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Burying Caesar: The Churchill-Chamberlain Rivalry

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Much has been written about Churchill's wilderness years in the 1930's ranging from the lavish praise of William Manchester to the scorn of a John Charmley. I have never before seen a history covering the precise topic of this book which is the rivalry between Churchill and Neville Chamberlain during the decade which began with Churchill an ostracized outcast and Chamberlain a rising star and yet ended with Chamberlain a scorned failure and Churchill a triumphant war leader.

Young British historian Graham Stewart has put together a massive and meticulous study of just how and why events played out as they did between the two men. American readers be warned, this book is extremely British in tone, use of idiom and most of all, in its intricate discussion of British Parliamentary politics in the thirties. Stewart certainly assumes his readers are aware of the British electoral and Parliamentary system and the way it works. I myself, an American reader, am not but this was not too much of a handicap as I was able to follow the story without too much difficulty.

The first part of the book provides a good deal of background on British politics from the age of Churchill's father, Randolph and Chamberlain's father Joseph through the beginning of the twenties. Stewart describes the rise and fall of various parties, in particular the National Liberals of Lloyd George in the early twenties. While Chamberlain was not a player in national politics during the twenties (although his brother Austen was), Churchill was at the height of his influence, having left the Liberal party and slowly edging back towards the Conservatives. Stanley Baldwin would make him Chancellor of the Exchequer and Churchill became a full fledged Conservative once again in 1925. Further chapters describe the Conservative's loss to a Labour/Liberal coalition and Churchill's resignation from the shadow cabinet over the "India Bill". When he gets to the thirties, Stewart covers the Parliamentary maneuvering in incredible detail. Contrary to popular belief, Churchill, though out of favor with the party powers, maintained his supporters, known as Winstonians.

Chamberlain was quite different than Churchill as Stewart demonstrates, unlike Churchill, his primary loyalty was to the party not to any specific principles. It was not for nothing that Churchill referred to him as "that clerk from Birmingham." But this was the sort of man Baldwin was looking for. Churchill's first true breach with the party came over his demand that Britain re-arm in order to protect itself from the designs of Nazi Germany. Although his criticism of the Baldwin government was muted by his desire to regain office, Churchill consistently called for stronger defense preparation. After 1935, when it was clear he would never gain office under Baldwin, Churchill became a vocal and outspoken critic earning him the ire not only of the Conservatives but of the Labourites as well, who favored suicidal disarmament.

Chamberlain became prime minister in 1937 upon Baldwin's retirement. With no background in foreign affairs, he was immediately confronted with foreign crises caused by the growing belligerence of Nazi Germany, the Spanish Civil War and the actions of Fascist Italy. Despite the book's subtitle, there really was no rivalry between Churchill and Chamberlain until the Munich crisis of 1938. At this point Churchill moved into open opposition with his own party by delivering one of the most eloquent addresses of his career, denouncing the Munich pact before the House of Commons. This is the best part of the book. Stewart is never unfair to either man and not at all a revisionist. Nevertheless, he never hesitates to point out the fantastic assumptions upon which Chamberlain based his policy of appeasement. A most interesting point is how little Churchill actively did to maneuver himself into power. Although an outspoken opponent of appeasement, Churchill did nothing either publicly or privately to create the conditions which led to his return to office and his eventual ascension to the prime minister's office. In fact, once he joined the government and the war cabinet upon the outbreak of war, he muted his criticisms of Chamberlain and became a loyal soldier. In the end, despite his best laid plans and hopes, Chamberlain died a sad and broken man, his policy of appeasement in ruins. Churchill ascended to the ultimate heights of greatness in which he is held today. The reader of this book will learn a great deal about Churchill about whom much has been written as well as a great deal about Chamberlain about whom less has been written. Once the story begins to focus on the rising menace of Naziism, it is always riveting and frequently fascinating. The book is dense, scholarly and yet eminently readable. I thoroughly enjoyed it and would recommend it to any serious reader of history.

...I agree that the cost is a bit much but I believe that the reader will conclude as I have that it's well worth it.I would also concede that if you are not into British politics all of the talk about coalitions and cabinet reshuffles can be a little hard to follow. But Graham Stewart carries it off very well.This book is at bottom the story of an ancient political rivalry between two statesman that changed ultimately the course of history.Stewart traces it the way back to the fathers of the two men Randolph Churchill and Joseph Chamberlain who were at various times political allies and adversaries.What they both had in common was that neither made it to the top as Prime minister. Both died in the hope that their supreme ambitions would be realized in their sons. But the big question which Stewart effectively answers in this book is why was''nt Churchill instead of Chamberlain PM in the thirties? Churchill was smarter,He had a much wider experience in government.Had he been Prime Minister Could He not have promoted rearmament and other steps that might have headed off World WarII? Stewart shows us clearly why this did not happen. Why Churchill was seen in the thirties as a political has-ben and an adventurer who was totally out of touch with the times. While Chamberlain was seen in Lady Astor's memorable phrase as ''the coming man''.All of it makes Churchill's final dramatic acension to power at the crucial moment in the history of the world all the more dramatic and providential.Graham Stewart has written a superb book.

