Amazon.com Review
The Brink of Peace does an excellent job of placing the reader at the negotiating table between Israel and Syria, but in some ways this may not be good. Since the talks were so maddeningly intricate, the players so difficult to read, and the final results so minimal, this record is a complicated autopsy indeed. Still, there is much to learn here, and few were as close to the action as Itamar Rabinovich. As Israel's ambassador to the United States and the chief negotiator with Syria from 1992 to 1996, Rabinovich sat through countless hours of teeth clenching and fist pounding that, despite the book's title, came nowhere near resolution on the main issues at hand. "At no time during this period ... were Israel and Syria on the verge of a breakthrough," he writes, and he then proceeds to present an incredibly detailed version of why things went awry.
Much of the reason for the impasse is placed at the feet of Syrian ruler Hafez al-Assad. By insisting that a full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights be a precondition for peace, Assad was essentially making Israel an offer they could easily refuse unless Syria made some major concessions of their own, particularly regarding full diplomatic recognition and security guarantees. Though Syria surprised nearly everyone by even agreeing to discuss peace, Rabinovich faults Assad for not following through with the sentiment when negotiations were closest to success. In the end, Assad seemed to feel that a stalemate was good enough. Rabinovich does not always heap praise on Yitzhak Rabin or Shimon Peres, either, making his book a balanced assessment of a seemingly impossible situation, especially since Benjamin Netanyahu became prime minister. Perhaps nowhere else on earth are the brink of war and of peace so closely aligned. --Shawn Carkonen
From Publishers Weekly
Far less well-known to the American public than the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations that led to the accord with the PLO, Israel's four-year diplomatic dialogue with Syria?conducted mainly in Madrid, Damascus and Washington, D.C., between 1992 and 1996?was tortuous, complex and ended at an impasse. Rabinovich, the Israeli diplomat and historian who headed Israel's delegation to Syria, has written an evenhanded, densely detailed chronicle that avoids being as plodding as the talks themselves by virtue of its revelations of secret back-channel face-offs and behind-the-scenes glimpses of the Clinton administration's frantic maneuvers. Rabinovich alludes more than once to Israel's and Syria's "mutual demonization," and he concedes that Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin was in no hurry to reach an agreement with Syria. Yet he clearly places the brunt of the blame on Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad, who saw peace with Israel as an unavoidable prelude to his primary objective?a better relationship with Washington. Syria's domination of Lebanon (where Damascus offered indirect support to Hizballah terrorists) and Asad's insistence on Israel's full withdrawal from the Golan Heights further strained the negotiations. After Rabin's assassination in 1995, Shimon Peres's willingness to make concessions, according to the author, frightened off Asad, who has not resumed talks. This saga of missed opportunities holds valuable lessons for those seeking peace in the Middle East. Editor, Walter Lippincott.
Copyright 1998 Reed Business Information, Inc.
