The CIA and the Culture of Failure: U.S. Intelligence from the End of the Cold War to the Invasion of Iraq (Stanford Security Studies) [Hardcover]

John Diamond (Author)

Book Description

Series: Stanford Security Studies | Publication Date: August 8, 2008

The 9/11 attacks and the war in Iraq sprang in no small part from massive intelligence failures, that much is well understood. How the CIA got to a point where it could fail so catastrophically is not.

According to John Diamond, this slippage results from the tendency to overlook the links between seemingly unrelated intelligence failures and to underestimate the impact of political pressure on the CIA: factors we need to examine to understand both the origin and magnitude of the 9/11 and Iraq intelligence failures.

To bring these links to light, Diamond analyzes the CIAs role in key events from the end of the Cold War (when the Soviet Union—and thus the CIAs main mission—came to an end) to the war in Iraq. His account explores both CIA successes and failures in the Soviet break-up, the Gulf War, the Ames spy case, the response to al-Qaedas initial attacks, and the US/UN effort to contain and disarm Iraq.

By putting into historical perspective the intelligence failures--both real and perceived—surrounding these events, Diamond illuminates the links between lower-profile intelligence controversies in the early post-Cold War period and the high-profile failures that continue to define the War on Terrorism.

Editorial Reviews

From Publishers Weekly

Diamond, a defense analyst and former reporter for USA Today, presents a perceptive account of the reasons behind a double-barreled intelligence fiasco: 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq. In the case of 9/11, Diamond claims that the CIA failed to determine the target, timing, and perpetrators of an attack it knew was coming. With Iraq, he says, the CIA perceived a threat that did not exist: weapons of mass destruction. The failures were linked, Diamond says. The implosion of the Soviet Union ended the threat the CIA was designed to meet, leaving the agency at loose ends in an unstructured global environment. Revelations of intelligence failures bred a culture of failure, by which Diamond means a crisis of confidence in the CIA's abilities. That generated internal friction and factionalism, with blind spots and biases shaping judgments. One result was failure to assemble a coherent image of developing security threats. Another was overcompensating for 9/11 by reasoning that with Iraq, safe was better than sorry. Diamond's evaluation of the CIA's crisis of confidence adds insight to debates about intelligence failures. 10 illus. (Sept)
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Review

"Diamond has put together a sequence of long, trenchant, truly eclectic essays on the CIA's internal workings, consistently stressing its tendency to outsmart itself. He has astutely canvassed active and recently retired agency personnel, cultivated top personalities in the congressional-oversight committees, combed through the documents and professional literature, and emerged with fine-grained, fair-minded analyses. The result is a collection of riveting specific case studies, with sharp and frequently surprising judgments. With Diamond's detailed treatment of key, catalytic incidents...the astute reader can appreciate the many setbacks—more than a few self-inflicted—that in turn produced full-blown debacles such as the Ames case and the falsified assessments that sparked the Iraq war." - BookForum

"Diamond, a defense analyst and former reporter for USA Today, presents a perceptive account of the reasons behind a double-barreled intelligence fiasco: 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq. ...Diamond's evaluation of the CIA's crisis of confidence adds insight to debates about intelligence failures." - Publishers Weekly

"John Diamond has combined his considerable journalistic skills and his policy knowledge to produce an interesting and important book that examines the interplay of intelligence and politics during a crucial transition period for U.S. national security. John adds new insights to our understanding of the links between intelligence and policy as they developed over the last 15 years—from the collapse of the Soviet Union to the Iraq War. Both policymakers and citizens interested in America's security will find this book to be a valuable frame of reference as we look ahead to the challenges facing our nation in the coming years." —Sam Nunn, Former U.S. Senator

"John Diamond's The CIA and the Culture of Failure is well-written and carefully researched. He begins by noting that our intelligence professionals must ask difficult questions, do robust research, and think critically. He is unflinching in delineating, honestly and succinctly, how hard it will be to achieve these goals. Diamond's book exposes the very real dangers of relying on biased intelligence products and describes how difficult it often is to identify such biases. This book will give policy makers new insights into the benefits and the hazards of relying on intelligence for policy decisions." —William J. Perry, 19th United States Secretary of Defense

