Anatole Kaletsky's key aim is to demonstrate that modern capitalism does not break, but bend in times of "existential" crises (p. 191). Like democracy, modern capitalism has an inherent institutional and political flexibility at its core (pp. 2; 19-20; 35; 311). This evolutionary ecosystem has reinvented and reinvigorated itself through rare crises for the last 250 years (pp. 3; 26; 36-37).
Modern capitalism has more staying power than its critics on both Left and Right usually want to give it for two key reasons:
1. Capitalism has been able to overcome its own contradictions allowing it to undergo radical change (pp. 2; 5; 21; 34-35; 52-53; 82; 157; 201-208; 246; 269-270);
2. Ambition, initiative, individualism, and competitive spirit are embedded in human DNA (pp. 1-2; 20; 22; 25; 41).
Kaletsky reminds his audience that the critical distinction between crises in capitalism and crises of capitalism is often overlooked. Crises in capitalism represent what Joseph Schumpeter called the process of creative destruction through which a group of businesses and industries are reorganized through the regular economic cycles of booms and busts (p. 34). In contrast, crises of capitalism have an impact on the broader capitalist system itself, shake economic assumptions and political beliefs, and cause far-reaching changes both within and between states (pp. 37-38).
The necessary metamorphosis of the capitalist system is at its most difficult when it is close to breakdown. The interest groups that have wealth and power under the threatened existing iteration of modern capitalism defend ruthlessly the status quo under the pretext that any attempt to change their cherished system is doomed to failure (pp. 9; 22-24).
To facilitate the understanding of this extraordinary resilience of modern capitalism, Kaletsky subdivides its history into what he calls the four ages of capitalism. The changing relationship between government and private enterprise has been the clearest feature of capitalism's evolution from one phase to the next (pp. 4; 192). Kaletsky further subdivides the first three ages of capitalism into several sub-periods to capture the key developments that occurred in each of these periods (pp. 43-54). Some historians will argue with Kaletsky's timeline and the way he regroups events to come up with these first three ages. The author notes on this subject: Unlike history, economics relies on simplifications and stylized facts (p. 44).
During Capitalism 1 that lasted from 1776 to the 1920s, economics and politics were to a large extent two distinct realms of human activity and emotion (pp. 3; 43-44). Governments intervened in the economy to collect taxes, mainly to pay for wars, and protect influential political interests without undermining both private property and the profit motive (pp. 4; 44-45). These interventions were expected to disappear over time as a result of a "natural" evolution towards liberalism and free trade. Managing economic activity and employment was excluded from the duties of the state (pp. 45; 159-161).
Capitalism 2 that found its genesis in both the Bolshevik revolution and the Great Depression lasted for about 40 years (pp. 3; 49). Strong belief in benign, omniscient governments and an instinctive distrust of markets, especially financial markets, were the dominant features of this phase of capitalism (pp. 161-168).
Capitalism 3 gestated in the global inflation of the late 1960s and 1970s and was unleashed onto the world under Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher (pp. 3; 51; 53; 76; 80). Capitalism 3 was the antithesis of Capitalism 2, reflecting a firm belief in benign, omniscient markets and an adamant distrust of governments (pp. 3-5; 85-102; 128-155; 168-180; 195). Capitalism 3 got the coup de grace with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008 (pp. 1; 124; 130; 136). Kaletsky notes paradoxically that the wealth created under Capitalism 3 was to a large extent illusory and much smaller than the wealth created by the government-led high-tax capitalism of the 1950s and 1960s (pp. 12-13; 268).
Kaletsky argues that instead of separating government and private enterprise, capitalism 4.0 will bring them in closer relationship (pp. 8; 31; 190-196). Experimentation and pragmatism will color public policy, economics, and business strategy, even it means uncertainty, ambiguity, and inconsistency (pp. 8-9; 26; 30; 40; 200; 258; 279; 306; 318). Kaletsky expects that capitalism 4.0 to exist for 30-40 years before making room for capitalism 5.0 (p. 331).
The main value of Kaletsky's book lies in his framing of the key features of capitalism 4.0 that is emerging around the world in the aftermath of the 2007-2009 crisis (pp. 3, 7):
1. Shrinkage of government size, despite an expansion of government responsibilities and influence (pp. 10; 266; 270; 274-275);
2. Sharper distinction between the twin goals of taxation, i.e., revenue raising and redistribution. Choices between higher taxes and cutbacks in social entitlements or big reduction in all other discretionary public activities are inevitable (pp. 231-245; 271-272; 278; 287-290);
3. Convergence of heath care toward a mixed public-private model (pp. 10; 282-287);
4. Higher education more likely to become more market-oriented (pp. 10; 271; 281-282);
5. Expected privatization of many public services such as postal service and infrastructure (p. 270);
6. Tightening of financial regulations and resumption of the 1980s model of floating currencies (pp. 10; 222-228; 250; 256; 270; 291-301; 329-331);
7. Competition rather than convergence between the Chinese and Western models of politico-economic development (pp. 11; 257; 304-313; 315-317);
8. Business support for government subsidies and taxes directed at specific (say, manufacturing) industries or sectors due to massive amount of industrial restructuring expected to happen worldwide (pp. 314-315; 317-318; 322). Structural unemployment in the U.S. cannot be solved without an assertive industrial policy that complements free trade (pp. 250-259; 317);
9. Rationalization of the consumption of raw materials and fresh water through taxation (pp. 196-200; 317-329).
Kaletsky concludes by saying that if the necessary reforms happen, American-led democratic capitalism will reemerge as the most successful and attractive political-economic model for both advanced and emerging economies (pp. 12, 33; 312-313).