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The Bloody Crucible of Courage: Fighting Methods and Combat Experience of the Civil War

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This superlative book is one of the first to breakthrough many of the myths and lore that have become so common in the study of our Civil War. Americans relish this conflict as a national rite of passage, yet seldom has a war been so venerated, with so little known about how it was actually fought. There have been countless books on this subject, yet few provide any solid picture as to how troops actually fought, with what methods, and how their weapons performed in the bloody crucible of combat.

This is a book that the study of the Civil War has long awaited. Yet, its acceptence may be hard for many devotees to accept. The American Civil War has cherished many myths and ideas, which, when taken out of their isolaoted context and compared with other conflicts of the time may seem less significant. This will be hard for many Civil War fans to swallow at first, but if they are to emerge with a greater understanding of this conflict, they must allow their beloved topic to be studied out of its box. This is something which the subject has long demanded, and which many the so-called experts in the field have been unable to do. Here Mr. Nosworthy has carefully studied the Civil War in comparison with contemporary wars of the day to provide a comparative analysis. We learn how the military studies of Jomini actually distorted how Americans perceived true Napoleanic tactics. Jomini was a conservetive French military writer who drew upon aspects of Napoleanic tactics to support his own views. The results across the Atlantic in America was a bizarre hybrid of columnar and linear tactics which would make the Civil War so difficult to compare to other conflicts. In fact if we look at the grand tactical elements of many of the Civil War battles we might be surprised to learn how un-Napoleanic they actually were. Jomini was more an advocate of 18th century linear warfare, where control of the entire line of battle was essential. This satisfied his conservetive ideas well, while to appear modern he threw in a few columns of the Napoleanic Wars just for good measure! we tend to look on civil war battles as more or less linear engagements, or heavy skirmish lines where prolonged firefights dragged on for hours. Nosworthy shows us that columns were indeed used, though not the flexible smaller ones of the Napoleanic period. Civil war troops were frequently deployed into columns of regimental width, arrayed along successive lines. Many battles saw this employment, yet this is something which has gone over the heads of most Civil War historians. American officers, following more or less the Jomini principles, added their own variations by tending to deploy early in most engagements. Civil War troops might march into battle in column, but they were generally formed into line. Still, these tactical distinctions so long ignored by many, are brought to the fore here for the first time.

Nosworthy is also careful to interlace primary accounts within his text to provide first hand accounts of how formations were used. This goes to show that such information was always there, but was never examined in this light before. Many contemporary journals are also used to show how current debates of the time discussed the issues at hand. These have long been ignored by most historians of the conflict. Instead, most secondary works have concentrated on troop movements, commanders decisions, and some general descriptions of how bloody some of the battles were. Our fuller understanding of how grand tactics played themselves out on the battlefiled have been largely ignored by these historians. Nosworthy further explains that in order to understand the nature of Civil War combat we must see how military matters stood abroad. This is something most have been unwiulling or unable to do. We learn for example how many American historians have wrongly attributed Napoleanic tactics to Napolean I, instead of to his grandson Napolean III who was a contemporary of the Civil War. References to Napoleanic tactics at the time were intended to mean this, but over the years Americans became confused over which Napolean was actually concerned! This subtle, but vitally important difference has been lost on generations of Civil War historians. We must remember that French military doctrine and style were vital until the eclispe of the Second Empire by the Prussians in 1870. The wars of Napolean III in Moracco, Italy and the Crimea had profound influences on American military thought. This has largely been forgotten in most studies today. In their desire to make the Civil War a purely "American" expereince, many American historians simpy overlooked these important facts. They have continued to do so today.

