Caporetto 1917: Victory or Defeat? (Military History and Policy) [Hardcover]

Mario Morselli (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: September 30, 2001 | ISBN-10: 0714650730 | ISBN-13: 978-0714650739 | Edition: 1

This work concerns the Battle of Caporetto in October 1917, where the Austro-German Army broke through the Italian lines forcing them to retreat after losing half their force. The book examines why, having routed the Italian Army, the Central Alliance forces were not capable of forcing the surrender of Italy.

Product Details

• Hardcover: 192 pages
• Publisher: Routledge; 1 edition (September 30, 2001)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0714650730
• ISBN-13: 978-0714650739
• Product Dimensions: 9.3 x 6.4 x 0.8 inches
• Shipping Weight: 15.5 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (1 customer review)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #2,694,869 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
  • #33 in Books > History > Europe > Slovenia

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4 of 5 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars A Different View on the Battle of Caporetto, May 6, 2003

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This review is from: Caporetto 1917: Victory or Defeat? (Military History and Policy) (Hardcover)

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Synopsis
The Battle of Caporetto in October 1917 was almost a catastrophic event for Italy. Eighty years after the event, this work reconsiders the meaning of that event in the wider framework of World War I. Following the Central Powers' breakthrough on the Isonzo front, there followed a huge collapse of the Italian army, which lost over half its men and material. Having suffered such losses, Italy was on the brink of total collapse. Yet, by December 1917, Italy had overcome the crisis and remained in the conflict. How did it manage to do this? For Mario Morselli, the answer lies in the poor performance of the Central Empire's military leadership after the initial success of the offensive. In the weeks following the breakthrough, the Austro-Hungarian and German generals proved unable to surmount a series of strategic situations, which negated the value of the original breakthrough. Morselli notes that forcing a surrender was a secondary war aim for the German generals; the recall of German troops to the Western Front was crucial to Italy's survival.