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44 of 44 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Overdue detailed study of a key commander in the first year of the Pacific War, October 1, 2006
This is an important book for any student of the Pacific War, because it corrects the largely unrefuted negative accounts of Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher's service as commander of the U.S. carrier task forces in the first three of the four carrier battles of 1942 (Coral Sea, Midway, and Eastern Solomons). In fact, there were only two carrier battles in history where he did not command the winning side - Santa Cruz in October 1942, and Philippine Sea in 1944.
Despite this record, Fletcher has been savaged by critics for allegedly failing to stand by the Marine garrison at Guadalcanal, and, since he headed the relief expedition to besieged Wake in January 1942, he gets blamed for that expedition's turning back as well (despite the fact that he was ordered to do so). That he won three carriers battles against superior forces never gets him the credit he deserves. This was due in part to a confluence of several negative factors. First, he was a "black shoe" admiral, and not an aviator - and aviators were furious that carrier task forces were being commanded by non-aviators in the early stages of the war. In their mind every mission he didn't send them on would have been a great success - and that's what they told his superiors. Second, he was a convenient scapegoat for other admirals - most notably Richmond Kelly Turner at Guadalcanal, and CinC Ernest King - when they either made mistakes (Kelly at Guadalcanal) or were dissatisfied with his failure to act more "offensively" in spite of the circumstances that prevented it, or counseled against it. Third, when the attacks started rolling in during the war and after, Fletcher did not respond to correct the record, in part because of two unfortunate circumstances. First, he lost his records for the first half of the war when the Yorktown went down at Midway. Second, when he left the Saratoga at Pearl after her torpedoing, he unexpectedly was not permitted to return for the change of command ceremony, and thus lost his records from June through September as well. And after the war, without these records to refute what was being said about him he repeatedly demurred when asked to review what was being written about the battles in which he took part. So the people who were writing that he'd been incompetent and reluctant to risk battle to the point of cowardice, and used hindsight to justify their opinions were largely refuted for half a century. Someone else (I cannot recall who, but Lundstrom does not mention it) has said that Fletcher in postwar interviews seemed confused and unsure what had happened when. Whether this was due to lack of records or old age, the writer said that Fletcher's appearance may have reinforced the common belief that he was not very bright, and was in over his head during the war. I thought I saw a reference to Fletcher's becoming senile as he aged (he did not die until 1973) and that probably did not help things - it is hard to see someone who is visibly impaired by old age as a sharp-eyed fleet commander.
Enter John Lundstrom. Lundstrom's painstaking knowledge of what the carrier commanders knew, and when they knew it, and when various participants were flat-out lying about what happened, or making incorrect assumptions (uniformly to Fletcher's detriment) makes clear than at numerous crucial points Fletcher consistently made the right decisions, at least based on what he knew at the time, and preserved the U.S. Navy's irreplaceable (at the time) carriers. Most readers are aware of Nimitz' order to Fletcher at Midway to only risk the carriers when he had the opportunity to inflict serious damage on the Japanese carriers, but it appears that Fletcher was under the same instructions at Guadalcanal. And with a far more dangerous mission in sub-infested waters within range of Japanese land-based bombers he made the decision to leave the forces at Guadalcanal temporarily uncovered at times to reduce the risk to the carriers. What this book makes clear is that at the time he was not aware - in part due to bad communications and in part due to Turner's errors, that he was leaving at a bad time. Of course both Turner and the Marines didn't see it that way, and there was nothing his presence could have done to avert the Savo disaster, but then they didn't know what he knew.
At bottom, the unpleasant truth was that Fletcher's carriers were incomparably more important than the Marines at Guadalcanal, and if he had to choose between abandoning the Marines (which he did not believe he was doing at the time he retreated to refuel - which he had to do at some point so as to be ready when the Japanese carriers showed up) or putting the carriers in substantial risk with no prospect to inflict equal damage on Japanese forces, the carriers won. Losing Guadalcanal would have been a temporary setback. Losing the bulk of the carriers in the fall of 1942 would have been far worse. The Marines would disagree - and understandably still do - but had that been the decision (and Lundstrom makes clear that it was never that clear) that would have been the right decision. In the long run, the Marines depended on the carriers being there to stop the Japanese Navy when it showed up far more than they needed them to cover the unloading of supplies, and that was what Fletcher did. If he had lost the carriers covering Turner's delayed unloading of supplies, the Marines would have been dislodged when the Japanese Navy showed up, no matter how much supplies they had on hand.
