Customer Reviews

The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century

5 star:		(7)
4 star:		(1)
3 star:		(2)
2 star:		(1)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

As a result of 9/11 foreign policy is hot. The popularity of intelligent academic like books dedicated to the subject has soared. The American public seems finally to have caught up an insatiable thirst of knowledge for this esoteric subject. This is undeniably a very good thing. And, this book from Robert Cooper is an excellent tonic to quench this thirst for knowledge. Cooper is an excellent writer. His lively style renders his book easy to read. Also, he is so erudite on his subject matter that the amount of information and knowledge he shares within this relatively short book is truly remarkable.

The core of the book is based on two essays Cooper wrote several years ago. The first one "The Condition of the World" originally written in 1996 is somewhat the better structured of the two. It develops a powerful foreign policy model by grouping nations into three categories.

The first category consists of "pre-modern states." These are completely dysfunctional. They are typically broke, can't deliver any social services effectively, and the government's authority is often challenged by gangs, warlords, and other outlaws. Many African countries come to mind.

The second category consists of "modern states." These are you regular sovereign nations working perfectly well on most counts. This is Australia, Japan, Canada, you name it.

The third category consists of "post-modern states." This essentially describes the European Union, whereby a group of countries have agreed to relinquish some of their respective sovereign rights to a supranational political entity (EU) for the greater good of the respective community of countries. In Cooper's views this category is obviously the higher political life form. And, the other two "states" consist simply of sequential stepping stones towards this most evolved state. This is obviously a questionable assumption. Where Cooper sees the benefit of multilateralism, cooperation, free flowing trade within the EU. Someone else could just as well see excessive bureaucracy, an extra layer of government, analysis-paralysis devoid of any effective foreign policy, and a trading block that actually reduces trade opportunity within a truly freer trade framework (WTO). However, Cooper makes his case extremely well. He is a formidable debater and does make a convincing case for his political framework and the superiority of the EU post-modern states structure.

Cooper somehow struggles a bit with the hegemonic status of the U.S. He concedes that the U.S. stands "outside and above" the post-modern structure. He also accepts that the world does indeed benefit from the U.S. protection umbrella. Without a strong leader setting a set of rules and examples, the world could easily fall into chaos of competing power blocks vying for the top spot. Thus, Cooper unlike many authors on the subject, finds himself both espousing European multilateralism and the American unilateralism.

His second essay, encapsulated within this book, has a much different overtone. Its vision is a lot darker. It reflects on a world becoming more dangerous, more uncertain, less manageable. He believes humanitarian and military interventions in collapsing states will become maybe more frequent and more urgent. Counter-terrorism will become potentially a permanent endeavor. Government efforts to hunt down and grab WMD from the wrong hands will also be a long term effort. His second essay, in style and vision, resembles a lot the excellent books written on the same subject by Robert Kaplan (The Coming Anarchy comes to mind).

In the end, this book may raises more issues, questions, and concerns than it answers. I think there lies his great merit. Contrary to many other authors who seem to know best about something as liquid and complex as foreign policy, Cooper's humbler attitude is refreshing. He does not have the ready solution to all the world's problems. But, he sure diagnoses these problems very skillfully. He also asks the right questions and raises the correct concerns. Finally, he also suggests the rather radical idea that European multilateralism and American unilateralism can cohabitate the Western World. They don't have to compete with each other.

This is a somewhat deceptive book. It is quite short, just a 180 pages including notes and is very well written. This might cause some folks to dismiss it out of hand as yet another self-serving tome form a retired bureaucrat (all be it an English one). In point of fact the book is an intelligent and original look at the way the post Cold War world looks and works.
The author describes this world as divided between `pre-modern', `modern' and `post-modern' nation states. He postulates that the post-modern state actually is more trans-national than national, with a strong affinity for multi-lateral foreign relations, a transparent security system and a high tolerance for outside interference in its domestic affairs. This sounds pejorative, but it is not. In the author's view the post modern condition is exemplified by the nation states of the European Union (EU) and Japan and is the model for a stable and prosperous world order. Yet in a remarkably realistic assessment of the condition of the world, the author notes that the EU and Japan can enjoy their status as post-modern states only because the United States posses the most powerful military force in the world. He refers to the U.S. as a `modern' state with attributes that include a penchant for unilateral action, a closed security system, and no tolerance for outside interference in its domestic affairs. He sees the U.S. as providing the security that allows the post-modern states to flourish and grow. This insight, to this reviewer, is a very generous and realistic view of the role of the U.S. in world affairs. The book contains a host of other insights, ideas and practical advice for making the post-cold war world a place worth living. They certainly make the book worth reading.