In a democracy, the people have the leaders they deserve. This would seem a rather self-evident observation, but one which is often forgotten when the inadequacy of Britain's political leadership facing Hitler in the thirties is discussed. As a citizen of a country that was ultimately liberated from nazi oppression by British troops, I certainly have no wish to belittle the heroism of the British people during World War II, but you need to make a clear distinction between Churchill's Britain living out its finest hour between 1940 and 1945 and the Britain of Baldwin and Chamberlain, struck hard by the twin calamities of World War I and the great depression and seeking only peace and comfort at almost any cost. This is what Burying Ceasar brilliantly demonstrates.

With the future of mankind hanging in the balance, the drama of Britain dealing with the menace of Nazi Germany boils down to a political and personal struggle between two elderly gentlemen, Chamberlain and Churchill, both striving to fulfill the ambitions of their fathers and families: Neville Chamberlain was both a son and a brother of great men, while Churchill, allthough the scion of a great family, was in reality the son of a demented political loser whom he nevertheless adored. No materialistic approach to history here - events are shaped by individuals, their qualities and flaws have decisive influence on the course of history. Burying Caesar portrays both men in an honest and objective way, neither vilifying Chamberlain nor glorifying Churchill and this is one of the great strenghts of the book.

It has been stated that the book seeks to redeem the reputation of Neville Chamberlain, but I do not agree. Burying Caesar merely frees itself from the conventional wisdom that Chamberlain was a narrow-minded and untrustworthy coward, showing us instead a basically decent and well-meaning politician who unfortunately (not least for himself) advanced to a position that demanded greater talents than this rather mediocre personality had been provided with. Chamberlain had been a reasonably succesful chancellor of the exchequer during the worst years of the depression and had his career ended at that, he would have been remembered in a mostly positive light as a minor figure of British history rather than as one of the worst failures of world history. Still, faced with an electorate which (naturally) did not want another war and hampered by his own lack of international experience, Chamberlain no doubt tried his best to serve his country. That he was no match for Hitler is obvious but one might wonder if any other British PM could really have prevented World War II (given, for instance, the attitude of France...).

Which brings us to Churchill. A vain, self-serving man of immense personal ambition, idiosyncratic in his view of the world yet ready to compromize if it might bring him back into the corridors of power. Not a man to be trusted, not a leader for times of great crisis. Yet history proved him right about the nazi menace and he turned out to be just the right leader for Britain when war came and the British people were ready once more to demonstrate heroism in the face of terrible adversity. Burying Caesar depicts Churchill with all his flaws, yet also shows us how he held on to his basic belief that Freedom and Justice would have to stand firm against Oppression and Crime and how that very staunchness made him into the leader now revered by all mankind - a fascinating portrait of the imperfect genius among men who were merely imperfect.

Graham Stewart writes historical non-fiction in the great tradition of British scholars such as A.J.P. Taylor, Corelli Barnett, Martin Gilbert etc. More, please....

I know very little about British Governments of the 1920's and 30's. This book provides quite a run through the period, contrasting the career paths of Chamberlain and Churchill, the former on the up escalator, the latter down. That being said, Churchill is dealt with very sympathetically, and as we know ultimately becomes immortal.
What comes across is Churchill's sheer self-belief, allied to a constant hunt for any opportunity to get back into cabinet through the 1930's. This self-belief ultimately was of service to the nation in his absolute refusal to negotiate with Hitler in the darkest days of 1940, when, unbelievably France had collapsed and the British Army had had most of its equipment captured. The power of Stewarts description of the debates in the House of Commons really enliven this book. Just read this

" This is only the beginning of the reckoning. This is only the first sip, the first foretaste of a bitter cup which will be proffered to us year by year unless by a surprise recovery of moral health and martial vigour, we arise again and take our stand for freedom as in the olden time"

This is Churchill after Hitler turned his back on the lenient strictures of the Munich agreement. It bellows through history, doesn't it?

Or Duff Cooper's resignation speech following Munich

"one great power should not be allowed, in disregard of treaty obligations, of laws of nations and the decrees of morality, to dominate by brute force the Continent of Europe. For that principle we fought against Napoleon Buonaparte, and against Louis XIV of France and Phillip II of Spain. For this principle we must ever be prepared to fight, for on the day when we are not prepared to fight for it we must forfeit our Empire, our liberties and our Independence"

It's Shakespearian.

That being said the book shows the pragmatic rise of Baldwin and Chamberlain through the 1920's and 30's, it is entirely possible to sympathize with the revulsion towards another European war and guilt about the terms of Versailles imposed on Germany which culminated in Chamberlain's abandoning of the Czech's as people `far away of whom we know nothing'.

Stewart advances the case that if England and France had been willing to go to war over Czechoslovakia in 1938, Germany would have had to fight in the South and West simultaneously and would not have had the Hitler-Stalin pact, therefore could not be sure of its Eastern Frontier and, ultimately, would have been in a much worse position than turned out to be the case in 1939/40. There is some interesting mention, not followed through, of the economic burden that rearmament placed on the German economy, and its chronic lack of natural resources - oil and iron ore specifically - in the early years of the war.

