Customer Reviews

The Case for Animal Rights

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This book accomplishes two goals: First, it is the best available discussion of the many aspects of animal welfare. Second, it is an excellent example of a fine philosophical mind grappling with a difficult issue. I have often recommended the book to those who just wish to follow the workings of rigorous thought. But reader beware--do not look for simple answers or slogans here. This is difficult reading indeed, but Regan has, better than anyone else (and this is characteristic of all his writing)carefully worked through the many arguments, objections, counter-examples, etc., with thoroughness and clarity unapproached by similar books. If you recognize that the question "Do non-human animals have rights?" is extraordinarily complex and thereby can produce only complex answers, then this is THE book for you.

As I suggested long ago in my review of Peter Singer's _Animal Liberation_, while I applaud Singer for pointing out numerous ways in which our treatment of animals could be improved, I don't find his "utilitarian" ethical arguments very persuasive.

But Tom Regan's now-classic book -- this one -- is a different story. This is a tour-de-force of ethical argumentation that makes the titular case about as well as it's ever going to be made. Regan doesn't simplify any issues and he's very much alive to fine ethical nuances. And he sets out his case with both rigor and vigor.

Probably most of us won't have any problem agreeing that at least some nonhuman animals are conscious, but there _have_ been people who have denied it (most famously, Rene Descartes). So for completeness, Regan begins with a careful discussion of the question. Avoiding simplistic answers and over-eager claims about research on e.g. animal language, he mounts a solid case that at least some nonhumans do possess consciousness.

(Some of his arguments are a bit weaker than he thinks they are, although I still agree with his conclusions. For example, he argues that possession of language skills can't be an indicator of consciousness because human infants are presumably conscious before they acquire a language; how else, indeed, would they acquire it? But this shows only that _present_ possession of linguistic ability isn't a necessary condition of consciousness; it doesn't show that the ability to _learn_ a language isn't such a condition. As I said, though, I agree with his conclusion; I'm merely criticizing the way he gets to it.)

The remainder of the book is a wide-ranging discussion, not just of animal rights, but of ethics generally. Even aside from Regan's nominal topic, the volume could serve as a fine introduction to ethical thought in general. (Among its many highlights: a short refutation of Jan Narveson's "rational egoism" that could double as a refutation of Ayn Rand's even sillier version.)

In the end, what this gets us is a careful case for regarding mammalian animals which are at least a year old as possessors of "rights." (Regan also argues that for other reasons, we could and should want to extend "rights" to other animals; he has limited his discussion to mammals in order to keep to what he takes to be a fairly clear-cut case.) These "rights" do not, he holds, trump every other ethical consideration under the sun; in particular, in emergency situations in which either (say) a human being or a dog (or a million dogs) must be killed, we should kill the dog (or dogs) every time. These "rights" are _prima facie_ moral claims -- strong, but not indefeasible.

What I think Regan has successfully shown is that living beings don't have to be moral _agents_ in order to count in our moral deliberations. And with most of what he says on this subject, I heartily agree; in particular I think he has made just the right distinction between moral agents and moral patients, and correctly argued that moral patients have _some_ sort of "right" to consideration.

I cannot, however, follow him _quite_ all the way to his conclusions -- for example, that we are morally obliged to be vegetarian and to refrain from using animals in all scientific research. Mind you, I've been a vegetarian myself and I think there _are_ good reasons for avoiding meat; I just don't think they're morally conclusive. I agree completely that many current practices are inhumane, and I also agree with a point Regan argues repeatedly: that moral limitations on what we can do with animals do _not_, as such, interfere with the operation of the free market. But I'm still not altogether sold.

(The problem -- to put it briefly and inadequately -- is that I think Regan assigns too much to moral _patients_ in the way of "rights." I'm not persuaded that in order to have a "right," it's enough that someone else could make a moral claim on your behalf. In other words, I disagree with Regan's contention that moral agents and moral patients are entitled to exactly the _same_ sorts of moral consideration.)

I don't, however, mind admitting that Regan has changed my mind on some points and may yet change my mind on others. If I ever _do_ change my mind on this last point, he will be in part responsible.

And at any rate I highly recommend this volume to any readers interested in the topic of animal rights. Moral reasoning doesn't get any better than this.

Warning: this book is not for people new to ethical philosophy or philosophy in general. Try Singer's book for an introduction to some of the themes discussed in this book. Essential reading for those tired of hearing the same old recycled arguments used to justify the torture and murder of sentient living creatures. As such, it appeals to two groups of people: 1) those who are already living or considering adopting an ethical lifestyle and 2) those interested in philosophy, especially ethical philosophy. Do your intellect a favor and READ THIS BOOK!

