a key point of the book. I look forward to the judgment of other scholars on this point. But no matter how much RVN controlled, the most important point Sorley makes is undisputable: the U.S. abandoned South Vietnam after the Paris Accords, breaking promises that we would continue to support them with funding and air power. It is not a proud moment in American history. Sorley's book will be debated for years to come, and, regardless of which "side" you may be on in the ongoing debate, is a must read.

One hundred years ago Captain Alfred Dreyfus was exhonerated from conviction by a French military court that sentenced him to imprisonment on Devil's Island for treason. The reversal was generated by author Emile Zola who believed the honor of France should prevail over other considerations. Sorley performs a service of equal courage today. But traditional roles are reversed: many who opposed US involvement in the Vietnam war, vigorously characterizing our efforts as fascist-equivalent, still cannot let go of the myths. Regardless of facts available since the end of the war, they cling uncritically to the notion that the war was unjust, illegal and immoral. Maybe. And maybe not. Which is what Sorley's book is all about. Maybe there were some Vietmanese who really didn't want to live under a Hanoi-directed dictatorship. Maybe the indigeneous Viet Cong virtually ceased to exist, because they were either killed or converted. Maybe the corruption in South Vietnam wasn't wide-spread. Maybe the Army of South Vietnam was able to take on the North Vietnamese Army, until their ammo ran out. In the end, we cut off all support, while the USSR and China showered their client without restraint. Could the Saigon government have prevailed if the US were equally generous? This book poses such practical and ethical questions. If one's mind is closed, go somewhere else. If one believes that earlier contributions by Averell Harriman and Clark Clifford compensate for their diminished stature during the Vietnam era, this book will certainly offend. But the question lingers: what would Zola say? On a personal note, I was an advisor in Vietnam during the period the book describes. If I knew then what I know now, I would have worked harder and with greater conviction to make our final exit less disgraceful than it was. The Desert Storm victory did not erase the pain of Vietnam. The truth does.