Customer Reviews

Black Shoe Carrier Admiral: Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Sea, Midway & Guadalcanal

5 star:		(15)
4 star:		(2)
3 star:		(0)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(6)

 

 

This is an important book for any student of the Pacific War, because it corrects the largely unrefuted negative accounts of Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher's service as commander of the U.S. carrier task forces in the first three of the four carrier battles of 1942 (Coral Sea, Midway, and Eastern Solomons). In fact, there were only two carrier battles in history where he did not command the winning side - Santa Cruz in October 1942, and Philippine Sea in 1944.
Despite this record, Fletcher has been savaged by critics for allegedly failing to stand by the Marine garrison at Guadalcanal, and, since he headed the relief expedition to besieged Wake in January 1942, he gets blamed for that expedition's turning back as well (despite the fact that he was ordered to do so). That he won three carriers battles against superior forces never gets him the credit he deserves. This was due in part to a confluence of several negative factors. First, he was a "black shoe" admiral, and not an aviator - and aviators were furious that carrier task forces were being commanded by non-aviators in the early stages of the war. In their mind every mission he didn't send them on would have been a great success - and that's what they told his superiors. Second, he was a convenient scapegoat for other admirals - most notably Richmond Kelly Turner at Guadalcanal, and CinC Ernest King - when they either made mistakes (Kelly at Guadalcanal) or were dissatisfied with his failure to act more "offensively" in spite of the circumstances that prevented it, or counseled against it. Third, when the attacks started rolling in during the war and after, Fletcher did not respond to correct the record, in part because of two unfortunate circumstances. First, he lost his records for the first half of the war when the Yorktown went down at Midway. Second, when he left the Saratoga at Pearl after her torpedoing, he unexpectedly was not permitted to return for the change of command ceremony, and thus lost his records from June through September as well. And after the war, without these records to refute what was being said about him he repeatedly demurred when asked to review what was being written about the battles in which he took part. So the people who were writing that he'd been incompetent and reluctant to risk battle to the point of cowardice, and used hindsight to justify their opinions were largely refuted for half a century. Someone else (I cannot recall who, but Lundstrom does not mention it) has said that Fletcher in postwar interviews seemed confused and unsure what had happened when. Whether this was due to lack of records or old age, the writer said that Fletcher's appearance may have reinforced the common belief that he was not very bright, and was in over his head during the war. I thought I saw a reference to Fletcher's becoming senile as he aged (he did not die until 1973) and that probably did not help things - it is hard to see someone who is visibly impaired by old age as a sharp-eyed fleet commander.
Enter John Lundstrom. Lundstrom's painstaking knowledge of what the carrier commanders knew, and when they knew it, and when various participants were flat-out lying about what happened, or making incorrect assumptions (uniformly to Fletcher's detriment) makes clear than at numerous crucial points Fletcher consistently made the right decisions, at least based on what he knew at the time, and preserved the U.S. Navy's irreplaceable (at the time) carriers. Most readers are aware of Nimitz' order to Fletcher at Midway to only risk the carriers when he had the opportunity to inflict serious damage on the Japanese carriers, but it appears that Fletcher was under the same instructions at Guadalcanal. And with a far more dangerous mission in sub-infested waters within range of Japanese land-based bombers he made the decision to leave the forces at Guadalcanal temporarily uncovered at times to reduce the risk to the carriers. What this book makes clear is that at the time he was not aware - in part due to bad communications and in part due to Turner's errors, that he was leaving at a bad time. Of course both Turner and the Marines didn't see it that way, and there was nothing his presence could have done to avert the Savo disaster, but then they didn't know what he knew.
