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Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons

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This book deals with something that most of us don't spend much time thinking about. We should think about it more.

Cirincione, the former director of the Nonproliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, takes the reader through the history of the development of nuclear weapons and the arms control agreements that have somewhat curtailed their spread. He presents a rational analysis of the drivers that cause states to seek to acquire nuclear weapons as well as the barriers that motivate some to turn away from the quest, or abandon it altogether.

And in the light of reasoned consideration he concludes, "The good news is that the nonproliferation regime has worked. The nuclear threat is less severe today than it was in 1970 when the Non-Proliferation Treaty entered into force". He bases this assessment on the fact that "the number of nuclear weapons in the world has declined from a peak of 65,000 in 1986, to roughly 27,000 today". But does this necessarily make the world a safer place?

Cirincione takes satisfaction that "the threat of a global thermonuclear war is now near zero". He goes on to state, "The dangers we face today are very serious, but they are orders of magnitude less severe than those we confronted just two decades ago from the overkill potential of U.S. and Russian arsenals. We no longer worry about the fate of the earth, but we still worry about the fate of our cities". It is in the ensuing discussion of nuclear terrorism that the upbeat tenor of the author's faith in the potential of negotiations and agreements to manage the imminent threat increasingly seems disconnected from reality.

While it is true that the threat of global thermonuclear war has diminished, the probability all out nuclear war was always very low as a result of the Strangelovian logic of mutually assured destruction. On the other hand, the likelihood of the detonation of a nuclear weapon smuggled into an American city by terrorists in the next decade is clearly significant. While such an event would not be the end of life on this planet, its societal, economic and political consequences would almost certainly be the end of life as we have come to know it. And, millions of people would die. This being the case, how can the author argue that the world is safer now than it was twenty years ago?

Cirincione also contends that the reduction in ballistic missiles is an indicator of a reduction of risk in the present day. What he neglects to consider is that weapons dispatched through alternate means - say in shipping containers with GPS activation - do not leave a return address, and as a result would not invite immediate retaliation. It would seem that a country hostile to the United States could launch such an attack with an impunity that would be inconceivable were the method of delivery a ballistic missile.

In this context it's hard to buy into the author's upbeat assessment of the future. As he would have it, securing existing weapons and stocks of fissile materials, new rounds of negotiations employing various carrots and sticks, and the good example of further disarmament by the US and Russia hold the promise of a better and a safer world. The problem is that while these actions are indeed necessary they are certainly not sufficient to produce the intended outcome. This is particularly the case given that some future nuclear adversaries may hold to apocalyptic world views.

Towards the end of the book Cirincione writes, "After wading through the history, theory, dangers, challenges and failures of proliferation policy, most readers could be excused for feeling a bit depressed. Don't be".

I guess I just can't help it. I am.

This book contains a useful brief history of nuclear weapons. It reminds us of the massive arms build-up of the 1950s and 1960s and how the world came to the brink of annihilation in the Cuban missile program. It also puts into perspective international nonproliferation efforts which have enjoyed considerable success in slowing the spread of such weapons. Finally, it reminds us that arms control agreements beginning in the 1970s and accelerating in the late 1980s have dramatically reduced stockpiles making us all safer.
Latter chapters look at the Iraqi nuclear program and rehash tired arguments about the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq without adding anything new.
I have two main criticism. First, we don't get enough detail about how nuclear weapons spread to Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea and elsewhere. We hear nothing about the Israeli program; likewise there is no real assessment of the state of the North Korean program. The author seems relatively complacent about the Iranian program, contrary to other sources who believe it is well-advanced and on the brink of producing a weapon within two or three years.
Second, the book often reads like a policy-wonk briefing paper from a Washington think-tank (which I guess it is). The author could and should have tried harder to write regular English for ordinary readers.

BOMB SCARE: THE HISTORY & FUTURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS begins with the first atomic discoveries of the 1930s and covers the history of the growth of nuclear weapons through the decades, right up to the current crisis with Iran and the threat of worldwide proliferation. History, security analysis and theory blends in a general text for any student of world politics and military history, particularly at the college level.