The book casts interesting light on the events following the negotiation of Irish independence - my main knowledge of this was that it sparked the Irish Civil War which resulted in the deaths of two of the Irish negotiation team. The British negotiators did not fair well either - the Conservatives revolted, deposing the leaders who had been Treaty negotiators (Churchcill, Austen Chamberlain) putting Baldwin in charge.
The book is queasy about Baldwin, he was such a poor Chancellor that his own Prime Minister (Bonar-Law) wrote anonymously to the Times to complain about him - this has the whiff of a tall-tale. He is portrayed as indolent, indecisive and overly-driven by public opinion. Yet it has an interesting twist on the Abdication Crisis, telling us that Baldwin rushed King Edward into an Abdication, because of personal animus. Perhaps.
A significant portion of the book spent on the failed attempts to limit the march towards Indian independence - which is seen in the light of the `mistakes' made with the Irish. Churchill's attitude to this is seen as futile, an example of his poor political judgement rightly causing his wilderness years. The book takes a different view, showing that the policy - effectively setting up an elected body, in which the various representatives would cancel each other's views out - was doomed from the start.

Chamberlain comes across as a cold, decent and ultimately tragic figure. Son of a famous father (Joe);younger half-brother of Austen, of whom great things were expected, he was meticulous, dedicated, an excellent number two. He seems to have been politically astute, never taking a position which could lead to his downfall, through the thirties he was always formally supportive of Baldwin, yet positioned to succeed him should he fail. Yet when he succeeds to the premiership, he implements a policy very much in line with the British public's aversion to a European War, protects the Empire as much as possible and yet ends up on the wrong side of history.

I found the book very enlightening on a period I knew very little about. The writing, while academic, is clear and even pacy at times. One minor fault I found was its references to contemporary events - the book was published in 1999, and references to John Major's difficulties in government, are, at this remove, a bit esoteric. With this small caveat I would recommend the book highly.

Offers an interesting perspective on the background to the rivalry between Churchill and Chamberlain. Of course, it wasn't really a rivalry at all until Munich blew up in Chamberlain's face. Until that moment Chamberlain was utterly dominant and Churchill was a widely disliked "has been". The author demonstrates how luck played a key role in elevating Churchill from the "backbenches" to the "Treasury Bench".

In my untutored opinion, the author is far too kind to Chamberlain who was, again in my opinion, an arrogant fool. Read Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott, The Appeasers, for a better take on the enormity of what Chamberlain and Halifax (et al) perpetrated.

Don't waste your time unless you have a strong interest in the gritty details of English history.

This book is fantastic. I found it superb. Joseph Chamberlain was one of the giants of 19th Century English politics - the family owned a business now known as GKN Plc.

In the Conservative Party his great rival was Lord Randolph Churchill, father of Winston who started out as a Conservative, became a Liberal, and switched back to Conservative.

Chamberlain's eldest son Austen [his mother died 2 days after his birth] once dined with Bismarck and won the Nobel Peace Prize as Foreign Secretary. He died just as his younger half-brother, Neville became Prime Minister after a superb track record of social reform but inspired by his brother's work he found a very different Germany and dreams of peace became delusions

It is all well and good to make this big deal over Chamberlian's
conscience, honour etc something that history does not record that had much to do with stopping Chamberlian from breaking his word fairly fairly regularly. A leader has to take responsibilities for the decisions that he makes within the parameters that he works under. In Chamberlain's case, he totally misjudged Hitler and his regime. It is not like the Nazis made any secret of their aims. As this book points out many in his own party like Churchill were worried that his actions.

Before the war and during the war, Chamberlain failed to produce the type of leadership required by his nation.

To Chamberlain credit, as the book points out, once he realized that Hitler could not be trusted his appeasement policy came to an end. I wish that other world leaders would have this sort of moral strength to admit sometimes that what they did was wrong and try to correct it.

Any book on this period that wants to be even and ballanced has to deal with the events going on else where but at the same time.

Stalin and the USSR invaded Eastern 1/3 of Poland just as Hitler took the Western 1/3 of Poland yet this is almost NEVER mentioned. Stalin also took the three Baltic States, Finland, and Sinkiang Province of China and bumped up against Manchuria. The invasions of free nations by Stalin is ignored. A little group called FOCUS or the Anti-Nazi Council funded by the owner of a South African gold mine who was a Eastern European Jew and all of London's Fleet Street press were beating the drums of war against Hitler, lying about his intentions to take England, Hitler's only hatred was directed against the USSR, Communism and Communists in Western Europe. Stalin's genocide of the Kulaks was covered up by the NY Times and Walter Duranty. Stalin's shipping of Jews to Siberia is ignored by history too. Why, is the question that does not even get asked ! All too often, the terms of the Versailles Treaty are never mentioned as a cause of German hatred of the West and a determination to excape from depression.
Clearly, Hitler should have been manipulated into going after the USSR and the Brits were insane to declare war over Poland, while Stalin was murdering 10,000 Polish officers in the Katyn forrest.