Nosworthy attempts to break the Civil War down into various parts so that we can see the variations that existed. He creates for us an anatomy of Civil War combat. This has not been done before to this extent here. We learn how combat differed in the Eastern and Western threaters of the war, we also see developments in ironclad technology, artillery, cavalry and infantry. We even see how ilregulars like Forest and Moseby conducted their hit and run battles. All of these aspects are discussed clearly, in one single volume, without bias, and without the legends and lore of the Civil War distorting matters. This book also dispels many myths about combat in the Civil War. Infantry firefights generally took place at much shorter ranges than we have been lead to believe. We learn that rifled muskets might not have been the sole reason for increased casaulty rates. Most Americans, unlike their European counterparts, were more familar with firearms because of the frontier style of life many had adopted in the Southern and Western parts of the country. In combat this translated into more accurate fire whether with rifled or smoothbore muskets. The stresses of combat often profoundly influenced how weapons performed as oppsed to the testing ground. Few studies have taken this into account. The bayonet, so often lauded as the decisive weapon of the war, was in fact more a pyschological threat than a physical one. There is a big difference between a bayonet fight and a bayonet charge. Many Civil War memoirs often don't make the difference. The former was very rare, while the latter more commonplace and almost never resulted in actual combat between opposing troops in open ground. Such careful reading into these accounts enables us to perceive details that were never considered before.

The final summation shows us that Europeans did not discount the Civil War, but simply saw it as one of many conflcits of the period. Many of the so-called firsts of the war which American historians are so proud to point out had in fact taken place already in earlier conflicts. The use of Ironclad technology, rifled muskets, railroads, etc had already occured by the time of the Civil War. The subsequent development of Prussian tactics employing skirmish lines supported by small mobile columns would revolutionize future tactics and provided a tactical flexibility that was unknown on the Civil War battlefield.

The final conclusion of this book is that the American Civil War needs to be studied outside of its own little box if it is to have any significant place in the evolution of warfare. Some readers may find this hard to swallow, but it is so. This book should take its place along side the lenghty tomes of Mcpherson, Sears, Foote et al. By reading this book you will get a better understanding of the Civil war than has yet been provided to date on the nuts and bolts of the conflict. Highly recommended for serious Civil War buffs, re-enactors, wargamers, and all who want to get a better understanding of how the Civil War was really fought.

Brent Nosworthy describes himself as an "independent" author. He is also a Civil War re-enacter. In writing this book he has made an original and informative contribution to the historical analysis of the American Civil War.

Nosworthy covers a wide range of subjects, many of which I hadn't previously understood, such as why some units in the early days of the war called themselves "Zouaves" and wore funny red uniforms. It seems that the uniforms, the training, and the tactics of Zouave units were patterned after the special units developed by the French for fighting their wars in Algeria. The uniforms were quickly discarded when it became clear that they made excellent targets in the open fields and woods of Northern Virginia, but Zouave training and tactics continued to influence American military thinking throughout the war, and continue to do so to some extent even today.

He explains the origin of the term "Napoleon" for the bronze 12 pounder field artillery piece favored by both sides. It was named after Napoleon III, not Bonaparte. He explains how the ballistic pattern of the Minie ball influenced battlefield tactics, why generals on both sides were reluctant to use field fortifications until the very end of the war, and the rationale for using wool uniforms winter and summer.

Interesting as such details are to students of the Civil War, Nosworthy's use of first-person accounts to illustrate his points is the most effective aspect of the book. Nosworthy's re-enacter experience serves him well in these sections. He is able to convey the actual experience of the soldier on the battlefield with terrifying effect. One marvels at the willingness and ability of men to undergo the experience of Civil War battle just once, let alone repeatedly, as the veterens did.

He places the Civil War in the context of European military thinking of the time. It is significant that the Crimean War and Napoleon III's invasion of Italy occurred just before the Civil War, since Napoleon's Zouaves made their reputation as "shock troops" in those wars, particularly at the battle of Solferino. French military science was of the highest prestige in that period, and French military manuals were translated and used at West Point. The French debacle in 1870 changed all that, of course. The outlines of this evolution are well-known, but Nosworthy relates these general developments to the specifics of weapons and tactics in a highly illuminating manner.