"The Breaking Of Nations - Order And Chaos In The Twenty-First Century", by Robert Cooper is another of the currently popular books that tries to explain the historical sociological basis behind our international dilemma; the breakdown of the authority of the state and perhaps of authority in general.
Starting with the generally accepted view of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, and Weber, that civilization and order rests on the legitimate control of violence by the state, Cooper examines the problems the world is facing with many non-state actors who use or threaten force and the states that are unable to exercise control over their own territory and are no longer responsible for the behavior of their citizens. These are the states he calls pre-modern. He further defines the pre-modern state as a post-imperial or colonial chaotic association where there is no real sovereign authority. In some cases these are the result of the decline of imperialism. Today, the general opinion being, that the rewards of imperialism are small and the burdens large, especially with a population hostile to being `colonials'. The result is all too often chaos, which may give rise to a `defensive' imperialism where nations may seek to control other states to maintain their own safety. Defensive imperialism is the latest interpretation of what used to be called a `buffer state' or `cordon sanitaire', a protective border zone to protect `us' from `them' or to keep potentially hostile neighbors apart. Nations have traditionally been secular and organized along ethnic or group identities. Their legitimacy has been derived from below rather than imposed from above. This is different than an empire, where the government is usually imposed from above and there is a non-homogenaeity of population. Frequently empires have strong religious elements (Ottoman, Mogul, Russian Orthodox, Soviet-Scientific Socialism) but no common relevant identity. When empires break up, however, identity becomes relevant for the first time as the chaos of tribal or ethnic division emerges. All of these situations lead to the Wilsonian idea of a nation-state that is sovereign, more or less homogeneous, and defined by fixed and defended or at least defendable borders. This is the type of state organization that Cooper calls modern. In this modern world order, force is still the ultimate guarantor of peace. Cooper calls these states modern because they are linked to the idea of the nation-state created by the Treaty of Westphalia, which he considers the engine that created the modern world. Both the `realist' theories based on the calculation of national interests and the so-called balance of power, and the `idealist' theories based on collective security and world government are considered `modern' because of their reliance on force to maintain order. By this measure, both the U.N. and the U.S. would be considered `modern' since the former has the use of force as a means of enforcement written into its charter and the latter has used force as part of policy since its inception. `Modern' states, according to Cooper, can, if successful, become expansionist and create a new imperialism. Its success would depend on its demonstrated superiority to the existing liberal capitalist democracies of the West. If, on the other hand, `modern' states fail, devolution into a `pre-modern' failed-state chaos is likely. The solution, at least in European eyes, to all of the world's problems is the "post-modern" state. The post-modern state system doesn't rely on balance, sovereignty, or the separation of foreign and domestic affairs for its stability. The post-modern ideal emerged from the 1957 Treaty of Rome and the Treaty On Conventional Forces In Europe (CFE) and was the inspiration for the Organization For Security And Cooperation In Europe (OSCE). Its rules stress openness and transparency that are contrary to normal state behavior. For example, it is normal behavior to conceal ones strengths and weaknesses from potential adversaries; under the CFE Treaty force details are declared and challenge inspections are mandated. In the `post-modern' state rules are self-enforced and there is no need for a mechanism to compel the payment of fines. All of this sounds like Utopia, and in many ways it is. Although under `post-modernism' the object of foreign policy is peace and prosperity, rather than power and prestige, unfortunately most democratic institutions remain stubbornly national. The EU is trans-national rather than supra-national. Although some still dream of a European State, outside of the elites this is a very small minority. If the state is the problem, a super-state cannot be the solution. Cooper obviously favors the concept of postmodernism as he has defined it, but is skeptical to the point of contempt to those who think that the post-modern state has arrived as embodied in the EU. He says that the presence of US forces in Europe rather than those of NATO or the EU is responsible for the half-century of peace Europe has enjoyed. Those forces enabled Germany to maintain much lower force levels at lower cost than would have been possible otherwise. The German `Wirtschaftswunder' was subsidized by the American taxpayer. He says that the US is the only nation in the world with an independent strategy. According to Cooper the rest of the world reacts to, fears, lives under the protection of, envies, resents, plots against, and depends on America. As the most powerful country, the US has less reason to accept the idea of security based on mutual vulnerability that is the basis of the post-modern state (see Robert Kagan "Of Paradise And Power"). In his view, every country would choose to be invulnerable if it were possible, but only the US is. He says the US is not imperial (Niall Ferguson "Colossus" disagrees and says the US should accept its imperial role), but is hegemonic. The US wants to rule, but only in order to promote democracy in a neo-conservative Wilsonian convergence that drives a foreign policy to make the world safe for America (see Walter Russell Mead "Terror, Power, War, and Peace). All of this said, he, like Mead and Ferguson, seems to favor a benevolent American hegemony, rather than the `association of the weak' offered by the EU at the present. He says that a balance of power produces instability rather than stability and hegemony produces resentment, but it would be irresponsible to allow even one more nation to acquire WMDs. This, he thinks, is an issue of such importance for the whole civilized world that the imperative of security must defeat rational argument and negotiated solutions. Longer-term he hopes voluntary reform (as in Turkey) and the extension of the system of cooperative empire (the EU) will result. He posits that real change in foreign policy only comes from change in domestic policy and that is related to national identity and national purpose which is in conflict with post-modernism. Cooper identifies this modern/post-modern EU versus US conflict as derivative from the differing attitudes towards nationalism in Europe and America. While European nationalism is tied to ethnicity and has been weakening (he doesn't mention the anti-nationalist sentiment resulting from the nationalist excesses of WWI and II), American nationalism is tied to the concept of national identity engendered by the US Constitution. There is no corresponding European identity, at least not yet, in his opinion. He calls for the creation of a European military force that trains together and has interoperable equipment, a force that would give some responsibility to Europe. He agrees with Kagan, that the inability to respond with force, leaves only one choice, the choice of weakness, which is inaction. He ends the book, with a quote from George W. Bush at the American Enterprise Institute: " We meet here during a crucial period in the history...of the civilized world. Part of that history was written by others, the rest will be written by us." Cooper comments that if that `us' is to include Europe, they will need more power, both military power and multilateral legitimacy. This book adds another serious voice to those of Ferguson ("Colossus"), Fukuyama ("State-Building"), Huntington ("The Clash Of Civilizations And The New World Order" and "Who Are We?), Kagan ("Of Paradise And Power"), Walter Russell Mead ("Terror, Power, War, and Peace"), and Nye ("Soft Power") in the discussion of the emerging world order. I recommend it.

