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Black May: The Epic Story of the Allies' Defeat of the German U-Boats in May 1943

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Mr. Gannon has written the definitive account of the U-boat battle in the North Atlantic during World War II. He admirably recounts the methods used by the Allies to detect and kill submarines, but also reflects upon the human side - the sounds of smashed ships and subs breaking up, the brutal weather conditions that affected both sides and the hideous realities of war. I've been reading about U-boats for more than 35 years, and this is the leading book on the subject.

September 26, 1998. Black May; ISBN 0-06-017819-1 In fascinating detail, Gannon takes you through a pivotal and epochal aspect of World War II that most interested laymen (like me) have only a foggy idea about - the battles over the Allies' Atlantic merchant shipsand the Germans and their U-boat fleet. For example I used to wonder, but no more, why the Allies didn't just put everything in airplanes and fly them over to England, avoiding all the U-boats.

The first thing I experienced as I read the book was that no thought of mine went unthought by the participants in that long and painful series of events. That was satisfying to realize. When the author mentioned a particular problem one or the other side was facing at the moment, you say to yourself, well, why don't they try this or that - it seemed obvious? Invariably, either the idea WAS then tried, or it was deliberately not tried after usually careful amalysis at the time. For example, Gannon relates coutnless incidents in which attacking aircraft dropped depth charges on diving U-boat submarines.

The probability of sinking or harming the boat (as U-boats were called) from such a single attack was not very high So you say to yourself, why not manufacture a "bomb" that would be capable of following the diving sub so that evasion would be impossible? Enter the homing torpedo bomb, which was designed to follow the "cavitation" noise made by the U-boat's propellors.

All the U-boat had to do if attacked by this device was to shut down its propellors until the device passed out of danger. So the problem at first became one of hiding from the Germans that such a device was being used when it was being used. Thus, aircraft were instructed not to drop this new invention unless the U-boat's hatch (in the conning tower) was closed, lest the Germans see that what was being dropped. I think he mentioned that the German high command never even found out about the device until after the war!

In general, the author has succeeded in several things. The first, in my opinion, is that the Battle of the Atlantic deserves to be seen for what it really was - the equivalent of any other set of operations and battles during the war in overall strategic importance to the final outcome. He mentions Kursk and Stalingrad. There's no question the author is correct. I would argue further that it was even more important than all other operations of the war, because regardless if the Germans had won or lost in the East, the Allies eventual unstoppable strength would have continued as long as the ocean war was won.

`The difficulty, or part of it anyway, is placing an exact geographical site of the Battle of the Atlantic - they talk of longitudes and latitudes, but people don't usually relate to that very well as "sites." His book more than adequately demonstrates the absolute truth that either the war would have gone on for many years more, or that even we might not have won the war at all, without the gradual overtaking in the numbers game of continual supply versus continual destruction of our supply train until, after a certain, long-awaited time, the cost for the Germans eventually became two U-boats sunk for every merchant ship sunk - obviously not a way to win a war.

The second is the managerial focus of the Allies in eventually coordinating everything that turned out to work, and to discard, by and large, that which didn't work well.. Once most of these elements were in place, the inevitable tide turned. What did these things consist of? Very many things - a combination of good military leaderhip, the willingness of the Allies to really be allies, the high level of required technical education, the wonderful ingenuity of British and American scientists to always seem to be one step (or more) ahead of the Germans (e.g., 10 centimeter, and later, 3 cm radar), HF/DF, Enigma decryption) and the enormous, still unbelievable, related industrial output of hte United States. I don't think the author gave this particular example, but I believe that at the height of the war, America was launching three Liberty SHIPS a DAY! (I couldn't build a rowboat in a year!) That number alone meant doom for the German side.

To make this great book even greater, I would recommend in a subsequent edition a chapter that would explain in a lot more detail several nautical terms that either are not currently explained at all or not fully-enough explained.

The glossary should be a lot fuller. For example, toward the end of the book (probably earlier too, where it is probably defined) the term OS occurs, referring to a rank of a U-boat officer. It's not in the glossary, and the reader forgets what it stands for.

