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Breakdown: How America's Intelligence Failures Led to September 11

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Does anyone really doubt that there wasn't a huge intelligence failure that led up to 9/11? All of these terrorist killers just materialized out of thin air? Political correctness, bureaucratic infighting and just miscellaneous stupidity couldn't have come into play as well? Our government was preoccupied with Clinton and Monica, the false War on Drugs, anything, anything, anything except those that bombed our embassies in Africa, blew up the USS Cole, killed our soldiers in the Saudi Arabian Khobar towers, etc. Lots of great wishful thinking (maybe the Taliban will hand Bin Laden over) too... It's a crying shame and let me tell you this dear readers, author/journalist Bill Gertz is a major patriotic American to tell the truth to us like this. You know, the people that failed us are still running the system! And as Coleen Rowley so bravely said, and I paraphrase, should we put the counterterrorism unit chief and his supervisor (the fools Maltbie and Frasca that messed up the Moussaoui matter) in charge now? Tenet stills runs the CIA. This is American accountability? What have we really learned since 9/11? Thank God for this book, I hope it causes a real storm and makes people upset, upset enough to demand change!

A quick informative read.

Gertz makes a strong case against the Clinton administration for its "politicization" of the US intelligence apparatus (CIA, NSA, etc). He also describes the ridiculously naive and stupid PC-based regulations which we have implemented which hamstring our field intelligence-gathering abilities. We should have been able to at least have a fighting chance at preventing 9-11, but not with the dysfunctional intel community described here.

Gertz also provides a brief plan to correct these major problems. This book is worth the two-three hours you will invest in it.

The author has done a wonderful job, without reference to any of the fifteen books on intelligence reform published between 1999 and 2000, in quickly reviewing the key elements of intelligence failure and in recommending some specific reforms that thus far have been denied by successive Administrations.

If this book forces policymakers to think, and makes it possible for the public to get very angry about the various failures of intelligence that contributed to 9-11, then it will be in the running for most patriotic and useful book of the year.

The author leaves one aspect of the 9-11 failure untouched--although he makes references to Democratic and to Republican policymakers, what he does not tell the American people is that intelligence failures do not occur without very substantive policy failures of two kinds: first, policy failures where the intelligence professionals are gutted, abused, intimidated, and generally prevented from being effective. The Director of Central Intelligence usually serves as the policy representative to intelligence in carrying out these abuses, rather than as the intelligence representative to policy. The second failure is one of "inconvenient warning," where solid professional intelligence estimates are set aside and ignored because the politicians don't want to be bothered, don't think it will cost them with their domestic constituencies, and are not truly committed to long-term national security. This is a bi-partisan problem--until the American people appreciate the connection between voting, policymaker character, and intelligence success, we will continue to get the government--and the intelligence community--that our citizens deserve.

If you need a Washington journalist with access to CIA and intelligence officials and documents, you need Bill Gertz. He has the access and the knowledge, and the trust of the intelligence community.

The book reads a lot like a Tom Clancy novel, transporting the reader instantly to the rocky hills of Afghanistan, and to the dusty cities of the Middle East, and then back to the paper covered desks of CIA intelligence analysts, and so forth. It names names, and tells stories of all intelligence agencies and intelligence gathering communities. Not just the CIA and the FBI, but the top secret NSA and other bureaus. It talks about the long term degradation of the CIA in particular, intensified by the political machinations of the Clinton administration.

You find out that thanks to Clinton, the last and best of CIA intelligence agents (that's spies) in Iraq, Robert Baer, was yanked back to the US and his cover shattered because it was brought to Clinton's attention that the NSA intercepted a memo within Iran saying they suspected that America was trying to assassinate Saddam Hussein, and they would rather stop Baer in his tracks than trust the CIA. Of course, Baer was simply staying alive and abreast of events in Iraq, doing a job no one else can do right now, nor will anyone be able to do it.

That is, of course, just the tip of the iceberg.

Perhaps we would be able to avoid war in Iraq if our espionage forces were supported these past 12 years. But we have zero "HUMINT" in Iraq and many other places we need it.

When you are done with this book, you'll be sad to know that George W. Bush, despite his sincere efforts in the war on terror, has not fired Clinton appointee George Tenet, figurehead of the CIA and one of its chief problems, and that no one in the CIA has been held accountable for the gross negligence of September 11th, nevermind Coleen Rowley's attempts to bring the issue to light to the tonedeaf liberal media. However, perhaps reform can be accomplished by Tom Ridge, the new Homeland Security Cabinet officer. Perhaps then, as vigilance has been returned to those affected by 9/11, vigilance and an effective organization will be returned to America's FBI, CIA, INS, and NSA.

