Customer Reviews

Big Blues: The Unmaking of IBM

5 star:		(7)
4 star:		(4)
3 star:		(0)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(1)

 

 

This book is more about bureaucracy than IBM. It demonstrates just how difficult it is to remain on-the-ball in the face of rapidly advancing technological innovation. It also provides a rare and wonderful insight into the perpetual battle between the creative individual and the second-rate bureaucrat. If you loved Orwell and Kafka you're gonna roll about the floor with this one. More importantly, especially in today's debate over Microsoft, the book clearly demonstrates why a monopoly is impossible within the high-tech industry. After reading this book you will understand Bill Gates and realize just how vulnerable Microsoft really is.

This is a penetrating and often amusing look at the rise and fall of IBM. It's dated, much like any book about computers that was published about seven years ago is obviously expected to be.

If IBM is doing better now, this book might have had something to do with it. Things like corporate hymnals, the ponderous decisionmaking process, and the reasons for the failure of IBM's PS/2 line are all exposed in humiliating detail. As a former retail sales rep for an IBM dealer from 1988-1990, I can tell you that in that time frame the IBM I saw looked a lot like Carroll's portrayal (and completely turned me off about them). This book is worth a search.

This book was published in 1994, but don't hold that against it. It covers a period of IBM history from 1980 to late 1993- from the beginnings of the IBM PC to the end of the John Akers era, when Lou Gerstner became CEO. Gerstner steered the company away from its failing attempts to once again dominate the PC industry, towards services and consulting, and is generally credited with saving IBM from the hole it had dug itself into by the early '90s. If someone were to write this book today, it would likely still wrap things up in 1993.

It starts out with with the story of how the IBM PC came to be, as well as a quick and interesting refresher on IBM itself, from the late 1800s up to 1980. Most people know the general outline of what happened next: the deal with Microsoft for an OS, the phenomenal success of the PC and the XT, the failure of the PC Jr., the rise of the clones, and finally IBM's attempts to reassert itself with OS/2 and MCA (Microchannel Architecture, an ill-fated replacement for the ISA expansion bus used by PCs of the day). This book goes into great detail on all of these topics, from executive decisions down to the engineering teams who were charged with implementing them. I don't know of any other book that gets into this level of detail on this material. It wraps up with the genesis of the PowerPC (a joint venture with Apple and Motorola) and Akers' retirement.

Most computer history books tell this story in a very glossed-over form: IBM was just too big and stupid and arrogant, and scrappy underdogs like Microsoft and Compaq turned the tables on them. This book gets into the nuts and bolts of how and why IBM was unable to keep pace with the PC industry. There were technical reasons, due to the burdensome engineering processes that their PC division inherited from their mainframe division. There were organizational reasons, due more to the democratic nature of IBM than any arrogance or stupidity. Finally, there were just some fundamental misunderstandings at the executive level about what drove the industry.

So, highly recommended if this is something you're interested in learning more about. I'm giving it 4 rather than 5 stars because it can be a little meandering at times. It feels more like a collection of essays than a single tight narrative, and there's some overlap between chapters and jumping around in time. However, it's compelling read if you're as interested in the history of the industry as I am.

People who complain that this book is unfounded because IBM is growing and profitable forgets that over a decade ago, IBM was a stinker: the bottom had fallen out of the lucrative mainframe market, and IBM could not compete long-term in the rapidly growing PC/Workstation market. This book is a great lesson in how not to adapt to change.

Luckily, IBM has pulled itself out, but at what cost? Imagine if IBM had got the PC revolution right? There might not even be a Microsoft today and IBM could have retaken its position as THE corporate super-power.

Besides discussing poor management, I enjoyed the information and great anecdotes about IBM's relationship with Bill Gates and Microsoft. I cannot believe the number of opportunities IBM squandered to acquire, invest or eliminate Microsoft. It seems that IBM pratically pushed Gates to build Microsoft into the power it is today.

I have now read this book twice. Not only have I read the book, I remember this time period as my company worked closely with IBM. One of the other reviewers said, "An amusing book that attributes IBM's success to a couple of lucky business decisions followed by endless blunders. Carroll makes alot of assertions about IBM but provides few facts to back them up..." Obviously, this person either works for IBM or did not know what was going on at that time. What Carroll says is true. Especially if you had ANY ties with IBM during these years, you will find this book fascinating. I have referred back to it many times.

Paul Caroll's years of experience covering IBM and his expertise as a writer really shows in this riveting documentary of IBM. The only problem with the book is that it is out of date. IBM has turned its business around under its present management and is doing quite well.

