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2 of 2 people found the following review helpful:
1.0 out of 5 stars
Derivative, Spurious Scholarship. SKIP IT!, July 31, 2010
"Blue water Patriots', an aggravating book fit only to be used as a fly-swatter, repeatedly insults American patriots' motives, thoughts, and opinions before and during the ARW without any basis in facts in the form of quotes from letters or speeches of specific persons of that time. This is a "take the names and dates" collection, that's more "BNA Tory" in attitude than Whig, (British or American). The author would have been liberally coated in 78 degree F. tar, and feathers, rather than winning a B. A. for scholarship, had he written this mulch in Boston in 1775. In the same sentence in which he calls groups of British sailors "jack-tars", (customarily armed for 1774 impressment duties in Boston with wooden cudgels the size and weight of Babe Ruth's baseball bats), he calls the unarmed colonial farmers and sailors confronted by them "thugs". He mentions that colonials were upset about the actions of certain British Navy ships patrolling the waters near isolated communities; but never says why. He never mentions that at least one of the captains whose ships were burned to the waterline by angry Americans made it his barely-legal habit to send bands of his ship's "jack-tars" sweeping into isolated farms, where they took part or all of a year's hard-earned winter food stores, paying with paper script which could only be redeemed in cities hundreds of miles away by sea. The book is derivative, however it appears to have derived only the attitudes of British Tories during their most foolish period of British rule, not the reasoned opinions of the men of time, British or American. He writes of the Stamp Act and the Intolerable Acts as if they were good things that the colonials just didn't understand. This book is a sly slam on our cash-poor, hard-working, brave, long-dead ancestors, long after the fact. Don't waste your money, time, or emotional peace-of-mind on wanting to rip it up with your bare hands. SKIP IT!
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2 of 2 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
A wealth of history!, January 21, 2010
I was fortunate to have met the author at a book signing at Connecticut's Mystic Seaport - an appropriate outlet for this book! At first, I thought that this was "just another history book", but after a few minutes of talking with Mr. Volo, I was impressed with his knowledge of naval events during the Revolutionary war against England. Most of can recall a naval battle or two during the Revolutionary war, and perhaps a quote by John Paul Jones, but what do we really know about the naval aspect of the Revolutionary war? During the Revolutionary war, England was the world's premiere naval power, while the Colonies were barely more than assembling of like-minded people. With just a handful of ships, how did the Colonials defeat such a superior naval power? Many of the battles that were keys to winning the Revolutionary war are barely known, or at best, briefly discussed and glossed over in traditional history classes, while the author delves into detail about the naval engagements, how they supported the land troops, and how the Admiralty of England's navy unwittingly helped the Colonials by much infighting. If you have a love for history, or even just a passing interest in ships, I highly recommend this book. This is certainly one "sea worthy" book!
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2 of 3 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
BLUE WATER PATRIOTS: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AFLOAT, May 3, 2010
BLUE WATER PATRIOTS: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AFLOAT JAMES M. VOLO ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHING GROUP, 2006 QUALITY SOFTCOVER, $18.95, 320 PAGES, APPENDICES, MAPS, NOTES, ILLUSTRATIONS, BIBLIOGRAPHY, PHOTOGRAPHS "In any operation and under all circumstances a decisive naval superiority is to be considered as a fundamental principle, and the basis upon which every hope of success must ultimately depend"-Washington wrote to Lafayette during the American Revolution. The war at sea changed its characteristics during the American Revolution. In the early stages, when the conflict was purely Anglo-American, the British held the mastery of the seas in that the Royal Navy's line of battle remained unchallenged. However, American colonial navies and privateers could provide a severe challenge to trade and stretch British resources. In 1778, the British edge deteriorated after the French entered the conflict. Despite the French Navy being smaller than the British, its admirals, such as de Grasse and Suffren, posed intense threats to Britain. In 1779, Spain joined France and the total naval balance, in numbers but not necessarily quality, was overturned. Britain's position was further weakened when Holland joined France and Spain in 1781. However, although outnumbered after 1778, Britain seldom lost local naval superiority except before Yorktown, a crucial situation benefiting Washington and Rochambeau in their march to Yorktown and their reinforcement of Lafayette in surrounding Cornwallis. Elsewhere, Britain, either through plan or accident, managed to defeat small enemy squadrons piecemeal: at Ulshant, Cape St. Vincent, the Dogger Bank, and Ulshant again. Only at the end of the war were British logistics stretched to a breaking point, but they managed to continue to finance the huge global struggle because of superior taxation and credit system. France slipped into financial collapse and revolution in 1789, partially as a result of the enormous costs of both the French and Indian War and the American Revolution. The colonists didn't have years to organize their navy. Instead, the colonists were faced with the almost impossible task of creating a navy from scratch when they declared their independence from Great Britain. It isn't surprising that the colonists failed; rather it is amazing that they accomplished anything at all. The first warships of the young nation were converted merchant ships; the first officers were taken from the merchant marine or were political appointees. Some of the new captains-John Paul Jones and Nicholas Biddle to name a few-were charismatic leaders with courage and brilliance, and were equal to the best foreign captains. Many more officers, however, proved entirely lacking in the required skills, and were as bad as the worst officers in other navies. Hardly any of the first group of officers had any prior combat experience. American warships came from three sources: the Continental (national) Navy, the various states' navies, and privateers. The Continental Navy was raised by decree of the Continental Congress, and was intended to be a regular navy, modeled on the lines of the British Royal Navy. Most of the states also raised their own navies, using them mainly for coastal defense. Lastly, private citizens could obtain letters of marque. These were licenses allowing them legally to capture enemy ships or "prizes" and make whatever profit from their prizes that they could. It was a lucrative but risky business; while some captains made their fortunes seizing and selling British merchant ships and crew, many others were captured, and languished in British prison hulls. There were some 70,000 colonial seamen involved in privateering! On December 13, 1775, the Continental Congress authorized the construction of thirteen frigates, one to represent each of the rebellious colonies. These frigates were to form the backbone of the new American Navy. These ships were in general larger than British ships of the same type, and appear to have been generally well-designed ships, despite their shipwrights' lack of experience in designing warships. Six of the thirteen were captured or burnt to avoid capture before ever putting to sea. All of the remaining seven were destroyed or captured by July, 1781, and most of them accomplished little before meeting their fates. Before the first batch of frigates had been completed, Congress passed a new naval act calling for the construction of three 74-gun ships of the line and five 36-gun frigates, in addition to smaller ships. This was a grandiose plan that was soon shown to be completely impractical, and in the end only the America (74 guns) and the Alliance (36 guns) were ever completed. In the end, the British Royal Navy failed in the American Revolution for a number of reasons: the war had became a sideshow when the French threatened the British Empire as a whole, factionalism, personal vendettas, a lack of resources, and the lack of a coherent strategy. BLUE WATER PATRIOTS: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AFLOAT recognizes the American Revolution as a maritime conflict and fully explores the struggle for command of the sea. Broad and balanced in vision, it is the first study to mesh the operations of the young Continental Navy and various state navies with the movements of the British and French fleets. Through his careful examination of the role played by the Continental Navy, author James M. Volo makes it clear that the outcome of the American Revolution was decided not at Yorktown but at sea. Lt. Colonel Robert A. Lynn, Florida Guard Orlando, Florida
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