At bottom, the unpleasant truth was that Fletcher's carriers were incomparably more important than the Marines at Guadalcanal, and if he had to choose between abandoning the Marines (which he did not believe he was doing at the time he retreated to refuel - which he had to do at some point so as to be ready when the Japanese carriers showed up) or putting the carriers in substantial risk with no prospect to inflict equal damage on Japanese forces, the carriers won. Losing Guadalcanal would have been a temporary setback. Losing the bulk of the carriers in the fall of 1942 would have been far worse. The Marines would disagree - and understandably still do - but had that been the decision (and Lundstrom makes clear that it was never that clear) that would have been the right decision. In the long run, the Marines depended on the carriers being there to stop the Japanese Navy when it showed up far more than they needed them to cover the unloading of supplies, and that was what Fletcher did. If he had lost the carriers covering Turner's delayed unloading of supplies, the Marines would have been dislodged when the Japanese Navy showed up, no matter how much supplies they had on hand.
Not everything Fletcher did was right, of course, but given that he was practicing a new form of naval warfare in which he had no experience (neither did anyone else, of course) and he won every battle he was engaged in, and preserved the Navy's carriers long enough to bridge the gap till the new carriers under construction reached the fleet, he deserves far greater credit for what he did.
The book also explain better his post-carrier command work. Once he was out of the South Pacific after the Saratoga was torpedoed, his days as a carrier commander were over - both King and to a lesser extent Nimitz were unhappy with what they perceived as a lack of offensive-mindedness, and he was relegated to a land-based commend on the mainland.
But Lundstrom also makes clear that that may have been where he was headed anyway. Having an admiral with no aviation experience command carrier task forces in early 1942 may have been unavoidable because there were no air admirals with sufficient seniority, but by the end of 1942 all the fliers who had started the war as captains (Mitscher as an example) were now rear admirals, and sufficiently senior to command carrier task forces. Fletcher, on the other hand, was now a vice admiral, too senior for a task force command, and with the wrong background to command the overall carrier fleet (despite his phenomenal failure at Midway, Mitscher did end up being the right man at the right time). Add to that that Fletcher did have a record of not seizing the initiative (although I don't think he can be faulted for doing so in the circumstances in which he operated) I really don't see that he would have remained with the carriers in any event. His record was precisely the opposite of the tactics that Mitscher would later employ to great success in early 1944. Again, it has to be said that Mitscher could afford to take risks with the forces available to him, and Fletcher could not. Had he played with fire the way the armchair admirals wanted him to, the benefits would have been minor, and the risks were incalculable.
In the end, if anyone deserves the credit for the way the U.S. carrier task forces successfully fought the first year of the Pacfic War, it has to be Fletcher, and I'm glad we finally have a book that explains this. Lundstrom is not neutral on the subject of Fletcher, but then neither has anyone else been, and this book helps to balance the account.
The only reason I give the book four stars instead of five is that Lundstrom's detail is sometimes overwhelming, and he not infrequently has sentences that are unintentionally cryptic, where it's hard to tell what exactly he is trying to say. It is also clear that he is an advocate for Fletcher, and while I applaud that because it helps balance the record, this is an analysis of what Fletcher did and why and why his detractors are or are not wrong. A five star rating would be appropriate if it were a balanced account of what happened. But that book is not yet possible, because no one had done the homework to see whether the attacks on Fletcher were justified. That has now been done, and we can now see what the next generation of naval scholarship makes of this stage of the war. For example, I am particularly interested in reassessments of what King and Nimitz thought about Fletcher - Lundstrom seems to be not entirely sure, and while that it perhaps not needed in this book, to get the whole picture, that needs to be analyzed further. There were a lot of politics going on in Washington, and perhaps Pearl as well, and those need to be taken into account.