Tom Regan's book is a classic in the animal rights literature. It is the most philosophical work to date and consequently not really accessible to the widest of audiences. However, Regan explains his own and others' thoughs in an extremely clear way. This book will be very welcome to anyone who wants a more "scientific" (as opposed to emotional) defense of animal rights. It is compulsive reading for anyone trying to get a grip on the debate today.

Of all the books I read in college, this one has nagged me the most. It offers a completely logical case for giving animals their own "right to life." Most of the book is an education in ethics philosophy - necessary background if one is to reflect on one's own moral decision-making when it comes to other living beings.

A Christian who believes that humans deserve higher moral consideration precisely because they are humans will not find the book particularly swaying. If one is to cite gospel for making moral decisions, Regan basically asks, "So ... WHICH gospel/scripture?" as there are many faiths that purport to receive the truth from a god or gods. Most Christians have a ready answer to that question - but one backed up by faith, not logic. Regan aims to show that our secular beliefs about human rights to life logically do not exclude - but rather, should include - other animals.

One woman in our class rejected Regan's thesis and conclusion when she learned that accepting his arguments logically necessitated a pro-life, anti-abortion stance. For that reason, a pro-life Christian might give Regan's book a closer, more sympathetic look.

Where Regan's case breaks down is in where to draw the line. Do we make it illegal to fish? To step on ants? To deal with this problem he creates a construct called "Subject of a Life" and establishes several criteria to decide which animals can be food and which ones can't. But it is hard not to see arbitrariness of whatever criteria we establish. In a sense, we are right back to where we started: refering to our personal biases as moral benchmarks.

Why do YOU exclude animals from deserving a right to live, to be eaten, skinned, etc? Is it because they aren't as smart as humans or don't have sophisticated language? Is it because the scripture you believe to be true says it's okay to kill them for your purposes? Is it because you can ... and just don't feel that guilty? Is it a morality of expedience that we choose to follow when we kill an animal that feels pain and enjoys its life?

Read this book and the questions will nag you, too.

Here in Sweden, Tom Regan is considered to be more "fundamentalist" in his defence of animal rights than Peter Singer. This is certainly true, if "fundamentalist" means "more consistent". Personally, I was militantly opposed to animal rights during the straight edge/vegan craze of the 1990's, and I considered Regan to be a frivolous wacko. (How I regarded Peter Kill-a-cute-human-toddler Singer, you might very well imagine!) I'm still opposed to animal rights, but in this review I will take a more open-ended, inquiring view of the problem. Imagine that!

Regan wrote "The case for animal rights" in 1980-81, and published it in 1983. Except for a new foreword, this 2004 edition is more or less identical to the original. The book isn't an easy read, and I wonder how many of the teenage militant vegans really digested it. It's a work of philosophy rather than a political pamphlet, written in a very cool, rational and "boring" manner, with Regan often being surprisingly charitable to his opponents. This may offend the more hot-headed activists, while perhaps commending the work to others. The foreword, however, where Regan responds to some of his critics, is more emotional and at times even personal.

Regan begins by tackling the issue of whether animals are sentient, have desires, can plan ahead, etc. He reaches the conclusion that this is true at least of mammals over the age of one. Regan then criticizes what he calls "indirect duty views", the position that humans should be kind to animals not because this harms the animals, but because it may in the long run harm humans. He sees Immanuel Kant as a typical representative of this school of thought. In another section of the book, Regan sharply criticizes utilitarianism, including the ideas of Peter Singer. This is, almost inevitably, one of the best parts of the book. A consistent utilitarian can believe neither in animal rights, nor human rights!

Regan then present his own position, which he calls "the rights view". Both human adults, human children, mentally handicapped humans, and mammalian animals are "subjects-of-a-life" with "inherent value", and therefore deserve to be treated with respect, and never as a simple means to an end. Very simply put, both humans and (other) mammals have individual rights. These rights can be taken from them only under exceptional circumstances, also discussed in the book (such as the right to self-defence). In the last chapter, Regan discusses the concrete consequences of "the rights view". Vegetarianism is mandatory, all medical or non-medical testing on mammals should be banned, and hunting should be discontinued. He also discusses whether endangered species can have rights as species, and reaches the conclusion that they cannot. All rights are individual. However, this doesn't rule out conservation measures towards endangered species, as long as this is interpreted as saving a collection of individuals.

