Customer Reviews

Bougainville, 1943-1945: The Forgotten Campaign

5 star:		(4)
4 star:		(3)
3 star:		(2)
2 star:		(1)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

I have mixed feelings concerning this book. Gailey did an excellent job in explaining the overall situation in the South Pacific and the Solomons prior to the landing on Bougainville and its place in the strategy for the eventual reduction of Rabaul. The detailed accounting of Merrill's covering of the landing by engaging the naval force under the command of Omori was first class. This severe beating of the Japanese naval forces was the last major surface engagement in the Solomon area. Halsey's gutsy decision to commit Sherman's Task Force 38 and its carrier air groups against Rabaul to protect the landing force made for enjoyable reading. From this day forward Rabaul was pounded into insignificance.

The 3rd marines landed on the island on 11/1/43 and in spite of hellish swamps, impenetrable rain forests and Japanese assaults, Seabees managed to construct the first air strip which was able to accept a damaged aircraft for landing a mere 23 days after the amphibious landing. A remarkable feat given the logistics problems at hand.

The major Japanese counter attack began on the night of March 8-9 and failed for a number of reasons given by Gailey. Chief among these reasons, to this reviewer, and not given the attention it deserved, was the piecemeal strategy employed. Commander of the defending Japanese, General Hyakutake, had at his disposal over 60,000 troops. For this major engagement he sent approximately 15,000 men under General Kanda to face a force which outnumbered them at least 2 to 1. Gailey laid off this tactical lapse, in part, to defective Japanese intelligence reports and assumed that Hyakutake thought he was facing at most a division. Even so, to attack a fortified position, one needs a superior force not an equal force. With so many troops under his command, there is simply no defending Hyakutake's flawed strategy. With similar defective reasoning, Kanda himself committed his meager troops in uncoordinated attacks resulting in the near destruction of his men. This tendency of Japanese commanders to husband their resources and commit them in piecemeal fashion was observed through out the Pacific, both with naval and land forces.

The book, after this battle, stumbles somewhat. Maps of the landings and early engagements were adequate but from this point forward, their quality and quantity declined noticeably. The last two maps dealing with the final Australian operations omitted rivers, villages and crossings referred to in the text. One later chapter deals with the unfortunate exploits of the 93rd Division. This unwieldy aside succeeds in raising more questions than it answers.

For it's excellent early chapters, Gailey rates the four star rating. Somewhere after the March Japanese counterattack, the book trails off and like the Japanese defenders, dies a slow death.

Gailey gives a detailed, concise look at what happened during all the skirmishes and maneuvers. He also explains the commanders' rationale for their decisions. He puts the battle in context vis a vis the other battles going on in different parts of the world, and the drain on resources this created.

My father was a 2nd Lt. with the 3rd Marine Division at the invasion of Bougainville. After reading this book, I have a much better understanding of what he went through, and why it changed his life forever.

If you are going to be doing an overview campaign book on the Pacific War then I think it is instructive to remember two books that have set the standard on how history needs to be written: Philip B. Frank's "Guadalcanal" and Louis Allen's "Burma: The Longest War." Both exhibit the stylistic flair, command of the sources, and a good grasp of the entire campaign in the whole course of the war.


Both authors can recount strategic discussions on the macro level, and then focus upon individual experiences. This ability to go between the experiences of the grunt and the dictates of his campaign overseers is the mark of a good military historian.

Gailey has given us a rough gem in a little known area of the war, but I think that it could be much better done. Gailey's writing suffers from time to time being too focused on writing unit actions and engagements without the individual detail and reminiscenes of either the Japanese heishi or the American grunt. Gailey give us a small glimpse but the number of individual first person quotations is actually very small given the often very personal nature of this battle -- Bougainville was a very large island, covered with jungle, both sides had difficulty maneuvring and contact came first at the infantry level once the beaches were left behind. But this element of fear, the very smell of the jungle is lacking.

In addition I was personally a little dissapointed by the lack of ANY Japanese sources on the battle. Such one-sided accounting 60 years after the battle is something that should, and easily can, be avoided. Gailey states that prior to landing "one cannot be sure how many Japanese were actually on the island." This is a very germane fact that can be checked and, granted that everyone cannot be a Japanese language expert (like Louis Allen), basic facts like these are surely in the Japanese archives -- I actually found them in Japanese secondary sources (A detailed order of battle).

