Customer Reviews

Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquests

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Kaegi broke the habitual insights into the early breakdown of the Byzantine Empire that usually "blame" external factors such as Armenian disertion, Christian Arabs flight from the battlefield, or even natural catastrophy. The book points out that the Muslims have done everything to secure victory, they even played down the political traps neatly set by the Greeks. Also, the Byzantines' weaknesses and strategic flaws were thoroughly explained without the usual "blame-it-on-someone/something" basis.

A much clearer picture of what went on in the frontline (or rather front cities) and temporary Byzantine's headquarter at Antioch was presented excellently. Along with what the Muslims' Generals carefully thought about their disintegrating, once formidable, foe. A must for anyone interested on the field, a necessity for any researcher looking for a fresh approach on the subject

I actually really enjoyed this book. It did a great job shedding light on why Byzantium caved so quickly to the initial Islamic conquest in the 7th century. It also did a nice job dispelling some of the more commonly cited (but insufficiently supported) explainations -- especially in regards to the religious differences between the Church Hiearchy and the population of Syria and the surrounding areas which therefore explained why the Muslim Arabs seems to be able to take over so easily. Kaegi instead gives a well reasoned and researched description of the exhausted state of the area after the delibatiting Persian war and the lack of manpower available to Heraclius as a result of years of plague and war. All that said, this book is one of the more poorly edited books I have read in a while (e.g., multiple cases of sloppy repetition). It actually causes a distraction in reading the book. Bear that in mind if you want to read this. While less specifically addressing the conquests, if you want a higher level and more readiable book, get "Justinian's Flea" instead.

Kaegi's book is a landmark study of one of the most important events in the history of the Byzantine Empire. His use of both Arab and Byzantine sources and his insistence on military factors are crucial for treating this subject properly.

However, this book is almost unreadable. In several instances Kaegi repeats himself within a chapter, covering the same subject that he has already discussed as if one were reading a draft in progress. He also uses many infelicitious if not nonsensical phrases such as "victorious defeat" (p. 259). His brief, choppy sentences are frequently banal.

Walter Kaegi's 'Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquests' is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand the details behind the rapid Byzantine collapse in Syria and Mesopotamia. However, those who want a more general and broader historical survey of the period in general should look elsewhere, as this book's focus is narrow and its audience primarily scholarly. For example, the Muslim conquest of Egypt is only ever mentioned in passing: the book's focus is purely that of Syria, Armenia, and Mesopotamia. Kaegi wisely takes a more military approach to the problem than traditional scholarship has applied, and he manages to argue quite convincingly that the religious dissent between Nestorian and Monophysite churches in the east and Constantinople, the theory that is still lazily applied, played virtually no role in the Muslim success. Instead, he cites the strategic difficulty in defending Syria, the surprise and shock of the Byzantines that led to a defeatist attitude, the lack of weapons amongst the Roman population in Syria, and the complicated politics of the last Romano-Persian war. This book focuses on a chronologically tiny amount of time by the standards of ancient and medieval history. As only a few years are discussed, Kaegi is able to go into great detail and thus is able to argue his thesis convincingly for all of the geographic regions he surveys. Kaegi also needs to be commended for his use of Armenian and Arabic source material. He begins the book by noting the limitation of the Greek and Latin sources (although he does not ignore the difficulties in using Arabic, Syriac, and Armenian material and some of the requisite historiographical problems) and he wisely does not assume that the Byzantine sources are in anyway better than the others. Theophanes is accorded the rather low place he deserves. The Battle of Yarmouk also receives a lengthy and solid treatment, far better than David Nicolle's Osprey book, although the description in Haldon's The Byzantine Wars is still probably the best narrative of the battle.

As other reviewers have noted, Kaegi's writing is frequently broken into small blocks of abrupt and awkward sentences. He repeats himself often, and sometimes arguments that are semi-relevant remain in the text when they would better belong in the footnotes. However, the writing style is still significantly better than his Heraclius, Emperor of Byzantium (an essential companion to this volume) so I'm not going to be too hard on him for that. This book is too important for the study of the early Muslim clashes with Byzantium to be exceptionally harsh based on Kaegi's writing style. This is not a general history of the period, but rather a detailed study of the immediate causes of Byzantine collapse in Syria and Mesopotamia, and one that will remain invaluable for a long time.