In spite of the many good, even great, things about this book, it has several serious flaws.

Nosworthy has insufficient control of his material. He often loses focus and becomes repetitious. There is a lack of discipline and logic in the book's organization. He is argumentative at times, assuming the unbecoming role of "debunker". He is especially obnoxious in the final chapter, which is a rant against his fellow military historians, as though he is in some kind of competition with them, rather than in a cooperative search for the truth.

He goes to great lengths to prove his thesis that Civil War battlefield tactics weren't much different from those of the smooth-bore period, but he does not succeed. Why, if that were the case, were the frontal assaults of Pickett's Charge, Kenesaw Mountain, Cold Harbor, and many others, such disasters? He says himself that as the war progressed, troops on both sides tended more and more to entrench their positions almost immediately at the start of a battle. Why was this, if not because of the increased lethality of the rifled musket and Minie ball at long range? Is there any doubt that had the Americans at Bunker Hill been armed with rifled muskets the British regular troops wouldn't have been able to form up their lines to begin with, let alone to eventually throw the colonials out of their trenches?

His prose rivals that of the best when describing the experiences of men in battle, but when expressing his personal opinions his language becomes pompous and verbose, as though he had read one too many 19th century memoir. The unevenness of his writing is the most noticeable symptom of his lack of professional training. A good editor could have helped him with this.

He tries to create a new term, the "rifle musket", using it repeatedly. George R. Stewart, Bruce Catton, and William McNeill were content with "rifled musket", in which "rifle" assumes the adjectival form with the "-ed" ending. Nosworthy himself writes of "rifled artillery", so why create a compound noun "rifle musket"? It's an unnecessary distraction.

He seems to think "nonplussed" means "unperturbed" or "stalwart", rather "perplexity", its true meaning. Again, a good editor could have saved him from this embarrassment.

Any Civil War "buff" will find this book, in spite of its flaws, well worth reading. It's a good book. A good editor could have helped make it a great book.

I will start out by admitting a personal interest in Brent Nosworthy's "The Bloody Crucible of Courage: Fighting Methods and Combat Experience of the Civil War". For several years I have aided Mr. Nosworthy in researching this book and by reading various drafts as it evolved. He delved deep into standard material such as personal memoirs and the Official Record's (CD-ROM searches in those 100,000-plus pages proved of immense value in the course of the research, allowing for a completeness of inquiry simply not possible before), and also into seldom-used sources such as "Scientific American" and the Fall River, Massachusetts, "Manufacturer and Farmer's Journal" for a mid-Ninteenth Century perspective as he examined weapons technology and tactical theory, implementation, and evolution.

It is no wonder that Joseph Bilby says: "This is a landmark work that establishes a new standard of excellence. No future Civil War campaign or battle study will be written without extensive reference to The Bloody Crucible of Courage." Gordon Rhea states it "deserves an honored place on the shelf of every Civil War scholar and buff." And Paddy Griffith writes;" The Bloody Crucible of Courage" is indeed the book we have long been waiting for! It is essential reading, not least for the wider European perspective that it casts upon a war that has too often in the past been viewed through very parochial spectacles. And beyond that refreshing historiographical perspective, this work also offers us a truly magnificent quarry of facts, explanations and pertinent interpretations that every student of the Civil War will surely want to keep constantly at hand." Often I take such dust jacket blurbs with a grain of salt, but this is one case where I will gladly support the opinions expressed.