In addition to the wonderful German grid maps provided, a superimposed grid of lat. and long. would be helpful.

Much of what he wrote only whetted my appetite for more.

If you are looking for a Tom Clancy style novel this is not the book for you. If you want ALL the details of what happened during WWII regarding Anti-sub warfare and German sub warfare you need this book. Michael is very detailed about names, places, ship numbers, tactics, weapons..you name it. Some times it gets a bit hard to read with all the technical info flying past but well worth it for the history buff.

This book is not written as a novel, and would be a disappointment for someone looking for an easy reading book. It is an historical account of events related to the war against German U-Boats in the Bay of Biscay and the North Atlantic, with emphasis on the turning of the tide against the German submarine service in May 1943. It is well reseached but sometimes digresses a little too much into minute detail. It also skips around a bit, and drops back to explain various developments. It is a good account for someone interested in the background details as well as the details of various actions that took place.

This is an excellent history of the defeat of Germany's U-Boats. Germany believed that it was on the verge of winning the Battle of the Atlantic. Then, disaster struck the U-Boats. The German submariners dubbed the month of May, 1943, "Black May", because of the incredible reversal of fortune they had sustained. Gannon's book shows the reader, in extreme detail, how this turn of events occurred. Anyone interested in the U-Boat war in the Atlantic should read this book.

Black May is full of detailed information on all of the technical systems which resulted in the ultimated defeat of the U-Boats. The author concentrates on telling the story of the fate of a small number of convoys, as opposed to an in-depth examination of each and every German loss during the climax of the Battle of the Atlantic. The result gives this history a truly personal feel, and gives readers a good sense of what convoy duty was like.

Readers should be warned that Black May is not an easy read, but it is well worth it for any WWII history buff.

This was a fairly good good book that extensively details the Battle of the Atlantic's turning point in May 1943. This book almost exclusively deals with the events of that month and refers to previous and later times only when important to the events that occured that May. If you are looking for general history of the Battle of the Atlantic from start to finish this book will not serve that purpose.

This is an excellent book for someone to read who has a great interest in uboat warfare and already has a good basic knowlegde of the Battle of the Atlantic to gain further insite into that battle. It is not a "Uboats for Dummies" book. Being an ex-Navy man who served on a destroyer during the cold war chasing "Ruskie" submarines around the ocean, I enjoyed Mr. Gannons thoroughness of the technical details of detection equipment and weaponry.

A must have for world war II buffs in general and uboat buffs in particular. Probably not too interesting for anyone else.

The author, a Distinguished Service Professor of History at the University of Florida, Gainesville, has done the best of anyone I have read in 60 years on the battle to defend Atlantic Ocean convoys in World War II. The research and personal exploration and referencing for this book is beyond anything I ever saw on the topic. If you do not mind details of individual battles with submarines, this book is easy to read and fascinating. The focus on the month that the U-boats lost the upper hand is carefully placed in context of the whole war in the Atlantic. Even transcripts of secret tape recordings of German prisoners of war are presented.

Besides all those individual numbered citations, there is a bibliography, glossary and index.

Only in Black May did I find, for the first time, that by 1943, fast radio direction finding was of more value than code-breaking or radar or sonar in dealing with U-boats., even though the U-boats had detectors for meter radar wavelengths, they did not have it for 10 cm radar. I did not know that the U-boats had some amazing torpedoes that, missing the prime target, would turn 180°, then zigzag! Or that the Allies deployed a sonic homing torpedo that could be dropped from aircraft. And what museum pieces the Allies were still using away from German fighter aircraft.

Highly recommended!

This is an excellent book, and deserves better ratings and reviews than it has so far received.

Several reviewers have complained about excessive detail - I found the details in this book most welcome and authoritative, but then I do read a lot of military history. This book may not be for the novice reader, but it is by no means overwhelmingly complex.

