Customer Reviews

The Boys' Crusade: The American Infantry in Northwestern Europe, 1944-1945 (Modern Library Chronicles)

5 star:		(17)
4 star:		(6)
3 star:		(6)
2 star:		(5)
1 star:		(6)

 

 

I suspect there is little middle ground for those who read Fussell and his work will resonate truly with some and will provoke accusations of being a pessimistic, bitter old man by others. If in reading about WWII you are looking for an unsparing impression of life in the American infantry after the Normandy invasion, something unsanitized by Zanuck, Spielberg, the History Channel or even Stephen Ambrose, this will fit the bill.

My own father served in the Hurtgen Forest area and in the Bulge as one of the "Boy Crusaders" Fussell writes about. It's uncanny to me how the attitude of the two are alike. There is no sentimentalizing, no attempts to varnish the time with nobility. It was what it was.

Reading Fussell hasn't helped me appreciate the magnitude of my father's (or Fussell's) experience. But it has helped me understand the anger that is till part of my dad, even now, sixty years on.

By Bill Marsano. This book comes along just in time: Already I've been getting invitations from French tourism folks inviting me to learn all about their plans for next year's 60th anniversary of D-Day. (Do they actually give a damn any more, or are they just trying to revive their critically wounded tourist trade?) Think of it--sixty years. Soon enough there'll be no one left alive to tell the tale, and then the whole shebang--World War II from front to back--will be deeded over to Ken Burns for a series of sincere and oh-so-tasteful documentaries for his caramel-centered fans to lap up on PBS.

It's probably all that "good war" and "greatest generation" stuff that drove Fussell to write this book; he doesn't have much truck with gooey backward glances, and that will probably make some readers mad. Well, you don't come to Fussell--author of, among other things, "Thank God for the Atom Bomb, and Other Essays"--for good times. You come to Fussell for the hard stuff.

And here it is his contention that behind and beneath all that "greatest generation" nonsense was the Boys' Crusade--that last year of the war in Europe when too many things went wrong too often. The generals who'd convinced themselves that this war would not be a war of attrition--i.e., human slaughter--like the last one found they'd guessed wrong. Casualties were horrifyingly high and so huge numbers of children--kids 17-19 years--old were flung into combat. And they were, with the help of the generals, ill-trained, ill-clothed and ill-equipped.

They were also faceless ciphers. As Fussell points out, the US Army's policy was to break up training units by sending individual replacements up to the line piecemeal--one at a time--so they often arrived as strangers among strangers, often addressed merely as "Soldier" because no one knew their names. The result was too many instances of cowardice--both under fire and behind the lines--too many self-inflicted wounds to escape combat. Too many disgraces of every kind because the Army's system, Fussell says, destroyed the most important factor in the fighting morale of the "poor bloody infantry"--the shame and fear of turning chicken in front of your comrades. Many of these boys--and Fussell is properly insistent on the word boys--funked because they had no comradeship to value.

This is not in the least a personal journal. Fussell was serriously wounded as a young second lieutenant; he was also decorated. But he wisely leaves himself out of this narrative. There's no special pleading here, no showing of the wounds on Crispin's Day. Instead this is a passionate but straightforward report on what that last year was like for the poor bloody infantry--those foot soldiers, those dogfaces, those 14 percent of the troops who took more than 70 percent of the casualties.

And yet there were those who stood the gaff, who survived "carnage up to and including bodies literally torn to pieces, of intestines hung on trees like Christ,mas festoons," and managed not to dishonor themselves. They weren't heroes, Fussell says, just men who earned the Combat Infantryman's Badge, which was the only honor they respected. In a brief but moving passage, he explains why: It said they'd been there, been through it, and toughed it out.

This is a very short book. It's only 160 or so pages of text and they are small, paperback-sized pages. Nevertheless this book is an object lesson in writing that hits home like a blow to the solar plexus, that can double you over in pain and shock. I don't know a professional writer who wouldn't be proud to have written it.--Bill Marsano is a writer and editor with a long-time interest in military writing.

I have read all of Fussell's work on World War 2, and enjoyed much of it. But I detect a bitterness beneath the elegant prose - honest and refreshing when compared to the likes of Ambrose etc. - but annoying when it leads to generalizations and statements that just don't stand up if one does proper research.
There was nothing new in this book - much of it has been far better presented in other books - but as an exquisite, bitter-sweet appetizer, it deserves a star in any Michelin World War 2 guide. Had another writer, say someone who is unknown, written this, it would probably not have been published. Nevertheless, if all you've ever read is ultra-jingoist Ambrose and the strangely PC and weepy Bradley, then this will get your juices flowing. I then suggest reading the first person accounts of veterans that have rightly become classics. There are many, all of them far more revealing than Fussell because they are less academically and stylistcially self-conscious. Try The Medic, A Screaming Eagle, Company Commander, If I Survive. Then Fussell sounds like a whinger, however beautiful his prose style.

