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25 of 29 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
Overly Optimistic, April 8, 2007
This book deals with something that most of us don't spend much time thinking about. We should think about it more.
Cirincione, the former director of the Nonproliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, takes the reader through the history of the development of nuclear weapons and the arms control agreements that have somewhat curtailed their spread. He presents a rational analysis of the drivers that cause states to seek to acquire nuclear weapons as well as the barriers that motivate some to turn away from the quest, or abandon it altogether.
And in the light of reasoned consideration he concludes, "The good news is that the nonproliferation regime has worked. The nuclear threat is less severe today than it was in 1970 when the Non-Proliferation Treaty entered into force". He bases this assessment on the fact that "the number of nuclear weapons in the world has declined from a peak of 65,000 in 1986, to roughly 27,000 today". But does this necessarily make the world a safer place?
Cirincione takes satisfaction that "the threat of a global thermonuclear war is now near zero". He goes on to state, "The dangers we face today are very serious, but they are orders of magnitude less severe than those we confronted just two decades ago from the overkill potential of U.S. and Russian arsenals. We no longer worry about the fate of the earth, but we still worry about the fate of our cities". It is in the ensuing discussion of nuclear terrorism that the upbeat tenor of the author's faith in the potential of negotiations and agreements to manage the imminent threat increasingly seems disconnected from reality.
While it is true that the threat of global thermonuclear war has diminished, the probability all out nuclear war was always very low as a result of the Strangelovian logic of mutually assured destruction. On the other hand, the likelihood of the detonation of a nuclear weapon smuggled into an American city by terrorists in the next decade is clearly significant. While such an event would not be the end of life on this planet, its societal, economic and political consequences would almost certainly be the end of life as we have come to know it. And, millions of people would die. This being the case, how can the author argue that the world is safer now than it was twenty years ago?
Cirincione also contends that the reduction in ballistic missiles is an indicator of a reduction of risk in the present day. What he neglects to consider is that weapons dispatched through alternate means - say in shipping containers with GPS activation - do not leave a return address, and as a result would not invite immediate retaliation. It would seem that a country hostile to the United States could launch such an attack with an impunity that would be inconceivable were the method of delivery a ballistic missile.
In this context it's hard to buy into the author's upbeat assessment of the future. As he would have it, securing existing weapons and stocks of fissile materials, new rounds of negotiations employing various carrots and sticks, and the good example of further disarmament by the US and Russia hold the promise of a better and a safer world. The problem is that while these actions are indeed necessary they are certainly not sufficient to produce the intended outcome. This is particularly the case given that some future nuclear adversaries may hold to apocalyptic world views.
Towards the end of the book Cirincione writes, "After wading through the history, theory, dangers, challenges and failures of proliferation policy, most readers could be excused for feeling a bit depressed. Don't be".
I guess I just can't help it. I am.
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16 of 21 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Sleeper Awake!, March 4, 2007
Perhaps the most significant issue in this century is not AIDS, the energy crisis, the environment or the Middle East but is the issue of universal nuclear disarmament. Joseph Cirincione has given us a clear solution to this problem in his book, BOMB SCARE: THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
The first recorded war between nation states occurred in 2700 BC. From that time to the present man has devised a plethora of clever devices to kill and maim his fellows.
Since the fall of the Soviet Union near the end of the last century (1991), the United States has funded the Russian government in the "cleanup" of warheads, bombs and other nuclear components scattered throughout the various nuclear facilities in the former Soviet Republic in an attempt to prevent terrorists and other non-nuclear nations from obtaining the same. Cirincione believes that "with additional funding, this threat reduction program could be accelerated to secure or eliminate the vast majority of nuclear weapons and materials by 2010."
The issue, of course, is that the "have-nots" want what the "haves" have: NUCLEAR ENERGY. Here the author proposes that a new system controlled by the International Atomic Energy Agency would provide a supply of nuclear material to countries that need it for civilian use in exchange for an agreement that those same countries not seek to build facilities to create their own "nuclear resources".
Cirincione understands that it is impossible to convince the "have-nots" to give up their nuclear weapons ambitions and to adhere to nonproliferation norms while the "haves" assert the importance of these weapons for their own safety and security (read that Pakistan and Iran). As one state goes nuclear, another state is forced to do the same thing ad infinitum: "in short, proliferation begets proliferation." Cirincione whimsically wonders if the obverse is possible.
188 countries are signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty that became effective in 1970. The only countries that have not signed are: Israel, Pakistan, and India. North Korea has withdrawn. These are the countries the treaty has unsuccessfully prevented from obtaining nuclear resources. The original signatories, the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France and China all agreed to ultimately dismantle their arsenals under a future agreement: to date that "future accord" has not happened. In fact, advances in this area have continued. Without compliance with this treaty, Cirincione posits the world faces a nuclear disaster.
In the end the author asks the reader to think beyond the old paradigms and to dare to explore ways to prevent what certainly, in the world's present state, is a sure slide into nuclear oblivion. This is more than a thoughtful book, it is a book every American should read and take to heart.
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11 of 14 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Optimistic, I hope he's correct, March 2, 2007
While the subtitle of this book might have you thinking this is a history of the construction of the bomb, it is really more of a history of the non-use of the bomb and of the various treaties that have effectively stopped the development of nuclear weapons by more states.
On the whole this has been a good journey. The time of the Bay of Pigs invasion was probably the most dangerous time in the history of the world. Unknown to Kennedy and his advisors, there were already nuclear weapons in Cuba and on board the submarines sent along with the merchant ships.
Since then nations with nuclear programs have cancelled their programs, nuclear arsenals have been reduced, and the threat has gone down.
The future part of the book is less certain. Nations like North Korea have announced their intention to build weapons. When the government there collapses, what will happen? For the first time Non Govermental Organizations (NGO's) such as terrorist groups are attempting to acquire weapons.
Mr. Cirincione is optimistic that the treaties in force, world opinion, and a stronger UN will prevale. Let us hope he is right.
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