A few days before writing this, Congress approved the 'Intelligence Reform Act of 2004'. I thought this book might be useful for understanding the exceptionally difficult issues involved. Unfortunately, it only covers the preliminary ground work.

Unless you have been living in a cave for the last 5 years, you are well aware that Congress, the FBI, the CIA and the NSA (and thus the President of the United States) had a variety of warnings which could have prevented the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, DC. This book reviews the warnings, using a chapter for each agency, the Congress and the Presidency.

While interesting, these reviews are poor narratives. The story line becomes very familiar, 1) agent 'X' was suspicious of 'Y' and wrote a 'warning memo'. 2) Unfortunately, a Democratic party functionary was running the agent's office and hid the warning. 3) If one looks into the office politics, it becomes obvious that the Democratic party functionaries were uninterested in Muslim terrorists. Instead, they favored activites that protected bureaucratic positions, maintained elected office, expanded a social service or played to the 'we hate the US military' crowd.

While interesting, the stories fail to argue for any general understanding of bureaucratic dynamics, the mind of Muslim terrorists or US politics. It is useful to know the specifics of various available warnings, but the simple moral tales were unconvincing. As a whole, the details are just details. The sum is less than the parts. In particular, there is no balance-of-powers governmental principle elucidated. Balance-of-power is the bedrock of US politics.

After these reviews, a set of recommendations were offered.
1. New clandestine service replacing CIA directorate of Operations and DIA Defense HUMINT. The goal is to create a service that relies on American diversity to place Americans in the front lines of intelligence collection.
2. Create a new Counter intelligence service outside the FBI.
3. Abolish the DIA and return its responsibilities to the Military.
4. Have CIA redesigned to support military.
5. Set up small Military 'special ops' force.
6. Upgrade technical abilities for collecting intel.

Two of these are non-controversial: #1 and #6, largely because they are so vague. Who would be against gritty 'real world' spies with technology James Bond would be proud to use? #3, #4, and #5 argue for giving more of the intelligence role to military officers, but the book has not made a case for trusting the military over 'spy bureaucrats', only against Democratic functionaries running spy agencies. #2 is the traditional 'new bureaucracy' temptation solution, which is as empty as #1 and #6. Thus, we are left with a simple analysis: turn counter terrorism over to the Army, Navy and Air Force.

Gertz and I probably agree that the Carter and Clinton administrations represent 20th century low points in US foreign policy, but the arguments and recommendations need to stand on their own merits. On their own, the case makes no sense. This probably explains the irrelevance of the book when used to inform opinion regarding the 2004 Intell Reform Act. The public debate over this measure revolved around two issues:
1. National driver's license standards
2. Congressional vs. Executive authority over 'real time' field level surveillance satellites.

The book makes no issue of driver license standards, nor the immigration issues that confuse the debate. The second issue is a 'balance of congressional and executive power' question, which the book never addresses.

In conclusion, while useful for summarizing the pre-9/11 warnings, the book is useless for making sense of 'how intel failed' and allowed 9/11 to take place. Since no theory of bureaucratic politics is offered, we end up with little more than 'my politics are better than yours' and 'another layer of bureaucracy will solve everything'.

I thought this book was actually more readable that some of the others on this subject. The organization is different being more agency oriented than chronological and in some ways that is more helpful and certainly provides a different and useful perspective.

There is little doubt that mature bureaucracies in general live to preserve the bureaucracy rather than serve the original purpose for which they were created. Gertz does a good job of illustrating this point as it relates to the various intelligence agencies. As with most other books I've read on the subject the CIA seems to be the best at this game while dismayingly ineffective in gathering intelligence about enemies.

Gertz also does a good job discussing the politics of intelligence and tracing the impact on the various agencies over the last 40 years. I thought his criticism of republicans in particular was interesting and compelling.

At the end Gertz discusses potential improvements. But by that time I was left pretty much convinced that there is probably little hope for these agencies to ever be effective in their missions without complete overhaul and that is unlikely. There is not much favorable about the new homeland security department either.

If the United States and the American way of life must depend on the Intelligence agencies as convincingly portrayed by Gertz in this book then there is little chance of the oldest democracy surviving another millennium.