The Boys' Crusade tells the story of the American GI in Europe, from his arrival in England in 1944 to the fall of the Reich. The narrative opens with a wonderful insight into life in the UK as an American soldier, which is later contrasted dramatically with the dreadful conditions the same troops faced on the continent after the invasion.

He portrays in vivid and at times heart-wrenching detail the hardship and privation that were the norm throughout the European campaign - the unpreparedness of `green' troops, friendly-fire incidents, the frequency of self-inflicted wounds, desertion and the fog of war.

As background to his theme of the plight of the US Army boy-soldier he has broadly encapsulated the story of the war in the west in 1944-5. Within the short space he has allocated himself he has focused on four aspects of that multi-faceted campaign: Normandy, The Bulge, Hurtgen Forrest and finally the dreadful discovery of the forced-labour (concentration) camps in the heart of Germany.

In doing so he has largely ignored the other Allies fighting on the western front, aside from a brief, unbalanced and damning indictment of Canadian forces at Falaise - but, surprisingly, that does not particularly detract from the story.

Paul Fussell writes particularly well - this is a book that is hard to put down, not least because clearly, much is written from personal experience.

In light of some of this excellent background, it is a great pity that Fussell has found it necessary to adapt and distort historical fact to fit his theme. There are several examples of this - one of the more glaring is the description of Operation Cobra as a US air attack on the German front lines, rather than the overall operation of which this simply played the opening bars. A justifiable focus is made upon the well known, but nonetheless appalling, short bombing that resulted in friendly-fire casualties at the start of that operation - but little else. Fussell consequently classifies Cobra a disaster.

Cobra was of course an overall battle-plan for the pivotal breakout of the American forces, under Montgomery and Bradley's command, to the south of the Cotentin peninsula in west Normandy. It resulted in a position being created from which the near destruction of Germany's Normandy forces in the Falaise Pocket became possible.

That brief, key point is ignored.

In the round, Cobra is widely recognised as one of the most successful operations of the entire Normandy campaign - history certainly does not judge it a disaster. Fussell needs to work a lot harder if he is to persuade us to the contrary.

In reviewing this book, Adam Zamoyski writes in Britain's The Sunday Times "A barely contained anger slips out from behind his sardonic prose on every page. And his anger is catching."

It is a shame that this anger should be created by some of the myth Fussell promotes here - he could so easily have achieved the same result without any need to distort the story. So much is written with bias and prejudice in this area, this book could rise above that - a little unbiased editing would probably get it there...... then the anger might be justified.

You still have to give it eight out of ten - it's a cracking read.

D.B.Prell WWII Combat 2nd. Lt.
READ BOY'S CRUSADE WITH THE FOLLOWING CAUTION:
Up until Paul Fussell wrote "The Boy's Crusade" his work has always been scholarly and well researched. Unfortunately in this, his most recent effort, he has let down his audience. In his effort to "tear away the veil of mythology that so often obscures and sanitizes war's brutal essence" he sometimes presents his opinion as if it were fact, when the actual facts do not support what he has written. Examples include his presentation of COBRA as a " disaster" and a "fiasco." Although the initial air strikes did cause many U.S. servicemen their lives, in the final analysis COBRA save thousands of GI's lives, and cost thousands of German troops their lives. In the view of most military historians COBRA was a major turning point in the war. Then in describing the Battle of the Bulge, Fussell relied on the much-discredited early work of Charles Whiting, instead of using Whiting's later book, in which he corrected most of his earlier misstatements. I wrote Fussell about using Whiting and he replied as follows: Jan 26, '04 Dear D.B.P., I shouldn't have used Whiting at all, I now see. You are good to write, & I send Best wishes, Paul Fussell. But Fussell's disparaging remarks about the men of the 106th Division are still in print, giving a spurious impression of the men who actually have been given credit for making a substantial contribution to delaying Manteuffel's goal of capturing St. Vith (which in turn sealed the fate of the German attack)." Only a reprint of the book will serve to correct what Fussell has written. Taken as a whole, the book does accomplish the author's objective, that of presenting war as it truly is, "with all its intimate horror, death, and sorrow; and as a warning for the future." A shame he was in such a rush to publish that he didn't take the time for a 'second opinion.'