This is not a dry, encyclopedic recounting of weapons specifications or tactical minutiae of how the third sergeant should move when a company changes from line of battle to a column of fours by the left flank. Rather, it is a highly readable work that ranges far and wide across infantry, artillery, cavalry and even naval forces, exploring how combat was really conducted and how that came about, looking at the roots of the weapons and tactical systems in Europe as well as in the US, and following the lengthy and often heated debates that were waged during the 1850's and well into the war over these matters. These discussions are illuminated by numerous battlefield examples of the use of these weapons and tactics, vividly described. Probably no such debate was more crucial than that over the best shoulder weapon to be issued to infantry: rifled versus smoothbore, muzzleloading versus breechloading. And contrary to modern assumptions, the choice was not at the time altogether straightforward and obvious, even given the experience of recent European wars. One of the intriguing elements that arises from Nosworthy's analysis of these matters is that he tentatively concludes that, for reasons still not entirely understood, in general American troops appeared to achieve better results (i.e., inflicted higher numbers of losses) than their European counterparts, whether using smoothbores or rifle-muskets.

This book has been a long time coming. The very first time I contacted Brent Nosworthy, whose name I knew from his excellent book on Napoleonic warfare, was to ask him whether some day he might write a similar one on American Civil War tactics. Little did I know where this simple question would eventually lead. "The Bloody Crucible of Courage" is a book I am proud to have helped in any fashion to come into being. There has never been a comparable work published about the Civil War, and I am confident that it will do much to shape our future perceptions and study of that conflict. It gets my highest recommendation.

In writing the "Bloody Crucible of Courage" Mr. Nosworty undertook a comprehensive study of interrelated subjects that are not well represented in the plethora of literature on the War. While presenting a large amount of carefully-researched and well-documented information, the author has not written a good book.

Content is of major importance in any book, but presentation, balance, accuracy and many other factors affect the quality and value of the work. It is in these supporting factors that "The Bloody Crucible..." falls short.

The subtitle of the book "Fighting Methods and Combat Experience in the Civil War" is inaccurate. It would have been far more accurate to to have subtitled it "Fighting Methods and Combat Experiences of the Union Army in the Civil War" for the text is so heavily weighted toward the Union Army that the reader is left wondering if there were significant differences in the Confederate approach or if the conditions under which the Confedrates fought or cultural differences led to other methods. There is little comparison or contrast between the two armies or between the Eastern and Western theaters. This reader felt short-changed. A notable example is the short shrift given to the Confederate cavalry of the early war years. There appears to be a bias toward the Union that is not appropriate with the historical perspective we now have.

The bias is reflected in the anecdotal material which is so filled with accounts of stunning Union victories and routs of Confederates that a reader could be hard-pressed to understand how the war lasted four years. Perhaps his personal military experience influences the author to take regimental histories and first hand accounts at face value. To put this type of material in perspective I suggest he at least reread "Battles and Leaders..." and consider the self-serving nature of much of the material therein.

In the Introduction the author criticizes Ian Drury and Tony Gibbons for not using anecdotal material in their excellent "The Civil War Machine". In the "Crucible..." he gives a vivid demonstration of the hazards of doing so by presenting the reader with:(1) Large--in my opinion excessive--amounts of anecdotal material (2) Anecdotes too lengthy for the minor points they make, and (3) Anecdotes not sharply focused on the point.

The overall impression is that the anecdotes are being used as filler. In fact there is so much material that is not clearly related to the theme of the book that it appears the contract called for 650 pages and that's what they were going to get.
The penultimate chapter "Tactical Development in European Warfare 1859-71" and the final chapter "Conclusions" which is primarily devoted to "The Impact of Systematic Biases on Military History" and "What Must be Done' exemplify material that is far away from the theme of the book.

A great part of the value and utility of a book like "The Bloody Crucible..." lies in careful editing to focus the book on its subject and to repair or remove those sentences and paprgraphs that don't work. This book would have benefitted greatly from one more time through. I often found myself rereading turgid or confusing material to get the sense of it. I was not always successful.

Equally important is the attention to such things as foot- or endnoting and indexing. The endnote system in this book uses no numbering system and thus no number on the page where the note applies. It is obviously cheaper to produce the book with this system, but this system is hard to use and does not lend itself to additional expository or anecdotal material that breaks the flow of the text. It is not a system worthy of serious historical writing. The index contains errors--a serious fault and one that can easily be corrected by attention to detail. Index errors seriously degrade the books use as a reference. The overall impression is that rushing the book into production was more important than producing a book of high quality and utility

This book will gather dust, unlikely to be reread or frequently referred to.

