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Carlson's Raid: The Daring Marine Assault on Makin

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George W. Smith has done a superb job of chronicling WW2's 2d Marine Raider Battalion. He tells the true story of the exploits of the Raiders, and details the life story of their leader, Evans F. Carlson.

Far from being a dry account of the facts of the 1942 raid on Makin Atoll in the Pacific, this tale recounts the events leading up the the actual skirmish with the Japanese, and tells the story of the battle in riveting first person detail. From their disorganized entry onto the island, their successful assault on the waiting Japanese forces, and their almost disastrous exodus through fierce ocean waves back to the submarines, the reader is captivated by their unique tale. For the first time, the conclusion to the attack is laid out in all its controversial detail. It is a highly compelling story that has waited 59 years to be told in its entirety.

Kudos to Mr. Smith for an exceptional, factual account of a significant World War II battle, one that captures the attention of history buffs and laypeople alike.

This is a fairly brief(233pp.) account of the 2nd Marine Raider Battalion's assault on a Japanese held Central Pacific island in the first year of the Pacific War during WWII. The author outlines the formation of elite Marine commando units and the intra-service squabbling it entailed. He then takes you into the early career of the leader, Evans Carlson, and its influence on his philosophy of covert operations such as these units were tasked with. He later follows with a descriptive narrative of the preparation, training, and execution of the mission of invading Butaritari Island in Makin Atoll in the Gilbert Islands. I applaud his use of oral interviews of survivors of the operation. My only critique was the ineffective sprinkling of humorous events throughout which did not blend well with the flow of the story. Overall I highly recommend this book to those interested in learning more about one of the elite Marine units of WWII.

Smith has surpassed his last work (The Seige at Hue) and written a "can't put it down" thrilling account of one of WWII's most daring attacks. You'll get to know the players (including FDR's son, Maj. Jimmy Roosevelt)and be part of the battle and drama. Whether you have a military background or just like adventurous reads, you'll find this to be a page-turner. Make sure you block out chunks of time to read this because you'll be wanting to know what happens next.

Evans Fordyce Carlson was a loose cannon. The Raider concept was "emerging doctrine" (MilSpeak for "make up stuff as the situation develops"). Carlson's legacy is the modern Marine Corps fire team--a humble honor that Carlson would probably appreciate. As for the official record, "maverick" is an understatement.

George W. Smith begins "Carlson's Raid" with the events of Sunday, December 7, 1941 at Pearl Harbor. The author also gives a brief biography of Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, a key player in the Raider story. James Roosevelt, FDR's son and Carlson's battalion executive officer, and of course the President of the United States, Franklin D. Roosevelt, were the reason that Carlson wound up with one of the two Raider battalions. The Marine Corps was bitterly opposed to forming any "special force" because the official dogma was that every Marine was special. (Note: in 2005 the United States Marine Corps finally recanted this long-held doctrine and established a presence in the Special Operations Command--SOCOM. "Carlson's Raid" was published prior to this event and only time will tell how this radical change will affect the Corps.)

The bulk of the book is about the Makin raid from preparation to aftermath. One chapter is devoted to Carlson's Raiders' Long Patrol and another is devoted to the disbanding of the Raiders. I like bibliographies and indexes because they allow me to go to other sources and quickly find things.

I came to the conclusion that the Makin Raid was a defeat for Headquarters Marine Corps because even after being organized and equipped specifically for raiding and undergoing extensive (for the time) training the raid was all but a disaster. This was an HQMC defeat because it proved that "ordinary Marine line companies" were NOT capable of conducting Makin Island type operations. The Raider companies themselves needed refinement in training and better equipment. Radios and outboard motors were not up to the task of keeping raid elements in touch with the mother ship or each other, and of crashing through the surf line. No wonder Raider units were "squandered" as line infantry on Guadalcanal and then disbanded! The Para-Marines were never used as parachute infantry, either.

