The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of Failure in High Command [Hardcover]

John A. English (Author)

Book Description

ISBN-10: 027593019X | ISBN-13: 978-0275930196 | Publication Date: May 30, 1991

The reverses experienced by Canadian troops during the late stages of World War II continue to be the subject of intensive inquiry among military historians. Going beyond the obvious immediate causes of these setbacks, the author presents a detailed historical examination of the role of the Canadian army in Normandy and of the organization, training, and fighting-style that the Canadians brought to the battlefield in 1944. In Book I, the author analyzes the impact of the British military model on the Canadian corps in terms of doctrine, training, command and staff appointments, equipment, and organization. He discusses the contribution of Canadian troops in World War I and the failure of the Canadian military to maintain a high level of professionalism in the interwar period. Drawing on archival records, particularly Montgomery's personal correspondence, the author offers new information on attempts to turn Canadian troops into an effective fighting force as late as 1943. Book II presents a critical analysis of Canadian operations in Normandy. The author gives special attention to the Canadian Army's inability to close the "Falaise Gap" in a timely manner--a delay that may have prolonged the war in Europe by several months. Providing both theoretical and practical perspectives on the relationship of peacetime preparation to the operation of large field forces in battle, this work will be of interest to students and buffs of military history and to professional analysts and strategic planners in the armed services.

Editorial Reviews

Review

“This immensely stimulating book by John A. English enrishes the already distinguished new generation of scholarship on the armies of the Western Allies of 1939-45.”–American Historical Review

“This book is a welcome and necessary addition to the literature. It will be warmly received by Normandy veterans, and will stimulate much interest and debate amongst professional soldiers and military historians alike.”–The International History Review

“[A]n outstanding analytical study that raises important questions about the army and the society that created it...The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign is an excellent book full of insight as well as new information.”–The Canadian Historical Review

“English has produced a remarkably rich record of a multiple of elements that are fascinating to read and fit together. It is well written, thoroughly researched and documented, and usefully illustrated. It is an honest reappraisal of the received version of Canadian experience in the Normandy campaign. The frank identification of the reality of responsibility resting with the Canadian commanders whose abilities, or lack thereof, were products of the decade of peace during which they had led is a valuable addition to he written historical record and to the theoretical approach to the Canadian military experience.”–The Historian

About the Author

JOHN A. ENGLISH is Associate with the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Product Details

• Hardcover: 376 pages
• Publisher: Praeger Publishers (May 30, 1991)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 027593019X
• ISBN-13: 978-0275930196
• Product Dimensions: 9.6 x 6.4 x 1.2 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.8 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (1 customer review)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,542,668 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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13 of 14 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars A damning indictment of Canada's senior WWII Army Generals, September 21, 1999

By A Customer

This review is from: The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of Failure in High Command (Hardcover)

Professor John English's work is a well-written, balanced, detailed and authoritative study of the largely mediocre role played by the First Canadian Army during the Normandy campaign of June-July 1944.

Professor English argues that the First Canadian Army's ineffective effort during the 1944 Normandy campaign can be traced back to the lackadaisical attitude held by many Canadian Army officers towards both the study of the art of war and the proper training of subordinate staff during the inter-war years. At the outbreak of World War Two in September 1939, the senior Canadian Army commanders were not only unable to understand the complexities of modern warfare, they were also unable to properly train their subordinate staffs, officers and enlisted ranks for the modern battlefield. For those few exemplary Canadian Army officers who cared passionately about the profession of arms - most notably Lieutenant General Guy Simonds - there was one senior British Army officer who acted as their teacher: Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery. Whatever critics may say about his arrogant attitude, prickly ego and blunt language, he was, and remains, in my estimation, the finest and most consummate professional military officer of World War Two. Other senior Canadian Army officers often parroted Montgomery's words, but none, with the exception of Guy Simonds, ever equaled his battlefield successes.

I found Montgomery's opinions of the senior Canadian Army commanders especially telling. They were either glowing (Guy Simonds was "the best commander in the Canadian Army") or blunt (Major General Chris Vokes was nothing more than "a good, plain cook"). General Harry Crerar (commanding officer of the First Canadian Army) was also the subject of disdainful comments by Montgomery. For example, in a letter to General Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the British Imperial General Staff, Montgomery stated that he felt Crerar was not suited to command an army in the field. After reading English's work, General Crerar comes across as a military officer of very dubious qualities: Indolent, insecure, and intellectually superficial. He was seemingly obsessed with inane bureaucratic paperwork and army regulations and held a deep-seated jealousy of his finest subordinate field commander, Lieutenant General Guy Simonds. In the end, those Canadian Army junior officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted ranks who fought their way through the Normandy campaign were ill-served by most of their senior Canadian Army commanders. They, not most of their senior generals, are the heroes of the Canadian Army in Normandy.