Perhaps the most significant issue in this century is not AIDS, the energy crisis, the environment or the Middle East but is the issue of universal nuclear disarmament. Joseph Cirincione has given us a clear solution to this problem in his book, BOMB SCARE: THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

The first recorded war between nation states occurred in 2700 BC. From that time to the present man has devised a plethora of clever devices to kill and maim his fellows.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union near the end of the last century (1991), the United States has funded the Russian government in the "cleanup" of warheads, bombs and other nuclear components scattered throughout the various nuclear facilities in the former Soviet Republic in an attempt to prevent terrorists and other non-nuclear nations from obtaining the same. Cirincione believes that "with additional funding, this threat reduction program could be accelerated to secure or eliminate the vast majority of nuclear weapons and materials by 2010."

The issue, of course, is that the "have-nots" want what the "haves" have: NUCLEAR ENERGY. Here the author proposes that a new system controlled by the International Atomic Energy Agency would provide a supply of nuclear material to countries that need it for civilian use in exchange for an agreement that those same countries not seek to build facilities to create their own "nuclear resources".

Cirincione understands that it is impossible to convince the "have-nots" to give up their nuclear weapons ambitions and to adhere to nonproliferation norms while the "haves" assert the importance of these weapons for their own safety and security (read that Pakistan and Iran). As one state goes nuclear, another state is forced to do the same thing ad infinitum: "in short, proliferation begets proliferation." Cirincione whimsically wonders if the obverse is possible.

188 countries are signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty that became effective in 1970. The only countries that have not signed are: Israel, Pakistan, and India. North Korea has withdrawn. These are the countries the treaty has unsuccessfully prevented from obtaining nuclear resources. The original signatories, the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France and China all agreed to ultimately dismantle their arsenals under a future agreement: to date that "future accord" has not happened. In fact, advances in this area have continued. Without compliance with this treaty, Cirincione posits the world faces a nuclear disaster.

In the end the author asks the reader to think beyond the old paradigms and to dare to explore ways to prevent what certainly, in the world's present state, is a sure slide into nuclear oblivion. This is more than a thoughtful book, it is a book every American should read and take to heart.

This book reviews the history of nuclear weapons and nonproliferation agreements and offers some solutions to the threat of nuclear terrorism as well as ideas to address lack of security of the nuclear fuel supply and preventing the development of new nuclear-weapon states. Cirincione clearly knows his policy issues and history. As often happens with policy-trained writers, however, some of the technical details get garbled: a discussion of assembly timing issues in the gun and implosion mechanisms of Little Boy and Fat Man are sufficiently garbled as to indicate that the author is unaware of the crucial role of spontaneous fission, and one also finds the patently incorrect assertion that the Sun will be able to synthesize elements as heavy as sulfur. These are quibbles in comparison to the grand themes of nonproliferation and disarmament, but one would expect an author of this experience to be more careful: policy issues can hang on technicalities. For the physics, read Bernstein, Serber, Garwin & Charpak and Hoddeson, et al. Cirincione proposes a multi-national system of assured nuclear fuel services, a sort of updated Baruch plan minus any requirement or incentive for current nuclear weapon states to decrease their arsenals. He is silent, however, concerning the resistance such a scheme would likely face from likely US suspicion of a UN-administered program and the vested interests of producers and consumers of nuclear materials and weapons. He also does not address what to do with waste fuel, not a gram of which seems likely to see the inside of Yucca Mountain anytime soon. His suggestion that Israel consider abandoning its nuclear capability without proposals for security guarantees from its neighbors seems divorced from reality.

"Bomb Scare" is full of credible and helpful data, as well as balanced in its assessments.

Early on readers learn that it takes about 80 generations of neutrons to fission a kilogram of material - this takes about 0.8 microseconds and creates a temperature of 10 billion Celsius. A gun design plug in an enriched uranium bomb has to travel at at least 1,000 ft./second to initiate a sustained chain reaction. The Hiroshima bomb gun barrel weighed about 1,000 lbs. and was 6 feet long; the bomb itself used 64 kilos of U-235. Today this could be accomplished with 25 kilos and put into a package about the size of a small melon. (Plutonium could not be used in a gun design - its neutrons are too fast.)

Implosion-type designs are used for plutonium bombs. About 6 kilos was used for the Trinity test and at Nagasaki. Modern weapons use about 5 kilograms - about the size of a plum. (So much for the debate on whether "suitcase" bombs are feasible.)

The first U.S. H-bomb had a yield of 10.4 megatons.

