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Bomber Command (Pan Grand Strategy S.)

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This book is a history of the British Bomber Command. The horror of world war one led the British to build a strategic air force as a means of avoiding the sorts of casualties faced in that war. It was hoped that by using air craft Germany could be made to surrender.

This book is an examination of the failure of that strategic concept. In the first days of the war the British tried a daylight raid on Bremen naval yards. It was generally thought that bombers could get through in daylight due to their speed and defensive armament. This turned out to be a false assumption and a large number of the British Bombers were shot down. Further raids confirmed the vulnerability of unescorted bombers and from that time on it was decided that British Bombers would fly only at night.

For some months bombers flew out at night and tried to bomb various military and industrial targets. The bombing was so inaccurate generally hitting farmland and forests that the Germans were not able to even work out what the intended targets were. The British carried out evaluations and found that only a small percentage of bombs were falling within miles of the targets.

As a result a change in strategy was adopted and that was to bomb the German civilian population. The reason for that was that cities by comparison were easy to find and the use of incendiaries could lead to destructive fires which could destroy housing stock.

The only problem with the strategy was that it resulted in the deaths mainly of the elderly women and children. The structure of German cities was such that the burning and bombing of cities only had a marginal effect on industrial production. (The situation was different in Japan where industry was dotted throughout cities and the fire bombing led to the collapse of industrial production in that country)

The German night fighter effort was reasonably successful against the British Bombers so that the casualty rates of British air crews was very high. The book argues that in general terms the campaign was a poor use of resources and had limited effects until near the end of the war. By late 1944 the German air force was practically destroyed and allied bombers by that time had such a preponderance that they were able to destroy the transport network and to destroy production.

The book is well written easy to read and a fascinating look at a topic that has been dominated by myth makers not truth seekers.

I read this on the advice of a friend after a tour of northern Germany during which I wondered why so many of the beautiful churches had been levelled in WWII. This book gives a detailed narrative of the strategy and tactics, as well as the horror on the ground and in the air of this controversial air campaign. Interesting and thought-provoking to read. Written by an Englishman.

First of all, it is easy to see how this work won the 1980 Somerset Maugham Award for Non-Fiction. I was totally riveted throughout. After reading the book in nearly one sitting, I felt exhausted and numb. The book is an indictment against the entire theory of strategic bombing in WWII and the wholesale slaughter of civilians specifically. While Max Hastings devotes much time to "Bomber" Harris who conducted the night-air campaign without reflection or apologies, his sharpest barbs are for those politicians (Churchill included) and senior military planners that made policy. These hid behind an unspoken but widely understood policy that wide-area terror bombing was the only avenue available to Bomber Command for most of the war but refused to discuss the subject honestly in the public arena in the hopes that they could maintain some sense of moral superiority over their enemy. Hastings also correlates Bomber Command's policy and operations with that of the USAAF, who he writes also hid behind a pretense that collateral casualties were a regrettable but unavoidable tragedy of war. Of course the hypocrisy of this position was laid bare following the continued slaughter of unprotected German cities in 1945 long after everyone knew that the bombing would make no difference to the outcome or even pace of the war, it became bombing just for bombing's sake, or in the case of Dresden, showing the Soviets what Anglo-American air power could do; slaughtering refugees fleeing from the advancing Soviet horde. In fact, the Associated Press reported in February 1945 that the Allied Air Chiefs had embarked on a terror campaign against the German civilian population, but Hastings points out that this news scoop was 3 years late (it had of course been policy soon after the British realized they could not hit specific targets at night). The most mind numbing account is late in the book in which Hastings describes in detail the bombing of Darmstadt. The Allied armies were within 100 miles of Darmstadt and the civilians were under the mistaken impression that they would be spared. In September 1944 Bomber Command made Darmstadt its next target for destruction. As Hastings makes the point, the horror is not that the attack was particularly special or difficult, it was the routine of it all that made it so terrible. The entire process reminds me of the banal evil more often associated with the murder of the Jews; being led into the concentration camps were "the system" would process and prepare them for organized and efficient death. Such was the case of German cities by late 1944. The Luftwaffe had nearly run out of aviation fuel and could only put up a meaningful defense on occasion. The Anglo-American armies had overrun the Luftwaffe's radar belts, so even when fuel was available, the Luftwaffe night-fighters could receive no warnings or directions. The "system" identified a German city for destruction, the bombers went up, everyone did their job and went home. Numbers were difficult to come by, but perhaps 10,000 died in that raid. 1 out of every 5 was a child under 16. 1.81 women for every man (at this stage of the war most men away from the war fronts were elderly). The casualties inflicted upon the citizens of Darmstadt were less than that of many larger German cities, but demonstrates that no German city regardless of size or importance was immune to terror bombing. In fact, Hastings describes how several German cities were identified for destruction not because they contributed to the German war effort, but because they could be easily destroyed, as in the case of medieval cities with a preponderance of wooden housing. Hastings describes the eventual unspoken shame that the wholesale slaughter of the German civilian population left in the minds of the British royalty and government. After the war, Churchill tried his best to distance himself from it and declined to secure a peerage for "Bomber" Harris (a reward given to many with lesser responsibilities). The Bomber Command aircrew were not awarded a Campaign Medal, though the Luftwaffe night-fighters and flak crews inflicted between 72,000-73,000 casualties on British Bomber Command alone. "Bomber" Harris himself emigrated with his family to South Africa soon after the war, shunned by those that used him to conduct their own policies. Hastings makes clear that nobody wanted to take credit for the terror bombing policies of Bomber Command after the smoke of WWII cleared. Hastings does not fault the young aircrew themselves and has nothing but admiration for them. Even so, during his research for the book, he interviews a surviving pilot who became a teacher after the war. The former Bomber Command pilot asks Hastings if others he interviewed complained of nightmares. Perhaps something for the young to think about the next time their government orders then to bomb civilians. Does a state of war really justify the killing of defenseless civilians? Does it really matter that the other side did it first (though in fact many give credit to Churchill for having a German city bombed first in the hopes of redirecting Luftwaffe focus from the RAF airfields to British cities, giving the RAF a new lease on life at the height of the Battle of Britain. This strategy proved successful). Regardless who bombed who first, can killing nearly a million German (and thousands of French) civilians be morally justified? There seems no doubt that the western Allies gave up much of the moral superiority they seem so fond of taking for granted. The biggest irony of all is a point Hastings makes again and again, would not the war have been conducted more efficiently had the resources lavishly spent on Bomber Command been used to assist the British armies and Royal Navy instead? The morale of the German civilian population and their industrial production levels never faltered throughout the day (USAAF) and night (Bomber Command) bombings, only when the German war machine ran out of manpower and fuel did Hitler's armies finally fall back and eventually become overwhelmed by sheer weight of numbers. It seems quite probable that the horrors unleashed on the civilian populations did little to actually win the war.