Not everything Fletcher did was right, of course, but given that he was practicing a new form of naval warfare in which he had no experience (neither did anyone else, of course) and he won every battle he was engaged in, and preserved the Navy's carriers long enough to bridge the gap till the new carriers under construction reached the fleet, he deserves far greater credit for what he did.
The book also explain better his post-carrier command work. Once he was out of the South Pacific after the Saratoga was torpedoed, his days as a carrier commander were over - both King and to a lesser extent Nimitz were unhappy with what they perceived as a lack of offensive-mindedness, and he was relegated to a land-based commend on the mainland.
But Lundstrom also makes clear that that may have been where he was headed anyway. Having an admiral with no aviation experience command carrier task forces in early 1942 may have been unavoidable because there were no air admirals with sufficient seniority, but by the end of 1942 all the fliers who had started the war as captains (Mitscher as an example) were now rear admirals, and sufficiently senior to command carrier task forces. Fletcher, on the other hand, was now a vice admiral, too senior for a task force command, and with the wrong background to command the overall carrier fleet (despite his phenomenal failure at Midway, Mitscher did end up being the right man at the right time). Add to that that Fletcher did have a record of not seizing the initiative (although I don't think he can be faulted for doing so in the circumstances in which he operated) I really don't see that he would have remained with the carriers in any event. His record was precisely the opposite of the tactics that Mitscher would later employ to great success in early 1944. Again, it has to be said that Mitscher could afford to take risks with the forces available to him, and Fletcher could not. Had he played with fire the way the armchair admirals wanted him to, the benefits would have been minor, and the risks were incalculable.
In the end, if anyone deserves the credit for the way the U.S. carrier task forces successfully fought the first year of the Pacfic War, it has to be Fletcher, and I'm glad we finally have a book that explains this. Lundstrom is not neutral on the subject of Fletcher, but then neither has anyone else been, and this book helps to balance the account.
The only reason I give the book four stars instead of five is that Lundstrom's detail is sometimes overwhelming, and he not infrequently has sentences that are unintentionally cryptic, where it's hard to tell what exactly he is trying to say. It is also clear that he is an advocate for Fletcher, and while I applaud that because it helps balance the record, this is an analysis of what Fletcher did and why and why his detractors are or are not wrong. A five star rating would be appropriate if it were a balanced account of what happened. But that book is not yet possible, because no one had done the homework to see whether the attacks on Fletcher were justified. That has now been done, and we can now see what the next generation of naval scholarship makes of this stage of the war. For example, I am particularly interested in reassessments of what King and Nimitz thought about Fletcher - Lundstrom seems to be not entirely sure, and while that it perhaps not needed in this book, to get the whole picture, that needs to be analyzed further. There were a lot of politics going on in Washington, and perhaps Pearl as well, and those need to be taken into account.
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61 of 65 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
A 5-star book by a 5-star author, October 21, 2006
"Black Shoe Carrier Admiral" is a 680-page, meticulously detailed accounting of Admiral Fletcher's leadership of U.S. carrier forces during the first year of World War II in the Pacific. Author John Lundstrom's fundamental thesis is that Fletcher has been unfairly maligned by many of his peers, by historians, and by a large segment of the U.S. Marine Corps for perceived errors of judgment or even failings of character during crucial battles in the Coral Sea, at Midway, and in the Solomons.
The author's painstaking research into primary sources largely ignored by other writers (i.e., memos, letters, and logs kept by those who were present with Fletcher during those battles, plus actual radio messages and dispatches sent by and to him aboard his various flagships) reveal a reasonable rationale for many of Fletcher's controversial decisions that mostly seem to have escaped his critics. It's not possible to adequately summarize them in a short review like this, but suffice to say that admirals sitting behind desks in Hawaii or Washington are poorly situated for grasping all of the important realities of a convoluted combat scenario occurring half a world away. Thus when Fletcher is condemned for failing to charge full speed ahead to engage the enemy when doing so would have totally exhausted the fuel in his escorting destroyers, making victory impossible and needless destroyer losses inevitable, he is chastised for failing to engage the enemy rather than praised for sensibly preserving America's meager fleet assets in the face of superior forces.