"Black Shoe Carrier Admiral" is a 680-page, meticulously detailed accounting of Admiral Fletcher's leadership of U.S. carrier forces during the first year of World War II in the Pacific. Author John Lundstrom's fundamental thesis is that Fletcher has been unfairly maligned by many of his peers, by historians, and by a large segment of the U.S. Marine Corps for perceived errors of judgment or even failings of character during crucial battles in the Coral Sea, at Midway, and in the Solomons.

The author's painstaking research into primary sources largely ignored by other writers (i.e., memos, letters, and logs kept by those who were present with Fletcher during those battles, plus actual radio messages and dispatches sent by and to him aboard his various flagships) reveal a reasonable rationale for many of Fletcher's controversial decisions that mostly seem to have escaped his critics. It's not possible to adequately summarize them in a short review like this, but suffice to say that admirals sitting behind desks in Hawaii or Washington are poorly situated for grasping all of the important realities of a convoluted combat scenario occurring half a world away. Thus when Fletcher is condemned for failing to charge full speed ahead to engage the enemy when doing so would have totally exhausted the fuel in his escorting destroyers, making victory impossible and needless destroyer losses inevitable, he is chastised for failing to engage the enemy rather than praised for sensibly preserving America's meager fleet assets in the face of superior forces.

While there is much more to be said about this fine volume, it seems necessary in this forum to spend as much energy reviewing some of the other reviews as the book itself. It is patently unfair to the author for a reviewer to post a derogatory assessment of this or any book when he (a) apparently has not read it, or (b) does not seem to be in possession of factual information about it or the author, or (c) both. Such is clearly the case with some of the reviews found here, with the result that Black Shoe Carrier Admiral gets less than the five-star ranking that it clearly deserves. For example:

~One reviewer denigrates the book because it says relatively little about Fletcher after the 1942 carrier battles. He apparently didn't bother to read the book's subtitle: Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal.

~Another writer says Lundstrom has no documentation and there is no evidence to support the suggestion that USS Hornet captain Marc Mitscher sent his air group in the wrong direction at the Battle of Midway. That writer is apparently ignorant of an abundance of testimony from Hornet veterans, both aircrew and ship's company, that support exactly that (see Naval History magazine, Feb 2006, p. 48 for just one resource).

~Another devotes all of three lines in ALL CAPS to trumpet the claim that Fletcher was hated by the Marines. Such a brief review obviously provides no space for the writer to tell us his opinion of Marine Colonel Melvin J. Maas, who unlike legions of other fine Marines, actually knew and worked directly with Fletcher during the Solomons campaign. Col. Maas cited Fletcher for his exceptional ability as a naval tactician and superior quality as a task force admiral.

~Other one-star reviewers complain that Lundstrom is trying to write an academic history without being an academic himself (Lundstrom has a master's degree in military history), that his book makes claims unsupported by facts or documentation (the book has 82 pages of fine print citing documented sources, largely original, for every significant statement in the manuscript), and that Fletcher was responsible for the loss of three fleet carriers in 1942 (apparently the Imperial Japanese Navy, with superior aircraft, battle-experienced aircrews, and an awesomely deadly torpedo had nothing to do with it).

Such agenda-driven opinions do not serve Amazon's review process in the intended manner, and in this case present a grossly inaccurate portrayal of the book's content and its author's qualifications for writing it. "Black Shoe Carrier Admiral" is a magnificent achievement, representing years of dogged research and composition by an award-winning expert who is eminently qualified and experienced in this subject matter. To revile it as anything less without supporting facts and documentation (so important to Lundstrom's detractors) is simply irresponsible.

You would think, judging by the harsher of the reviews appearing for this book, that John B. Lundstrom was something other than one of the best and most interesting historians of the Pacific War working today. His detractors, too, judging by the tone and literacy of their reviews, appear to be something other than they are. They are, no doubt, good, solid Marines. What they most assuredly aren't are careful and thoughtful readers motivated by good faith. They appear to be unwilling to take on its merits a book that strikes even glancingly against their zealously held biases. They appear, in fact, to be prejudging the book without reading it.

"The best laid plans of mice and men gang oft agley," wrote Robert Burns. Put another way, "If you want God to laugh, tell him your plans." When the Navy and Marines executed their plan to invade the Solomons in August 1942, no one was to know that the bulk of the American cruiser force would be wiped out in short order. What they certainly did understand was the very obvious risk of losing America's carriers at a time when naval airpower was scarce indeed. Lundstrom is persuasive on point after point in this well researched book, and with his guidance and careful sifting of fact, one can readily understand why the Navy made the decisions it did. He is far from uncritical of his subject. Anyone taking this to be a hagiography simply hasn't read the book.