I am not a Civil War buff and haven't read a ton of military history, but I really liked this book. It was very well written and explained the tactics and weapons used in the context of what other countries were doing around the same time. I read another review that said this was "dry", and I guess it is if you are looking for heart-tugging emotional stories about the soldiers' lives. But if you are looking for a clear and revealing overview of how soldiers prepared and fought on a technical level, without the usual Civil War pretense or bombast, this is very enjoyable and informative.

First, this is a difficult book to place - I found it while browsing in a bookstore, and it fully met my expectations, but it's not for the general audience, and probably not even the general Civil War reader. Two key groups who would most benefit from this book are Napoleonic and Civil War re-enactors and gamers. The latter would include both computer, board and miniatures players, and the book directly addresses problems each of those genres faces in verisimilitude. For example, the discussions of placement of artillery and types of ammunition bring forth considerations that are ignored by most games on the market, especially the psychological effects.
Nosworthy sets out to write the definitive book, but falls short; but it's certainly the best attempt yet. He starts with the decades before the war, examining practices in Europe, and finishes with several excellent chapters which stand alone as essays. These discuss the place of the Civil War in military history and thinking. The discussions of tactical doctrine are enlivened by vivid anecdotes. This relieves the potentially dreary theoretical passages, but the jumps can be disorienting. Sometimes the anecdotes are on point, other times, their usefulness is questionable. It needs better editing, both on this scale and to fix the numerous smaller typos and editing problems.
Despite these misgivings, I'd highly recommend this book -- he examines many 'myths' of the Civil War, such as the diminished role of cavalry; the effectiveness of edged weapons; the rifled versus smoothbore controversy for both artillery and small arms. (If these topics don't pique your interest, the book's probably not for you). The bayonet discussions in particular are novel - while agreeing with the consensus view that bayonet wounds were rare, he makes the stronger argument that bayonet ATTACKS played a key role in many actions. The rifle-smoothbore discussions also provide an excellent view of the historical transitions and adjustments from the French Revolutionary army thru Napoleon and the Civil War to the German domination in 1870. He tries to overturn many long held truisms about the Civil War, but the evidence he presents varies in its persuasiveness. At the least, though, he provides alternatives for what is often by hindsight thought of as obvious -- e.g., the long discussions of rifled and breech loading weapons are shown to have many more considerations, such as difficulty of aiming (muskets fire at the level, while rifles fire on a parabolic curve and require more precise attention). Of sidebar interest too, is the dominance of Scientific American in the military debates of the 1840-60's. Its current emphasis on theoretical and cutting edge advances in pure science obscures thee fact that it in the 19th century a much stronger emphasis was on the engineering and mechanical arts.

This book is both larger and smaller than it seems at first glance and heft -- it's 750 pages long, but the print is larger than average and the paper is thick, making for a pleasant tactile feel. In content, the book wanders, sometimes dealing in broad strategic and tactical analysis, other times dropping down to the minutiae of combat anecdotes.

This volume is like the Powder River-an inch deep and a mile wide. While the author has evidently done a large amount of research from a very impressive bibliography, the text, and many of the conclusions, don't match the effort that was quite obviously put into this book.

There is a lot of good information in this volume, but it appears to this reviewer that the author was attempting to be all things to all readers and enthusiasts. That, coupled with some glaring errors and critical information left out leaves the book crippled.

The artillery section, for example, is very poorly done. Information in the section(s), such as ammunition, the reference to French artillery practices in the Napoleonic period, tactics, and the problem with identifying Henry Jackson Hunt (who would become the artillery chief of the Army of the Potomac) giving him three separate entries in the Index, all contribute to the impression that the research done here was superficial at best.

