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The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization

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In recent years media attention for the Muslim world has increased tremendously and many reputable scholars of Islam have joined the flurry of publications that is released month after month. With Following Muhammad -- a thoughtful essay on Islamic spiritual traditions -- Sufism expert Carl Ernst has attempted to counterbalance the torrent of books on political radicalism. Bernard Lewis, the nestor of Islamic history writing, took the easy way and jumped the bandwagon of Islam-bashing by rehashed his 1999 Vienna Lectures Series under the title What Went Wrong?

Partially in response to Lewis, fellow-historian Richard Bulliet of Columbia University dusted off some of the manuscripts in his archives and then elaborated further on these earlier musings. His The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization consists of four essays and, although the first one was drafted more than thirty years ago, they have been reworked into a remarkably consistent argument.

Refashioning that earliest essay, from which the book has taken its title, into a rebuttal of Huntington's Clash of Civilizations thesis, Bulliet explains that there are more similarities than differences between Christendom and the Muslim Middle East. The conversion processes during the earliest centuries shared many features; in particular the slow percolation of the new religions into the lower social strata. As contacts became more intensive during the middle periods, it is true that mutual hostility increased but even then peaceful exchange was more common than violent interaction. Only from about 1500 did the two civilizations go their separate ways, but - in an explicit rejection of Huntington - Bulliet observes that this was more due to accidents of history than an inherent necessity resulting from irrevocably different outlooks.

The second chapter "What Went On" is a correction of Bernard Lewis' negative assessment of Islam as a failed civilization. Bulliet attributed this misreading to the influence of 20th-century western history on Lewis' own worldview. Having been very much part of the effort against totalitarianism during WWII and the Cold War, Lewis fails to appreciate that a Muslim world fighting for independence from colonialism had very different issues on its mind. In his detached survey of Islamic political history, Bulliet consistently argues that, throughout the centuries, safeguarding justice and opposition to tyranny was the constant preoccupation of a religious establishment that tried to remain aloof of politics. When either indigenous despotic regimes - fashioned after the absolute monarchies of early modern Europe (!) -- or imperialist outsiders managed to take over the main power centers in the Muslim world this counterweight was successfully repressed. However, an unintended side-effect of the ensuing modernization efforts has been the rise of alternative `religious authorities' which have started challenging these political constellations.

The next chapter is more of a self-evaluation, in which the author critically examines the misconceptions that are still prevalent in his academic field of Middle Eastern studies. He illustrates this by critical assessments of three seminal works published in the first decades after WWII, when area studies were first introduced in the US. Tied up in the `development theory paradigm', scholars singled out only those congenial to this theory as acceptable representatives of and spokespersons for the Muslims. Those proposing alternative approaches to the challenges of a rapidly changing world, by drawing on the treasure house of their own cultural legacy, were greeted with suspicion and hostility.

Based on his own studies of medieval Islam, Bulliet extends some of the prevailing trends of that past into the future. In his closing arguments Bulliet shows that throughout history the most creative responses to the challenges, which the Muslim world had to face, came from `the edge'; meaning the often heterodox strands of thought and practices shunned by the power centers - and not infrequently emerging at what were also the geographical peripheries of the Muslim world. In our contemporary world, Bulliet sees three such edge situations that could become significant for the future: the `diaspora' Muslim communities of Europe and America; the democratically oriented political parties in certain Muslim countries; and newly formed institutions of higher Islamic learning. With regard to the latter, the writer specifically mentions Indonesia, where many Muslim scholars of Islam holding western degrees occupy key positions at Islamic universities and in the religious affairs departments. Interestingly, one of them is a graduate of Bulliet's own Columbia University. In his own writings, the rector of the Syarif Hidayatullah State Institute for Islamic Studies in Jakarta, Azyumardi Azra, has also stressed the important role played by Muslim intellectuals of the geographical periphery in shaping the intellectual discourse of Islamic reformism.

Bulliet's long-range historical perspective is a welcome contribution to the current discussions on the role of political Islam in the contemporary world, a discussion that has remained too limited in scope because of the myopic perceptions of those focusing only on the most spectacular excesses that have recently unfolded on the world stage.