The best-selling author of "Betrayal," which should have won a Pulitzer Prize, and "The China Threat" has done it again with his latest book about how America's intelligence failures led to September 11. Gertz, who has unprecedented access to our intelligence system, shows convincingly and conclusively with previously unpublished classified documents how there is plenty of blame to go around.

He says it best when he states, "The established bureaucracies that make up the U.S. intelligence community have lost sight of their purpose and function. Instead of working to support U.S. defense and national security objectives, they have become wedded to the idea that the institution--not its intended function--is what matters. This book . . . examine[s] the events of September 11, what was known and what was not known. It is a story of an intelligence bureaucracy that is broken and urgently in need of repair."

This is a very objective, well-balanced, researched book, that can help us not repeat the pre-9/11 intelligence failures in the future. Why did our most prominent leaders and others, insultingly question the author's patriotism for coming out with this book? Answer: embarrassment and an attempt to deflect the publics' attention away from these failures. As for the intelligence community, bureaucrats are constantly trying to take credit for successes and pass blame to others for failures. Since every agency, and department within every agency, has failed to some degree in this matter, they are all running for cover. Egos and careers come first. What is the most common "Washington way" to do it? Attack the messenger.

Not necessarily pointing the figure, but noting that human nature, organizational behavior, agency turf-disputes, overlapping roles, and a lack of communication within and between governmental agencies, were all factors that led to this surprise that shouldn't have been. These factors still exist today. The politically correct CIA director George Tenet, is still on the job. He should have been canned on September 12.

This is a very well researched exploration into the many events that happened before, during, and after this tragic event. It's about the facts. It can only help.

This is an important book about some major problems with our nation's intelligence community and intelligence infrastructure. Author Bill Gertz takes no prisoners and certainly points fingers in this book. He is abundantly clear in his assertions that intelligence failures failed to prevent the 9/11 terrorist attacks and that had our intelligence folks been doing their job that those horrendous attacks would have been prevented.

One chapter is devoted to Osama Bin Laden and what U.S. intelligence forces knew about him and what they did and what they didn't do about him before 9/11. Other chapters deal with the FBI, the CIA and the DIA, respectively. Gertz also delves briefly into the history behind the problems with our intelligence agencies. He levels a great deal of criticism at the Church and Pike Committees, which ravaged our nation's intelligence in the 1970's. In addition, Gertz lays much blame at the foot of the Clinton Administration and looks more favorably upon the current Bush Administration. Nonetheless, he still criticizes many Republicans for failing to provide proper performance-based oversight over the intelligence agencies, since he concludes they felt it their duty to protect those agencies from further attacks.

Gertz's charges that the CIA was overcautious in the years leading up to 9/11 and was averse to doing counterintelligence, that the FBI had all but ceased its counterintelligence activities, that worries about lawyers had come to dominate national security, that our intelligence agencies were under-funded, that agencies did a poor job communicating with one another. He also claims that the bureaucracies in these agencies were too frequently concerned with political correctness, protecting their image in the media, and guarding their turf.

Interestingly, in the prologue of the paperback edition, Gertz states that both the Joint Select Committee and the 9/11 Commission were not given adequate time to investigate and prepare their reports. The 9/11 Commission Report had not yet been issued when the paperback edition of this book was published, so he does not provide any analysis or critique of the Report. (Interestingly, Gertz puts much stock in Czech accounts that 9/11 terrorist Muhammad Atta met with Iraqi officials in Prague, whereas the 9/11 Commission does not consider such accounts particularly reliable.)

Granted, this reviewer is not an expert on national security, and does not have the knowledge to provide in-depth critiques of all the author's assertions and conclusions. But this book does contain some very interesting and extremely startling information about our nation's intelligence apparatus. And according to Gertz, if we are going to truly be protected, some serious changes must take place.

At the time of this review, Breakdown's paperback edition is still more than a year old. Thus, it is not the most current publication. But if you are an American citizen who is concerned about our national security and have invested the time in reading the Joint Select Committee's Report and/or the 9/11 Report, then this is certainly one you will want to read.

Well written though a bit tough to follow at times as he uses many sources. But the information provided gives a detailed blueprint into the damage Clinton and his administration did by misplaced politically moviated people into the roles which true intelligence experts are needed. The information only once again raises the question, How could this president have done so little to protect our nation and inflicted so much damage. A must read for both sides of the political spectrum. Politics should not matter when we are talking about national security.