Robert Cooper has written a brilliant book that takes a big-picture look at the vast scenery of the international community at the beginning of the 21st century. His short treatise is made up of three parts. The first is a discussion of the differences in makeup of pre-modern (the third world), modern (the U.S., Japan), and post-modern states (Western Europe).

The second section is a discussion of diplomacy today. It is broken up into a discussion of five maxims for international relations: 10 foreigners are different; 2) in the end, what matters is domestic politics; 3) Influencing foreigners is difficult; 4) Foreign policy is not only about interests; and 5) Enlarge the context.

The last section is a discussion of Europe and the U.S. today. This part has a special resonance as Cooper is currently the Director-General of the Council of the European Union. Cooper says that such simplistic postulations as Robert Kagan's in "Of Paradise and Power" that Europe and America are drifting apart because of different values are wrong. Europe and America may have different capabilities, but they want the same objectives. They both want to create conditions for prosperity and freedom. They both are threatened by rogue states and terrorists. However, Cooper sees the biggest problem in the relationship Europe's reluctance to create force capabilities that can work with the U.S. military by increasing defense spending. Cooper believes this is wrong and should be rectified before the problem becomes untenable.

This is a short and concise work that should be widely read. I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in international relations in the 21st century.

This book consists primarily of two essays on an emerging world order from the perspective of a British scholar and diplomat who has also participated in the European project. He is fully conversant in what Europe implies for Europe, but he is also fully conversant in (and sympathetic to) the British objections to Europe and the psychology of American foreign policy. Furthermore, it seems that this book is meant as a "third way" alternative to the "Power and Paradise" that Robert Kagan discusses in his book of that title (or "Power and Weakness", the title of the underlying Policy Review article that began the debate).

Cooper takes several phenomena in the modern foreign policy world as new. The basic idea is the emergence of a post-Westphalian order that qualifies (and sometimes rejects) sovereignty. This emerged out of World War II (which he importantly compares to the Thirty Years' War in that it gave cause to radically change the international order), but the full implications are only now becoming apparent. There are a couple of features of this world order.

First, new kinds of entities appear on the international scene which are not states, but to which states cede sovereignty. For example, the EU, the WTO, IAEA and NPT, verifiable arms control regimes, etc. In each of these, states give up sovereignty in exchange for various kinds of benefits, either in security or economic realms. Slowly, cooperation becomes the order of the day. He terms this "post-modern" international relations, and he calls the international order that existed between Westphalia and the end of World War II, "modern".