"The CIA and the Culture of Failure is a very important work that focuses on intelligence and policy issues that are of immediate interest in dealing with key crisis areas like Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. No one can be definitive in a field where so much is classified, but this book frames a key debate over the future of intelligence that deserves broad attention by the Administration, the Congress, and the intelligence community. The work is solid, well-thought out, and covers a wide range of sources without bias; and without academic, ideological, or political prejudice." —Anthony H. Cordesman,Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for
Strategic and International Studies

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Product Details

• Hardcover: 552 pages
• Publisher: Stanford Security Studies (August 8, 2008)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0804756015
• ISBN-13: 978-0804756013
• Product Dimensions: 9.2 x 6.3 x 1.7 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.8 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 5.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (2 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,110,168 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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7 of 8 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Intelligence in Context, October 11, 2008

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Retired Reader (New Mexico) - See all my reviews

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This review is from: The CIA and the Culture of Failure: U.S. Intelligence from the End of the Cold War to the Invasion of Iraq (Stanford Security Studies) (Hardcover)

The explicit concept guiding this book is that intelligence failures (or successes) are not isolated events, but rather occur within the context of the national security processes. Or as Diamond succinctly puts it: "The biggest intelligence failures are usually the product of accumulating misjudgments and lapses..." at all levels of the national security establishment. He also makes the important point that there is a very thin line between intelligence successes and failures. These related concepts are the bases for Diamond's central argument that the legacy of real or perceived failures at CIA, its culture of failure, makes its intelligence production processes vulnerable to pressure from other elements of the national security establishment. Diamond believes this culture of failure leads to other intelligence failures that are caused by the reluctance of CIA analysts to make the same mistake twice or to present intelligence that may be counter to the thinking of senior policy makers.

Diamond also makes a very valuable observation that there is a wide gap between the line intelligence analysts and the senior intelligence officials who present the face of CIA to the executive branch and congress. Much of the problem of so-called "bad" intelligence stems from the reluctance of seniors to accurately reflect analytic positions if those positions run counter to the direction that policy formulation is taking. As
Diamond points out, analytic processes and conclusions are often by necessity convoluted and ambiguous. Therefore, both senior intelligence managers and their policy making clients find many accurate intelligence products confusing and frustrating. As a result, staff functionaries often will `scrub' intelligence products to eliminate contradictions and ambiguities. The resulting product may not be accurate, but it is much easier to understand than the original.

That said, Diamond also notes that CIA analytic tradecraft is sadly lacking. He cites numerous examples where CIA working analysts demonstrated a shocking lack of competence. For example, the CIA misinformation that caused the U.S. to execute a precision air strike that hit the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, instead of its intended target a Serbian military target was the fault of inexcusable carelessness of CIA analysts (this included failure to use readily available open sources, existing local CIA and U.S. Embassy sources, and an unwillingness to examine current information). Even allowing for all the mitigating factors, CIA has a sub-standard record for intelligence production that is as much due to poor analysis as to outside pressures and the complexities of the analytic craft.

This book is fair to CIA and to the national security establishment. Diamond is on the fringes of this establishment and not of it and this has enabled him to be objective about its failings and successes.

0 of 3 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars AN INDISPENSABLE BOOK ON THE C I A, July 8, 2009

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100% "alrightnik" (Amsterdam Netherlands) - See all my reviews

This review is from: The CIA and the Culture of Failure: U.S. Intelligence from the End of the Cold War to the Invasion of Iraq (Stanford Security Studies) (Hardcover)

THIS IS AN INDISPENSABLE BOOK ON THE C I A, WELL-BALANCED AND HIGHLY INFORMATIVE. IT COULD BE SHORTER BUT IT HAS MUCH INSIGHT AND INFORMATION--AND I KNOW THE LITERATURE.