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The Bitter Heritage: Vietnam and American Democracy, 1941-1966

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There isn't an argument made today supporting our invasion of Iraq that wasn't made forty years ago in favor of the war in Viet Nam. There isn't a criticism of the war's opponents being offered today that does not echo the positions voiced four decades ago.

Prof. Schlesinger demolishes the war advocates and brilliantly bolsters those who stand up and object to a policy and an administration that is headed 180 degrees in the wrong direction.

Does criticism of the present administration embolden our enemy? (Please see page 9 of the paperback edition.) Are objections to the Iraq war unpatriotic? (Pages 53-55.) Prof. Schlesinger points out "It is hardly prudent for any President to insist on a conception of unity which, on closer examination, means no more than unquestioning acceptance of government policy...Criticism of a war always cheers up the enemy; but I do not recall that any government official admonished Abraham Lincoln to stop criticizing the Mexican War on the ground that it gave aid and comfort to Santa Anna." (Page 118.) And he quotes Secretary McNamara "'This is a nation in which the freedom of dissent is absolutely fundamental.'" (Page 122.)

Does this problem have a military solution? (Page 39.) "'My feeling,' General Wallace Greene, Commandant of the Marine Corps, has wisely said, `is that we could kill every Viet Cong and North Vietnamese in South Vietnam and still lose the war. Unless we can make a success of the civic-action program, we are not going to obtain the objectives we set.'" (Page 48.)

Now this Administration has proposed the "Surge" Strategy. In other words, it's just going to take one more military step [escalation] (pages 31-33). Or, as Prof. Schlesinger summarizes this approach: "The theory, of course, is that widening the war will shorten it."

We've received continued optimistic progress reports and predictions in the face of evidence to the contrary (page 24). Yet the war's advocates suggest the public's perception of failure is the fault of the press (page 26). Indeed, is there a justification for preventive war? (Pages 94-95.) And, once again, we see how a puppet government leverages American support (page 112).

What if the people do not support the present course of action? Each President remains "accountable at the bar of public opinion for every act of this administration." - Andrew Jackson (page 32)

Is world opinion important? (Pages 56-57.) "'An attention to the judgment of other nations is important to every government...'" - James Madison, 63rd Federalist (page 58). "If our credibility is the issue, it is rather more important that other countries believe in our intelligence and responsibility than our passion for over-kill." - Prof. Schlesinger (pages 115-116).

If we leave, is this another "Munich?" "In the years since [World War II], the consciousness of policy-makers has been haunted by the Munich and Yalta analogies - the generalization ...that appeasement always assures new aggression...The multitude of errors committed in the name of `Munich' may exceed the original error of 1938." (Pages 89-92) "There is more respect to be won in the opinion of this world by a resolute and courageous liquidation of unsound positions than by the most stubborn pursuit of extravagant or unpromising objectives." - George Kennan (page 115). There is also the view of Winston Churchill: "I would not sacrifice my own generation to a principal however high or a truth however great." (Page 97.)

We are fighting this war at a frightful financial cost (page 50). And there is "the most serious cost of all - a cost both domestic and foreign: the ebbing away of belief in the American government. It is an irony that a war undertaken to demonstrate the credibility of the American word should end in erosion of confidence in American integrity and purpose." (Page 64.) "...the intensity of the national administration's commitment to the Bill of Rights can make a vital difference." - Prof. Schlesinger (page 117).

Happily, Prof. Schlesinger offers not only history but also hope. In Chapter VIII. ("A Middle Course"): "Are these the only alternatives: disorderly and humiliating withdrawal or enlarging the war? Surely our statesmanship is not yet this bankrupt." (Pages 99-101.)

When this book was published approximately 4,000 US military personnel had lost their lives in Viet Nam. The final tally of the butcher's bill was over twelve times that terrible number. I wish more people had read this in 1967 - and I wish every member of the Senate and House would read it today.

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. is a renowned author and historian. He is currently the Albert Schweitzer Chair in the Humanities, and professor in history at the Graduate School and University Center of the City University of New York. He has written numerous books, including two Pulitzer Prize winners; The Age of Jackson (1946) and A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (1965). His major historical work was The Age of Roosevelt; a three volume set that examined the New Deal. Schlesinger has been active in politics as well, serving as an adviser to Adlai Stevenson and to JFK during their presidential campaigns, and was later appointed a special assistant for Latin-American affairs during the Kennedy administration.

The Vietnam War was one of this country's saddest sagas. Perhaps only during the Civil War did the people of this country so divide amongst themselves. A war thousands of miles away, an unclear goal, and a dishonest government all contributed to this division. A much heralded historical author, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. looked at the unrest and instability, and traced the war back to its roots, all the way back to Franklin Roosevelt's administration from his view in 1967 in The Bitter Heritage: Vietnam and American Democracy 1941-1966.

