In the autumn of 1917, after years of stalemate at Ypres, the British and French armies launched a massive offensive to take Passchendaele Ridge. Following an intensive bombardment the Allies began their attack, but the low ground between the lines had been churned into a quagmire, and the attack was literally bogged down. All surprise had been lost, and the German defence in depth was well organised. For the first time the Germans used mustard gas, while German planes flew low to strafe the British infantry with machine guns. After two and a half months the British finally took the ridge they had been aiming for, but at the cost of over 300,000 Allied lives. German losses in the offensive were estimated at 260,000. Based on the archival holdings at the Imperial War Museum, this book gathers together a wealth of previously unpublished material about this horrific offensive. A history to appeal to the scholar and the general reader alike.
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About the Author
Nigel Steel and Peter Hart are both historians at the Imperial War Museum in London. They have collaborated on two previous titles, on Gallipoli and the war in the air. Peter Hart was born in 1955. He went to Liverpool University before joining the Sound Archive at the Imperial War Museum in 1981. He is now Oral Historian at the Archive.
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Most Helpful Customer Reviews
5 of 5 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Decent Account of the Fighting at Passchendaele,
By Aussie Reader ""Rick"" (Canberra, Australia) - See all my reviews
This review is from: Cassell Military Classics: Passchendaele: The Sacrificial Ground (Paperback)
Nigel Steel and Peter Hart's third book covering the Great War deals with the Third Battle of Ypres, better known as Passchendaele. This book joins a long list of other titles covering this most horrendous battle of World War One. As in their previous books the authors utilize the accounts of many of the participants in this great struggle. From gunners and footsloggers to the men in the air trying to gain mastery of the airspace above the salient. Using first-hand accounts, interviews, letters and after action reports they put together a fairly comprehensive story of the fighting as experienced by British and Commonwealth soldiers. It must be said that there are very few similar accounts used in this book from the German side.Overall they do reasonable well in presenting the story of the fighting in the Ypres salient from 1917-1918. However I feel that they may not have done as well as some previous books. At times I found that the narrative appeared to drag or lose its continuity. The authors have attempted to be very fair in their assessment of the British High Command and the involvement or lack of involvement of the politician's back home. The book does not appear to have an axe to grind in regards to any one person's culpability in regards to the tremendous casualties suffered for so little tangible gain. The authors simply present the facts and allow you, the reader, to determine who may be at fault for the loss of so many innocent lives. I found that the authors offered a very good overview of the circumstances leading to this battle, the tactics used and the decisions of the Commanding Generals. Overall it's a very easy to read account of this battle and a good starting point for someone wishing to learn more about what the poor bloody `Tommy', `Aussie', `Kiwi' and `Canuck' suffered. I would also recommend for further reading Lyn MacDonald's `They Called it Passchendaele', Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson's `Passchendaele; The Untold Story', and books by Philip Warner, Winston Groom and Leon Wolff. I would like to finish up with an account from the book where a young British soldier was about to go `over the top' during the offensive to take Pilckem Ridge on the 31st July 1917: "It was still dark but then suddenly it was illuminated by a line of bursting shells, but what was astonishing still was that we must all have been deafened by the noise. I looked at Herbert, I could see his lips move - I shouted but I couldn't hear myself at all. I wanted to tell him that we would keep together so I grabbed his hand and we went over together as we had gone to Sunday School - hand in hand." - Private Alfred Warsop, 1st Battalion, Sherwood Foresters.