Bulliet, a learned, articulate, and persuasive writer, argues that we should reject Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" rhetoric and embrace the notion that Islamic/Middle Eastern Civilization and Christian/European Civilization are one. Sort of. I say "sort of," because he doesn't really think that Islam and Christendom form a single civilization; rather, he sees them as sibling civilizations that have each shaped the other's development much more profoundly than is commonly acknowledged today.

The strengths of Bulliet's book are, on one hand, in showing that Christianity and Islam, and Europe and the Middle East, have not merely been rivals, but have frequently had fruitful exchanges in the past; and, on the other hand, in critiquing Huntington's arguments and scholarship. These -- plus the slimmness of the volume and the fluidity of the writing -- make the book worth reading. (The biggest revelation to me was that when the Islamic Caliphate sprang up and began rapidly conquering territory, it almost immediately gained control of two of Christianity's five patriarchates and presumably a similar proportion of that day's Christians. This undoubtedly contributed to the Great Schism in Catholicism.)

The primary weakness of the book is apparent in its title. By making an argument about "civilization," Bulliet accepts Huntington's terms of argument. "Civilization" is a shorthand that both authors use for an amalgam of societies, religious institutions, empires, nation states, etc. To talk about Islamic and Christian "civilizations" as if these were clear and coherent entities persisting across time and space for centuries does too much violence to the historical record and weakens Bulliet's attempt to disarm manicheans like Huntington. What is "Christian civilization"? Is it the societies and cultures of Western Europe? Does it include the societies and cultures of Eastern Orthodoxy? What about Islamic civilization? Why doesn't it include (in Bulliet's reading) the Islamic world outside of the Middle East? Discussing history at the level of the "civilization" places the discussion on an extremely abstract plane that encourages vast overgeneralizations and distortions like Huntington's.

A minor criticism that also stems (partly) from the title has to do with Bulliet's displacement of "Judeo" by "Islamo" in "Islamo-Christian Civilization". The term "Judeo-Christian" is an Americanism that allows people to say that we're a Christian society without dissing what has until recently been America's largest non-Christian religion. The term also directs attention to Christianity's Jewish (Abrahamic) roots. Bulliet has no qualms about dismissing the "Judeo" part of the phrase because--at the risk of oversimplifying what he says--Jews have mostly been a powerless minority within Christendom over the past couple millenia and have not had the same kind of influence over Christian civilization that Islamic civilization has had. Thus, Christian civilization is more meaningfully described as Islamo-Christian than Judeo-Christian. While he clearly has a point, I still feel slighted (as a Jew).

One more thing about the title: On first reading, the title implies that Bulliet will be making a case for the fusion of Islamic and Christian civilizations. While he probably wouldn't oppose such a project, Bulliet's project is something else: arguing that Christian Civilization *is* Islamo-Christian Civilization. I can see why Bulliet didn't choose to title his book "The case for seeing our civilization as Islamo-Christian," but that is the book he wrote.

Four chapters of this marvelous book deliver a strong, thoughtful, compelling message about understanding the past, present, and possible future of Muslim societies on their own terms. Would that pundits and media `experts' provide at least some part of this maturity. Bulliet eschews polemic and bitterness to provide sound perspective some of the most essential themes of public discourse and policy regarding the world of Islam.

The whole book is a compelling alternative to common (and shallow, ideological, Islamphobe) views promoted by Neocons and others. Whatever your present perspective, understanding will be sharpened by careful reading of this excellent book.

The only thing I do not like is the title, which makes a point but has mislead some reviewers already so that they dismiss or misunderstand the sound arguments presented.

The first chapter condemns Huntington's thesis about the "Clash of Civilizations" indicating how it is both misleading and damaging. (Bulliet might have added it has been used for aggressive, hateful, and misguided policies that obscure economic, oil, and geostrategic motives). Christianity and Islam as social, political, and institutional matters are "siblings" not clashing civilizations and excellent comparative analysis about responses to often similar needs are enlightening.

The second chapter "What Went On" provides much insight and more than the entire book with a similar title that has been widely promoted for those who want to think that they have answers "What Went Wrong". It is insightful and fascinating on topics ranging from expansion and conversion to the social and institutional place of clerics, law, religious hierarchy.