Books about the men who fought World War II tend to romanticize their subject, sometimes more than a little, especially recently. This book should be read as soon as possible by anyone who thinks that war was (or present and future ones can be) noble, uplifting, or even fun. It wasn't, as Fussell demonstrates in clear and unambiguous prose. He points out that the army in Western Europe was made up chiefly of 17-, 18-, 19-, and 20-year-olds who had no notion of what would confront them on the beaches of Normandy or in its hedgerows or in the slave-labor camps inside Nazi Germany itself, and he tells the reader plainly what actually did confront them. The book is not for the weak-stomached, but it's a much-needed corrective for those of us who've subscribed uncritically to the "Greatest Generation" view. As Fussell makes clear, that generation "included among the troops and their officers plenty of criminals, psychopaths, cowards, and dolts." It is a superb little book of only 165 pages of text.

Sometimes it seems that we tend to romanticize and glorify the nature of the general experience of war to better adopt ourselves to the idea of it and our tacit acceptance of and participation in it. Thus, with memorable novels such as "From Here To Eternity" or in movies like "Saving Private Ryan", we overlay the experience of war with a sentimentality that makes the whole notion of combat much more palatable. Yet, in this relatively brief but articulately stated and footnoted book, noted historian Paul Fussell takes able aim at such sentimental balderdash regarding the welter of pimple-faced post-adolescent warriors we sent by the millions to help liberate Europe in 1944. He announces early on that far from flying with the angels of popular culture, which imply that the experience of war produces admirable and even desirable factors as pride, companionship, and "the consciousness of virtue enforced by deadly weapons", the actual experience of the men on arms was anything but ennobling, prideful, or mutually embraced courage among one's peers. For, although the youngsters sent to liberate Europe were surely launched on what can only be described as a moral crusade, their experience of the events surrounding it were anything but romantic and sentimental.

They arrived in Britain by the very boatloads, settling down amidst small rural setting in the countryside to polish their rather rudimentary soldiering skills and to prepare for the oncoming onslaught, the single largest amphibious landing ever attempted, and they understood from the beginning what a bloody affair it was all destined to be. They were more consumed with the particulars of their experience, an affair better characterized in terms of massively poor planning, inadequate training regimes, antiquated and obsolete weapons until close to the launch dates for the invasion, and a lackluster officer corps. Once launched into battle in France, these problems were additionally compromised by incidents of frequent desertions, self-inflicted gunshot wounds, and overwhelming fear. This was, according to Fussell, especially true for infantry, which, while only composing some on eighth of the total allied forces in Europe, suffered more than seventy percent of all the deaths and wounded. Moreover, they were often poorly led, as by General Bradley in an unconscionable and yet insistent push into the Hurtgen Forest area in the late fall of 1944, managed to suffer over thirty thousand casualties. Indeed, before the end of the war in Europe, scores of units refused to obey orders, feigned illnesses, or shot themselves to avoid further combat. Many even broke ranks and ran. In fact, close to twenty thousand Americans deserted their units during the final campaign on 1944-45.

In surveying all this, Professor Fussell is neither denying the heroic efforts of countless young men and women, nor is he suggesting the sacrifices of millions was anything less than justified for the result it produced; the total liberation of Europe. Rather, he is accentuating the actual experience of the combat on the individuals who suffered through it so that we might better appreciate the true magnitude of their sacrifice on the one hand, and the true horrific cost of the conflict for those who lived through it, day by day, and on the solid bloody ground of the battlefield, far from the sounding trumpets and the roar of the crowds in the victory parades. For Fussell, it is crucial for us to understand just how momentous and fateful the decision to send such young men and women into combat is. It something that should only be done as a last resort, when no other choice pertains. To do it on any lesser basis, especially while clinging to some sentimental and romantic notion of heroism pertaining to war, is heinous and inhumane. This will be a controversial book, but one I hope will be widely read and appreciated for what it is, a mature view of the actual experience of modern war.

Paul Fussell served in the US Army infantry in Europe during World War Two. It was the defining event of his life. His war-related writings unrelentingly attempt to de-romanticize warfare in general and infantry service in particular by bluntly portraying the horrors of modern battle.

The Boys' Crusade is a thin volume of short chapters covering familiar ground. There's not much new here. The discussion of the COBRA affair highlights the book's small strengths and major weakness. COBRA was a plan by General Omar Bradley to use fighter-bombers and strategic bombers to blast a gap in the German defenses near St. Lo. Although the US infantry pulled back some 800 yards in advance of the bombing many were still killed when 'friendly fire' strayed off target. The chapter provides a tragic, but useful illustration of the FUBAR principle. On the other hand, the entire COBRA chapter is only eight short pages, far too short to develop the full story. Indeed, the chapters are too short to develop the repellent awfulness of infantry life and death.

