Customer Reviews

Beyond Stalingrad: Manstein and the Operations of Army Group Don (Stackpole Military History Series)

5 star:		(5)
4 star:		(2)
3 star:		(1)
2 star:		(1)
1 star:		(1)

 

 

This book is an excellent source for the operations of Manstein's Army Group Don during the winter of 1942-43 and the spring of 1943. It covers in detail the failed attempt to save the trapped 6th Army in Stalingrad, the terrific defensive battles along the rivers Don, Mius and Donets and, of course, the famous "backhand blow" against the Soviet Southwestern and Voronezh Fronts. It's clear that the author has studied his subject in depth and the bibliography he uses is top notch. Unfortunately there are some annoying spelling errors regarding German names and Soviet place names which persist throughout the book (like Knoblesdorf instead of Knobelsdorf etc.) The maps included are numerous but very crude and there are no photos. In summary, this is a book for the serious student of the Eastern Front rather, than the casual enthusiast of military history.

This is an excellent book in many ways about an Eastern Front campaign that has received very little attention in English historical literature. The results of these battles firmly cement Field Marshal von Manstein as belonging in the ranks of the very best generals of World War II and indeed, military history. Von Mainstein's genius ranks right up there with "Stonewall" Jackson's 1862 Valley Campaign.

My major compliants about about the book concern:

1- It's costs. The book is short--154 pages printed on rather cheap paper and hard binding and it costs anywhere from $80 to $100+ !
Grossly overpriced!
2- The accompaning maps are rather crudely rendered and appear to be hand drawn and hard to follow. Surely the author and publisher could come up a better set of maps that are cross-referenced in the text. An overall map would have rendered the text much clearer. There's not even one or a set of photos that could explain the costs. While the author has produced a useful book about one of the more important campaign's on the Easern Front, this book could have been so much more!

A well done operational anaylsis of a much overlooked battle...the struggle for Southern Russia in the immediate post-Stalingrad period when had the Russians been a little bit better, and the Germans a little bit slower, would have dealt Nazi Germany a crippling blow of Napoleonic proportions, which certainly would have seen the war end sooned than it did.

Based largely on German records, yet they are all PRIMARY records...and were analyzed, dissected, and interwoven into a first rate telling of the battle.

This book is an example of what can be done, and should be done, even if an author is not fortunate enough to have the appropriate Soviet archival records for his study. The German records readily available in the West still have much to offer, & their analysis even in the 21st century, is still a novel contribution to the study of WW2. Don't kid yourselves; the study of the German records is still an unfinished science.

Length:: 5:42 Mins

In order to truly understand German military history in the Second World War one must become familiar with the campaigns of Germany's greatest field commander, Field Marshall Erich von Manstein. This is the only scholarly history I have found which looks exclusively at Manstein's greatest campaign, his command of Army Group Don which held the German line in the East after Stalingrad was surrounded. Truly no other German general could have conducted this running, mobile series of battles with the Soviets but von Manstein. He had nerves of steel and an impeccable sense of timing. More incredible, was that he managed to do this with scratch forces of troops formed from Romanians, Italians, German rear echelon troops, returning wounded all stiffened with a small group of regular German soldiers.


Beyond Stalingrad: Manstein and the Operations of Army Group Don (Stackpole Military History Series)

The sub-title describes the coverage found in this book very well. The author doesn't get deeply involved with the inner workings of the Stalingrad pocket or how it was formed from the Soviet actions of Operation Uranus. The author restrains himself to the actions taken by Manstein and his quickly assembled AG Don as it defends itself from Operation Little Saturn. The author extends his coverage to mid February and will also include Operations Star, Gallop. The author does cover troop dispositions of both sides very well at the time of Manstein's arrival.

This coverage lies in three areas: The shoring up and holding the defensive line on the Don-Chir River line while Hoth tries to relieve and resupply the 6th Army in Stalingrad. Second, Keeping the exit corridor open for Hoth and Paulus to escape. Finally, Manstein also had to protect and keep open the southern Ukraine including the Donets area in order for the AG A to escape the Caucasus. In late January and February, there is much fighting south of the Chir in the Rostov-Voroshilovgrad-Slavyansk area and the author does a superb job of covering it. With the meager resources Manstein had and the tramatic effects of the reversal at Stalingrad, it was a miracle the Germans avoided complete collapse. Escaping defeat can be attributed to Manstein's brillant insight and the above human effort of people like Hollidt, Fretter-Pico and all the Panzer commanders who fought and blunted the superiority of the Soviet assault. Without sufficient infantry, Manstein had to use the panzers as "fire brigades", chasing after each fire the Soviets started. The "Back-hand" counter-offensive at Kharkov, which will set up the Kursk Offensive in July, is also included. Hitler's interference and Paulus's hesitancy to disobey Hitler is also discussed briefly.

