Customer Reviews

Bomber War

5 star:		(2)
4 star:		(5)
3 star:		(3)
2 star:		(1)
1 star:		(1)

 

 

Being a pilot myself and interested by WWII, I naturally bought this book. The author surely made an extensive research on the subject but I found the book pretty labourious to read. He constantly repeats himself, he often mentions that he will talk about a subject later in the book, and, worse, the chronology is not always respected: sometimes we go backwards two years, so it is hard to understand the evolution of the bomber war.

The description of the various electronic aids (Gee, H2S, Freya...) shows that the author hardly understands what he is talking about, although the aids were key to the precision of the bombings.

In terms of organisation, a chart showing the structure of the bomber command with the various groups and squadrons would have saved pages of blabla. A map of Europe, UK with airfields (I doubt that readers can figure out where a countryside airfield in UK can be located), and Germany with the main cities would have helped, as well as a concise list of the missions, given the fact that the author doesn't follow a chronological order.

All in all, I found very deceptive that a good base of information is so badly organized, as if the book were not finished. The author could have done a much better job with at least 100 pages less. Simply put, the author didn't put himself in the reader's shoes.

On the positive side, personnal stories give a more lively account rather than dry statictics. The fact that the author could get testimony of so many people directly involved in the war more than 50 years after its end is remarkable: this will be hardly feasible in 10 years.

Also remarkable is the fact that the author crosschecked information between allied and German sources, and we are amazed by the descrepancies about the real damages (target destroyed and planes shot down).

I won't enter the polemic of who (RAF or USAAF) did the best job or had a leading role, I think the book is pretty well balanced in that respect. There will always be people on one side or the other but all in all the book presents the contribution of everyone (US, UK, Canadians, Australians...), and behind nationalities there were just humans fighting for liberty.

The book also deals pretty well with the fact that the more the war advances the more you don't feel bad about using terror weapons. It is an infernal spiral where human beings die in horrible conditions and cultural heritage is devastated and gone for ever. Bombing is not a computer game where you are happy with a good score, bombing generates wounds and death of innocents, and behind each human killed there are family members and friends grieving. Let's not forget it

This is a balanced account of Allied bomber war. Both RAF and USAAF contribution is considered. It rightly concentrates on Germany, because the pre-war doctrines of strategic bombing were put to practise above Germany. This concentration lets him to condense the war to manageable 400 pages, while including many reminisences by those involved: both commanders, pilots, navigators and gunners, and he also lets German fighter pilots and flak gunners as well as bombed civilians to speak.

Neillands tries to understand the bombing effectiveness, unlike Harris, who preffered to bomb cities because they were large enough targets to hit with lousy navigation aids. Neillands spends a lot of time discussing morality of area bombings, but very little on alternative ways of fighting the war: heavy bombers are accepted as the main fighting vehicle of bomber war and no alternatives are considered or cost-benefit analyses tried. Yet USAAF 10% losses per mission (which translates to 12% chances of surving 20 mission tour of duty) and even the 4% RAF losses (with 30% chance of finishing 30 missions) should have made somebody think about alternatives (like Mosquito "light" bomber which could carry the same bomb load as the B-17 "heavy" bomber, but with 0.2% loss rate).

Neillands has the tendency to repeat selected topics so many times as to drive the reader furious. His favourites: 88 mm flak gun was an excellent anti-tank weapon; bombing accuracy in cloud-covered Europe under enemy fire is worse than in training bombing in sunny Texas; losses are prohibitive in daylight bombing without fighter escort. These comments and many others appear 5-10 times in the book. 50 pages could have easily been culled by removing repetition.

On page 387 Neillands commits a statistical fraud when discussing losses: assumably he tries to soften the allied losses by quoting side by side the Luftwaffe fighter command losses. These two, however, have very little to do with each other: Bomber command and the 8th USAAF were minor contributors to German fighter losses, compared with the Eastern front. Early in the bomber offensive Germans lost one fighter for two heavy bombers, which in economic terms was a bargain: two shot down fighter pilots who could often parachute to safety of fatherland, vs. 20 airmen who either died (only 20% survived, based on Neillands's scattered statistics on the topic), or were captured and imprisoned. 8 aircraft engines destroyed against two. Towards the end of the war the situation developed into parity: one fighter for one bomber.