The title of the book refers to the month of May 1943, when several pivotal battles with German U-boats played out. The center section of the book focuses on a detailed analysis of the battle of convoy ONS.5. Some 30 U-boats were vectored to attack this slow convoy of 43 merchant ships (escorted by only 2 destroyers, a frigate, and 3 corvettes), and ended up sinking 13 merchant ships, but at a loss of 7 U-boats and several others damaged. This was at the time the worst result ever for a major U-boat operation, and came about because of improved Allied training and tactics to make the most efficient use of the best technology available at the time (which included aircraft patrols with radar, and shipboard HF/DF radio detection, radar, sonar, and hedgehogs). Thus, the convoy battles of May 1943 marked the turning point in the Battle of the Atlantic, as U-boat losses began to rise sharply while Allied shipping losses dropped.

There is much more in this book besides the month of May 1943. The book neatly summarizes almost the entire course of Allied anti-U-boat warfare during WWII. A great many fascinating details come out, ncluding:

1. The U.S. lost over 5,000 merchant marine sailors and over 2 million tons of shipping in the first six months of her entry into WWII. This was directly the result of decisions by Admiral King to not institute a convoy system (he finally started one in May, 1942) and to not impose a total blackout on the East Coast shoreline. During that time, the unescorted merchant ships were helpless as they were picked off at night by U-boats, silhouetted by the bright lights from the shoreline. That more ships were not sunk was due only to the limited numbers of U-boats that could make the trip to the U.S. East Coast.

2. Strategy and tactics against the U-boats were developed by a think tank of select academicians and other civilians in Britain. Statistical analysis was applied to the results of the ongoing battle against the U-boats to determine the most effective strategies.

3. The "tonnage war" that Karl Donitz's U-boat men fought to win was lost the instant that the U.S. entered the war. The strategy of the tonnage war was based on sinking more ships than could be produced by British shipyards and thus starving Britain into submission. This effort became hopeless for the Germans when the U.S. entered the war with her high output shipyards (as an ironic aside, does the U.S. build any merchant ships today?).

4. Although much has been made of Allied code-breaking of the German "Enigma" machine, the real story was much more complex than that, as the Germans did frequently change their codes, and it was during one of these changes that Allied code-breakers went blind during the battle for convoy ONS.5. At the same time - something rarely mentioned in most historical accounts of WWII - the Germans did have their own successes in breaking codes to Allied communications, and this played a part in the ability of the Germans to vector their U-boats against convoy ONS.5

5. The war against the U-boats was won with a combination of improved technology, improved strategy, improved training of the escort personnel, and finally, improved types and numbers of escorts, with increased air coverage from long range shore based bombers and from escort carriers.

6. Ultimately, the German U-boats proved to be obsolete weapons, as by the mid-part of WWII, they had become all too easy to detect and destroy, once the US and British made concerted efforts to do so. Gannon points out that the U-boats were not even true submarines, and were in reality submersible surface ships, as they spent the vast majority of their time on the surface, and even attacked while surfaced. The later development of the schnorkel was countered by Allied development of 10cm radar that could detect the schnorkels. It was not until the Type XXI and XXIII submarines, with their expanded battery stores, that German submarines would have the capability of staying underwater long enough to completely avoid detection. But these appeared too late in the war to see action.

There are many, many other such wonderful gems of information in this book. Take the time to read it carefully, and savor the many fascinating details of this often overlooked part of WWII.

This book is brilliantly researched, and every military history nerd (such as myself) will welcome it!

Sooner or later, the book answers every "but, WHY?" question I might think of asking.

I am a bit put off by some needlessly complex, compound sentences that are hard to read. This book CRIES for a decent editor!

But, at the end of the day, the book truly delivers.

Michael Gannon is a fine writer, and his subject matter lends itself to his style. One can almost imagine what it was like to sit inside that steel tube waiting for death from above. And you can't help but admire the courage of these German sailors, who crewed the boats. Most were not Nazis, but rather, ordinary seamen fighting for their country, not their fuhrer. Yet they shipped out over and over again, until over 30,000 of them were dead. A loss rate of over 75%.