Foremost, Bourgeois Dignity is to be recommended because it offers an abundance of economic insights. Professor McCloskey deserves the highest praise for emphasizing the hugely important, predominant role of ideology and innovation in the unprecedented improvement in the standard of living since the close of eighteenth century.
Ultimately, however, Bourgeois Dignity fails to prove that what McCloskey terms "bourgeois dignity and liberty" are, to the virtual exclusion of every other factor, responsible for this economic revolution.
One problem is semantics. It seems that, in "bourgeois dignity and liberty", McCloskey means an ideology that promotes and rewards (materially and psychically) commerce and innovation. Fair enough, but McCloskey's choice of the word "dignity" is highly problematic.
In one historical meaning, in the sense of "being dignified", having dignity meant being worthy of honor, being illustrious, being highly esteemed. One was endowed with dignity by doing or accomplishing something honorable or illustrious or esteemed. In this sense, not everyone was inherently endowed with dignity: it had to be earned, and it could be forfeited. In this historical sense, McCloskey's use of the term "dignity" is not objectionable, and is faithful to the substance of the argument. For example, McCloskey writes of the "bourgeois revaluation" in Holland that started it all: "It became honorable - `Honorable', the aristocrat snorts! - to invent a machine for making screws or to venture in trade to Cathay." (p. 11)
However, in its modern usage, in the sense of the U.N.'s declaration that "all human beings are born...equal in dignity," in the sense of Geneva's declaration that "outrages upon personal dignity" are war crimes, the term "dignity" has arrived at a comprehensively different meaning. No matter what his or her political persuasion, no sane person could argue that is a war crime to deprive a Khalid Sheikh Mohammed of "high esteem and honors." Unfortunately, McCloskey seems to be using the word to mean something closer to its bastardized modern sense, when, for example, writing,
"Dignity encourages faith. You are dignified in standing, in being who you most truly are, and have been. A Chicagoan. A scholar. A woman." (p. 10)
If this is how we are to understand McCloskey's "bourgeois dignity", then the book's entire argument is utter rubbish. The Industrial Revolution did not begin because a bunch of eighteenth century Dutchmen started "being who they most truly were, and had been." And, as noted, this does not even appear to be what McCloskey is arguing, no matter how the term is being defined. Either way, McCloskey deserves criticism for selecting a word that is fraught with so much potential for intellectual mischief.
Moving on, the failure of the book's thesis seems almost inevitable in McCloskey's approach, which is to argue that every other proposed factor had no material role in the economic revolution, and merely by that process of elimination, anoint "bourgeois dignity and liberty" as its sole cause.
In the process of doing this, McCloskey deserves credit for clearing away a lot of silliness about the roles of imperialism, expropriation, exploitation, genetics, religion, mineral endowments, and the like (silliness that, unfortunately, seems eternally trapped within the thick skulls of academics, journalists, politicians, most Europeans, and many Latin Americans).
However, the book's arguments become much more difficult to accept when McCloskey addresses trade, incentives, institutions, and, especially, science and technology. In all of these cases, McCloskey relies heavily, if not exclusively, on this one form of an argument: "X factor" existed somewhere in the world prior to 1700 or 1800, and since it didn't cause a revolution in the standard of living there and then, it could not have caused the revolution in the standard of living since 1700 or 1800. As we will see, the only (serious) factor to which McCloskey does not apply this standard is "bourgeois dignity and liberty."
In the case of science and technology, the weaknesses in McCloskey's argument are manifold. For some reason, McCloskey spends a lot of time reviewing examples of late European scientific or technological discoveries that were allegedly "anticipated" by centuries or millennia in other cultures - mostly, the Chinese. So, we read that the Chinese invented "soil science or ecology" and the curved-moldboard in 500 b.c., the compass in 400 b.c., cardboard in 200 b.c., that they drilled for natural gas (for whatever purpose), invented the crank handle, and knew about the circulation of blood a millennia or more before the Europeans, and so forth. We read that the Koreans invented movable type two centuries before the Europeans. It is not clear what any of this proves beyond the Professor's solid anti-Eurocentric credentials.
