The Bombing of Auschwitz: Should the Allies Have Attempted It? [Hardcover]

Michael J. Neufeld (Author), Michael Berenbaum (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: August 2000

Destined to become the standard reference work on one of the most hotly contested issues of World War IICould the Allies have destroyed the gas chambers of Auschwitz-Birkenau in 1944, saving the lives of tens of thousands of Holocaust victims?Could the Allied forces have cut the railway lines leading to Auschwitz, disrupting the transportation of the Hungarian Jews to their deaths?Or are these questions just speculative exercises in "what if" history, reflecting mostly our concerns, not those of 1944?For years these questions have been debated heatedly by historians, ethicists and military experts (though seldom in the same forum).Inspired by a conference held to mark the opening of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, The Bombing of Auschwitz: Should the Allies Have Attempted It? brings together the key contributions to this debate, with new and original articles by eminent historians of World War II and the Holocaust, and a selection of the most important documents and aerial reconnaissance photos from 1944.Among the issues discussed are: How much knowledge of Auschwitz did Allied intelligence agencies have? What British and American aircraft might have been used to carry out attacks against the gas chambers and rail lines, and when would they have come within range? Would bombing missions have had a reasonable chance of success? Would even a successful mission have been a diversion of military forces at a crucial juncture of the war? What about our Soviet ally? Why were the appeals of Jewish groups rejected in 1944?Published in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, and jointly edited by an aerospace historian and an historian of the Holocaust, this book provides a balanced and comprehensive guide to these and other questions, allowing readers to draw their own conclusions.Stimulating and easy to read, this book will become an invaluable reference source for general readers, scholars, and students alike.

Editorial Reviews

From Library Journal

This book argues the feasibility of whether the Allies could and should have bombed the Auschwitz concentration camp out of commission in 1944. Editors Neufeld and Berenbaum, both Holocaust scholars, have collected essays and book excerpts from 15 contributors who present the military, political, and moral questions. The editors' own views are clear: The majority of the arguments are weighted toward the conclusion that the American and British military had the capability but lacked the political will to bomb Auschwitz or do anything else militarily to stop the Holocaust. The moral and emotional arguments naturally favor bombing in Auschwitz or do anything else militarily to stop the Holocaust. The moral and emotional arguments naturally favor bombing Auschwitz, but the strategic arguments against bombing remain convincing, recognizing that the all-consuming Allied goal at the time was defeating Hitler and that the Allied effort did not have unlimited resources to divert from what were then considered to be its vital, war-winning military targets (to say nothing of the further tragedy that might have been inflicted on the prisoners by a less-than-perfect bombing). Best are the pro and con essays by James H. Kitchens and Stuart G. Erdheim, as well as the discussions of intelligence collection. Accompanying documents are enlightening. However, as the editors acknowledge, it is always risky to apply today's standards of judgment and emotion to horrific events half a century ago, which is one problem in the book's overall presentation of should vs. could. Recommended for academic libraries.
Col. William D. Bushnell, USMC (ret), Sebascodegan Island, ME
Copyright 2000 Reed Business Information, Inc.

From Booklist

This book had its origins in a 1993 symposium at the Smithsonian Institution, sponsored by the National Air and Space Museum and the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum. In essays by 15 World War II and Holocaust historians, including Martin Gilbert, Walter Laqueur, and Deborah Lipstadt, all sides of the debate are presented. The contributors are divided over the answers to several basic questions, including What was known about the Holocaust? When was it known? And by whom? Was bombing feasible? In an introduction, Neufield concludes that it is fair to say that Auschwitz II^-Birkenau could have been bombed by the same U.S. planes that were bombing I. G. Farben^-Monowitz but that bombing of the railroad "seems likely to have been a failure under any circumstances." Forty pages of original documents are reproduced, appealing to the American and British governments to bomb the concentration camp. An absorbing collection. George Cohen
Copyright © American Library Association. All rights reserved

See all Editorial Reviews

Product Details

• Hardcover: 368 pages
• Publisher: St Martins Pr; 1 edition (August 2000)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0312198388
• ISBN-13: 978-0312198381
• Product Dimensions: 9.6 x 6.2 x 1.4 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.4 pounds
• Average Customer Review: 4.4 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (5 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,287,195 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

21 of 24 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars An informative, provocative historiographic tour de force, September 6, 2000

By 

Richard E. Hegner (Columbia, MD USA) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

Amazon Verified Purchase

This review is from: The Bombing of Auschwitz: Should the Allies Have Attempted It? (Hardcover)

This collection of essays about the feasibility of bombing the crematoria and gas chambers at the Nazi death camp Auschwitz and the railways leading to it in 1944 presents virtually every aspect of the issue--from the available intelligence about the camp to military logistical and operational considerations to the British and American politics behind the decision not to intervene to the likely casualties caused and lives saved by such an intervention if it had taken place. Don't come to this book expecting facile, clear, categorical answers to the issues. While most authors have their own viewpoints to argue, collectively, the essays present a reasonably balanced set of perspectives on the pros and cons of bombing Auschwitz and its environs. The editors largely leave it to the reader to decide what could and should have been done. They are to be commended for their overall objectivity.