I think that "Carlson's Raid" is great history because it shows how fouled up war fighting can be. Smith leaves me with more questions than answers, which is a good thing. There are gaps in the record on the Makin Island operation. George W. Smith put a lot of information into "Carlson's Raid" because military operations do not happen in a clinical, isolated setting. FDR's "interference" in "military operations" and the Hollywood connection (the movie "Gung Ho!") all cloud the issue of success and failure. In military operations the difference between defeat and victory is often merely a matter of opinion.

I enjoyed the book, however, a lot more can be learned of the Raiders by reading Oscar Peatross' book Bless 'em All, which is out of print, unfortunately; however, excerpts are available at one of the Marine Raider websites. The chapter on The Long Patrol at the end of the book, is short and somewhat superficial, and a story truly deserving of a novel in itself. Imagine being on patrol and living in the jungles of Guadalcanal for 32 days. Ahoy Raiders! We are truly indebted and thank you for your sacrifices.

In the first half of World War II, things looked very bleak for the allies. The German and Japanese military were presumed to be invincible, by the more pessimistic observers. Germany had over-run Europe and North Africa, and almost defeated the Soviet Union in October of 1941. The Japanese had over-run much of East Asia and half of the Pacific Ocean. The Axis Powers were planning to link-up in India, and to most of the world, it seemed that this was innevitable.

In Britain, a nation crippled by its losses in the disaster at Dunkirk, Winston Churchill refused to wait for the prospective German invasion of his nation. Believing that any manner of offensive action would be better than doing nothing at all, Churchill authorized the formation of elite raiding units, the Commandos. This was the birth of modern military special-operations.

The Commando-concept found much resistance from the typically closed-minds of intellectually-mediocre, inner-circle, military careerists who always seem to dominate armed-forces bureaucracy. Unfortunately, the U.S. Marine Corps had its share of such uninspired conformists. However, not everyone was opposed to such "radical" ideas.

Franklin Roosevelt, inspired by the commando successes reported by Churchill, gave his endorsement to the formation of American commando units. Roosevelt's son James was a Marine Corps officer, and was among the first eager advocates. James Roosevelt would serve as XO under his friend, Evans Carlson, in the 2nd Raider Battalion. This should not have been such a contentious issue for the U.S.M.C. After all, the Marines historically had always been a raiding-force, by their vary nature as ship-borne infantry. As the Army formed the Ranger units, the U.S.M.C. formed its own commando group, the Raiders.

Here is the story of Evans Carlson, James Roosevelt, the Marine Corps Raiders, and the raid on Makin Island.

Conducted as a diversion for the larger Marine landings on Guadalcanal, the Makin raid was an operation of questionable value in some respects. The raid did result in the capture of useful intelligence documents, and valuable experience was gained. Sadly, as is common in such daring under-takings, things did not go as well in the conduct and extraction phases as theycould have. There are always unforseen hazards, despite how thorough the planning and the rehearsals may be. The Makin raid almost became an absolute disaster, but the Raiders prevailed.

Earlier histories of the Raiders have alluded to the controversial nature of Lt.Col. Carlson and his eccentric politics, without going into much detail. Finally, we have a bit more of the story. There were suspicions by some, that Carlson was a communist, as he had temporarilly accompanied the Chinese communist forces in China prior to World War II. This is where he learned about guerilla-warfare, and the value of a raiding force. Carlson was openly a socialist, but also a Christian, and certainly no communist. Although I can not identify with his socialist idealism, I can sympathize with his sincere belief in democracy and egalitarianism.

Carlson communicated openly with all his personnel, group discussions were held that included all ranks. He believed it was hypocrytical for military personnel serving a democratic nation, to be subjected to dictatorial and un-democratic leadership. He despised blind obediance, and endorsed the concept that democracy requires thinking human beings, not puppets. As a veteran, I believe this is a basic fact that still needs to be addressed in our military. Being an American means being free. A volunteer serving in the armed forces should never forget that fact. Naturally, there are circumstances that demand strict adherance to orders, but common-sense people are aware of this. The Raiders did too. Like all of us, Carlson may have been overly idealistic and naiive in some of his views (socialism), but in the grand scheme, he was a true visionary. In short, he was a free-thinking non-conformist, and I believe his heart was in the right place.