Neillands spends a lot of time speculating whether bombers could have won the war without ground forces, and he believes that Harris and Arnold could have done it. But then, on page 396, he refutes his own argument: "Germany was still fighting in 1945, and fighting hard." which means that the infantry had to invade Germany to end the war, and the "bomber dream" of winning the war from the air was just a dream.

Despite these deficiencies and shortcomings Neillands's book is clearly the book of choice on bomber war. It may be complemented by Arthus Harris's memoirs "Bomber Offensive". A book to be avoided at all cost is Denis Richards's RAF Bomber Command.

Prof. Neillands does an excellent job setting the props, introducing the actors and explaining the plot of that incredibly tragic drama which was Allied strategic bombing in World War II. If there are compliments to be rendered or blame to be assessed he doesn't shirk at the task. Rich in data yet compelling in pace, Prof. Neillands kept my interest at a level I seldom reach with nonfiction.

There are those who will still castigate him for his defense of Air Marshal Harris. Having been in the military myself, I understand the limitations of command. As far as bombing Dresden is concerned, there is very little doublt but that Harris and Spaatz were following orders. Therefore, the blame must rest higher.

All in all, I would place this in the top ten of all WWII nonfiction I have ever read. If you have a choice of books on the Strategic Bombing Offensive, please consider the late Robin Neilland's book first.

I just wrote a long review & my computer crashed before I could submit it, so I'll be brief. Yes, the book is pro-Bomber Command, but theirs was a remarkable story & they did, after all, win. The first person narratives are fascinating, and the author gives due credit to the USAAF 8th Air Force. The 9th Air Force is stiffed, which is fair because the author tells you that he is going to stick to strategic bombing, but surely more could have been written about the 15th Air Force?? I also thought the Halifax and its pilots were given a bit short shrift, but the author gets kudos for being fair about the B-24, and giving its pilots their props. Neilland is not a "professional" historian, but is more or less a professional military history writer, and he writes lucidly and compellingly. Definitely recommended for the WWII buff, especially if you have not given enough due to Bomber Command. I think one of the author's theses, that he is seeking to exonerate Air Chief Marshall Harris, is successful, even on the Dresden bombing. I also think the author's criticisms and conclusions about strategic bombing are fair and well-put.

Robin Neillands succeeds in writing a very comprehensive review of the British and US Strategic Bombing of Germany in WW2. The author states in his introduction that he is not so much interested in the technical aspects, or whether or not the bombing of Germany was effective, but was it moral? Ironically, Neillands is at his best when he does touch on the scientific and impact of the bombing raids on Germany, issues that add great value to the book. The political, military and personality conflicts that arise in any allied effort are also well covered.

To answer the morality question, Neillands starts back in 1915 during WW1 and reviews the intra war years when theorists such as Douhet, Mitchell and others thought a war could be won by an air campaign alone. The Second World War is covered phase by phase, the growth of the Allied bomber force in size, training, technology is reviewed. Even as an experienced reader, I found it very comprehensive and enlightening. I enjoyed his inclusion of personal narratives from bomber crews and key leaders. British, American and German views are recounted here.

I would recommend this book to someone who has never read a high level review of the Allied bombing campaigns in WW2. I do not think new ground was covered. The author gives a very good, logical answer to the alleged purpose of this book in the introduction. War is hell, once started, it is best to finish it as quickly as possible. The author concludes that the Allied commanders had to do what was done. I rated it four stars because it's not really new ground or perspective as the author claims, the issues of morality have been covered elsewhere. It still is a good, single source reference, well researched and documented.

In "The Bomber War", author Robin Neillands sets out to provide a one-volume history of the British/US air offensive against Nazi Germany during 1939-1945. At just over 400 pages, he succeeds in providing a reasonably comprehensive account of the strategic bombing campaign, accessible to the general reader and to the student of the Second World War.

Neillands approaches the air campaign from a functional as well as a chronological point of view. This approach results in some duplication but also in an all-around account of the air war. Neillands nicely mixes narrative and first person accounts; the latter bring home a sense of the difficulties, and the horror, of strategic bombing from the air and from the ground.

Neillands promotes a number of points. First, early in the war, strategic bombing was virtually the only way Britain and the US could strike back at the German homeland. Second, it took years of trial and error effort to build effective British and US strategic air forces. Third, both Britain and the US expended the lives of thousands of their airmen trying to prove the efficacy of strategic bombing, an objective they probably lacked the technology and numbers to achieve.