"Looking for Love in all the Wrong Places", chapter 3, avoids polemic while showing how area studies in the US provided a sort of revised "Orientalism" driven by triumphalist assumptions about democracy, development, and capitalism all the more biting (and ideological) because of the competition of the Cold War. Even now this has not been corrected to deal with things more objectively and with some degree of empathy.

The fourth and final chapter on the "Edge" analyses and speculates about the direction of development in Islam based on creative and changing situations that may become sources for broader future development - as they often have in the past.

Bulliet eschews blame and bitter argument and does not dwell on the sometimes negative aspects of Colonialism, intervention, anti democratic interventions by democracies of the west. Nor does he dwell on terrorism, putting it in perspective as presently exceptional and not widely supported. He is perhaps, if anything, too kind to some of those critiqued. (There is the implication that an approach based on `clash' and antagonistic policy ideologues who intensely dislike Islam - including Pipes and Lewis as well as NeoCons perhaps - may create more terrorism. This is a whole other discussion however.)

This is a short book (161 pages, Appendix, and notes) that will challenge readers of any stripe to improve their understanding, their reasoning, and perspective. It could well replace four longer books one might otherwise choose to read on these subjects. Attention is richly rewarded providing the mature and considered views of a thoughtful scholar that so clearly sets it apart from the many shallow books that have rushed to print since 9-11. Read it carefully whether your interest is history, exclusively current events, or speculation about the future.

One of the few books published recently that seems to offer at least some hope for a peaceful settlement of the problems between the Islamic and Christian cultures. Unlike Huntington's Clash of Civilizations, the author says that we are not doomed to a struggle to the death, any more than the religious between Protestants, Catholics and Jews.

Written from the viewpoint of a historian accustomed to see the world as a process of change, the author sees changes occurring in both camps. He sees a more moderate, accepting view coming from the Islamic world, with the modern day terrorists and religious conservatives being not unlike the Christian equivalents.

This view is close to that I see from the few muslim people visiting here from other countries (such as Iraq). I have been wondering if their views represent a majority, a small minority, or are even just being polite to tell me what I want to hear.

Let us hope this author is right. Sooner or later, we all have to live together on just one planet.

I have been hoping that someone with sufficient historical knowledge and eminent scholarship would present this case ever since reading both Huntington's "Clash of civilizations" and Lewis's "What went wrong?". Thank you Professor Bullient for putting in words exactly what I felt was wrong with both of those books and so much of the commentary that has surronded them since publication.
As a Muslim convert that grew up in a Western Christian family, I agree with this approach completely. The big problem with the clash thesis is that it is so self-fulfilling - the more that people believe that the clash with the "other" is inevitable, so it becomes dangerously close.
So much of what Huntington and Lewis say about Islam is based on selective and biased perspectives that ignore the complexity and diversity of the religion as practised in many different countries and cultures around the world, particularly in Asia.
The case for Islamo-Christian civilization is a much more positive and sensible way of addressing the short-comings and problems that exist in some Muslim countries in the present day, irrespective of the cause of those problems.
I hope that everyone that has ever read any of Huntington and Lewis will also be open minded enough to read this wonderful small book.

I must point out, I am only half-way through the book but still feel qualified to add a few words here, right of future edits witheld of course.

Bulliet brings a very fresh view and analysis to the history of interaction of Islam and Christianity and most importantly distinguishes it from the more fundemantal interaction of East and West, which so many scholars have failed to grasp time and again.

His writing is efficient, incorporates much quantitative analysis and demonstrates a much deeper understanding of the subject matter than many other talking heads who are busily spouting sound bites for the masses.

He goes beyond "what went wrong" and asks and tries to answer the "why"?

I am not sure if he is really making a case for an Islamo-Christian civilization, but it is certainly important to note as he does, the common roots and institutions between these two so-called opposing world views.

What is the relationship between the Western world and the Islamic (and specifically the Middle Eastern) world? Richard Bulliet's book is a well written and insightful - and wrongheaded - assault on one school of thought trying to answer this question, and a proposal of an alternative.

