Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton [Paperback]

David Chandler (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: August 1, 1999

The Dayton Accords brought the Bosnian war to an end in November 1995, establishing a detailed framework for the reconstitution of the Bosnian state and its consolidation through a process of democratization. This intended to lay the foundations for a stable, western-style liberal democracy, strengthening civil society, overcoming ethnic division, fostering political accountability and thus guaranteeing the highest levels of civic and human rights. This book analyzes the policies and the results of the democratization process in Bosnia. The author's original research reveals that the process of democratization has in fact done virtually nothing to develop democracy in this troubled country. Political autonomy and accountability are now further away than at any time since the outbreak of the Bosnian war. In a measured but damning critique, Chandler argues that the real dynamic behind international intervention in Bosnia has very little to do with any altruistic desire to aid the people of Bosnia, despite all the talk of human rights, but is overwhelmingly dictated by the imperatives of establishing new mechanisms of international cooperation and control in the post-Cold War period.

Editorial Reviews

Review

‘Chandler’s book deserves urgent and serious attention by all those who care about the future of Bosnia, Balkan stability, and above all, democracy – before the corrosive effect of justifiable cynicism takes hold.’ --Susan L. Woodward, Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution

 

‘A devastating analysis.’ --Simon Jenkins, The Times

 

‘A welcome contribution to the debate over Western intervention in Bosnia... For a detailed discussion oft he Dayton Peace Accord, there is no better book on the market.’ --Millennium: Journal of International Studies

--This text refers to an alternate Paperback edition.

About the Author

David Chandler is Professor of International Relations, Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster. He has written widely on democracy, human rights and international relations and is also the author of From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and International Intervention (Pluto Press) and Constructing Global Civil Society: Morality and Power in International Relations (2004), editor of Rethinking Human Rights: Critical Approaches to International Politics (2002) and Peace without Politics: Ten Years of State-Building in Bosnia (2005), and co-editor of Global Civil Society: Contested Futures (2005).

--This text refers to an alternate Paperback edition.

Product Details

• Paperback: 256 pages
• Publisher: Pluto Press (August 1, 1999)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0745314031
• ISBN-13: 978-0745314037
• Product Dimensions: 8.4 x 5.3 x 0.8 inches
• Shipping Weight: 13.4 ounces
• Average Customer Review: 4.5 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (2 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #7,847,311 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

9 of 9 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Guide to post-Dayton Bosnia, June 1, 2001

By 

Edward Bosnar - See all my reviews

This review is from: Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton (Paperback)

Chandler's book is an outstanding analysis and critique of the political/administrative system set up in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the signing of the Dayton Accords in late 1995. There is a very useful breakdown of the (too numerous) power structures at work in the country, from the `local entity' governments of the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska to the astoundingly confusing layers of international administrative bodies and organizations. The rather obvious result is that little gets accomplished with all of these parallel governing institutions in place. Chandler's central argument is that the deep involvement of the international powers in Bosnia through the Office of the High Representative, NATO, the OSCE and other bodies is actually making matters worse, rather than laying down the foundations for peaceful coexistence and Bosnian self-government. In this vein, for these international institutions the process of "democratization" has become an end to itself rather than the ideal objective of establishing a functioning democracy that would require no international tutelage. Chandler also correctly points out that the Dayton Accords, although declaratively committed to a multiethnic, unified Bosnian state, have in fact solidified the country's division into ethnically-based units. However, the book is less persuasive where it implies that a major withdrawal of international troops would not necessarily mean a resumption of hostilities. Indeed, Chandler focuses very little attention to the mutual fear, mistrust and hatred which escalated in the early 1990s and led to the war in the first place. Nonetheless, this is a very useful, and damning, overview of an international experiment in peace-making and state-building - a must-read for anyone interested in Bosnia's future.

2 of 2 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Democratization vs. Democracy, July 3, 2009

By 

R. L. Huff "An old reader" (Louisiana) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton (Hardcover)

Chandler's book is a case development of his basic theme, treated in broader range in his "From Kosovo to Kabul and Beyond," that democratization is not the same as democracy: they are, indeed, polar opposites. Here Chandler outlines the blatantly colonial political structures created by NATO powers for their own benefit and control. Any benefits brought to those they governed were incidental.

The first reviewer has done an excellent job presenting Chandler's insights. Here I'll only add that intervention began before the first NATO boot ever trod Bosnian soil, and was instrumental in pulling the former Yugoslavia apart, playing to "ancient hatreds" in much the same way that the British broke the Indian jar before granting sovereignty. The British, at least, did grant sovereignty, and did not use communal violence as an excuse to reimpose empire.

Reading Chandler's book one sees there is little practical difference between NATO democratization and the top-down paternal authority of Tito's Yugoslavia; or, for that matter, the Turkish conquest. An old Bosnian saying has it that "where the Turk trod, nothing grows." The same seems to hold true for these NATO interventions, from Bosnia to beyond.