For anyone interested in IBM's recent history, this is an excellent account. It shows how IBM failed to adapt to the effects of new technology in the 1980's. At the end of this period, Lou Gerstner took over as CEO. If you also read Lou Gerstner's book "Who Says Elephants Can't Dance," you can get some idea how in this archetypal U.S. company, workers were shoved aside for the sake of success after the failure that came to a head in 1993. Lou was ruthless and greedy, but his formula for centralization saved the company for the time being. In the process, workers were exploited to some extent and security disappeared from their lives. I wonder how long this solution will continue to work. I think that an organization that disregards its workers' needs is vulnerable. At least two possibilities exist: the company weakens because of lack of support from its employees or employees get more power by force. The conflict between haves and have-nots damages the business. Dictatorships are unstable.

If you love the tech industry, especially tales of the "golden age" of PCs in the 1980s, you will love this book.

If you manage a company (tech or not) that has a commanding market share lead in its space, you should read this book.

This is practically a manual for what not to do when you are a big company in control of a market. Basically:

1) Don't ignore disruptive technologies thinking that you can use your market share/pricing control to slow adoption

2) Don't make long-term promises to your employees or customers: Business moves so fast that you won't be able to keep them and still be competitive

3) Less is always more when it comes to personnel... Most corporations are hopelessly bloated with people, and this fact alone slows the decision-making process

I'm reading "Who says elephants can't dance" next to see how Gerstner fixes the problems. Perhaps there could be an update to this book that covers the Gerstner turnaround era and includes a bit of the Palmisano years?

Paul Carroll wrote this book as a novell crammed with details and humor. By reading this book we can understand a little bit better how IBM has lost its glamour in the 90's and how Microsoft has became such a powerful company . Moreover, the history acts as a good teacher, showing us why a successful company can go down due to bad management and at the same time, the good decisions that leverages smaller ones in order to achieve global positioning .
Marco Aurelio - Brazil

This very readable book is the model that Gerstner should have followed. Elephants can do heavy towing, or push aside obstacles; they can't pirouette en pointe. This book is the viewpoint of IBM by an outside journalist. It lacks a table of contents. The book describes the problems, it does not tell when or why it originated.

Page 20 says IBM developed "a lush bureaucracy that prided itself on having a higher ratio of managers per employee than any other business around." Is this what they teach in business school? IBM's chairmen came from the sales force; if you can't sell it, there's no point in making it. The IBM PC was created from off-the-shelf parts so it could be quickly marketed; pre-defined interfaces too! Page 24 tells how Microsoft did an operating system: they licensed QDOS (a replica of CP/M), then bought it. It eventually made Gates the richest man in America.

Page 27 tells of the management problem in creating software. Architects spent months producing detailed designs for software. Then masses of programmers had a hard time deciphering the hundreds of pages of specifications. More time was spent in communicating than actually writing code! Isn't this a recipe for a project to be over budget and behind schedule? Estridge's habit of shunning meetings, not returning phone call, and ignoring unwanted advice could set an example of a well-ordered project manager who concentrates on the mission, not the housekeeping. Page 37 explains why standards for PCs began at birth.

Page 53 mentions the "fear of nuclear attack" as the reason for moving out of New York city. But other companies also moved out in the 1970s; the fear of a nuclear attack drained away after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Didn't IBM build a skyscraper in the 1980s only to sell it in the 1990s? Didn't AT&T do the same?

Page 87 tells how Gates got lucky when VisiCorp began to self-destruct. Those familiar with counter-intelligence operations may think of another reason (p.192). Page 97 says IBM never wanted to have too many people in one spot. Unstated here is the fear that nearly all could walk out to a new company (p.186). Page 101 tells that IBM used lines of code as a measure of programming; what did IBM use to measure its management? Microsoft rewrote IBM code to make it faster and smaller, then; how are they doing now? The last pages of Chapter 8 deal with the OS/2-Windows politics. There is no explanation as to why they didn't share the same application interface. Page 201 tells of developing a RISC chip; didn't CDC do this in the early 1960s? Page 208 describes the chip development problem in Burlington VT. Page 217 mentions the "golden screwdriver" and how quickly some machines were upgraded. Think ahead!

Pages 245-7 tell of the PS/1 project: crippled so it would not compete with PS/2. Would General Motors restrict the sale of Chevrolets to sell more Cadillacs? Page 281 suggests Microsoft moles reported on IBM's strategies. Pages 301-9 tell of the changes in Lexington under new owners. In political history, this is like a revolution that sweeps away the aristocracy and lets the farmers and merchants rise to power. Does the description of the IBM bureaucracy remind you of France before the Revolution? Will anyone write a book to cover the last ten years as well as this one does?