The U.S. total stockpile of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons reached around 20,000 by 1960, vs. 1,600 for the Russians. (So much for Kennedy's argument that the U.S. had a "bomb gap.") We recently learned that during the Cuban missile crisis the Russians had already positioned about 100 nuclear weapons in Cuba.

There are five main reasons states acquire nuclear weapons: Security, prestige, domestic politics, technology, and economics. Different sides of the same reasons are also why many nations choose not to acquire such weapons.

Cirincione sees Russia as the #1 potential source of nuclear weapons/material for terrorists. It has thousands of nuclear weapons at 150-210 sites and hundreds of nuclear materials at about 49 sites. Experts believe that it would be difficult for terrorists to acquire a completed bomb - they are well guarded and utilize complex security locks. On the other hand, experts also believe that terrorists could construct a bomb from enriched material with only 3-4 technically people.

Pakistan is seen as a close #2 potential source. USA Today reported in November of 2001 that at least 10 Taliban had contacted Pakistani scientists in the prior two years. Pakistan has enough highly enriched uranium to make 50-100 bombs.

There are also about 40 nations with civilian stockpiles for power reactors. While not sufficiently enriched for nuclear weapons, it would be a simple matter to extend the enrichment process to create such.

Potential nuclear powder-kegs involve U.S. and Russian weapons being on 15-minute alert, and situations involving Taiwan, or India-Pakistan. Adverse recent events include the U.S. invasion of Iraq (increased terrorist and nervous state motivation to acquire nuclear weapons), our support for increased Indian development of nuclear weapons, U.S. promulgation of new logic for nuclear weapon use ("bunker-busters," use against non-nuclear states), and a slowdown/stop in reduction programs involving Russia.

The good news is that the number of nuclear weapons in the world has been cut in half over the past 15 years, those seriously considering their acquisition or having them have declined from 23 to 10, there has been a two-thirds reduction in ICBMs, and both the U.S. and Russia have destroyed their chemical weapons.

Author's Bottom Line: Cirincione believes that efforts must not only be directed at reducing nuclear weapons and proliferation, but eliminating the underlying sources of conflict as well.

While the subtitle of this book might have you thinking this is a history of the construction of the bomb, it is really more of a history of the non-use of the bomb and of the various treaties that have effectively stopped the development of nuclear weapons by more states.

On the whole this has been a good journey. The time of the Bay of Pigs invasion was probably the most dangerous time in the history of the world. Unknown to Kennedy and his advisors, there were already nuclear weapons in Cuba and on board the submarines sent along with the merchant ships.

Since then nations with nuclear programs have cancelled their programs, nuclear arsenals have been reduced, and the threat has gone down.

The future part of the book is less certain. Nations like North Korea have announced their intention to build weapons. When the government there collapses, what will happen? For the first time Non Govermental Organizations (NGO's) such as terrorist groups are attempting to acquire weapons.

Mr. Cirincione is optimistic that the treaties in force, world opinion, and a stronger UN will prevale. Let us hope he is right.

This book is in fact one of those "pocket books" which are more long than wide. I usually find this to be very annoying, yet this seems to be a special case. The shape of the book does not take away from the overall quality of the book. The author is very informed and makes it easy to read. He also gives plenty of examples with the points that he makes and includes graphs for easy understanding. One need not be a rocket scientist to understand this book, and you will gain a good insight to the international situation of nuclear weapons. He presents quality information and clear ideas.
For those that don't know what this book is about, it is quite simple to understand as the author makes it clear in his introduction: "the proliferation of nuclear weapons is undesirable" (Cirincioine xi). This book informs the reader about what a nuclear weapon is, what reasons states have for acquirement, what the international community has done to cease proliferation, and who has nuclear weapons. These ideas a supported with examples, graphs, and general evidence.
I highly recommend it to all those that are interested in the topic!

He had shipped the book on time, but it never arrived. It was not his fault, but he still refunded the money. I would still do business with him again.

Living with nuclear weapons for over half a century, many people have little appreciation for their immense destructive power and the increasing probability that they will be used in anger or detonated by accident. Most policy experts see the world on the verge of a binge in proliferation. This slender book succinctly reviews the history, explains the technology needed by the layman to understand the problem, and, most importantly, lays out the choices facing the United States and the world to reduce and eliminate the possibility of their use in the future by terrorists or nation states. The book is well referenced and balanced.