Bulliet's target is the so-called "Clash of Civilizations" school, named after a classic work by the late Samuel Huntington (The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, which I haven't read). Championed by such diverse group as Ayaan Hirsi Ali (Infidel), Bernard Lewis (The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror), Paul Berman (Power and the Idealists: Or, the Passion of Joschka Fischer and Its Aftermath) and Martin Kramer, the "Clash of Civilizations" school, to oversimplify, sees the Muslim world as containing an alien alternative to the West's secular, democratic and Capitalistic order. The Muslim world is dominated by "Islamism" (or "Radical Islam" or even "Islamo-fascism"), which, like Communism, is a dangerous ideology which has to be confronted, with a mix (possibly quite eclectic) of ideological, but also diplomatic and possibly military means.

The Alternative Bulliet offers is a blurry concept of an "Islamo-Christian civilization" "According to the Islamo-Christian civilization model, Islam and the West are historical twins whose resemblance did not cease when their paths parted". He talks about an "Islamic road to modernity" (p. 120). What does he mean by that? He mentions "religious democrats" but fails to tell us who they are and what they want (p. 125). As far as I can tell, the only policy implication in Bulliet's book is that we shouldn't prevent Islamist parties from competing in elections (p .128). This is not the place to discuss this claim in details (I talked about it in my review of "The Crisis of Islam" and Inside Egypt: The Land of the Pharaohs on the Brink of a Revolution), but, with the possible exception of Turkey, I don't think that's a good idea. Trusting that the Islamists would prove to be sheep in wolves' clothing is too large of a gamble, when it is based on remarkably little information (When discussing present Islamist groups, as opposed to their historic roots, Bulliet's well of information dries up, and he is left only with comparisons to the Western world. That thing ended happily in the West does not mean that gambling with foreign society is a good idea. We would do well to reread Reflections on the Revolution in France: A Critical Edition).

When attacking the "Clash of Civilization" school, Bulliet uses something very close to a straw man argument. He gives a distorted definition of the "clash of civilization" thesis, which is easy to knock down. Thus, he writes "According to the `clash of civilizations' hypothesis, the (Judeo-Christian) West has always been and always will be at odds with Islam."(p. 43). But this is hardly a necessary definition. Perhaps the Muslim world and the Western world were at unity in some distant time, and perhaps they would be again, but the important questions are whether they are clashing *now*, and whether they are likely to stop clashing anytime soon.

Bulliet attacks Bernard Lewis's central question in What Went Wrong?: The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East? the Islamic world is different, not inferior, he argues. But the task is onerous - the Muslim world is clearly behind the Western world in every respect: Economic development, Technology, Democracy, Freedom, Human Rights and Women's Rights. Furthermore, with the economic rise of China and Asia, the Islamic world is now not only behind the West, but behind Asia. How can you deny that something went wrong?

One technique is to "take the long view". Talk about Muhammad Ali and Napoleon (p. 50); Stress, necessarily, the cultural effects of the Muslim world on Europe in the middle Ages; Lament its under-representation in Western discourse (pp. 32-33). The influence of the Muslim world may or may not be underestimated, but it is past; eight hundred years is a long time to live on memories.

Another technique is moral relativism: the popular supporters of Radical Islam are likened to the American religious right (p. 44), Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar are matched with Jim Jones, David Koresh, and Meir Kahane (pp. 12-13). These comparisons are more significant for what they leave out than for what they contain. The American Religious Right, as unappealing as Liberals such as myself find it, is very, very different from Radical Islam. It lacks the sexism, opposition to basic human rights (barbaric Quranic punishments are regularly carried out in Saudi Arabia), gross anti-Semitism and disdain for democracy. It opposes Gay marriage, but does not encourage the execution of homosexuals. Bin Laden and Omar, and certainly Hamas, Hezbollah, Ahmadinejad and the Muslim Brotherhood carry infinitely more weight among Middle Eastern Muslims than Jones and Koresh do in the West. Most importantly, the conduct of Western states is so different than that of Islamist states as to make the comparison ridiculous and insulting.