Regan is honest enough to admit that his positions aren't 100% worked out, and there are indeed some loose ends in his book. For instance, he doesn't regard human infants or newly-born mammals as subjects-of-a-life. Despite this, Regan doesn't condone infanticide. His point is that killing new-born mammals might lead people to think that killing adult mammals is alright, and that we should therefore avoid killing the new-borns as well. But this sounds almost like Kant's "indirect duty view"! Regan seems to support the right to abortion, but once again I wonder why? Aren't fetuses at least potential subjects-of-a-life? Couldn't it be argued that abortion is part of a wider "culture of death" that's detrimental to both humans and other mammals? (I'm not saying that it is. However, this seems to be a possible problem for the pro-abortion position of the rights view.)

Ironically, Regan has also been criticized by animal rights activists and environmental ethicists for not going far enough in his defence of animals. As already noted, Regan "only" regards mammals as subjects-of-a-life. But what about poultry farming, vivisection of frogs, fishing, etc? Here, Regan takes the same "Kantian" position as he did concerning human infants and new-born mammals. These practises should be discontinued, in order to buttress the rights of mammals. His other argument is more consistent: since we really don't know where to draw the borderline between subjects-of-a-life and non-subjects, it's better to err on the side of caution. Another serious criticism has been levelled against Regan from an environmentalist perspective. If only individuals have rights, and if only mammals or vertebrates are subjects-of-a-life, how do we justify conservation of plants and insects? The question isn't academic, since many plants and at least some insects are red-listed. Those who believe that every species have a right to exist, could argue for conservation from a viewpoint that isn't anthropocentric. But Regan is forced to resort to a human-centered and hence "speciesist" defence of such organisms: they should be preserved for aesthetic or sacramental reasons.

But the most well-known, almost famous, objection to "The case for animal rights" is the "lifeboat case". Regan believes that if four humans and a dog would find themselves on a lifeboat after a shipwreck, and there is only room for four creatures, the dog should be thrown overboard (or even killed and eaten), since the quality of a dog's life is lower than the quality of human lives. Indeed, even if the choice would be between four humans and a thousand dogs, the dogs would still have to go. In other words, Regan is willing to kill Fido! Of course, he regards this as an exceptional case, but his critics consider it an inconsistency in his theory. Indeed, it's often regarded as one of the major flaws in "the rights view". In his new foreword, Regan seems annoyed by constantly having to debate "the lifeboat case". However, I think his critics have a point. (See further below.)

There are many situations in which the interests of animals, and those of humans might collide. What about pest species? They would be a problem even in a vegetarian world! And while many pest species are insects, some are mammals. Don't humans have the right to defend their vegetarian agriculture from animal pests? And what about invasive species? The ecological balance can sometimes be upheld only by human intervention. In extreme cases, this could mean killing members of an invasive species to save local species. Nor is it so easy to simply "leave the animals alone", since many animals are dependent on human-created habitat to thrive. "The rights view" doesn't seem to address these problems.

As already noted, Regan opposes all scientific testing on animals. He believes that potentially lethal drugs and products should be tested on human volunteers instead, or discontinued altogether (he prefers the latter). But this is where the "lifeboat case" comes in. If animals have a lower quality of life than humans, why *not* test potentially lethal drugs on animals? To Regan, the lifeboat scenario is exceptional, and I don't think he's inconsistent within the confines of his own philosophy. But a critic might respond, that while animals have certain interests we should acknowledge (say, by passing laws that prohibit beating or eating pets), the need to save humans from dangerous diseases overrides any interest an animal might have, if the only way to avoid human deaths is testing new drugs on animals. In other words, certain forms of animal testing are "exceptional cases" in this sense. It could further be argued that prohibiting testing would harm the human community, for instance by letting chronically ill patients suffer, or by recruiting "volunteers" to the tests, leading to a less humane society. And, as already noted, Regan says himself that humans have a higher life quality than animals.

Unfortunately, in a world where humans and animals necessarily compete with each other, it's difficult to see how a consistently applied "rights view" can be anything but utopian...

PS. I gave this review a facetious title, just to get everyone's attention!

(This review was revised on 20th November, 2011)

Other reviewers all seem to be Animal Rights advocates, interested in a sound justification for their preconceptions. I read this work for a different reason -- because I was interested in a non-theistic AND non-utilitarian justification for ethics. Tom Regan does an excellent job as a moral philosopher presenting an alternative way to look at ethics, and I stongly recommend this book for that reason.

As for justifying animal welfare, I found it less convincing. Regan's reason for rejecting Singer's argument for utilitarianism is because utilitarianism could sometimes justify sacrificing an animal, and he wants a moral guideline that will not allow that. Well, this is certainly assuming your conclusion, and made me wonder how much of the work was honest reasoning, and how much was a political spin document.