This is an excellent book that objectively traces the history and rationale for the area Bombing campaign against Germany that would lead to the deaths of 52000 aircrew and more than half a million civilians.

The book also relates the revulsion and guilt felt by many aircrew when confronted, after the war, with the results of their bombing missions.

Ironically these same aircrew still idolise their Operational commander - Bomber Harris, who never set foot on an operational squadron during the War.

Arguments are also related about the disagreements that Bomber Harris had with his American colleagues who wanted the Area Bombing campaign transferred to destroying synthetic oil plants and ball bearing factories. Harris wanted to continue bombing cities even when there was not much left to bomb.

When first published this book was severely criticised in England, for daring to suggest that the effort put into Area Bombing could have been better spent elswhere.

This is a thoroughly readable and thought provoking book.

Bomber Command is a masterpiece, an in depth study of strategic bombing in WWII by the RAF. From the opening days of 1939, when Bomber Command was limited to largely dropping propaganda leaflets, to the firestorm of Dresden in the last days of the European war, everything is covered off in detail. The growth in planes, both in number and capability - from the single engined Battle to the unused Avro Lincoln, the change in method to (or rather, the default acceptance of) "area bombing", the creation of the pathfinder force, the technical advances...it is all here.

Some raids are discussed in detail - notably, not the Dambusters raid - and the loss of life, the flak, the nightfighters, the sheer terror of being in the air over Germany, and in some cases being on the ground being bombed are all set out. Planes, crews, the role of 'Bomber" Harris - all you could want is here. But where this book comes into its own is by asking the question whether it was all worth it, and giving each reader the tools to make his or her own evaluation.

The economics is covered off, as is the military impact of bombing on Germany. It is incredible in one sense to read how much slack there was in the German ecomony until the last days of the war: the sacrifices that Britain made in 1940 (such as killing zoo animals) were never made in Germany until the bitter end, if at all. German women were meant to remain in the kitchen, not building planes in factories, unlike in Britain, the US, and course Russia.