All of the key engagements in protecting the Chir line, the Tatsinkaya and other airfields, the railroad line that fed AG Don, as well as the struggles of the relief force moving northeast to link up with Paulus are covered. This coverage includes the towns, terrain features and the units of both participants. Even though the Soviet armies are spelled out with each offensive, this book is clearly German oriented with Manstein the central character. The author has high praise for the Field Marshall, believing that he was probably the best man to save the southern forces from complete destruction. The coverage is concise but descriptive and would be ideal for a newcomer. It would also be good for an old pro as a reference guide.
Another feature that was good was in the last chapter. Throughout the book the author bestowed high praise on Manstein for not only his actions on the battlefield but also how he handled Hitler. Hitler was either in denial or just didn't understand the precarious position his forces were in for he rejected most of Manstein's requests. Hitler made Manstein's job twice as hard. The author covers this conflicted relationship well. In the last chapter he also acknowledges that Manstein had the help of some of the best officers in the Army. Hollidt and Fretter-Pico were outstanding in their defense. There were many other officers who performed well also.

The author provides some simple maps which help but they could have been more professionally drawn. There is a good Bibliography of primary and secondary sources plus an index to assist the reader. The author has really done his homework for there is little that is missing from this book and the Bibliography will confirm this for it has an impressive array of sources.
If this book has stirred your interest in this campaign, this bibliography will help you find other books to read. I would like to suggest David Glantz's "After Stalingrad" which has greater depth and breadth or the two volume set by John Erickson. However if you're looking for a really, really good, informative, easy to follow overview, Mr Sadarananda's book is highly recommended.

this is very well done book especially for some one who has trouble with german and russian words and towns. maybe as i read more the places will come easier. the only problem i had was the maps trying to find places and rivers. that is my fault, but i do plan to read this book again once i learn more. i can see why it took him four years to write this book. Manstein has really been increased in his leadership. the last chapter is probably the best and you see what a great leader he was.

reb 1

The author deserves credit for creating a comprehensive account of the actions of Army Group Don in the wake of the Stalingrad disaster.

Dana Sadarananda has used German records almost exclusively (for good reason) to present the reader with the unfolding campaign in southern USSR in the winter of 1942/1943 as well as the dextrous improvisation of Erich Von Manstein in defending aginst the Soviet juggernaut and then turning the tables on Soviet forces.

The author does a lot of things right. He not only gives the reader a sense of the units involved, the maneuvers, the "sword and shield" tactics used by the Germans during retreat (block here, counterattack there, retreat when advantageous to do so instead of when forced) but also gives the reader a sense of the superiority of German leadership at all levels when time was of the essence and a premium was placed upon those who could think quickly and soundly.

The author makes the reader aware of the realities of combat and the attrition of combat units involved - on both sides. Unlike some authors, Mr. Sadarananda makes the reader aware that the 6th Panzer Div., for example, is down to only thirty tanks and 2400 effectives left! We discover that these German units are only of battlegroup strength, having been worn down by constant combat. The Soviets were in the same state.

The author is able to show not only the effective leadership of Von Manstein (as well as many German officers under him) but also his moral courage in confronting Hitler to wrangle reserves from him. We get a sense of Hitler, who was right just often enough to make him think he knew more than his generals, trying to micromanage every battle and campaign while Von Manstein is able to strongly communicate his point of view clearly enough that he can get what he needs from the distrustful Fuhrer.

The reason I rated this book as only four stars is the quality of the maps. As already noted by other reviewers, they are very poor. The reason this is crucial is the nature of the campaign. This was a fluid campaign in which units advanced hundreds of miles, were shifted hundreds of miles to reinforce, other units moved from sector to sector, other units counterattacked, etc. The distances are so vast that a reader not acquainted with the geography of the region is completely lost in regard to who is moving what, to where, and why.

The author relates the circumstances, actions, reactions well and, although I warn the reader they might get lost at times, it is worth the effort to read this book. I recommend it with four stars.

I don't know what the original hardbound 1990 edition was like, but I advise you to wait for another, better edition of the Stackpole book, "Beyond Stalingrad", by Sadarananda. (copyright 1990, published 2009)

The written material in it actually has a lot of potential,
but the maps are few and bad, to the point that I am frustrated and annoyed, and regard my money as wasted.

The maps appear to be mostly hand drawn, and Stackpole should have had a graphic artist re-work them.
I usually can't tell the roads from the rivers, or from the front line traces, and the nearest map usually doesn't show most of the place names in the text. I'd have thought as simple a method as using different pen points would be useful, but was that done? No!

The few maps there are don't have captions, and really need something like "Situation around _, February 1-15, 1943". They usually don't have legends either.

So unless you have your own medium-scale map library for southern Russia & the Ukraine, take warning:
Reading the stream of place names with little clue as to where they are is like listening to a radio broadcast of a circus performance. It's just not worth the price of admission.

This book gives the armchair historian a true insight into the Stalingrad Battle and its aftermath. The Germans eventually mastered the situation and were able to regain the initiative which culminated in the battle of Kursk. The battle of Russia is portrayed in a very brief simple manner by western historians. However it was the biggest land battle in history. The Germans eventually lost the war, but it should be remembered that the Germans killed 14 million Russian soldiers on the battlefield, destroyed 99 thousand tanks, shot down 122 thousand aircraft and captured 3.5 million Russian soldiers (numbers from the Soviet archives). World War two was decided in Russia. If you have an interest read Guy Sajers book: The forgotten Soldier, his personel account of these battles and of course read General Von Manstiens: Lost Battles. Kurt Seraphine

This book reads like a term paper. It is an interesting period, but the writer is too concerned with footnotes and references. Find another book on the subject.