If the point is that a listing of miscellaneous scientific or technological discoveries of the Chinese and Koreans (and Africans and Arabs) spanning several earlier millennia in time is comparable in impact to the revolutionary discoveries surrounding scientific methodology, energy and metallurgy - just to name the most prominent -- during the first two centuries of the Scientific Revolution in Europe, then it is a frivolous argument.
Further, McCloskey writes that
of course one problem that has to be faced by advocates of science as a cause, and to some degree even by the advocates of the Enlightenment as a cause, is that Chinese, and at one point Islamic, science and technology, separately and together, and their humanistic scholarship, were until very lately superior to Western science and enlightenment in most ways, and yet resulted in no industrial revolution (p. 358)
No, Professor McCloskey, this is not a problem that has to be faced by advocates of science because it is beside the point. The issue is not about the relative level of science and technology among different societies at one time or another, but whether the absolute level of scientific and technological knowledge reached by any society was enough to facilitate the accomplishments of the Industrial Revolution and later (and which societies reached that level and when they reached it). "Advocates of science as a cause" would "of course" face the problem McCloskey poses only if the Chinese or Ottomans in, say, 1500 were more advanced scientifically and technologically than the Europeans in 1800, but nobody would argue that point.
Recognizing the sheer implausibility of arguing that our modern standard of living owes nothing to science and technology, McCloskey develops the argument that the "first Industrial Revolution and its nineteenth century denouement...depended hardly at all on science" (p. 360) and that the economic growth from this first Industrial Revolution caused the science and technology to which we obviously owe our modern standard of living. There is something to the fact that greater and greater wealth leads to greater and greater scientific and technological accomplishments. But McCloskey's argument implies that, in the opening stage of things, steam power and advancing techniques of iron and steel production "depended hardly at all on science." This, in turn, implies a surprisingly narrow or theoretical-only definition of "science" when "science", in the earlier "superior" examples of it in China and Korea, included the curved moldboard, cardboard, the crank handle, movable type and so on.
To sum up the point, McCloskey boldly asserts that "a world without modern electrical, electronic, chemical, agronomical, aeronautical, or for that matter economic science, would be poorer, of course, but still it would be very much richer than the world of 1800 - so long as the Bourgeois Revaluation had taken place." (One presumes that McCloskey's omission of modern medical science was oversight). Very much richer? I very much doubt that. To me, it is simply not serious to argue that we could have escaped the Malthusian trap without "modern electrical, electronic, chemical, agronomical, aeronatical" medical, and all of the other branches of modern science and technology. It would seem that we would have had recourse to very little beyond the shuffling and reshuffling and the "accumulate, accumulate, accumulate" of classical economics that McCloskey properly consigns to insignificance in the scope of our actual long-term economic development.
Finally, McCloskey does make an important (Austrian) insight that it is not scientific discoveries, per se, that generate economic growth but successful commercial applications of scientific discoveries. But this is not the same thing as arguing that scientific discoveries had little or nothing to with the resulting economic growth. Fundamental scientific discoveries without the entrepreneurial or innovative talent to figure out how and where to apply them will not do much for a society's general economic welfare; by the same token, opportunities for entrepreneurs and innovators are, it seems undeniable, circumscribed by the state of fundamental scientific (and technological and mechanical) knowledge.
No matter how entrepreneurial or innovative or commercial a society might be, it obviously would not and could not generate modern levels of economic growth and standards of living without access to the scientific and technological discoveries that closely preceded and have continuously accompanied the modern period of economic growth.
The proof of this, and the point that definitively undermines McCloskey's argument, is that Holland in the eighteenth century was not the first society of "bourgeois dignity and liberty." Not nearly so.
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