Campaign 129: Operation Barbarossa 1941 (1) Army Group South [Paperback]

Robert Kirchubel (Author), Howard Gerrard (Illustrator)

Book Description

Publication Date: September 25, 2003 | Series: Campaign (Book 129)

Osprey's first title that examines the events of Operation Barbarossa -- Germany’s surprise assault on the Soviet Union in June 1941, aimed at nothing less than the complete destruction of Communist Russia. This book focuses on Field Marshal von Rundstedt and Army Group South, tasked with the capture of the Ukraine and Crimea. Von Rundstedt’s 46 divisions and single Panzer Group faced fierce resistance from the best equipped, trained and commanded units in the Red Army, but ultimately succeeded in destroying the Soviet 6th and 12th Armies at Uman before inflicting a further 600,000 casualties at Kiev. Here, von Rundstedt’s five-month advance to Rostov is examined in detail.

Editorial Reviews

Review

"It does an excellent job in presenting the fighting between German Army Group South and its Russian foes during the six-month campaign from June to December 1941." - Andrew Nguyen, ww2db.com (August 2009)

From the Publisher

Highly visual guides to history's greatest conflicts, detailing the command strategies, tactics, and experiences of the opposing forces throughout each campaign, and concluding with a guide to the battlefields today.

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Product Details

• Paperback: 96 pages
• Publisher: Osprey Publishing (September 25, 2003)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 1841766976
• ISBN-13: 978-1841766973
• Product Dimensions: 7.3 x 0.3 x 9.8 inches
• Shipping Weight: 11.2 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.3 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (3 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #642,666 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

16 of 18 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Some Rough Edges, but a Decent Summary, November 23, 2003

By 

R. A Forczyk (MD, USA) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Campaign 129: Operation Barbarossa 1941 (1) Army Group South (Paperback)

Lieutenant Colonel Robert Kirchubel, of the California Army National Guard, has embarked upon the ambitious task of summarizing the greatest land offensive in history - Operation Barbarossa - in three volumes. Kirchubel's first volume covers the German Army Group South's (AGS) invasion of the Ukraine in 1941. The bar is high for this task, given the vast literature available on this subject, and this volume does suffer from some rough edges. However, LTC Kirchubel's volume is a handy summary of an important campaign and as such, is useful for military professionals and amateur historians alike.

Operation Barbarossa 1941: Army Group South begins with a 5-page introduction and a detailed campaign chronology. The 5-page section on opposing plans is good, and emphasizes that while Hitler sought the destruction of the Red Army, many of his commanders were attracted by prestige objectives like Moscow. The 3-page section on opposing commanders is decent in covering army-level leaders, but then Kirchubel starts to ramble and includes a diverse assortment of minor subordinates. Considering the vast amount of material available on the opposing armies in 1941, the author's 8-page section is insufficient. Kirchubel states that "von Rundstedt's command numbered 46 ½ German and allied divisions" but his own order of battle lists 48 German, 2 Slovak and 14 Romanian divisions for a total of 64. Oddly, the author does not mention that AGS had 674 tanks at the start, despite tons of data available on the panzer divisions. As for the Red Army, somehow the author managed to miss the fact that the Soviets were in the midst of a huge reorganization of mechanized forces in the summer of 1941, which had a major impact on their combat readiness. Indeed, it is clear that the author did not use David Glantz's excellent Stumbling Colossus, which details the Soviet disorganization. Kirchubel makes two other significant errors in regard to Soviet forces: (1) he is unaware that the anti-tank brigades had been stripped of their trucks rendering them immobile and (2) his exaggeration of the combat prowess of the KV-1 heavy tank is tempered by his ignorance of the vehicles' faulty transmission that rendered it too, immobile (a recent article in ARMOR magazine described how Soviet propaganda had concealed the KV-1s weakness for decades because it was one of Stalin's pet projects).

The 2-D maps in this volume are quite good and include: initial dispositions (division-level); the frontier battles; the Kiev pocket; the capture of the Crimea; the Donbas and Rostov; and strategic overview. The three 3-D maps (the Uman Pocket, the Battle of the Sea of Azov, and the Battle for Rostov) are a bit less even; the Uman map is the victim of poor editing that mixed up Axis and Soviet units and the Rostov map is just too busy (it could have showed the German offensive or the Soviet counteroffensive, but not both). The Rumanian front does not get its own map, so both the Axis allies and the German 11th Army are under-represented. The three battle scenes are all very good but lacking in balance, since all are from the German viewpoint (I thought Osprey always tried to represent both sides?) and indeed, the entire volume is clearly pro-German. The Soviet tank counterattack at Dubno - one of the largest tank battles before Kursk - would have made a good battle scene.

Kirchubel's campaign narrative, which is 55 pages in length, is relatively clear and strait-forward. It is clear from his bibliography that he has combed many excellent lengthier works for source material and that he is able to synthesize this data into a coherent summary. Unfortunately, very few of these sources represent the Soviet point of view. Overall, this volume represents a decent campaign summary, albeit one that is heavily from the German point of view. The author also misuses the 5-page conclusion to essentially summarize the highlights of his narrative with very little analysis and some faulty statistics (is he really trying to say that AGS suffered only about 20,000 casualties during Barbarossa?). The editing throughout this volume is often slip-shod, which reduces the author's ability to drive his points home.