But along the way, Bulliet makes almost a volte face. It starts with a denial that the Muslim world wants the same things the West does. It is not a failure if Muslims don't want Western "degeneracy". This is a dangerous path to tread - what better proof of the Clash of Civilizations than if Muslims don't want freedom, democracy, human rights and Capitalism? Of course, the Islamists reject Westernization. But Muslims want much of what the West has - economic wealth, military power, and status. Isn't Islamism explicable, at least in part, by envy? Isn't it driven, at least partially, by resentment (See Amy Chua's World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability)?

Bulliet comes close to acknowledging the Clash of Civilization School when he writes that "the worldviews of Arab and Muslim rulers have been... conditioned by Islamic political traditions." (p. 61). He goes back, unbelievably, to the Grecians, and their opposition to Persian (read: Eastern) despotism (p. 63). Who's the Orientalist now?

That leads to a long argument that the people turned towards Islamism because the Islamists were the main force of opposition to the Middle East's 19th century tyrannical Modernizers. I'm not sure: the Catholic Church was Bismarck's main opposition, but Catholic fundamentalism is not a problem in modern Germany. Be that as it may, to explain is not to excuse - the Islamists may be against the Middle East's secular, modernizing tyrants (they are), but they are also against Modernism, democracy, human rights, etc. The Islamist cure is worse than the disease.

Thus while ostensibly protesting against the "Clash" school, Bulliet describes how Liberalism fails in the Muslim world because it is incompatible with Muslim culture, and how the Islamists are successful because the Muslim culture is predisposed to accept them. "The manifestos of the nonreligious print ideologues ultimately came to naught for lack of roots in an indigenous political culture. The preachings of the religious print ideologues sank deep because the roots were already in place."(p.92). When reading that, can a "Clashist" say to Bulliet anything but "Welcome aboard"?

In the end, what separates Bulliet from the Clashists, is not analysis - it is hope.
"I fully expect that the next twenty to thirty years will see religious leaders of tolerant and
peaceful conscience, in the mold of Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and Nelson Mandela, eclipse in respect and popular following today's advocates of jihad, intolerance, and religious autocracy" (p. 161). Personally, I wouldn't bet on it.

Samuel Huntington coined the phrase "Clash of Civilizations" in the early 1990s after the fall of Communism, when the growing power of Islam as a civilization and geopolitical force was beginning to challenge Western hegemony. But was Huntington right? Are Islam and the West really on a collision course?

No, Bulliet argues. And he doesn't do this as an "apologist for terrorism" as right-wing, neo-conservative pundits label anyone who seeks dialog over dissension with Islam and Muslims. Rather, he approaches the issue as a scholar who has been in the field of Middle East Studies for almost 40 years. And he doesn't just talk about today. He delves briefly but cogently into the history of positive interaction between Islam and the West.

For instance, he discusses how the role of Madrassas, those schools of Islamic learning that are associated with terrorism in the minds of most Westerners today, mirrored and influenced the development of universities in Europe.

Bulliet also points out the weaknesses of the common approach to Islam and Muslim societies, as reflected in the way Western Middle East Studies scholars idealize the Westernized elites of Muslim societies versus trying to understand the worldview of the average person in these cultures.

Bulliet also successfully challenges the views of America's top Orientalist scholar Bernard Lewis, whose generally negative view of Islam colors the way many American policymakers see the world and have developed their relations with Muslim countries based on it. Lewis is credited with providing the intellectual impetus for the current war on Iraq.

The case for Islamo-Christian Civilization is a necessary read for every student and scholar of the Middle East, as well as anyone seeking arguments for an alliance of civilizations in today's world, not a clash.

Makes a sustained argument for similarities over differences in the Abrahamic tradition between Christianity and Islam. He gives a short history of 20th century Western academic research into Muslim and Middle East societies and how it has affected our current perceptions of the Muslim world. He does not sugar coat difference, but says they shouldn't be over-estimated either. At the same time, he acknowledges the future is unknown and how democratic and western principles, let alone Eastern humanitarian impulses will play out politically remains a big question.

tracing how we both believe in peace, justice, humility, cooperation, family, and in God. Or so our publicists claim.


but most of all don't we all just believe in peace?
can't we all just get along?
Love thy neighbor
do good to those who harm you
love your enemy
treat others the way you want them to treat you
remember?