Customer Reviews

Blundering to Glory: Napoleon's Military Campaigns

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The extent and nature of Napoleon's genius will always be a matter of debate and controversy. Owen Connelly has added fuel to the fire in an interesting way. He is in fact trying to stir the pot, not least with the provocative title of this work. In the process, he has turned out his usual well-written, clear and concise work. This book is a great outline of Napoleon's campaigns, whether or not one agrees with his conclusions. I have put it to good use assigning it in my courses, and my students always enjoy it. They get a good, quick overview of Napoleonic warfare. Owen Connelly (an American) is one of the most knowledgable and objective living historians of the Napoleonic period.

Connelly analyzes Napoleon as "strategically challenged," but a masterful improvisor. Thus, per Connelly's analysis, Napoleon blunders into one potential disaster after another and snatches victory from the jaws of defeat only by scrambling brilliantly. Probably a more accurate assessment would be that Napoleon's confidence in his abilities and his troops made him willing to take enormous risks. When things went awry, his mental acumen and military ability usually carried him through to victory in spite of his overweening audacity. The book is an interesting read.

I started out very involved and interested in Connelly's premise, but as the book went on, he strained his credibility.

With such misleading statements as, "Massena scored a victory over [Wellington] at Bussaco in September 1810," Connelly made me wonder just how strenuously he had checked his facts and just what he may have twisted to suit his argument. Bussaco was a clear defeat for Massena, who had thrown five assaults at the British/Portuguese troops and been repulsed in every case. The allies were not only left in possession of the battlefield but had lost approximately 1,000 men to Massena's 4,000. How Connelly could count that as a victory for Massena is beyond me. Unless, of course the fact that, two days AFTER the battle, Massena's drive to outflank the allies caused Wellington to start his strategic withdrawal toward the Lines of Torres Vedras, is what Connelly calls a "victory."

And it made me wonder, what else did Connelly change or leave out...what may he have glossed over because it didn't suit his argument? One reviewer here complained that Connelly covered Napoleon's early battles extensively but barely covered what some consider to be Napoleon's most brilliant display of genius: the battles of 1814. Was 1814 glossed over, perhaps, because it was damaging to Connelly's argument? Who knows? It's too bad, really. This book had great promise, but it lost me through sheer sloppiness. My recommendation: Read it for its interesting approach, but don't expect to be convinced by the end of it.

I first read this little gem in 1992 & I've just finished my 4th enjoyable reading. Personally, I can't think of a more readable, economical, introduction to the Napoleonic wars. Following an introductory chapter on Bonaparte, each chapter examines a separate campaign (Italy, Austerlitz, Spain, Russia etc). Professor Connely's lifetime of scholarship in this field is well reflected throughout to include a comprehensive bibliography and a very good bibliographic essay examining works published since the first edition of this book. Whether you agree or disagree with his thesis (Napoleon the opportunist) this work is well worth the price. I also recommend Connelly's FRENCH REVOLUTION/NAPOLEONIC ERA, a short but well-done college text examing the military, political and cultural events of that period. Prior to attacking David Chandler's massive opus The CAMPAIGNS of NAPOLEON, also see
David Gates' The NAPOLEONIC WARS, Charles Esdaile's Thr WARS of NAPOLEON & Gunther Rothenberg's ART of WAR in the AGE of NAPOLEON.
All three are available in paperback. Happy reading!

Just because Napoleon scrambeled and won doesn't make him lucky in fact that's what makes him a great military leader. He was a detailed planner but he understood that no plan survives first contact and that adjustments need to be made on the fly. The side that can make the quicker and faster adjustments wins. I think the author should have stayed away from words like "Blundering" in the title because it gives the impression that he was lucky but nothing could be farther from the truth. If Napoleon was lucky you could say he made his own luck. The ability to quickly adapt plans especially when your moving large armies is predicated on detailed planning and a well trained chain of command and staff system - all the responsibility of the man in charge. This book, from this perspective, enhances the great reputation that Napoleon has and deserves.

It is a real gem of a volume, and although I have many other books on the Napoleonic Wars I have used it as a reference source countless times. The writing is very good, all trivial matters have been excluded and the maps although simple are numerous and informative. This book is the perfect choice for someone who wants to learn a lot about the wars of Napoleon without spending weeks to read the massive volumes of the other experts on the subject (Chanlder etc.)It gives the essence of Napoleon's operational art and reveals many little known aspects of his campaigns, like his excellent defensive maneuvers under desperate conditions in France in 1814.

The author of this book is an American university professor. This is a little unusual, in that most English-language history dealing with Napoleon is either a translation of something or British. Connelly wrote a book on Napoleon's family some time ago, but never before (that I know of) ventured into military history. That makes this book unusual too. But most unusual of all is the author's view of Napoleon on the battlefield. Connelly presents Napoleon as a soldier very concious of his own appearance in history, always looking in the mirror to make sure his coat's straight and his shoes are shined. He gives examples of Bonaparte's ego: the official Imperial account of the Battle of Marengo was rewritten several times to make sure everyone understood that the original surprise wasn't Napoleon's fault, and the late reinforcements commanded by General Desaix (which decided the battle in the French favor) had nothing to do with the French victory. The author refers to Napoleon as the "scrambler" and makes much of his energy and aggressiveness, which he credits with a great deal of Napoleon's reputation. An entertaining and lively reinterpretation of the great general's battlefield victories that should provoke discussion among any group of Napoleonic buffs

This was a very interesting and refreshing account of Napoleon the general and his military campaigns. Overall it offers a concise and interesting look at Napoleon's campaigns and battles and shows that he was a master of adapting to battlefield conditions.

The author states from the beginning that his book is not an in-depth account and anaylsis of Napoleon's military strategy and he does nothing that detracts from Napoleon's legend/myth. He argues that on a number of occassions Napoleon blundered in his strategy but he always regrouped and utilised what ever advantage he had to overcome his enemies.

I think the author did a good job in substaining this arguement and offers a number of accounts to justify his claims. You might not agree with what he has to say but you could not always fault his logic. Either way it was an interesting but quick story and I enjoyed the book.

For some reason, the Napoleonic Era is my passion. I love to consume books about it. I bought "Blundering to Glory" in order to learn more. All I could learn from it is that some people are still fighting the Napoleonic Wars. In the place of muskets and cannon are prejudiced words and propoganda of the age. Mr. Connelly uses the same Anglo-eccentric/ anti-Napoleon propoganda that was used back then. At first, I thought it different, but as each chapter unfolded it became easier and easier to predict what he would say. I usually keep the Napoleonic books that I purchase. Needless to say, this is one that I didn't keep. So, I suggest that you do not make the same mistake I made and instead save your money and look for authors like Peter Hofschroer, David Hamiton-Williams, Scott Bowden, John Codman Ropes, Jay Luvaas, Brent Nosworthy, George Nafziger, Andrew Uffindell,... the list goes on and on.

I thought this book was, in general, very well done. The author laid out his thesis quite openly and made a convincing argument for it, although he was never dogmatic about it. One complaint- the early Italian campaigns are covered in exhaustive detail, while all the post-Marengo campaigns are treated with comparative brevity. I think the author should have written a more balanced treatment. For example, the 1814 campaign in France is dealt with in a few paragraphs when, in my view, it should have had a complete chapter devoted to it. Nevertheless, I thought this book was good and the information contained in it was quite enlightening.