While there is much more to be said about this fine volume, it seems necessary in this forum to spend as much energy reviewing some of the other reviews as the book itself. It is patently unfair to the author for a reviewer to post a derogatory assessment of this or any book when he (a) apparently has not read it, or (b) does not seem to be in possession of factual information about it or the author, or (c) both. Such is clearly the case with some of the reviews found here, with the result that Black Shoe Carrier Admiral gets less than the five-star ranking that it clearly deserves. For example:
~One reviewer denigrates the book because it says relatively little about Fletcher after the 1942 carrier battles. He apparently didn't bother to read the book's subtitle: Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal.
~Another writer says Lundstrom has no documentation and there is no evidence to support the suggestion that USS Hornet captain Marc Mitscher sent his air group in the wrong direction at the Battle of Midway. That writer is apparently ignorant of an abundance of testimony from Hornet veterans, both aircrew and ship's company, that support exactly that (see Naval History magazine, Feb 2006, p. 48 for just one resource).
~Another devotes all of three lines in ALL CAPS to trumpet the claim that Fletcher was hated by the Marines. Such a brief review obviously provides no space for the writer to tell us his opinion of Marine Colonel Melvin J. Maas, who unlike legions of other fine Marines, actually knew and worked directly with Fletcher during the Solomons campaign. Col. Maas cited Fletcher for his exceptional ability as a naval tactician and superior quality as a task force admiral.
~Other one-star reviewers complain that Lundstrom is trying to write an academic history without being an academic himself (Lundstrom has a master's degree in military history), that his book makes claims unsupported by facts or documentation (the book has 82 pages of fine print citing documented sources, largely original, for every significant statement in the manuscript), and that Fletcher was responsible for the loss of three fleet carriers in 1942 (apparently the Imperial Japanese Navy, with superior aircraft, battle-experienced aircrews, and an awesomely deadly torpedo had nothing to do with it).
Such agenda-driven opinions do not serve Amazon's review process in the intended manner, and in this case present a grossly inaccurate portrayal of the book's content and its author's qualifications for writing it. "Black Shoe Carrier Admiral" is a magnificent achievement, representing years of dogged research and composition by an award-winning expert who is eminently qualified and experienced in this subject matter. To revile it as anything less without supporting facts and documentation (so important to Lundstrom's detractors) is simply irresponsible.
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38 of 39 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Unfair criticisms against a *very* good book, July 11, 2006
You would think, judging by the harsher of the reviews appearing for this book, that John B. Lundstrom was something other than one of the best and most interesting historians of the Pacific War working today. His detractors, too, judging by the tone and literacy of their reviews, appear to be something other than they are. They are, no doubt, good, solid Marines. What they most assuredly aren't are careful and thoughtful readers motivated by good faith. They appear to be unwilling to take on its merits a book that strikes even glancingly against their zealously held biases. They appear, in fact, to be prejudging the book without reading it.
"The best laid plans of mice and men gang oft agley," wrote Robert Burns. Put another way, "If you want God to laugh, tell him your plans." When the Navy and Marines executed their plan to invade the Solomons in August 1942, no one was to know that the bulk of the American cruiser force would be wiped out in short order. What they certainly did understand was the very obvious risk of losing America's carriers at a time when naval airpower was scarce indeed. Lundstrom is persuasive on point after point in this well researched book, and with his guidance and careful sifting of fact, one can readily understand why the Navy made the decisions it did. He is far from uncritical of his subject. Anyone taking this to be a hagiography simply hasn't read the book.
War forces difficult choices. It's patently unjust to savage an important book because interservice rivalry forces one to maintain a lazy understanding of those choices and the circumstances under which they were pondered and made.
Towards the end of his book, Lundstrom quotes U.S. Grant: "The most confident critics are generally those who know the least about the matter criticized." The confidence of those who criticize this book is a rather sure sign that they are most in need of its information and perspective. Information and perspective are in abundant and well-ordered supply in this book. It would be nice if these book-critic Marines would spend less time with Soldier of Fortune and really, thoughtfully, read, and then, thoughtfully, think. A work of this level of seriousness deserves nothing less.
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