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The Blood Road: The Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Vietnam War

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Explication of the importance of the supply lines from North Viet Nam into the battlefield that was South Viet Nam proves to me for the first time that the failure to cut off the Ho Chi Minh Trail complex cost the United States the Second Indochina War. The trail was the centerpiece of the war according to this work. This study shows that the failure to seal the borders of South Viet Nam sealed the fate of the United States very early on in the history of the battle. By 1965, according to this study constructed using newly released US and North Vietnamese political and military records as well as the works of Alexander Haig, Kissenger, Nixon, Westmoreland, General Giap and Ho Chi Minh, the US had already lost the war because the Bloody Road or the "Truong Song Strategic Supply Rout" supplying the north of South Viet Nam and its Cambodian verson supplying Siagon and the Delta military regions could deliver enough tonnage of sustaining war supplies and personel to match and exceed anything the US could ship or fly into the country. The failure of the leaders of the time, LBJ, Kennedy, McNamara, Dr. Rostow, William Colby, Curtis LeMay, Bundy, Westmoreland, Maxwell Taylor and the mysterious U.S. ambassador to Laos, William Sullivan, to recognize and obey the basic rules of war has never been laid out in such an agreeable or lucid form. The mistakes assumptions and consequences of the beliefs of the above listed men are all here in this one book. I feel so strongly about the information presented herein that I plan to add it to the required reading list of my college students.

John Prados, a veteran writer of military history, has attempted to write the first detailed scholarly examination of the role of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the Vietnam War. The Trail, dubbed the "Blood Road," was a vital pathway through the jungles of Laos and Cambodia that enabled the North Vietnamese regime to conduct a protracted guerrilla struggle in South Vietnam. Without the Trail, the indigenous Viet Cong in South Vietnam would have been virtually on their own. Nor is Prados content just to examine the history of the Trail; rather, he poses the critical question: could the United States have severed the Trail and thereby achieved a military victory in Vietnam?

There is no doubt that The Blood Trail has historical value. Prados has pulled together high and low-level accounts from both sides to produce the first real synthesis on this subject. Unfortunately, far more is promised than is delivered by this book. One major problem is the over-focus on Washington strategy sessions by Bundy, McNamara, LBJ, et al. It seems that every book written on the Vietnam War has to detour into the Oval Office, no matter how much this ground has been trampled before. The only germane aspect of these familiar policy debates is the issue of whether the insurgency in Vietnam would be handled with diplomatic or military means. Prados shows that severing the canal by a variety of military means was the preferred option.

Although the Americans tried everything from ground attacks, bombing, mining and raiding, they could not sever the Trail. Thus Prados concludes that, "the truth is that the war fighters lost their gambit". Well, that's rather obvious Dr. Prados, given that we lost the war. Unfortunately, by asserting that we couldn't sever the Trail by military means (which actually is not proven, only that the means employed did not work), the author leaves the reader high and dry. What then should the United States have done about the Trail? Abandon South Vietnam in 1964? Negotiate surrender? How could we have known that interdicting the Trail would fail if we did not try it? There is nothing worthy of being called a conclusion here. I also believe that Dr. Prados overstates the effect of severing the Trail in any case. Even if the US military had successfully interdicted the Trail for say 6-12 months, thereby disrupting the enemy build-up, Hanoi would merely have asked for a temporary cease-fire. They could then use the period of cease-fire to repair any damage to the Trail.

I think Prados misses the boat on this one. The Vietnam War was not an exercise in military logistics, whereby if we had severed the enemy lines of communication their war effort would have collapsed. Prados has been influenced too heavily by Jomini and Clausewitz, instead of Mao. First, the enemy would always find a way to get some troops and supplies into South Vietnam, no matter how painful we made this to them. Even if we stopped 80-90% of the troops and supplies - a real success - the remaining 10-20% would probably be enough to keep a low-level insurgency burning in South Vietnam. The war was not about logistics, it was about motivation and protracted struggle. The fact is that as long as Hanoi's leaders remained committed to victory, they could outlast any temporary US military successes. The United States never intended to adopt a large-scale, open-ended defense of South Vietnam for decades on end. Thus, the Trail was probably not as critical to victory or defeat as Prados makes out.

As a participant in the air activity over the trail in 67&68,I was hopeing for more information regarding the ground activites during this period. In actuallity, there is little information about either. Onr glareing error is the authors continuing referance to all FAC aircraft as Ravens. The Ravens came into being in 1967 and were working days, flying from within Laos itself. In most cases when the author is calling the FACs Ravens, they were actually Nail or Covey FACs, flying from Thailand. Still waiting for a book that covers the construction crews, maintainers, truck drivers and GUNNERS that were a brave and awesome group.

John Prados, a veteran writer of military history, has attempted to write the first detailed scholarly examination of the role of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the Vietnam War. The Trail, dubbed the "Blood Road," was a vital pathway through the jungles of Laos and Cambodia that enabled the North Vietnamese regime to conduct a protracted guerrilla struggle in South Vietnam. Without the Trail, the indigenous Viet Cong in South Vietnam would have been virtually on their own. Nor is Prados content just to examine the history of the Trail; rather, he poses the critical question: could the United States have severed the Trail and thereby achieved a military victory in Vietnam?