Especially compelling are the aerial reconnaisance photographs and contemporary documents included in the book. One photograph alone--showing Auschwitz from high above, with the crematoria bracketed by bombs dropped to destroy the adjacent IG Farben slave labor factory--is especially haunting, since it shows very vividly that not only could the Allies have bombed the killing facilities at Auschwitz/Birkenau, they did bomb a facility literally only a few miles away. (Former Israeli Premier Benjamin Netanyahu is quoted to the effect that the Allies knew enough and had the capacity to bomb Auschwitz; the problem, he asserts, was that the Jews did not have enough political clout at the time to command attention and military resources.)

Among the documents included in the volume is a detailed report from two Slovakian Jews who escaped from Auschwitz, documenting very clearly that early in 1944 detailed information was available to Allied leaders about the massive murders being carried out there. It also included a remarkably accurate map of the area, drawn from memory by the escapees.

Many of the essays caution the reader against the fallacy of "presentism"--reading the history of over half a century ago through the prism of the present along with its political and ethical standards. For example, at the time that it first became militarily feasible to bomb Auschwitz--late spring and early summer of 1944, when American bombers were operating out of southern Italy--the Allies were understandbly preoccupied with launching the D-Day invasion of Normandy, and most available British-American resources in the European theater were being devoted to that goal. Nor was victory over the Nazis a certainty at this time. Thus, the repeated response of U.S. War Department officials that military resources could not be diverted to bomb Auschwitz is a bit more understandable, albeit still morally obtuse in light of the boming of the nearby I.G. Farben works. (None of the essays seems to recognize that the allocation of military resources at the time was not 100-percent efficient--a point underscored repeatedly in Joseph Heller's "Catch-22.") Similarly, there was some political concern that openly proclaiming an Allied goal of halting the slaughter of the Jews might backfire, given the widely prevalent anti-Semitism in both the U.K. and U.S.A. at the time. None of the points like these seems to be presented to excuse Allied inaction so much as to explain it.

As might be expected, the essays vary a great deal in quality. A few seem excessively detailed and verbose, but most are quite thought-provoking, well-written, and informative. None is an easy read, however--this is not a book for the reader who does not feel like investing a good deal of time, concentration, and energy. Nonetheless, it is a book not to be missed by anyone seriously interested in the Holocaust and World War II in Europe. I learned more from this book about both those topics than I have from any single book in a long time. Pay attention to the endnotes, too--they are filled with additional insights.

14 of 16 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Very good, January 14, 2001

By A Customer

This review is from: The Bombing of Auschwitz: Should the Allies Have Attempted It? (Hardcover)

The point is made which I agree with is that the responsibility for the murders should be with the murders.

I found it this the best and quite a readable account of this issue. Its a series of articles which allow the reader to reach a conclusion. It discusses the US and Britain. It makes it quite clear Stalin did not care and did nothing.

There are basically two issue involved.

The first is could it be done. After reading the discussion in the book but its left to you the reader to decide. I think it could have been. There seems to be no reason, why not? The technical, military and intelligence problems seem quite solvable.

The second is if it could have been done, could it have made any difference. This question is more difficult to answer. If the operation had been done its quite possible that the people would have been killed by other methods eg forced marches or bullets. However this was harder and slower then the gas chambers. It goes on to discuss an air raid on Hungary scared the government there into stopping the transportation of Jews. This was purely an accidental effect of timing. The air raid occurred just when the transportation of Jews started. The Hungarian government thought it was because of the transportation and stopped them. It then discusses the effect of this air raid. Leaving the reader with the impression that maybe political action may have helped to stop some of these murders.

The question that I would like to ask the writers "Is if they had been Americans or English being sent to those gas chambers - would they have been bombed?". I think they would have.

14 of 17 people found the following review helpful:

3.0 out of 5 stars I WAS THERE, November 4, 2002

By 

Paul N. Frenkel (New Preston, CT United States) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: The Bombing of Auschwitz: Should the Allies Have Attempted It? (Hardcover)

I saw the bombers fly over the camps and we waived to them.

At another camp they flew low over us, bombed the factory (BRABAG at Zeitz) just by our fence and sent no bombs to liberate us inside the fence. Even our guards have fled. I ducked when the shrapnels started flying but oh how welcome the attack was.

Lets face it no one in power REALLY gave a... If we were all British or American troups being exterminated THE CAMPS AND RAILROADS WOULD HAVE BEEN BOMBED TO SMITHERENES./

It is a sad chapter, not even the FDR Museum at Hyde Park has
a good explanation except to refer to this book. It was FDR' decision not to bomb, as evidence now emerges in a recent article in NEWSWEEK magazine by Beshloss.