War forces difficult choices. It's patently unjust to savage an important book because interservice rivalry forces one to maintain a lazy understanding of those choices and the circumstances under which they were pondered and made.

Towards the end of his book, Lundstrom quotes U.S. Grant: "The most confident critics are generally those who know the least about the matter criticized." The confidence of those who criticize this book is a rather sure sign that they are most in need of its information and perspective. Information and perspective are in abundant and well-ordered supply in this book. It would be nice if these book-critic Marines would spend less time with Soldier of Fortune and really, thoughtfully, read, and then, thoughtfully, think. A work of this level of seriousness deserves nothing less.

Magnificent! That's all I can say about Frank Jack Fletcher: Black Shoe Carrier Admiral. As a Professor at the Naval War College with a Ph.D. in Military History, I have read literally hundreds of books on World War II in the Pacific Theater. John Lundstrom stands out as one of the three or four top authorities on the Pacific War alive today. He has spent nearly forty years meticulously researching the Pacific War and I have uncovered only one very minor factual error in the three previous books he has written on the most critical period of the war for America -- 1942. The same can be said for Frank Jack Fletcher: Black Shoe Carrier Admiral. Lundstrom has spent years uncovering incontrovertable evidence to support his findings on Fletcher. Much like Air Marshal Hugh Dowding, who was responsible for the defense of England, Scotland and Wales during the Battle of Britain and was subsequently written out of the official British account of that great struggle, Frank Jack Fletcher has been overlooked by historians for his absolutely critical actions while in command of U.S. carrier forces at the battles of the Coral Sea, Midway and the Eastern Solomons. Had Fletcher lost at Coral Sea and the Japanese carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku and their air wings been available at Midway, I am absolutely convinced that the U.S. Navy would have been defeated at Midway too due entirely to the additional aircraft the Japanese would have had in the battle. Fletcher's actions at the Eastern Solomons likewise enabled the U.S. success on Guadalcanal that turned the tide in the war and made offensive operations aimed at the Japanese home islands possible. Some may not like what Lundstrom has to say, but they should absolutely believe that this fine scholar has accurately and honestly presented the facts associated with this critical phase of the Pacific War. Lundstrom's depth of detail and meticulous research have marked a more complete understanding of actual decisions and events. He has also provided superb analysis to objectively indicate where blame for events laid at Fletcher's doorstep actually belong.
As some of the other reviews indicate, Fletcher did not return to operational command once Saratoga was torpedoed. Instead he was assigned to command the U.S. Nineth Fleet and the entire North Pacific Area out of Adak, Alaska. Anyone who thinks commanding a fleet is something FDR, King or Nimitz would assign to someone they thought to be a "loser" in time of war has obviously never worn a uniform. As an Annapolis graduate with over 28 years of active duty Navy service I can assure you that Fletcher was sent where he was needed most. John Lundstrom has done an immeasurable service to our understanding of the Pacific War by eschewing conventional wisdom and sorting through the facts to give all students of World War II an accurate assessment of the contribution of Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher to U.S. victory in that war. My hat is off to Lundstrom for setting the record straight, and for producing a highly-readable and first-rate account of three of the most important naval battles in history. Frank Jack Fletcher: Black Shoe Carrier Admiral is an indispensible addition to anyone with serious interest in World War II.

This work has all of the outstanding qualities of Lundstrom's The First Team, and The First Team And The Guadalcanal Campaign, both of which it draws upon. Lundstrom's research is meticulous, impeccably documented and correct in regard to the facts. What comes through as a result is a much better appreciation of what the man in the hot-seat went through. Any person with a serious interest in the history of the Pacific War and particularly the carrier battles must read this book.