Neillands returns repeatedly to the emotional debate over the morality of the Allied strategic bombing campaign, especially the February 1945 firebombing of Dresden. His specific purpose is to demonstrate on a factual basis that Air Chief Marshal "Bomber" Harris and Bomber Command executed the air campaign against Germany as directed and well within the context of the war. Readers may judge for themselves how well he succeeds.

"The Bomber War" is recommended to the general reader and to the non-specialist student of the Air War as a very useful one-volume account. Specialists on the strategic bombing campaign can find more detailed accounts, and more exhaustive arguments, elsewhere.

Here is an in-depth survey of the Allied bombing campaign over Europe in World War II. It's still striking to read of all the turf wars, infighting, doctrinal differences, stubbornness, and all-around friction that were behind this massive effort.

Throughout, there are plenty of technical details concerning the aircraft. The stories of the P-51D Mustang, the Norden bombsight, and the B-17 Flying Fortress will all be familiar to military buffs, but are still intriguing nonetheless.

This was the high-tide of the doctrine of Air Power, and with hindsight it seems that air marshals overestimated the power of longe-range bombers to affect the War. The skill and bravery of the men behind missions like the Ploesti raid are beyond praise, but their tangible effects turned out not to be decisive. In fact, when strategic bombers were used in tactictal operations in France, to help the bottled-up armies break out of their salients, one might argue that this use was more productive. But, of course, there was no way to know any of this beforehand.

The author wraps up with Dresden and its moral repercussions, and also with the revisionist reevaluation of the bomber war. His point in brief is that everyone thought it necessary to hit the Germans as hard as possible with everything to hand, and that we've got the whole rest of history in which to second-guess those decisions. In one personal note, he notes that the Germans destroyed the City of London so thoroughly that he, the author, practiced wargames in its ruins as a Royal Marine in 1952. One comes away with a renewed appreciation for the brave aircrews, and for the knotty task of Bomber Command and the USAAF, who had no 100% good way to fight the Good War.

Took a bit to get through this book. The information provided regarding the tactics and technology used during the various phases of the war was well presented. It was very interesting to read how the human element played in the development of the tactics and testing of them.

The interviews and sections provided by various people was very interesting. The reports from those under the bombers, those who felt and experieneced the effects first-hand, were astonishing. These reports truely tell the tale. The crews accounts also were great, as those who were there are able to recount the sights, sounds, and experiences. We need to do more to document as much as possible of those in the skies before the generation is lost.

The ending of the book where he seeks to defend the Dresden raid wasn't really in line with the rest of the book. I enjoyed the blending of historical facts, numbers, and personal accounts throughout, but the ending didn't quite fit as he devoted an awful amount of time and effort to Harris.

Overall a good addition to anyone's collection of WW2 bomber library.

Four stars for this thoroughly researched and eminently readable book. It is also pleasing to note on this page that veteran flyers and relatives of such find this book to be accurate and respectful.

Neillands uses a wide variety of documents to examine the way strategic bombing developed as a tool of warfare, describes how technology evolved and likewise traces the way in which the allies constructed their policies on this aspect of the war. It is all fascinating.

One thing that Neillands always does very well is the incorporation of veterans' recollections into his work. This is accomplished without appealling to emotion and depicting images of blood & guts like in Ambrose's books, that goes without saying. Rather he simply relays the stories of men getting on with their jobs and leaves the reader to construct his/her own emotions.

Morality? Civilians died in their tens of thousands, but all war is immoral.

The late Robin Neillands does have a tendency to be a little repetitious in his books, and I do feel that a couple more maps night have been useful here - hence one star docked. Nevertheless, this book is a significant achievement and quite rightly champions the crews who died and endured.

Finally, post-war the politicians involved in developing bombing policies and directives (including Churchill) failed to put their hands up when the accounting was done, allowing the prosecutors, men like Harris and his crews to shoulder the opprobrium.........things don't change. That Churchill refused to sanction a campaign medal for Harris's men of is a black mark against his name. Fighter Command received due adulation in 1940, it is a scandal that Bomber Command have not been sufficiently honoured

_The Bomber War_ by Robin Neillands is a fascinating, comprehensive, and well-written overview of the entire bomber war against Germany during World War II, covering both British (RAF Bomber Command) and American (largely the USAAF Eighth Air Force) forces as well as the German defenders.