5.0 out of 5 stars One of 3 books in collection..., June 27, 2011

By 

Elizabeth M. Nickerson - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Campaign 129: Operation Barbarossa 1941 (1) Army Group South (Paperback)

For any fan of the Osprey format this set of books is a must have for the collection. Some of these series of books have been collected in hardbound format in the past. The D-Day invasion and the Battle of the Bulge series are collected in this manner, so you might want to look into buying them that way instead of paying three seperate shipping and handling charges. This particular series I don't believe to have been collect yet, but I am not complete sure about that perhaps someone esle can shed some light on that.

Altogether these books are generally very high quality with a decent overview, maps, and an introduction to the material should you choose to delve in further later on. They also have suggestions for gamers to play out the battles at the end of the book.

4.0 out of 5 stars German Command and Tactical excellence vs Soviet Incompetence, May 9, 2010

By 

John "Silence is Golden" (New York City) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Campaign 129: Operation Barbarossa 1941 (1) Army Group South (Paperback)

Army Group South was overall the most successfull of the 3 German army groups { A.G North, A.G Center, A.G. South} of Operation Barbarossa in 1941 in achieving its primary objectives. Considering the huge area frontage and multiple tasks it was assigned, Army Group South was by far the weakest of the 3 army groups with 46 1/2 German divisions, Rumanian forces equalling about 14 divisions, 2 Hungarian, 2 Slovak and {later in the campaign} 3 Italian divisions - a total of 67 1/2 divisions and being a multi-national army greatly complicated AG South's command and logistical arrangements. The Red Army initially outnumbered the Germans and their allies on this front {85+ Divisions} and even though the Red Army continually suffered enormous losses, the Soviet state was ruthlessly able to mobilize massive manpower reserves to reinforce the front in far greater quanities than the Germans could. The satellite formations were not up to German {or Russian} standards in training or equipment. On June 22, 1941 - In tanks, Army Group South was inititally outnumbered by about 5 to 1 { 3400 vs 660 }. By July 15, the Soviets were reduced to about 350 tanks - a loss rate of 90%. By contrast the Germans suffered a permenant loss of about 100 tanks. So, sheer numbers / quantities aren't the measure of an army's operational effectiveness as Mr. Kirchubel rather reluctantly chronicles in this decent campaign volume. In higher command leadership, troop training, armour and infantry tactical abilities, communications, mid-level command and control and combined army /airforce coordination - Army Group South despite equiptment and logistical shortcomings was able to inflict over 1.25 million permenant casualties {killed and captured} on the Red Army in the 1st six months of the campaign. Field Marshall von Rundstedt and his army commanders did a brilliant job in manuvering their limited forces to advance over 600 miles to Rostov and were finally to be stopped by troops losses and exhaustion ,an over extended frontage, logistical issues stemming from the sheer distances involved and finally the Russian winter. The Luftwaffe working in coordination with the armored spearheads deserve a great deal of credit in providing key air support and smashing Red Army reserves and counterattacks. Yet despite all its tactical success, Army Group South still had to face time and space limitations, supply problems ,wear and tear on the troops and equipment and the RUSSIAN WINTER !! Had Hitler and General von Halder allowed von Rundstedt to halt in late November {as he requested} to re-group and consolidate his forces defensively on the Dnieper River, it is very likely that Stalin's ham-fisted insistance that the Red Army attack, attack and ATTACK could have wrecked what was left of the Red Army facing Army Group South in futile counterattacks and Von Runstedt would undoubtly have been presented with new tactical opportunities to exploit. The overall performance by the Soviet high command, troop training and tactical performance by the Red Army can only be described as lamentable. The author's narrative tries to put a postive spin on the Red Armies combat performance and to overstate the damage it inflicted on German forces but does not make his arguments very convincing. The Red Army deployed huge #s of men and equiptment and some of its formations fought well. BUT when near1y one {1} million men are taken prisoner it is hard to credit that the Red Army fought with as much skill or detirmination as the author seems to want to make us believe. General Kirponos the front commander was a stubborn and dogged leader but his inexperience in going in less than 3 years from command of a division to the command of 6 + armies totaling 85 + divisions was much to big a jump for him to be an effective commander. His army commanders {with the possible exception of Tyulenev on the Odessa Front} were inferior in experience and tactical ability to the German army and corps commanders - in particular Panzer General Edward von Kleist. Kirponos was hampered by Communist political commissar control {including a young Nikita Khurshchev} and Stalin's ignorant interferance espically in regards to allowing a withdrawal from Kiev before Kirponos armies were cutoff and surrounded. This criminal stupidity to make the Red Army stand and fight at Kiev led to what is arguably the greatest disaster in military history - the encirclement and destruction of 6 + armies in the Kiev pocket {with the assistance of Panzer Group 2 from AG Center} with the Red Army losing nearly 1 million men {including 650,000 + prisoners including General Kirponos also perishing while trying to break out. The high command incompetence of Stalin and the Stavaka and immense losses of men and material suffered in 1941 only serve to show how remarkable the Red Army's winter recovery in 1941-42 was and even more remarkable were the tremendous victories it achieved in 1943 -45 - no other army could have {or ever has} sustained the losses that the Red Army suffered and was still remain in the field to win the war. Quoting Stalin " Quanitity has a Quality all it's own". Despite the author's pro-Red Army slant,this book provides good maps and a decent overview of the 1st 6-7 months of AG South's campaign. I recommend it and give ita 3 1/2 star rating.