Any reader familiar with Paul Fussell's work is likely to be disappointed and anyone not familiar with it is likely to be misled by The Boys Crusade. Anyone wanting to read a far superior book that also takes aim at de-romanticizing the infantry soldier's war need look no farther than Fussell's own Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War. Or try E.B. Sledge's the With the Old Breed: At Peleliu and Okinawa. World War One spawned its own memoirs on the horrors of war such as Ernst Junger's Storm of Steel (Penguin Modern Classics) and Robert Graves' Good-Bye to All That. The best I can really say about The Boys Crusade is that it may open the eyes of the uninitiated and it will not long detain you because of its brevity.

Fussell's book is an unusual contribution to the Modern Library Chronicles series. Whereas most volumes provide short introductions to their respective subjects, as other reviewers have noted, this is not a straightforward military history of the war with Germany. Instead, Fussell offers a much more idiosyncratic work, a social and cultural history of the American riflemen who fought in northwestern Europe after Normandy.

This is not to say that this book isn't worth reading - quite the contrary. Throughout this book, Fussell dispels much of the "greatest generation" mythology cultivated in recent years by writers such as Stephen Ambrose. A veteran of the war, Fussell provides a much more complicated portrait of inexperienced young boys thrown into the chaos and violence of combat. In a series of short chapters, he covers topics ranging from the interactions with the French to the treatment of the wounded and the dead to the discovery of the work camps - all of which he addresses with the same blunt and insightful analysis that is a hallmark of his work. Anyone seeking to get a more accurate portrait of what the "good war" was really like for the men who fought in it would do well to start here.

I'm sorry but this book is simply not worth the price. As a fan of Fussell's writing I was eagerly looking forward to more of his unsentimental, realistic insight as a counterpoint to pop-WWII history. Unfortunately this is a slim, scant volume with much blank space between short chapters. The main problem, however, is that the vast majority of the work is rehashed writing of well-known events.

Those of us who've read any WWII history know what happened during Operation Cobra, in the Huertgen Forest, the Ardennes and when "the camps" were liberated. There's simply very little new or enlightening material here. When I finished the book I asked myself what I had learned and, other than a couple of anecdotes that I found interesting, the answer was nothing. The subjects the author addresses are summed up in "chapters" (more like short essays) that span maybe 1 1/2 to 3 pages.

If Fussell had gone into more detail (more than his previous books) about his own experiences, further light would have been shed on the American infantry's experience in Northwest Europe in 1944-45. An example of this is "Sixty Days in Combat" by Dean Joy. As a slightly bitter former ASTP student/soldier, who's time at the Univ. of Idaho was cut short by cancellation and consignment to an infantry division, Dean's account gives an excellent picture of what it was like in a green unit during the last three months of the war.

To make matters worse, the book quotes liberally from far more touching, shocking and true-to-life memoirs, specifically "The Medic" by Leo Litwak and "Before Their Time" by Robert Kotlowitz. The latter is probably the finest account I've ever read by a WWII infantryman in the European Theater. His story epitomizes everything Fussell is trying to say so you'd be better off just reading Kotlowitz's book.

Fussell's main point in "The Boys' Crusade" seems to be that the "boys" of America didn't deserve what happened to them in WWII. He frequently refers to "boys" and "youth" and even cherry-picks a photo of a highlighted baby-faced soldier to use on the cover of his book (which may have been solely the publisher's action). When one looks closer at this well-known Normandy invasion photo, however, it is revealed that the GIs surrounding the boy look plenty old enough to be in the infantry, appearing to me to be well into their 20s and maybe even early 30s. I bring this up because, despite Fussell's assertion, the average age of the Army's GI in WWII (including frontline troops) was 25, in stark contrast to the Marines' average of 19. I know of one citizen, married with kids, who was drafted and ended up in combat at the age of 43!

I do agree with and welcome Fussell's thesis that by 1944-45 the US Army should have gotten a lot more right. They'd had a couple of years of combat experience to practice. There was no excuse, for example, for Bradley opting to ship bullets and not winter clothes to the troops just in case the popular assertion that "the war would be over by Christmas" didn't pan out. I also like to see some sober reality injected into the current genre of flag waving WWII nostalgia and don't fault the author for that.

His exercise in "Boys' Crusade," however, could have been summed up with an essay published in a history magazine. I hate to be so disparaging of this well-known and admired professor but I found the price charged and the skimpy volume of this rehashed history a rip-off.