8 of 11 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
Reinforcing Failure,
By
This review is from: Cassell Military Classics: Passchendaele: The Sacrificial Ground (Paperback)
Between 31 July and 6 November 1917, the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) under the command of Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig launched a series of major attacks against the German defenses in Flanders. While this four-month British offensive is known as the Third Battle of Ypres, the battle is also strongly associated with the destroyed village of Passchendaele where it culminated. After four months of horrific fighting, the BEF had advanced only five miles at the cost of 275,000 casualties and even worse, most of the territory was abandoned when the Germans started their own offensives in 1918. The Third Battle of Ypres was controversial in its day and has become more so over time, indeed it has become a metaphor for waste and futility. In Passchendaele: The Sacrificial Ground, authors Nigel Steel and Peter Hart offer an anecdotal-driven account of the British offensive. Steel and Hart's account lacks the chronological format and comprehensiveness to classify it as a true work of military history but rather, it leans toward being a collection of British trench stories. Passchendaele: The Sacrificial Ground consists of nine chapters and an epilogue. There are a total of six not-very-helpful maps, which depict only advance lines, not unit locations or boundaries. The lack of a detailed order of battle is a serious deficiency, which makes it difficult for the reader to determine where the participant's cited were located on the battlefield. However, the greatest deficiency in the book is the complete lack of perspective from the German side. Although the authors cite Ludendorff's post-war memoirs on a number of occasions, there is only one German soldier's account of the battle versus more than 200 British accounts. None of the German army commanders (Gallwitz, Arnim) are ever mentioned in this account, nor is a single German unit of any size ever identified. Clearly, the authors have done not a whit of research on the German side, which seriously degrades the value of this account. On the other hand, the British accounts are often good and they are extremely varied, covering infantry, artillery, engineer, aviation and signal perspectives. Most readers, accustomed to thinking of artillerymen in the First World War as the "fair haired boys" in the rear will be surprised how rough the British redlegs actually had it in the Ypres salient. Much of rationale for the British offensive was based on the need to create "a strategic distraction" in order to divert the Germans from discovering the widespread mutinies in the French army. However, Haig honestly believed that a breakthrough of the German defenses was still possible and his vision was that the 3rd Ypres would lead to the clearing of the Belgian coast. Once it became obvious that a breakthrough was not possible, Haig resorted to attrition as his rationale for continuing the offensive, claiming that German collapse was imminent. While the authors do note that Haig could have evacuated the Ypres salient instead of trying to expand it, British pride and Haig's obstinence prevented that more sensible course. Indeed, the authors never question the cosmic significance that Haig attached to Ypres, the British held ports of Calais and Dunkirk, or the German-held ports of Zeebrugge and Ostend. In actuality, the British could and did use larger ports such as Cherbourg for supply, and the loss of either Ypres or Dunkirk would not have had catastrophic effects upon the BEF. After all, the American Expeditionary Force was able to supply its troops from ports that were more than 20 miles from the front - couldn't the BEF do the same? The authors conclude that Haig was wrong about imminent German collapse but correct that offensives were needed to keep the Germans off balance until the Americans arrived and the French recovered. Fine, but why Ypres - certainly the worst terrain on the entire Western Front? To read in these pages about 60,000 British missing during the offensive - including thousands who drowned in the mud - will infuriate and appall most readers. If offensives were necessary, why not pick better sectors like Cambrai (which Haig did not use until he was almost out of reserves) or even move several corps to attack in French sectors like Champagne? Why not go after exposed German-held salients like St Mihiel? It is clear that Haig lacked the imagination to try anything different and was content to batter away in the same old sectors. From the intelligence perspective, we learn two things from Passchendaele. First, intelligence must speak with a single voice. The chief of British intelligence in London warned that German collapse was not imminent, but Haig preferred to listen to his own intelligence officer who cheerfully predicted that one more attack would cause a collapse. Throughout the battle, British intelligence officers at different levels offered starkly divergent analyses, and commanders were prone to accept the most optimistic ones. A second lesson from Ypres is that terrain analysis matters a great deal. Although the BEF was aware of the effects of heavy rains and mud on the offensive, these factors were minimized. In effect, Haig ignored terrain and weather and for that, he deserves to be pilloried by historians. Passchendaele did offer a few tactical innovations as well. The Germans introduced concrete pillboxes and mustard gas - both missed by British intelligence prior to the battle - and these two devices helped to stymie the British offensive. The British improved their artillery tactics, but their improvement was not as strong as the authors suggest. British infantrymen still attacked walking upright as they did a year earlier on the Somme, and tanks were stupidly committed single file into swamps. Yet the greatest lesson of Passchendaele, never learned by Haig, is that in war you don't reinforce failure.
1 of 1 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Awesome,
By Indiana Lee (Texas/Michigan) - See all my reviews
Amazon Verified Purchase(What's this?)
This review is from: Cassell Military Classics: Passchendaele: The Sacrificial Ground (Paperback)
I want to start with that I bought this book from Amazon. I bought this book after reading a book by author Peter Hart on the battle of the Somme. Wow that was a great book. I will up date this review later as I read more. I am reading 4 books at the same time as well as working and study. I also want to state that this book is awesome. I rate it as a classic and must read for WWI history.
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