Second, a post-modern international order depends on a modern hegemon like the United States. Someone has to affirm security and tradition interests and to enforce them. However, this creates a fundamental tension between the post-modern states and the modern states. It is interesting to compare this discussion with Huntington's (in Soldier and State)about the need for a conservative-realist military in a modern liberal state. Huntington, mistakenly, thought that liberalism would ultimatley fail in the Cold War. Cooper explores the current tensions that arise, but he does not attempt to predict the future as Huntington did.

Third, he talks about the role of legitimacy in this context. How does legitimacy work when you have a necessary modern state, like the US, and a post-modern world order? How do you incorporate states that are failing or, perhaps, not yet even modern? Can states go from a sort of pre-modern state to a post-modern state? Do they have to pass through a variety of "modernity"? All important questions in an age of nation-building and an expanding European project. It is also interesting to see how much this agrees with the afterward to the 2nd edition of Kagan's book, discussed above. The Iraq war has made us realize these crises more.

Unfortunately, I don't believe that Cooper addresses one of the more interesting questions, which is the rise of non-national, non-sovereign entities like NGOs, multinational corporations, and international crime and terrorism. Many of the treaties that define this post-modern order, such as the ICC, the landmine treaty, and others, have all been negotiated as much by MGOs (operating out of the US!) as they have been by states. In addition, it appears that terrorist organizations can exist most easily in those places in which sovereignty is not total, such as in both pre-modern states and in post-modern states. What does this mean? The modern response to terrorism is that a state stops it because it challenges the monopoly on violence. But how does a state that has cedes part of its monopoly to others respond?

Finally, it would be interesting to consider the relationship of America's historically commercially driven policy has to the post-modern order. Walter Russell Mead wrote about this in "Special Providence", and it illustrates an important feature about the United States. Was it, in fact, an early post-modern state that reverted to a modern condition? What would that mean for Cooper's model?

In this remarkable book of essays, Robert Cooper, former foreign policy adviser to Tony Blair, gives a brilliant analysis of the present state of international relations.

Since the Peace of Westphalia, in 1648, modern European states have organized themselves according to two principles: empire and balance of power. This was known as the arena of the great powers and, in the 19th century, Japan and the United States joined the game. By 1945 most of the great powers were in shambles; there remained only the United States and the Soviet Union as two competing "imperial systems." And after 1989 there was only one, the United States as sole superpower. Many observers saw this as the global triumph of markets and democracy, and saw it as an end to the battle of ideas. Francis Fukuyama called it "the end of history." However, with the events of September 11, the world is again plunged into history and the battle of ideas, this time looking more like Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations."

In his analysis of the present-day world, Cooper divides nation states into three types: premodern, modern, and postmodern.

The premodern states are the "failed states." These states have lost their monopoly on the use of force; where governments have lost control to warlords, gangsters, terrorists, and other non-state actors (examples are Somolia, Liberia, and Afghanistan under the Taliban). These states have lost their sovereignty and chaos rules the day.

The modern states are sovereign states that pursue their own national interests. They fit into the traditional balance of power or hegemonic scheme. For them the world is a jungle and world government interests them only insofar as it furthers their national interests. Prominent among the modern states are Russia, China, Brazil, and India; and most prominent among them, the United States.

The postmodern world consists of nations that have relinquished much of their sovereignty to international governmental bodies, the primary example of this, of course, is the European Union. In Cooper's words it "is a highly developed system for mutual interference in each other's domestic affairs." European states gain their power from being completely vulnerable and transparent to each other. They operate on mutual security and rule of law. War between postmodern states would be next to impossible. Cooper believes this to be a higher level of civilization, but also sees the problem when not all states are postmodern.

Cooper also rightly notes that the development of the European Union from the Treaty of Rome (1957) to the present day was underwritten by American power, without which it would not exist today.

What is most interesting in Cooper's theory is the difference between how a postmodern and a modern state confront terror or genocide in the premodern world. Postmodern Europe failed to respond to genocide in the Balkans nor could it respond to terrorist attacks originating in premodern states. The postmodern outlook prevents them from building up a unified military capable of intervening in a time of crisis. Their primary tools are diplomacy and legal action. The response of the United States, the pre-eminent modern state, of course, is overwhelming military force. This, however, is insufficient and so unsettling to the rest of the world that is counterproductive and destabilizing.

According to Cooper, the key ingredient needed is legitimacy. Yes, military force is needed but it must be done in a multilateral way to bring along the rest of the world for a successful outcome.

Cooper's argument is much more complex than just described. I highly recommend this book for those who are concerned about the dangers of the present and those on the horizon.