Some minor criticisms are in order. Perhaps through no fault of the author, the book appears at first glance to be a biography. It is not in the conventional sense. For those who find long renditions of a person's childhood and early career of interest, it will disappoint; for those who find such things tedious, it will be refreshing.

Lundstrom has developed an affinity for his subject. It is hard for a biographer, even an unconventional one, not to do so. This perhaps colors some conclusions and presentions on Lundstrom's part, but never to the point of doing violence to the facts. This affinity is most apparent in the introduction and conclusion where it is most appropriate for it to be displayed. However, it occasionally crops up elsewhere and one must ask if Lundstrom has applied the same standard to all Fletcher's detractors that he has to Fletcher. He quite correctly notes that the impressions of the time colored perception of Fletcher in ways not supported by fact. However, it sometimes feels as if he does not completely credit that most of the decisions regarding Fletcher were made in the context of the time and from the distorted information. To Lundstrom's great credit, he tries mightly not to do this and it is only a minor matter that in no way discredits the author or this work. If you avoid this work because of my statement, you're making a serious mistake.

The only weakness of the work is in detailing what took place after Fletcher's tenure as a carrier commander. This is probably because that time period and theater are outside the scope of the author's area of detailed study. Rather than tramp blindly through unfamiliar fields, Lundstrom confines himself to what he knows, and the facts he can report. This leaves what happened between Fletcher and King subsequent to Fletcher's relief as a carrier commander somewhat murky, and there may be a little more to the story. That extra detail might serve to explain a little better why Fletcher was so poorly treated officially (although Lundstrom clearly and correctly identifies three parties largely responsible for his ill-treatment in history). This too, is a minor matter and no reason to avoid reading this book.

Criticisms aside, this book thoroughly accomplishes what it set out to do: ventilate the unwarranted accusations levelled against Admiral Fletcher and his conduct. Lundstrom is fair-minded and meticulous enough to note Fletcher's true errors even as he sweeps away the inaccuracies. It is left to the reader to decide if they completely agree with Lundstrom's conclusions, however.

I, for one, agree for the most part, but not entirely. I find myself, even after Lundstrom has set the record straight, still somehow dissatisfied with this Admiral, much as King and Nimitz apparently were. I no longer regard him as timid, a coward, a goat, an incompetent, a tired old man, a hopeless "black shoe" big-gun man or any other of a host of other characterizations that have clung to him over time. Some of these I discarded with maturity, some courtesy of this author's work. Lundstrom has exonerated Fletcher of all sins but one to my mind, and that is that I do not find in Fletcher the ability to truly seize the initiative. Recognizing that, I think I recognize why King relieved him. It's a subtle but very important thing in a commander.

That I am able to come to this conclusion, at last within the context of the facts, is a through-going testimony to the outstanding quality of Lundstrom's work. Seldom have I seen a better presentation of a series of battles where what a commander knew, and when, was more clearly delineated. Placing information, events, and facts in their proper context goes very far toward making clear what was previously inexplicable to previous historians and writers. This is how any historian who presumes to criticize the conduct of a battle should operate and Lundstrom is to be applauded for setting the standard. It is now possible to reasonably discuss Admiral Fletcher and his decisions without the baggage of the Marines' hard feelings, fellow admirals' self-serving agendas and the fact of his relief clouding the picture.

Fletcher did good, creditable, journeyman work for which he received shamefully little credit and much undeserved condemnation. He participated in a great victory, and two other great battles whose outcomes are open to interpretation. He contributed to carrier warfare doctrine, albeit largely through having the presence of mind to accept the recommendations of experts junior to him and little through his own thought. He was, perhaps, a good man to have on your defense, but his insufficient grasp of the initiative made him a questionable offensive player. His treatment after his relief is certainly questionable, but one must ask just what place there was for this man when the offense took the field for its second series? Approximately concurrent with his relief, Fletcher had been used to the best of his abilities...abilities that appear to have been no longer the ones most needed. One suspects that even had he been treated better, he would not have returned to a starting position.