Carlson would be pleased to know that his influence on the Marine Corps was not forgotten, and not in vain. His "Gung Ho" philosophy of team-work and egalitarianism amongst Marines is still there, more prominent in some units than in others, but more prominent in the Marines than in any other service.

It's not often you find a work of non-fiction that uses a novel in the bibliography, yet author George Smith references WEB Griffins "Call To Arms" in this telling of the US Marine Raiders assault on Makin Island in WW2.

I enjoyed this book very much; it traces the political behind the scenes development of US commandos or "Raiders" as they became known. Just after Pearl Harbor, the Americans needed something to boost their morale. A hastily planned raid on the Japanese captured Island of Makin provided just the ticket. The `establishment' of the Marines resented an elite force within the elite Marines and resisted this concept.

The raid itself and its leader, Evans Carlson have become controversial subjects in post war history. No one, however, doubts the courage of the Marines who fought and died there. Or the submariners who risked their lives rescuing the Marines. The Raiders involvement on Guadalcanal is also reviewed.

While this is not the most exhaustively researched book I've ever read, it does do what good books should do - makes me want to read more about the subject. I was surprised by the author's conclusions. Whether or not the raid was worth the risk and price paid is left to your own opinion, I think the pros and cons are fairly presented.

Interesting reading on the early phases of the US-Japanese Pacific War, the Marines, I recommend this book for a quick read on a little known battle on an obscure Island.

Smith is a pretty good writer for this style of book, essentially a regimental history. That genre, though used as source material is particularly excrable in writing style. But Smith pulls of a masterly work which could be claim of larger and more campaign-centred histories.

The essentials of Carlson's biography set up the mission requirements and the advent of this particularly class-less based fighting unit in WWII. Carlson has attracted a lot of controversy in life and death with his commando concept for the marines. In other countries such a figure as Carlson -- brash, socialist, schooled in guerrilla warfare by basically travelling with Mao's troops in pre-WWII China -- would not attract such attention. But the US with its particularly ideological slant on the world, anti-collectivist attitude, and mere fact that the US Marine Corps is perhaps one of the most conservative of institutions, it was inevitable that a man who believed in mythic leadership -- the notion that leaders lead by example -- would get under the skins of conservatives, turf defenders and those advocates of grander strategies.

Smith did not really cover too much of Carlson's ideology except to stated that he was no communist, but something worse -- "a socialist with a genuine fear of God." Such a man with a mission was dangerous in established institutions and went very far for the same reason a Orde Wingate -- he was a soldier that fights.

The book should be standard reading for any special operations person and tells the value of not only preparation, but how even the best laid plans can, and often will, go astray. Many people found fault in Carlson. I found his ability to improvise to be quirky and inspiring. I also found the fact that the raiders were not expecting snipers in trees also a glaring fault in their training.

I do not think there is much to be gained in arguing over the military value of the raid. It was paltry. Not even a blip on the screen of combat that presaged and followed. But it was a test run of a daring concept.

The value of the raider concept for combat in WWII is more controversial. There are those that argue you get greater bang for your buck by integrating these fighting men into traditional combat units. Certainly this was proved with the British-Commonwealth Commando raiding concept. It was also proved in Burma where clearly Orde Wingate's Chindits would have been better employed as a traditional British line divisions.

I like the book and rate it highly. I think it highly ironic that in 1943 the raider concept was ultimately crushed by the Marine "forces that be" and their units integrated into regular Marine Divisions. This contrasts with the obscene plethora of troops in the US Armed Forces who regard themselves as "Special Forces" -- to such a degree that the term has beome largely meaningless.