British Diplomat Robert Cooper has written a straight forward and to the point analysis of the state of the world as we know it; and, the future of places like Europe and the United States in it. Cooper dissects the world into three readily definable camps - not first, second, and third world, "Pre-Modern" "Modern", and "Postmodern". Pre-Modern would be hopelessly lost and failed states such as Afghanistan; Modern states would be defined as nation states such as China or India; and the Postmodern would be defined as supra/super states such as the European Union and Japan. The United States sometimes fits somewhat into the Postmodern state while at other times fits a Modern nation state; all while also standing above it all in some ways (including that the U.S. has far outspent the rest of the world militarily, and more efficiently at that) to Cooper - a thread that runs throughout the book.

From these definitions, Cooper then works forward as he describes how the world is changing and how it affects these types of states in general as well as specific states such as the E.U. and the U.S. One major factor for the future to consider is that imperial, territorial, and state-against-state wars are mostly a thing of the past. Replacing these are civil wars, wars over ideology, and most importantly wars waged by non-state aligned groups with no actual territory and no actual government.

Cooper sees a secure future of the world dependent upon a few things: the European Union must solidify a stronger internal defensive infrastructure that is not reliant on the United States; that beyond that, the E.U. and the U.S. must work better together (and this he sees as a two-way problem to solve with both sides part of the problem); and the problem of non-governmental enemies must be tackled before it consumes everything.

This book is very readable and I found myself at times stopping to contemplate what I have just read and at others rereading a section to better absorb Cooper's thoughts on the subject. This is an honest consideration of the subject that is balanced and does not show a favoritism to Cooper's home country England or its Postmodern state the European Union...he is equal in his praise and his critique.

>>>>>>><<<<<<<

A Guide to my Book Rating System:

1 star = The wood pulp would have been better utilized as toilet paper.
2 stars = Don't bother, clean your bathroom instead.
3 stars = Wasn't a waste of time, but it was time wasted.
4 stars = Good book, but not life altering.
5 stars = This book changed my world in at least some small way.

Although the author appears to present a compelling case, it is rampant with idealism. He relies extensively on his academic and diplomatic credentials to float ideas, a thesis and methodology that he does not substantiate with scholarly work. The author uses 3 essays with the liberal use of many historical analogies to both build and support his case, regrettably for all his alleged academic and political experience he does not write as scholarly as one would expect and asks the reader to accept all his notions at face value without providing the necessary references, notes, footnotes or endnotes to support his case. In the three essays that total 175 pages he barely provides 38 endnotes.

The book is not entirely without merit. He debunks Kagans "Of Paradise and Power" and admonishes Europe for riding the "Free Security" ticket. Although he blasts America for its missteps and poor decisions in foreign policy, he is equally blistering of Europe. If you are looking for the observations that an experienced diplomat would make, then this is a great book. remenber, the operative word is observations;If you expect to use this book as a reference or source of primary evidence then I would suggest that you think twice because the book is heavy on opinion and idealism and essentially asks the reader to make the quantum leap of faith without the necessary supporting references.

The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century

Robert Cooper is excellent in describing and explaining different models of the world. The book is more philosophical than scientific, but I would argue that it represents biggest challenge to so called ``Scientific`` theories of international relations, mainly to the modern realist school, mainly neorealism. While arguing that there are different worlds and that these worlds have different logic, Cooper implicitly parts with Constructivist approaches to IR, mainly to Alexander Wendt's thesis. I highly recommend this book as it envisages the possibility for escaping the Hobbesian world of ``War of everyone against everyone``. The book is especially relevant in the light of last year's event, mainly Russia's war against its tiny neigbour Georgia. This war within the Modern World reminded the Postmodern World of Europe, that not far from its borders their is still the old war of realpolitik and balance of power, national interest and coercive diplomacy, buffer zones and geopolitics. Existence of the Modern and pre-modern worlds means that ``the world is not safe for democracy`` . . .

I read this book a long time ago. It reads like what you might get if you asked a typical IR undergrad's thoughts: short, confused, abstract, littered with unnecessary and oh-so-intellectual neologisms. And the book literally has no point. He does not describe how he came up with his 3 categories of state (pre-modern, modern, post-modern), how we move from one state to another, or just his neo-Whiggish assumption the post-modern (European, of course) state is the inevitable end-product.

A waste of time, another piece of waste-paper in the contemporary IR debate. Put it beside the rest of the one-track-minded garbage of Huntington, Fukuyama and Kagan.. (And I think of the Cold War generation of IR writers and intellectuals, Raymond Aron, George F. Kennan, Walter Lippmann, we really are being poorly served!)