But the ultimate problem for me in accepting the arguments was in two areas. First, the absolutist nature of rights (either you have them, or you don't and they are non-negotiable) flies in the face of what is reasonable in the world. If a fish is not conscious, it has no rights, and if it is, its rights equal mine, even though its consiousness may be so marginal that we are extremely uncertain whether it even exists. Instead, for any consciousness-based rights system to be funcitonal, it must be based on DEGREE of consciousness, so a fish has less rights than a mouse, who has less rights than a mature human. (If mice have as many rights as humans, then almost all human activity is unacceptable -- plowing/tilling kills small rodents, as does driving, as does ANY construction work of any kind -- his mine rescue example neglects that all his options, including digging the mine in the first place, disturbs the soil fatally for some small rodents.) But Regan will not accept this, partially because any such scheme would be extremely difficult to work out, but primarily because it would allow the use/abuse of animals in some cases -- a consequence he will not accept (per his rejection of Singer) even if the reasoning for it is valid.

The second objection is that this scheme takes no account of the welfare of future beings. Extinction to him is a concern of corporatist ethics, when all that matters according to him are the individuals CURRENTLY involved. But an ethics which cannot provide a rationale to prevent future ecosystem destruction, or to prevent mass extinctions say by a comet impact 100 years in the future of individuals who are not alive today and therefore do not compute for rights calculations is deeply flawed in providing moral guidance.

These weaknesses are correctable, and this work could be improved to become a fairly compelling and general moral guideline. But to do so will result in drastically weakening the justification for animal welfare in his work, so I expect they will not be adressed, and this work will remain an interesting, but ulimately unconvincing excercise, serving solely to rally the faithful.

Good argument for the rights of animals, but sometimes a bit too "deep." Regan is a philosopher, afterall. Great book for those familiar with the topic and who want to deepen their arguments, but probably not the best read for someone just getting introduced to the philosophy of the rights of animals.

Most philosophical justifications of human rights are based on the Kantian autonomy of human beings - the capacity to be one's own person, to live one's life according to reasons and motives that are taken as one's own and not the product of manipulative or distorting external forces.

This is impossible as a basis for animal rights, but Regan makes use of an alleged overlap between humans and animals to attribute rights (albeit the lesser of two forms of rights) to animals. Both Bentham and Rousseau had argued that the ability to suffer provided an overlap between humans and various other creatures that ought to determine how we treat them. Bentham had argued that "a full-grown horse or dog, is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day or a week or even a month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? the question is not, Can they reason?, nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?" Regan has a different approach, arguing that what he calls "subjects-of-a-life" have an inherent value which bestows rights on them. To qualify they must "perceive and remember", be "sentient and have an emotional life", "have a sense of the future, including a sense of their own life" and have a "psychophysical identity over time". Of course, Regan is asserting this is the case rather than proving it, and many would dispute this applies to any non-human.

Regan proceeds to argue that is such "subjects-of-a-life" have a capacity for morality then they are "moral agents". If they do not they are "moral patients" (and in this category Regan includes young children, the senile and imbeciles as well as the higher mammals). Moral patients do, argues Regan, have rights, but they do not have as many rights as moral agents for in any clash of rights (not interests) then the rights of moral agents take precedence. However, animals' rights are sufficient to prevent us eating them or using them for experiments. Regan's theory does at least make it possible to account for the rights of babies and the severely mentally retarded, which is impossible in any theory that places autonomy at its centre. Whilst accepting there may be an overlap between the higher primates and babies and morons, many will disagree that as many animals are involved in such an overlap as Regan supposes. However, the central attack we can make on Regan's case is to argue that rights can belong only to those who actually understand the concept, though we may have "duties" to various entities which cannot.

These are the salient points in the book, but the author takes an inordinately long time to make them. For a completely different (utilitarian) approach to the subject have a look at Singer's "Animal Liberation" which strongly advocates what animal rights activists want though he prefers the word "liberation" to "rights".

I liked the book, but am saddened that I bought it from a company that SELLS FUR. I am sick and sad that I ever gave Amazon a single dime. I am not the only one. Amazon execs should understand that there are many more people out here who are offended at the butchering deaths of helpless animals for ridiculous VANITY, than there are people who would actually go to amazon to buy their FUR COATS. I ask that others please reconsider buying any more products from these people until they stop selling fur, and stop sending out cookie-cutter form letters to those of us who give a damn about the lives of others. (No, it is not enough to claim that they're merely trying to "give the customer what they want even if it offends some people. Would they say that if I wanted to buy heroin? If I wanted to buy a nuclear weapon? If I wanted to buy an Indonesian House Boy??? Not good enough. Some things are so reprehensible that society demands that they NOT sell them. Although, I'm sure that if they could, they would, so long as it was profitable.)

Take the profit out of death and join me in boycotting Amazon.