Customer Reviews

The CIA at War: Inside the Secret Campaign Against Terror

5 star:		(5)
4 star:		(2)
3 star:		(7)
2 star:		(9)
1 star:		(3)

 

 

Anyone interested in learning how the CIA operates (and for Americans that should be all of us) will find this book fascinating. Choc-a-bloc with anecdotes and infomation that is both scary and amusing, it's hard to put down. Did you know that former CIA director John Deutch place l7,00, that's right, THOUSAND, CIA files, some of which were classified as top secret on his unclassified home computer? Did you know that since 9/11 certain Arab countries such as Yemen have actively cooperated with the CIA in its' war against al Qaeda? Do you want to know what the CIA is doing to try to insure there is never another 9/11? Do you (as I do) question whether we should have invaded Iraq? Read Kessler's analysis of the information amassed by the CIA demonstrating that Sadam Hussein was concealing a program dedicated to developing weapons of mass destruction and then decide what you think about the decision. Clearly a fan of George Tenet, whose achievements are impressive by any standard, Kessler is nonetheless critical of the CIA in many respects, as well he should be. Don't criticize the CIA without understanding something about it. This book will help you do just that.

"Inside the Secret Campaign Against Terror" makes it sound, at least to me, that the book will concentrate primarily on the battle against Al-Queda. However, Kessler doesn't get around to that until about 2/3rds of the way in; the first 2/3rds are essentially an overview of the history of the CIA from its inception; not that that isn't interesting, but do I really have to read about the Bay of Pigs and Irangate again? Also Kessler's writing style is dry, lacking flair, which shouldn't surprise me since he comes from a newspaper background. Overall, a mixed bag. For those interested in reading about the battle against Al-Queda, The Cell (the authors names escape me for the moment, but do a search and you'll find it) is far, far superior.

As other reviews have noted, this book is partisan toward George Tenet's Directorship, but in my opinion this is most welcome at a critical time when there are many calls to scapegoat one the CIA's most effective directors.

Tenet followed a series of failed Directorships (no less than 5 in 7 years!) and has revived a cultural of confidence and intelligent risk taking in the Agency that is crucial to prosecution of the War on Terror. If the feckless (and invariably insubstantially supported) calls to fire Tenet are heeded it will not only be a crushing blow to morale within the CIA and the intelligence community generally, but will also send a message that the (all too recent) bad old days of political scapegoating have returned, and that operatives, agents and analysts should revert to C.Y.A. mode.

Tenets accomplishments are considerable. To relate just a few:

He began the process of reviving HUMINT after it had been gutted by his predecessors; he literally pounded the witness table in hearings urging policy makers to take the offensive against al-Qaeda, and identifying Bin Laden as the country's single most important covert threat, years before 911; he promoted Coffer Black, the Khartoum station chief, to head the CIA's Counterterrorism Center precisely because of his expertise on al-Qaeda and his aggressiveness; he increased the staff of the Counterterrorism Center from a few dozen employees to over 300, again years before 911, while also integrating FBI employees on special assignment and actively addressing institutional infighting that undermined the center.

Unlike the technophobic Freeh at the FBI (who probably DID need to be fired) Tenet has been a consistent booster of modernization and innovation. He supported and pushed development of the Predator drone, for instance. With a less far sighted Director (who would have deferred to the Defense Dept's plodding development of similar but ultimately overly complex and less effective systems) we wouldn't have had that vital resource available, which has been responsible for "smoking" many al-Qaeda operatives.

Another example of Tenet's embrace of effective innovation is his promotion of In-Q-Tel, a nonprofit org established in '99 that funds and develops CIA technology and software projects, incorporating and co-opting private sector innovations. Prior to this, private firms with cutting edge technologies avoided the CIA because of it's cumbersome procurement procedures.

Along the same line, Tenet installed the ex-marine and retired millionaire investment banker A.B. "Buzzy" Krongard as the CIA's executive officer with a charge to cut through the Agency's bloated bureaucracy. Among other bold reforms, Krongard eliminated an entire directorate -- the powerful but bloated and sluggish fourth directorate, of administration -- so that (as in a private firm) the CIA's various divisions now report directly to higher management.

As other reviews have also noted, the treatment of CIA directors previous to Tenet is unremittingly negative. While this is glaringly true, it's not quite as bad as it sounds. Taking William Casey as an illustrative example, Kessler's criticisms -- poor handling of congress, shaky and inattentive administrative skills, failure to kill some ill conceived and counter productive operations, etc -- are at least arguably fair and accurate. The deficiency is not one of commission, but is rather the omission of Casey's strengths. For instance, Casey is given no credit at all for his most important accomplishments: his development of the economic warfare strategy against the Soviet Union, and his cultivation of accurate intelligence on the previously murky status of the Soviet economy.