Further, while the excellent Artillerist's Manual by John Gibbon is referenced, the equally excellent, and necessary, Ordnance and Gunnery by Benton and Field Artillery Tactics 1864 have not. Other excellent artillery references, such as The Guns at Gettysburg and Sound of the Guns by Fairfax Downey have not been referenced which would have enabled the author to develop his artillery sections in the book to an acceptable and accurate level of scholarship.

Emory Upton has only been mentioned in passing, and his comrade in arms, David Russell, not at all. Upton was arguably the best tactician produced by either side in the conflict and his absence is striking. He and Russell were responsible for the superb night attack at Rappahannock Station in November 1863, the first successful night attack of the war. Further, Upton's famous assault at Spotsylvania in 1864 is barely mentioned in passing. Seems to me that these innovative and successful tactics should have been presented for discussion and review along with some of the other examples the author focuses on.

Further, James Wilson, the famous Union cavalry commander whose horsemen rampaged in the South late in the war and defeated Bedford Forrest gets no mention in this text.

The excellent Time-Life Civil War Series doesn't appear to have been used as source material, while such dubious works as Attack and Die have been. While the Time-Life Series is a secondary source, it is an immense study, full of primary source material contributed by an excellent team of Civil War historians.

While a noble effort, this work falls short of its intended objective and contains too many errors to be used as a standard reference. This is the same situation with the authors two other works, The Anatomy of Victory and With Musket, Cannon, and Sword, which is unfortunate.

As a long-term Civil war buff and miniature wargamer, I found Brent Nosworthy's "The Bloody Crucible of Courage" to be thought-provoking and stimulating, forcing me to relook at some of my long-held perceptions regarding Civil War combat tactics. As with his previous work om the Napoleonic period, the author carefully examines the wepons, tactics, and combat methods. Often, authors who tackle this subject tend to take a strictly North American viewpoint, isolating ACW events, strategy, and battlefield tactics to a nationalistic perspective. Mr. Nosworthy properly examines how global military tactics and international advances in weapons and killing power significantly influenced Civil War thinking (well beyiond the trite and conventional comments often seen that Civil War officers used Napoleonic tactics). Nosworthy correctly points out that the mid-19th Century American officers were much moire in tune with more recent tactivs being used in Europe and elsewhere (perhaps reminiscent of Napoleon in spome aspects, but certainly not to the extent that other writers have claimed).

As a tour guide and frequent speaker at Gettysburg, I am so tired of the cliches that Pickett and Lee were trying to recreate some grand assualt at Borodino or Waterloo on Day 3 at Gettysburg. Brent Nosworthy helps keep the Civil War in its proper context, and offers some fresh ideas that are well-worth strong consideration.

A must read for any serious Civil War enthusiast!

Whether or not one agrees or disagrees with Brent Nosworthy's conclusions in The Bloody Crucible of Courage is not the point. What Civil War enthusiasts must appreciate is that if you want to understand the study of Civil War tactics, if you want to know the state of the question about the rifle revolution, you must read this book. If you do not read this book, you can not be an informed participant in the current debate.

Do I agree with all of his conclusions? No, but this book has made me reexamine the subject and ask new questions. More research needs to be done before we can reach more conclusive answers, but that new research must deal with the issues raised in The Bloody Crucible of Courage.

This is the only book I have found that gets into the details of why Civil War battles were fought the way they were. I always thought it seemed ridiculous that two armies would march in a line and just maul each other, but this book explains the logic and evolution of these tactics. Also, other Civil War books frustrated me because they just assume you know all the little details about small arms, artillery, and field works. This book just doesn't tell you about what they are, but how they were developed over time.

Unfortunately, I have to agree with another reviewer--the book is very dry because Nosworthy seems to repeat the same information over and over again. For example, he explains the Civil War rifled musket shortcoming of low muzzle velocity over and over again in the book, as if we had not read the previous chapters. It is a shame it so dry, because I think more books like this are needed.