7 of 7 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
Interesting, but Skimpy on Details, December 8, 2004
This review is from: British Home Defences 1940-45 (Fortress) (Paperback)
In the late summer of 1940, Britain was faced with the prospect of German invasion and due to the disaster in France, few resources were at hand to repel this threat if it succeeded in getting across the English Channel. In Osprey Fortress #20, Bernard Lowry outlines the British efforts to develop an effective homeland defense. This volume is interesting, well researched and fairly well written and certainly provides a good introduction to the subject. Unfortunately, the author has not defined his focus to fit within the framework of a 64-page volume and in attempting to cram in a myriad of sub-topics, he slights important details on the key topics. Ultimately, the two questions about British Home defenses are: were they sufficient to defeat a German invasion in 1940-1 and were they adequate to deal with the air and missile attacks in 1942-5? The author makes very little effort to address these crucial questions and appears content to provide a broad overview.
The volume begins with a discussion of Operation "Sea Lion," the planned German invasion of Britain and how this led to the hasty development of British Home Defenses in 1940-41. The author describes the creation of the Home Guard (the picture presented is probably a bit rosier than the reality of a hastily-cobbled together citizens' militia) and the construction of thousands of pillboxes and obstacles, as well as skimming over the coastal artillery. The author then diverts into a section on air defenses, which is somewhat redundant with the Osprey volume on Britain's air defenses by Alfred Price. Then the author diverts to a section on British plans for waging guerrilla warfare in the event of German invasion (oddly, the author spends more time on hypothetical resistance groups than he does on things that actually were used, like the coastal batteries at Dover) and another section on civil defenses. The final German V-weapon offensive is covered quickly, and readers should refer to other Osprey volumes on the V-1 and V-2 for more detail. The author includes one 2-D map (the land and air defenses of Britain 1940-42, which shows "Stop Lines," RAF groups and radar stations) and the volume has seven color illustrations: defending an AT island; the 15" gun 'Jane' at Wanstone Battery; Coastal defenses at Aldeburgh, Suffolk in 1942; 5.25" HAA battery in London 1943; LAA Bofors battery 1942; the morning after an air raid 1941; the cabinet war room in London. The author's bibliography is good, but provides no Internet websites that relate to this topic. A quick search on the Internet revealed that there were sites that provided information and photographs on British defenses around Dover that were not discussed in this volume.
The author's focus is a bit too high-level and does not offer readers a good picture of the British defenses that were most likely to face a German invasion. Although the author briefly mentions that the 1st London Division - which was defending the Dover area - was woefully short of automatic and anti-tank weapons, he provides few other details about the first-line defenses. Indeed, the author spends more time discussing inland defenses - "Stop Lines" and "Anti-tank islands" - than he does discussing the actual coastal defenses that would have faced the first German invaders. One suspects, given the diminished circumstances of the British Army in September 1940, that if the Germans had made it past the beaches in any strength the other British defenses wouldn't have mattered much. If the British lacked the machineguns and anti-tank weapons to defend the beaches, there certainly wouldn't have been much to hold "Stop Lines." Although the German plan to land elements of 11 divisions in the first wave was too ambitious for their limited naval resources, the British had less than two full-strength divisions on the intended invasion beaches. Nor does the author make much effort to discuss how British air and sea power would have been used to defeat the invasion (other sources mention near-suicidal plans to deploy British capital ships to smash the invasion convoys, if necessary and the RAF would have had to switch from the counter-air mission to naval interdiction).
Some areas of the volume were just too skimpy on detail to even approach accuracy. The section on coastal defenses has barely two pages of text on the subject and omits a number of key facts. First, the British lost the only three super-heavy batteries of artillery they had in France in June 1940. The British quickly built some coastal batteries near Dover from odds and ends, but the author fails to mention the three 13.5" railroad guns that were employed. The author also gives the impression that there was rough parity with the German coastal batteries near Calais; in fact, the Germans had a large superiority with 20 large-caliber guns versus less than 10 similar pieces on the British side. The author is also inaccurate when he claimed that the Wanstone Battery was dismantled in 1957; while the guns themselves are gone, there are pictures on the Internet of the magazines and some others parts of the batteries taken in 2000. Since the author notes that he has been part of a project to record Britain's remaining WW2 defenses, it seems odd that he missed something this large. Despite this type of oversight, the volume still provides a useful summary, but it should be carefully vetted with other material to flesh out the details.
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5.0 out of 5 stars
Good enough, May 8, 2006
This review is from: British Home Defences 1940-45 (Fortress) (Paperback)
A good guide to Britain's coastal defenses of WWII. Good enough for those interested in the Battle of Britain or the Blitz, or for that mater anyone interested in what might be possible for Operation Sealion.
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