Neillands originally set out to refute what he saw as a growing mythology that portrayed Bomber Command in general and Air Chief Marshall Sir Arthur Harris in particular as being guilty if not of war crimes than at least of an immoral war, and that their area bombing of German cities was wholly unnecessary and that precision bombing should have used instead.

Though Neillands went well beyond these questions in writing this book, he did in my opinion refute these allegations quite thoroughly, showing that the bombing was both moral and necessary and also that precision bombing was difficult if not impossible.

First of all, Allied leaders were well aware of the moral implications of what they were doing and early on did strive to avoid civilian casualties; Neillands detailed early efforts by the British and later by the Americans when they entered the war to avoid attacking any target that might result in civilians injuries.

Unfortunately, as the war dragged on, civilian deaths became unavoidable. To an extent some of this was from an erosion of concern; leaders and air crews just wanted the long hard war to end and anything within reason that brought that end even one day closer was an option. There was also a firm belief in the "Bomber Dream" (particularly with Harris), that a successful bombing campaign could bring the horrors of war to the German people and induce them to force their government to sue for peace as well as destroy the war-making capacity of Germany.

The main reasons though that civilians were bombed were technical, weather, and enemy defense problems, ranging from frequent cloud cover and adverse weather in Europe, industrial haze over many targets, technical problems with radar bombing technology, navigational problems, fierce and growing fighter and flak opposition, and lack of fighter escorts for much of the war, all leading to often fantastically inaccurate attacks. If one worried too much about not hitting civilians by accident, many important targets would have enjoyed weeks or even months of respite from attacks. Allied leaders quickly discovered that if one worried about hitting civilians, one could not bomb Germany at all.

I was surprised at how inaccurate the bombing could be. Very early in the war British bombers had great difficulty even finding the cities they were supposed to bomb owing to a lack of good navigational training and equipment. Even once they found the cities they had real trouble hitting the target; one British study of 1941 concluded that only one in three bombers dropped their bombs within five miles of the target! Since the inquiry decided that the target area had a radius of five miles, this meant that bombs were being dropped in a 75 squire mile area around the target. Even the Americans as late as 1945 admitted in their official histories that an average circular probable error of two miles existed when using radar bombing methods, and could only achieve any effectiveness by "drenching the area with bombs."

The United States prided itself on its attempts at daylight precision bombing, but was not able to really achieve this to any degree until 1945. Its prewar precision-bombing doctrine proved fundamentally flawed thanks to misconceptions about what the bomber could achieve in combat, frequent cloud cover and haze over targets (rendering their vaunted Norden bomb sights useless), deficiencies in radar bombing methods, and lack of fighter cover (not remedied until the advent of P-51 Mustang fighters in 1944, capable of long-range escort).

Neillands firmly concluded that the bomber war was vital to the Allied victory. In addition to the tremendous damage done particularly in the latter years of the war, the bombing campaign opened a Second Front well before the invasion of Europe, tying down vast resources to fend off the bombers. Goering had to deploy 8,876 very useful 88 mm flak guns to fight off the bombers (Rommel's Afrika Korps only had 35 of these guns, which were quite effective against tanks). To man these guns (as well as 25,000 pieces of 20 mm and 30 mm canon) Germany required 900,000 soldiers (Rommel's army for the defense of Normandy only had 500,000 men). Similarly, many pilots and aircraft that could have been used to attack Russia or the United Kingdom were tied down defending the Reich.

The book as I mentioned is quite comprehensive and dealt with a number of other topics relating to the bomber war. The operational histories of both the Eighth Air Force and Bomber Command are covered, as well as the evolution of bombers in both countries, not only in terms of design, engineering, and the service records of the various aircraft used, but also in terms of bombing philosophies, as Neillands explained for instance why the Americans even well before the war focused their energies on precision bombing as well as the wrong lessons learned by pilots used to North American terrain and climate, lessons not serving them well in Europe. Also fascinating were the differences in structure, culture, morale, and training between American and British forces and the series of measures, countermeasures, and counter-countermeasures developed by Allied and German scientists in terms of radar, radio, and navigational aids, as one country produced an innovation that was then countered by the other nation, which sought to counter that countermeasure.

One of my favorite things about the book were the many quotes and anecdotes provided by those who served in the war, their words painting vivid and fascinating pictures of life from the point of view of Bomber Command and Eighth Air Force air crews as well as from Luftwaffe pilots, German flak gun crews, and those on the ground who experienced the end result of their bombing raids.