Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War [Hardcover]

John Ellis (Author)

Editorial Reviews

From Publishers Weekly

Ellis's argument, backed with statistics, is that the Allied victory in WW II was the inevitable consequence of enormous advantages in manpower and materiel, but that the deployment of this overwhelming force was so maladroit that the war dragged on longer than necessary. In his lucid summaries of the major campaigns (Blitzkreig, Battle of Britain, Eastern Front, Battle of the Atlantic, Bomber Offensive, Mediterranean, Northwest Europe, Pacific) the author is highly critical of the conduct of Allied operations, charging British General Bernard Montgomery, for instance, for overcautious tactics, and RAF Marshall Arthur Harris with "insane insistence" on area bombing. Ellis ( Cassino: The Hollow Victory ) contends that the U.S. Navy ignored the speediest and most cost-effective way to defeat Japan, choosing to squander resources in the Central Pacific instead of strangling the country economically by severing its access to the raw-material deposits in the East Indies. The book's pragmatic interpretation is convincing, and fundamentally changes the received wisdom about WW II.
Copyright 1990 Reed Business Information, Inc.

From Library Journal

Ellis ( Cassino: The Hollow Victory, LJ 6/1/84) has matured from military reporter to serious combat analyst. In this sober but readable study he concludes that the wartime triumphs of the Allies were due less to their battlefield skills than to their enormous industrial capacity. In all World War II combat theaters, he argues, Allied tactics on the ground, sea, and air were crude and wasteful, dependent upon abundant firepower rather than training and finesse. This viewpoint is not new, but Ellis buttresses it with formidable statistical proofs that will be grist for countless future debates. He freely overstates his case, possibly for emphasis, and greatly overpraises the Germans, but his basic premise is well and forcefully presented. Highly recommended to public as well as academic collections.
- Raymond L. Puffer, U.S. Air Force History Prog., Los Angeles
Copyright 1990 Reed Business Information, Inc.

Product Details

• Hardcover: 643 pages
• Publisher: Viking (1990)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0670807737
• ISBN-13: 978-0670807734
• Product Dimensions: 9.4 x 6.4 x 2.1 inches
• Shipping Weight: 2.4 pounds
• Average Customer Review: 4.5 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (6 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #381,933 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

15 of 16 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars A controversial but well written book, September 3, 2001

By 

R. H OAKLEY "roboakley" (Vienna, VA United States) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War (Hardcover)

Remember all the World War II movies where a handful of American or British soldiers mow down scores of German soldiers because the Allies are smarter? Ellis' argument here is that the Allies won the war not by being smarter that than the Germans but by outproducing them in war material by a huge margin. Ellis produces a substantial amount of evidence to support his claims. For example, the famous Luftwaffe bombing of London in 1940 cannot compare to the tremendous number of bombs dropped by the Allies on Berlin. Part of the reason for discrepancy in production is that the Allies, as stable democracies, were quicker to put their economies on a war footing. Unfortunately, the innovations they used to increase production beyond levels previously believed possible did not extend to military tactics. The result were higher casualties and a longer war than might have othewise been the case.

11 of 11 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Fascinating insight into WWII, September 5, 2002

By 

PkyBny (Milwaukee, Wi United States) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War (Hardcover)

I just finished reading Brute Force by John Ellis. His thesis is that of the title i.e. the war was won largely by the overwhelming productive capacity of the allies. He backs this up with clear and ample statistics. But his book is by no means dry. In fact it was very engrossing for he delves deeply into the causes and implications of the production dissimilarities. While praising the heroics and sacrifices of allied soldiers, he doesn't spare their leadership for succumbing to the temptation of brute force. Numerous quotations and stories make the book an enjoyable read. One story is of a German lieutenant who told his captors how the American tanks kept coming and he kept shooting them. "Unfortunately, we ran out of bullets before you ran out of tanks." If you are not aware of the economic aspects of the war, this book can certainly change your perspective. Definitely a well researched and well written book. But, you may also wish to read "Why the Allies Won" by R. Overy. His thesis (in one sentence), is that WWII was really won in 1942 when the Axis still had parity.

10 of 11 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Somebody had to put it all together, June 13, 2007

By 

James Levy (Levittown, NY United States) - See all my reviews
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John Ellis wrote an important book in 1990, the title of which is rarely spoken in 2007 without derision or anger. But he was mostly correct. The Allies did win WWII largely because of what Churchill rightly described as "the application of overwhelming force." Sure, German and Japanese strategy were both flawed. But how were they ever going to compete against Soviet, American, British, Commonwealth, and Empire resources? Axis confusion, dithering, and demoralization were not the cause of their defeat--they were symptoms of being overmatched and knowing it. Everyone today from Overy on down the academic food chain wants to attribute Allied victory to their own inherent strengths and abilities, nay, overall superiority in virtually all things military, rather than to German, Italian, and Japanese weaknesses. So be it. They have the more flattering answer that the Anglo-American world wants to hear. But the truth of the matter lies much more in the "brute force" arguments of Ellis. Perhaps when the post-Cold War self-congratulatory chest-thumping and anti-German pile-on (ain't it interesting that once we didn't need their million men to buttress the NATO position in Central Europe, all benefits of the doubt were removed and the "they were all Nazis" perspect reemerged as common wisdom?) that marks so much of contemporary historiography dies down Ellis will be rediscovered as a valuable contributor and this book's reputation redeemed.