Schlesinger traces the conflict all the way back to 1941, the first time that Vietnam involved the United States in a conflict. The Japanese had moved into Indochina and FDR saw that as a threat to the U.S. because their occupation would give them a base for larger aggression in Southeast Asia, and it jeopardized the then important supply of natural rubber. The French had held colonial rule over Indochina for nearly one hundred years, and even though France was an American ally, FDR had no plans for this rule to continue after and Allied victory in World War II. As Roosevelt put it, "France has had the country-thirty million inhabitants-for nearly one hundred years, and the people are worse off than they were at the beginning." FDR's plan was to set an international trusteeship over the area promoting Indochina's new independence. Perhaps had this plan been carried out much bloodshed could have been avoided. Instead the world paid little attention to the area and France tried to re-establish colonial rule, but was met by opposition by a Vietnamese Communist named Ho Chi Minh. The same Ho Chi Minh that had let and anti-Japanese movement in WWII, and had worked closely with the American office of Strategic Services. The U.S. paid little attention to the fighting there until 1949 when China fell under communism. In 1954, President Eisenhower explained "You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one and what will happen to the last one is that it will go over quickly." The Domino Theory entered political vocabulary. China had fallen, now it was starting to spread.

The French struggled in Vietnam and pleaded for U.S. military intervention, but Eisenhower doubted unilateral cooperation. He tried to convince British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to intervene. He compared the conflict in Indochina to failing the halt of Hitler, Mussolini, and Hirohito--but Churchill did not see it as being that big of a problem and feared involvement might lead to another world war.

Many senators in the U.S. Congress questioned involvement including senators John F. Kennedy and the Democratic leader in the Senate, Lyndon B. Johnson, as well as major general. Eisenhower was able to "escape" the troubles of Vietnam when he left office in 1961, giving way to Kennedy. JFK started sending military advisors to Vietnam to help train the South Vietnamese army, but each small step taken was followed up by a slightly bigger step and further escalation until 1965 when the U.S. had 184,000 troops in the jungles of Vietnam. When LBJ took office he saw himself deeply involved in the conflict, although he had opposed involvement while in Congress. By 1967 he had 400,000 troops in Vietnam. Despite outnumbering the North Vietnamese Army (including the Viet Cong guerrillas in the South) ten to one, and having the ability to blow up the entire world, the U.S. could not defeat the communists because of the rugged conditions and the guerrilla tactics. The Viet Cong looked like everyday civilians by day, but by night it was quite a different story, thus many civilian lives were lost in the process. Many civilians would be killed just trying to kill a few Viet Cong. Encouraging reports came from the U.S. government saying the end was near, but the reality proved to be much different.

The U.S. had the ability to wipe out the North Vietnamese, there is no question about that. However, did China await? Schlesinger points out how MacArthur had doubted the Chinese in Korea and what happened there, but also said it was a very different situation this time around. North Korea was a state of the Chinese and thy feared losing it and an American attack onto Chinese mainland. Schlesinger believed de-escalation was the only solution. Many in the government, including President Johnson, feared it would be too big of a blow to the nation's pride and would hurt the U.S. in the eyes of the rest of the world. Nobody wanted to be remembered as the president that lost the war. The U.S. did de-escalate years after the book during Nixon's term and finally the last troops were brought home in 1973.

Arthur Schlesinger is a wonderful historical writer and has added many insights in his books, including this one. There were two major things in this book that could have been clarified to a greater detail. For one, he denounced China has being a real threat to the U.S. Had the U.S. really made this an all-out war with the Vietnames Communists and sought total victory, instead of just trying to preserve South Vietnam as a free nation, China would have came to their aid to preserve the communist ideal, maybe even Russia. China considered itself the center of communism and would not have let Vietnam fall to an "imperialistic" United States. Look at it through their eyes: What if thousands of Chinese troops came and occupied the U.S.' southern border of Mexico? What if they were setting up military bases there, trying to defend their ideals? There would certainly be repercussions.

The second issue Schlesinger's proposal of de-escalation. This book was written six years before the U.S. actually did pull troops, so maybe he is a prophet, but he does not tell how he would win the war, or at least leave by gaining something. He says de-escalation "could work, if there were the will to pursue it." What does he mean by "work"? Get out and save American lives? Yes, de-escalation is the answer there. But if he means "work" by pulling out troops yet still gain "victories", both politically and militarily with the Vietnamese Communists, he should have explained how.

All in all, this was a well-written book by a terrific historical author. Schlesinger does not paint any pictures for the reader (nor does he include any in the book), just presents the facts and his take on them.