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11 of 11 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
This work is a significant effort about the why of Viet Nam., June 22, 1999
By A Customer
Explication of the importance of the supply lines from North Viet Nam into the battlefield that was South Viet Nam proves to me for the first time that the failure to cut off the Ho Chi Minh Trail complex cost the United States the Second Indochina War. The trail was the centerpiece of the war according to this work. This study shows that the failure to seal the borders of South Viet Nam sealed the fate of the United States very early on in the history of the battle. By 1965, according to this study constructed using newly released US and North Vietnamese political and military records as well as the works of Alexander Haig, Kissenger, Nixon, Westmoreland, General Giap and Ho Chi Minh, the US had already lost the war because the Bloody Road or the "Truong Song Strategic Supply Rout" supplying the north of South Viet Nam and its Cambodian verson supplying Siagon and the Delta military regions could deliver enough tonnage of sustaining war supplies and personel to match and exceed anything the US could ship or fly into the country. The failure of the leaders of the time, LBJ, Kennedy, McNamara, Dr. Rostow, William Colby, Curtis LeMay, Bundy, Westmoreland, Maxwell Taylor and the mysterious U.S. ambassador to Laos, William Sullivan, to recognize and obey the basic rules of war has never been laid out in such an agreeable or lucid form. The mistakes assumptions and consequences of the beliefs of the above listed men are all here in this one book. I feel so strongly about the information presented herein that I plan to add it to the required reading list of my college students.
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10 of 10 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
A Good Synthesis, but Weak Conclusion, June 7, 2001
John Prados, a veteran writer of military history, has attempted to write the first detailed scholarly examination of the role of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the Vietnam War. The Trail, dubbed the "Blood Road," was a vital pathway through the jungles of Laos and Cambodia that enabled the North Vietnamese regime to conduct a protracted guerrilla struggle in South Vietnam. Without the Trail, the indigenous Viet Cong in South Vietnam would have been virtually on their own. Nor is Prados content just to examine the history of the Trail; rather, he poses the critical question: could the United States have severed the Trail and thereby achieved a military victory in Vietnam? There is no doubt that The Blood Trail has historical value. Prados has pulled together high and low-level accounts from both sides to produce the first real synthesis on this subject. Unfortunately, far more is promised than is delivered by this book. One major problem is the over-focus on Washington strategy sessions by Bundy, McNamara, LBJ, et al. It seems that every book written on the Vietnam War has to detour into the Oval Office, no matter how much this ground has been trampled before. The only germane aspect of these familiar policy debates is the issue of whether the insurgency in Vietnam would be handled with diplomatic or military means. Prados shows that severing the canal by a variety of military means was the preferred option. Although the Americans tried everything from ground attacks, bombing, mining and raiding, they could not sever the Trail. Thus Prados concludes that, "the truth is that the war fighters lost their gambit". Well, that's rather obvious Dr. Prados, given that we lost the war. Unfortunately, by asserting that we couldn't sever the Trail by military means (which actually is not proven, only that the means employed did not work), the author leaves the reader high and dry. What then should the United States have done about the Trail? Abandon South Vietnam in 1964? Negotiate surrender? How could we have known that interdicting the Trail would fail if we did not try it? There is nothing worthy of being called a conclusion here. I also believe that Dr. Prados overstates the effect of severing the Trail in any case. Even if the US military had successfully interdicted the Trail for say 6-12 months, thereby disrupting the enemy build-up, Hanoi would merely have asked for a temporary cease-fire. They could then use the period of cease-fire to repair any damage to the Trail. I think Prados misses the boat on this one. The Vietnam War was not an exercise in military logistics, whereby if we had severed the enemy lines of communication their war effort would have collapsed. Prados has been influenced too heavily by Jomini and Clausewitz, instead of Mao. First, the enemy would always find a way to get some troops and supplies into South Vietnam, no matter how painful we made this to them. Even if we stopped 80-90% of the troops and supplies - a real success - the remaining 10-20% would probably be enough to keep a low-level insurgency burning in South Vietnam. The war was not about logistics, it was about motivation and protracted struggle. The fact is that as long as Hanoi's leaders remained committed to victory, they could outlast any temporary US military successes. The United States never intended to adopt a large-scale, open-ended defense of South Vietnam for decades on end. Thus, the Trail was probably not as critical to victory or defeat as Prados makes out.
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17 of 21 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
Blood Road, December 1, 1999
As a participant in the air activity over the trail in 67&68,I was hopeing for more information regarding the ground activites during this period. In actuallity, there is little information about either. Onr glareing error is the authors continuing referance to all FAC aircraft as Ravens. The Ravens came into being in 1967 and were working days, flying from within Laos itself. In most cases when the author is calling the FACs Ravens, they were actually Nail or Covey FACs, flying from Thailand. Still waiting for a book that covers the construction crews, maintainers, truck drivers and GUNNERS that were a brave and awesome group.
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