That I can say this, is entirely thanks to this outstanding book by John Lundstrom, whom I thank for writing it.

Black Shoe Carrier Admiral is one of two excellent works to be published this year on WWII Pacific carriers, battles and the men who commanded them. John Lundstrom has obviously put a great deal of effort into setting the record straight on Admiral Fletcher and his contributions to our early victories in the Pacific. His work is well documented and thoroughly researched, and adds new sources that had not previously surfaced in World War II histories of that period.

The book demonstrates how Fletcher became the target of severe criticism for his actions, primarily by others who hoped to improve their own reputations or deflect criiticism as a result. Lundstrom pulls no punches, however, by describing both Fletcher's strengths and failings in the events of December 1941 to September 1942. He repeatedly demonstrates that misinterpretations of Fletcher's actions, particularly by Admiral King in Washington, resulted in Fletcher's eventual downfall. At the same time, he explains how some noted historians played down or ignored Fletcher's important contributions, that sealed the US victories at Coral Sea and, particularly Midway.

John Lundstrom's book is an excellent read for anyone wanting to know more of the early war in the Pacific. It is also an important source for any serious student of the period who wants to gain insight both to the actions of the war and the politics inside the Navy at that time.

This is a long overdue look at Adm Fletcher and his role in the critical first year of the war. I always found it odd that the victor of the three most important battles fought by our fleet in WWII was quickly shunted aside and treated with disdain by postwar historians. John Lundstrom does a fine job of exposing the biasis and backbiting within the navy at the time that resulted in Fletcher's downfall.
Mr Lundstrom is an eminent historian of this subject and has produced a first rate, readable and important work. It deserves a place with the best accounts of the wartime Pacific Fleet to appear in many years. It clearly shows Frank Jack Fletcher for the fine leader and fighter that he was.

John Lundstrom must be considered among the top 3 or 4 historians on the War in the Pacific, and he returns to the primary sources of data and the interviews of significant figures to take an in-depth look at Fletcher's decisions at Coral Sea and Midway. Taking critics to task for bad history or personal bias, the author abundantly shows Fletcher's correct decision making at "America's Trafalgar". Furthermore, it is a wonderful read. This is a must for people interested in WWII and is a great companion to SHATTERED SWORD.

In reading this book I was struck by several things.

First was Roosevelt's comment about being the man in the ring. Unless you were there, all beat up and bloody you have a limited right to critize. Fletcher was there at the beginning when nobody knew what was going on. He was leading carriers into battle when we had no idea of what the Japanese were doing. But he knew that after Pearl his carrier was a very important ship to risk.

Second I was struck by how often Fletcher had someone under him but a couple of steps down that took it upon himself to critize so strongly. Further these people seemed to have ability to then talk to people like Adm. King and complain about Fletcher.

Third was the description of things that our Navy had never really practiced, i.e. rapid refueling, operating carriers together. Things that the Japanese had mastered. And of course there were people like King insisting that the battleships be used, but nevery could come up with a suitable task.

Finally, Fletcher has had a tremendous amount of critism in the books written after the war when his decisions could be examined with leisure and much better knowledge.

In the end, I'm going to use another Teddy Roosevelt quote: "It behooves every man to remember that the work of the critic is of altogether secondary importance, and that, in the end, progress is accomplished by the man who does things."

I've belatedly gotten around to reading the FJF bio, and it's absolutely indispensable to understanding the first year of the Pacific War. With due respect for The Big E, Fletcher and Yorktown (CV-5) lugged most of the flattop mail in the six months after Pearl Harbor, and with his Guadalcanal experience, he became the leading practitioner of carrier warfare in the US Navy--and in the world.

If you don't read anything else, go to the Conclusion for an education in how history gets written, especially by Recognized Historians with agendas. As an example of expositive historiography it will stand alone for a long-long time.