First of all, don't be misled by the book's title. There is very little written about the CIA at war. In fact, if you have read Kessler's previous book "Inside the CIA," you will undoubtedly be amazed at the sheer amount of regurtiation that goes on in this book. I'd like to personally congratulate Mr. Kessler on fooling me into buying what is roughly the same book twice. Thanks, you hack. When the current book does venture into new grounds, it quickly becomes nothing more than a shrine of words to glorify George Tenet. Regardless of your partisan views or personal feelings of the man, it's pretty clear that the author loves him and goes to great extent to make the second half of this book a giant Tenetfest. There is nothing written in this book that could be confused with an exclusive story or a good investigative journalist's work. There is no analysis or even a hint of information that one wouldn't get by simply keeping up with general news and current events since 9/11. Kessler fails with this one...unless the publication was written for the sole financial purpose of adding a new room to his house or perhaps a second home right next door to his current love, George Tenet. Do yourself a big favor and don't bother with this book. It just isn't worth it.

Ronald Kessler continues his illuminating series of spy non-fiction with THE CIA AT WAR, picking up where he left off with his last CIA book and including new information concerning the post-9/11 agency. Kessler, always a balanced and insightful writer, delivers a solid sense of context before broaching subjects including the CIA's hunt for Bin Laden, the agency's work in advance of the Iraq invasion, and the technology used during operations (most fascinating: the Gnat and Predator surveillance aircraft). At times critical, at times laudatory, the book is always respectful and fair. The author's trademark anecdotal style guarantees that the subject remains fresh and new stories -- often with an unexpected human element -- come up with each turn of the page. Highly knowledgable, highly recommended.

This book had some interesting background info on the CIA. Unfortunately, all but the last few chapters are nearly identical to "Inside the CIA," a book the Kessler wrote 11 years earlier. "The CIA at War" lack a central narrative--it's filled with short choppy paragraphs. It's is a sometimes-interesting information dump. In the final chapters, Kessler defends the necessity of the invasion of Iraq and the Bush administration. I lost all faith in the book after that.

The CIA at War by Ronald Kessler is another very informative review of a major government agency by the acclaimed author who wrote The Bureau, Inside the FBI, and Inside the CIA. Like most books by Kessler the CIA at War starts with an in-depth history of the CIA from its origins to its most current incarnation and like his other works it is incredibly informative tracing the CIA's current struggle against terrorism back to its roots with the OSS. Although this historical recap does come at a price, often dry in parts and removed from the books central focus, even dominating the majority of the work as it take over half the book before Kessler returns to the events surrounding and then following the attacks on 9/11. Having read his other book Inside the CIA I was a little disappointed in this one and the board level approach it took to a more focused topic, leading to the eventual conclusion that it is simply a modernization of his past works. My recommendation would be to check it out if you haven't read any other books on the history of the CIA and are interested in developing a comprehensive knowledge of it but to hold off or get it used if you are just interested in learning more about the changes to the CIA and US Intelligence since 9/11. Also you may want to check out the CIA's website, under Studies in Intelligence you can review an unclassified study and examine book reviews and works from "The Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf". The list is updated regularly so be sure to check a few different dates if your interest in getting a good overview of the entries.

You can tell this is written from an outsider. No matter how much access he had to "secrets" he doesn't understand what he is talking about like someone who has done it as their career and written about it from the inside. The beginning of the book is very hard to follow and repeats information, often in random order. Names are thrown in so fast it is hard to keep track of who he is talking about or what the person's job is/was. It does settle out toward the middle and becomes pleasantly readable until the end.

This reads like a book rushed into print not long after war in Iraq was declared officially over by the President. As noted by others here, much of it is pastiche history of the agency seemingly slapped together rather haphazardly. The rest of it is a genuflection to Georges Tenet and Bush. What caught my eye is that Iraqi weapons of mass destruction are a given in the author's view up until second to last chapter, where their absence is dismissed rather cavalierly.

This book was a somewhat dissappointing read (worse books have been written) due to shallow content, an unusual timeline progression, and the ramblings of an overly partisan author. There isn't much depth in terms of actions and events that are referenced. Rather, much of the book contains generalizations about policy and personalities.

The book's timeline jumps around too much for my taste. A paragraph explaing the CIA's role in the 1990's will be followed by a section that deals with the CIA during the Cold War. And this will repeat throughout the book a bit abruptly, with no clear links.

The author discounts the value of former CIA officers like Robert Baer, dimissing him as a "cowboy" and making little mention of him beyond that. Yet a prominent point throughout this book - that the CIA needed to regain it's Human Intell. capabilities post Cold-War - is the same seniment offered by Robert Baer in his book, See No Evil (a MUCH better read.)

Unlike Baer, who criticizes both Republican and Democtratic administrations' handling of the intelligent community, Kessler is overly partisan in his writing of the same administrations. A more objective persective would have greatly helped Kessler's credibility. The end of the book especially, dealing with the Iraq War, reads like a Republican commentator on the Fox News Channel.

I wouldn't recommend this book. Buy Robert Baer's "See No Evil" instead.