There are also several spelling errors for Japanese Commander names -- also disapointing. When I see this I begin to wonder how well my historian really understands his subject ... and more importantly, how much he is really attempting to understand.

Having said that, I must say that I enjoyed the history tolerably well(... if not by virtue of the fact that there is so little written of this campaign). The initial landing and the spreading out of the perimeter was good, as was the last chapter on the sterling effort of our British Commonwealth allies -- the Australians and the Fiji Regiment. Although this island was made famous by the coastwatcher in WWII, there is surprisingly little about this, as there is nothing about the indigenous peoples, though Gailey rightly emphasises the importance of the small gardens and their role in supporting the Japanese troops and how their destruction eventually became a military objective.

As the son of an Americal Division infantryman, I found the book a very important addition to my personal library and I have given a number of copies away as gifts to others with an interest in Bougainville. My father and my uncle arrived at Bougainville Christmas 1943 and spent most of 1944 there. There has been precious little written about this phase of the war. We should all understand the price these men paid at places such as Hill 260. "Bougainville" is a word that freedom loving Americans should understand and cherish, and this book helps that happen. Professor Gailey recognized a need and filled it admirably. If your loved one served at Bougainville, this is a must read.

After the Guadalcanal campaign (Aug-42/Feb-43) the Allied forces started operations to isolate the Japanese naval base at Rabaul. Walking up the Solomons Chain, New Georgia was occupied, followed by Vella Lavella. The next step was Bougainville.
The invasion was effected in three phases: the first one started on 1st November 1943 was trusted to the 3rd Marine Division, in its first action as a combat unit. The next phase was an entirely Army affair: it was up to the XIV Army Corps (37th Infantry and Americal Divisions), after the Marines were withdrawn at the end of 1943, would last until the end of 1944. And then started the most controversial phase, when the task of encircling and containing the Japanese troops remaining on the island passed to the soldiers of the II Australian Corps, until the final surrendering of all enemy forces on September 1945.
Besides the military operations against the Japanese forces on the island, there is also a chapter dedicated to the controversy about the use of black troops (93rd Infantry Division) within the then segregated US Army combat units. Also described are the infrastructure-building actions made by Service forces such as the Seebees, Army construction, hospital and sanitary units, building air and army bases, hospitals, roads, fuel and supply storage depots, lodgement and recreational areas and so on.
I really liked the initial 2/3s of the book because so little has been written about the subject. However, in the final third the author seemed at a loss: the maps were crude, the actions by the Australian and New Zealand forces were very sparsely described and, very likely they should - and could - have been more extensively detailed.

Been reading a whole slew of WWII histories recently. This on isn't quite as bad as Tuskeegee Airmen - I slogged about halfway through that one before I returned it to the library. This starts off ok, but loses focus very quickly. There are only like two maps in the book, and entire chapters seem to cover areas not covered on the maps. It becomes a book of details that tells the history, not a history that includes details. It doesn't hold my interest - actually it is great to read at night on the bedstand. Ten pages puts me right to sleep.

This book provides the reader with good information and persepctive on the war efforts at Bougainville and the surrounding area. It fills in a valuable piece in the Pacific War puzzle. We recently visited the USMC Museum in Quantico, VA, and this book helped enrich our experience and understanding of the challenges faced by those who fought in the Solomons. A recommended read for those with an interest in WWII.

I purchased this book from Amazon.com because my dad was in the first landing at Bougainville on November 1, 1943, and it affected him for the rest of his life. The book goes into great detail but not always in chronological order.

My father was a staff sargent in the 3rd Marines who landed there. I suppose I wanted to better understand his ordeals. He lived through it, and never spoke of it once.

I think the book is definitely worth reading! I have seen other materials on this protracted engagement, and all have something to offer.

In terms of writing style, the book reads a bit like older pices, in a style that is not quite elegant, but certainly readable. It is not an exciting book, however, with a notable few sections.

And yes, we are somehow related to Albert C. Wedemeyer, general in the Army at that time.

He was my professor in college. A great one at that. I have the privilege of having been educated by him about what history is, not what it "ought to be". Will there be errors? Maybe, but will you learn what it was supposed to be...yes. If you really want to learn what history is about, find a copy of "Sir Donald Cameron: Colonial Governor" or "Lugard and the Abeokutra uprising: the Demise of Egba Independence" and you will learn what it takes to get a Phd. Meanwhile, I choose to remember how he was.