In asking how effective was the bombing campaign, the question is only worth asking to the extent alternative uses of the capital can be identified. Hastings does this - although he could perhaps go into more detail - but the clear example given is that by devoting the resources it did the production of heavy four-engine bombers, Britain had to resort to buying most of its tanks and all of its transport aircraft from the US.
Ultimately, Hastings conclusion is that air power alone could not win WWII, without air supremacy, which was achieved in part by the day bombing of the USAAF (with and without escorting Mustangs) and the boots on the ground in Western Europe. This is hard to disagree with.

The morality and effectiveness of air power in WWII is something everyone must make their own decision of, with the benefits of hindsight. What this book does is enable that decision to be informed. It's a must read if you want to learn more about WWII.

This book passed the train test.

My daily train commute takes me past the dreary, once bombed, industrial suburbs of Frankfurt Am Main, Germany. If I can read a book and emerge at my destination oblivious to the trip then the book was good.

Written like a dull government memo, this book faithfully documents detail at the expense of writing style. The reader learns that many RAF bombing missions were spontaneous and that the paper trail for many RAF air strikes is sparse (Dresden in particular.)

Opposition to area bombing in England was slight with only token objections coming from the House of Lords, the Church of England, and the Royal Navy. George Orwell's early wartime essays echo the point raised in this book that about eighty percent of the English population supported the urban area bombing of Germany.

We are given a brief overview of the technology available to Bomber Command during the war with a discussion of OBOE and ground sight radar. The systematic nature of the bombing itself is not ignored with references made to the bomb mix used to optimally burn cities and create firestorms. My house was ignited by one of the small thermite sticks the English used to burn roof tops. The high school teacher who owned the house was quick enough to run to the attic in time to extinguish the flames. Missions were successful if less than five percent of the bombers crashed...losses could be recouped. This book abounds with detail.

The history of the allied air offensive would not be complete without mentioning the fact that small Nazi air strikes- the Baedeker raids against England- continued well into the war. The Nazi V2 rocket attacks against England continued until March 1945 with one of the last rockets hitting a London WOOLWORTH store during a crowded Saturday morning sale killing one hundred and fifty shoppers. Moral opprobrium is not appropriate when discussing the sad history of civilian bombing during World War Two.

The Germans could condemn Hitler for starting the war and not developing heavy bombers like the English, yet the outcome of the war would have probably been the same but with heavy English civilian fatalities. The actual strategic value of area bombing is in doubt as this book documents.

My daily commute ends in Hanau...briefly mentioned in the book- destroyed by Lancaster and Wellington bombers in March 1945...5000 civilians perished, mostly aged and children.

Although this book is 31 years old the information is as valid today as it was then. It exposes many of the myths surrounding the British efforts in World War Two. Should be of interest to those who wish to learn the unvarnished truths about this war.

This book is a very good read. For it gives very detailed accounts of how the bombing offensive by the RAF was created. It also exonerates Harris from the blame he and his "old lags" were shouldered with during and after the war. The bravery of bomber command crews in the RAF, from all nations, is brilliantly shown amongst these pages. Even though the stupidity of the politicians of the day, and some of those from the RAF's command structure is high lighted as being narrow minded and short sighted in their belief and understanding. As the stupidity of those mentioned within this book was paid for with the lives of the Bomber Command crews who were simply following the directives that were passed down by the back stabbing government of that time. These pages are filled with pride and bravery. Those who deserted what Bomber Command crews did, and told to do, from the first day of the war to the last day...... SHOULD HANG THEIR HEADS IN SHAME. Read this book folks and make your own judgemnet. Whereas Max Hastings has at least done those brave men of Bomber Command, those who never made it back and those who survived with deep hearts, some justice at least by exposing the TRUE version of what happened.

Great book. Lots of information about just how terrible the bombing campaign during WWII really was, the reasons it was carried out, and the fact that it really didn't accomplish its goals until the very last months of the war.
The sale from the Amazon provider was also top notch. No complaints.

I read this book, here in Brazil.This book is full of correct things, and I must tell you, that this book isn't very biased or ridiculous.This book even has some appendixes about bombers, losts e even one appendix with a letter.
Failures of this book are small.The biggest of them is the fact, that this book has almost nothing, about american bombers and its results.
Even so, this book is good.To example, on page 350 , the author writes:"The two great archivements of the allied strategic air offensive must be conceded to the Americans:the defeat of the Luftwaffe by the Mustang escort-fighter, and the inception of the deadly oil offensive."The British inflicted grevious injurious upon us,'said Milch after the war, 'but the Americans stabbed us to the heart.'