Customer Reviews

Bloody Beaches: The Marines at Peleliu

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This book was written by Brigadier General Gordon D. Gayle, USMC (Ret). He was Maj Gordon D. Gayle, commander of 2d Battalion, 5th Marines during the Peleliu invasion. He served in three Pacific campaigns: Guadalcanal, Cape Gloucester, and Peleliu. While commanding the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, on Peleliu, he was awarded the Navy Cross.

Pelileu was a fiasco. Lots of problems, such as the Navy stopped pre-invasion shelling because it thought it ran out of targets. Problem areas found by the infantry troops later on would show they had never been touched by pre-invasion Naval gunfire. Marine commander Rupertus who refused Army reinforcements for too long so the Corps kept the glory was another issue. Incorrect estimates that this would be over in three days came about due to Japanese defenders staying hidden until the invasion occured. The thing with Pelileu was it was a new experience. Maps were outdated and missed key points so swamps that weren't known about all of a sudden appreared. Japanese tactics changed from banzai charges to making the Americans bleed. Foxholes were out of the question since you can't dig into coral. Drinking water contaminated by oil didn't help matters.

Hindsight is great but it wasn't available when this invasion happened to know about Japanese cave defensive systems and other surprises.

The other review states blame is placed on MG Paul Mueller and upon Rear Admiral William H. P. Blandy. What the book states is "The commanding general of the 81st Division wanted to land as soon as possible, and he was supported in his view by his naval task unit commander, Rear Admiral William H. P. Blandy. Opposing the 17 September date for the Angaur landing was Marine Major General Julian Smith. Smith argued that committing the element of III Corps Reserve before the Peleliu operation was more fully developed would be premature. His advice was ignored by Vice Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson." Wilkinson as a three star would take the blame.

Plenty of blame is placed on Rupertus in the book- "The other obstacle to reinforcing the division on Peleliu and encircling the Pocket lay in the thinking of General Rupertus, who clung to a belief that his Marines could do it without help from the Army. The III Corps plan tasked the 81st Division to reinforce the Marines in seizing Peleliu and then to relieve the 1st Marine Division for the mop up, but the general continued to exhort his commanders to "hurry up."

"Even after General Geiger had ordered General Rupertus on 21 September to stand down Puller's shattered 1st Marines, General Rupertus expressed the belief that his Marines, alone, would shortly clear the entire island. After taking a closer look at the situation on the ground. Geiger ordered RCT 321 from Angaur and attached it to the Marine division. Encirclement of the Umurbrogol Pocket now became tactically feasible."

Criticism of Rupertus occurs elsewhere as well in this material.

The last paragraph of the other review reveals a lot about the personal viewpoint of the other reviewer if you check their review history and little of how these campaigns played out.

Peleliu was a fiasco. 1st Marine Division Commander William Rupertus beleived his division would take the island in 3 to 4 days. The Japanese garrisson, rather than meet the Marines on the Beaches, occupied prepared positions in a rugged, easily defended area called the Umurbrogol, positions which were impregnable to direct frontal attack. Rupertus tried to break Japanese resistance via the tactic of direct frontal attack. The result was thousands of killed and wounded for the Marines in return for no gain.

The Headquarters charged with taking Peleliu was III Amphibious Corps, commanded by Marine MG Roy Geiger. MG Geiger had two divisions, 1st Marine Division and 81st Infantry Division. III Amphibious Corps also had additional objectives, Angaur, Yap, Ulithi. 81stID's mission was to be the floating reserve, to provide reinforcements for 1st Marine Division should 1st Marine DIvision need reinforcing. 81st Infantry Division was not to be released for other missions unless Rupertus reported the 1st Marine Division did not need reinforcing.

Although he was taking heavy casualties and making no progress, Rupertus was reporting to Geiger that his situation was favorable and he did not need reinforcing. On September 17, 1944, 81st Infantry Division was released to go after the other objectives, Anguaur,Yap, Ulithi. Consequently, at a time when 1st Marine Division needed reinforcing, III Amphibious Corps had no reserve.

Gayle seems to place blame on 81st ID Commander MG Paul Mueller and upon Rear Admiral William H. P. Blandy, who commanded the task group carrying 81st ID, his argument seeming to be that MG Mueller and RADM Blandy insisted on carrying out the Angaur operation although the Army troops were needed on Peleliu. The real situation was, Rupertus did not like the Army, Rupertus did not want Army troops on Peleliu, and the 81st ID was not released until after Rupertus assured Geiger that Army reinforcements were not needed on Peleliu.

In World War II, in spite of their status as an elite force, the Marine Corps was not a very effective tactical organization. They were not very good at winning battles, and it was not uncommon that a "Marine" victory happened because of intervention of Army troops, and Peleliu was a prime example. It was not uncommon for Marines to blame Marine ineffectiveness on Army troops, and this book seem to be an example.