There is no doubt that The Blood Trail has historical value. Prados has pulled together high and low-level accounts from both sides to produce the first real synthesis on this subject. Unfortunately, far more is promised than is delivered by this book. One major problem is the over-focus on Washington strategy sessions by Bundy, McNamara, LBJ, et al. It seems that every book written on the Vietnam War has to detour into the Oval Office, no matter how much this ground has been trampled before. The only germane aspect of these familiar policy debates is the issue of whether the insurgency in Vietnam would be handled with diplomatic or military means. Prados shows that severing the Trail by a variety of military means was the preferred option.

Although the Americans tried everything from ground attacks, bombing, mining and raiding, they could not sever the Trail. Thus Prados concludes that, "the truth is that the war fighters lost their gambit". Well, that's rather obvious Dr. Prados, given that we lost the war. Unfortunately, by asserting that we couldn't sever the Trail by military means (which actually is not proven, only that the means employed did not work), the author leaves the reader high and dry. What then should the United States have done about the Trail? Abandon South Vietnam in 1964? Negotiate surrender? How could we have known that interdicting the Trail would fail if we did not try it? There is nothing worthy of being called a conclusion here. I also believe that Dr. Prados overstates the effect of severing the Trail in any case. Even if the US military had successfully interdicted the Trail for say 6-12 months, thereby disrupting the enemy build-up, Hanoi would merely have asked for a temporary cease-fire. They could then use the period of cease-fire to repair any damage to the Trail.

I think Prados misses the boat on this one. The Vietnam War was not an exercise in military logistics, whereby if we had severed the enemy lines of communication their war effort would have collapsed. Prados has been influenced too heavily by Jomini and Clausewitz, instead of Mao. First, the enemy would always find a way to get some troops and supplies into South Vietnam, no matter how painful we made this to them. Even if we stopped 80-90% of the troops and supplies - a real success - the remaining 10-20% would probably be enough to keep a low-level insurgency burning in South Vietnam. The war was not about logistics, it was about motivation and protracted struggle. The fact is that as long as Hanoi's leaders remained committed to victory, they could outlast any temporary US military successes. The United States never intended to adopt a large-scale, open-ended defense of South Vietnam for decades on end. Thus, the Trail was probably not as critical to victory or defeat as Prados makes out.

This is a must-read for all Vietnam veterans and students of the Vietnam War. Author Prados outlines why we were never able to interdict the flow of troops and supplies down the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos into South Vietnam. As a veteran of C-130 flare missions searching for trucks over the Trail, I now understand why our task was often so fruitless

The title, The Blood Road: The Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Vietnam War, makes you think this will only be about the Trail. In a sense, it is. As author John Prados demonstrates, you cannot discuss the Vietnam War without discussing the Trail. It was the beginning, middle and end of the war. Every decision made by the US, Vietnam, China, Laos and Russia either impacted on the Trail or was impacted by the Trail. He who wins the battle of logistics will win the war.

It is absolutely mind boggling how the US could spend so much time, energy, money and lives on bombing the Trail and yet still fail to stop the supplies from going south. Indeed, with every passing year, the Trail grew in length and load capacity. It went from being a path hacked out of the jungle just wide enough for a bike and person pushing the bike to a multi-lane paved highway. The geography is mountainous, swampy, subject to monsoons, poisonous critters of all shapes and sizes. As many North Vietnamese died from exposure, disease and starvation as they did from US bombs.

Prados shows that contrary to popular myth, the US tried to stop the Trail from our earliest involvement in Vietnam to the bitter end. Dien Bien Phu (French loss), the Siege of Khe Sanh and many Special Forces operations all centered on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. We tried bombing, Special Forces (they were in Laos), CIA, technology. He takes you step by step on what the politicians on both sides said, did, and why. This book shows the thinking and analysis of the CIA, military, hawks in the US government. Many, including LBJ, accurately predicted what would happen.

I've read a lot about Vietnam, trying to understand what happened there any why. This is by far the best book for me because the author puts you in the mind of the decision makers in the context of that time. Prados points out that there is plenty of blame to share. The results of Vietnam were not for a lack of heroism, effort or thought on our part. And that the US did not loose the war so much as North Vietnam won it. There is a difference. To read this book helps understand that difference.

This is very serious, in depth reading. I think this book is essential to try to understand the full realm of the Vietnam War from all sides - victors, losers, and politicians, military. Kudos' to author John Prados, this is thought provoking, revealing and insightful reading, highly recommended.

This is a must-read for all Vietnam veterans and students of the Vietnam War. Author Prados outlines why we were never able to interdict the flow of troops and supplies down the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos into South Vietnam. As a veteran of C-130 flare missions searching for trucks over the Trail, I now understand why our task was often so fruitless.

Sam McGowan
Vietnam Veteran, author of "The Cave", a novel of the Vietnam War.

If you are looking for an indepth analysis of the Vietnam war - this is your book. The author does a great job of research and analysis of the Ho Chi Min trail as well as the political puppet masters behind the war. You will be glad you read this entertaining book.