Cassino 1944: Breaking the Gustav Line (Campaign) [Paperback]

Ken Ford (Author), Howard Gerrard (Illustrator)

Book Description

Series: Campaign | Publication Date: April 27, 2004

Osprey's study of Italy's Cassino campaign during World War II (1939-1945). The battle for Cassino was probably the most bitter struggle of the entire Italian campaign. The dominating peak of Montecassino crowned by its magnificent but doomed medieval monastery was the key to the entire Gustav Line, a formidable system of defences that stretched right across the Italian peninsula. This position completely dominated the Liri valley and Route 6, the strategically vital road to Rome. Between January and May 1944 the Allies struggled amid inhospitable terrain and dreadful weather to dislodge the German paratroops that tenaciously defended the vital mountaintop. Ken Ford’s book details the dramatic events of the battle to break the Gustav Line.

Editorial Reviews

From the Publisher

Highly visual guides to history's greatest conflicts, detailing the command strategies, tactics, and experiences of the opposing forces throughout each campaign, and concluding with a guide to the battlefields today.

About the Author

Ken Ford was born in Hampshire in 1943. He trained as an engineer and spent almost thirty years in the telecommunications industry. He now spends his time as an author and a bookseller specialising in books in military history. He has written a number of books on various Second World War subjects.

Product Details

• Paperback: 96 pages
• Publisher: Osprey Publishing (April 27, 2004)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 1841766232
• ISBN-13: 978-1841766232
• Product Dimensions: 7.2 x 0.3 x 9.8 inches
• Shipping Weight: 12 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 3.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (3 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,199,048 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

More About the Author

Discover books, learn about writers, read author blogs, and more.

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

12 of 12 people found the following review helpful:

3.0 out of 5 stars Lacks Detail Needed for a Proper Study, June 11, 2004

By 

R. A Forczyk (MD, USA) - See all my reviews
(VINE VOICE)    (TOP 500 REVIEWER)    (REAL NAME)   

Amazon Verified Purchase

This review is from: Cassino 1944: Breaking the Gustav Line (Campaign) (Paperback)

Ken Ford's Cassino 1944: Breaking the Gustav Line, which is Number 137 in the Osprey campaign series, probably attempts to bite off more than can be reasonably summarized in a 96-page format. The author's decision to include a substantial amount of coverage on the Anzio landing - certainly worthy of its own Osprey title - detracts from space available to cover the Cassino battles. Furthermore, the author fails to provide the kind of critical analysis or detail that would enable serious military readers to evaluate a lengthy and controversial campaign; for example, important details on troop strengths involved and casualties are often omitted. Overall, this Osprey volume on Cassino falls short of the type of summary that a reader might reasonably expect from such a well-known battle.

Ford begins the volume in the standard fashion, with an introduction that sets the strategic background to the Cassino campaign and the operational background, sketching the Allied advance to the German Gustav Line. The chronology that follows is inadequate, since it only mentions "start dates" for Allied offensives at Cassino, with little mention of actions on specific days. The section on opposing leaders is threadbare, listing only operational level commanders (theater, army and corps), showing only photos of two German division-level commanders. Ford also slights French General Juin who played a critical role in the first and fourth battles of Cassino, but gets only a nod here. This section is unfortunate, because Cassino was a very tactical battle and the division-level leadership counted far more than remote operational commanders. The section on opposing armies is inadequate. First, Ford should have mentioned that there were over 700,000 Allied troops in Italy facing about 412,000 German troops, giving the Allies an almost 2-1 edge in manpower. Second, Ford spends little effort mentioning important differences, such as the fact that the 2nd New Zealand Division was an over-size unit with almost 25,000 troops but most of the German divisions had only about 6-7,000 men. The order of battle appears to be a complete muddle, and Ford lists most Allied and German brigade and higher units that were involved in the Cassino battles at various times, but it also includes Darby's Rangers who did not fight at Cassino but omits the entire Polish II Corps which actually seized Cassino Monastery (whoops!). No artillery units are mentioned - like the German 71st Nebelwerfer Brigade that so ably supported the 1st Parachute Division or the US 240mm batteries. Ford's section on opposing plans fails to note that the first Allied offensive against the Gustav Line in January 1944 failed to actually designate any specific units to seize the critical Monastery position, nor was any special air or artillery support arranged to breach a known fortified line. Nor does Ford note the operational-level incoherence introduced by the Anzio landing: which was the Allied main effort in Italy - 6th Corps at Anzio or US 5th Army on the Gustav Line?

The maps are also a bit skimpy in this volume, with only five 2-D Maps: advance to the Gustav Line; US 5th Army's attack on the Gustav Line; US VI Corps landing at Anzio; New Zealand II Corps attack; Operation Diadem. Unfortunately, there is no map depicting the link-up between the Allied forces that broke through the Gustav Line and the Anzio beachhead - a crucial omission. The three 3-D "Bird's Eye View" maps depict: the US II Corps attack north of Cassino; the third battle of Cassino and the Polish II Corps captures the monastery. The three battlescenes by Howard Gerrard depict: the American attack across the Rapido river; German paratroopers defending Cassino town and Polish infantry advancing on Snakeshead Ridge. The bibliography provided is modest and the notes on the battlefield today are rather terse.

Ford's description of the US 36th Infantry Division attack across the Rapido river on 20-21 January 1944 is decent and this was one of the most botched US military actions of the entire war, on a par with the action at Sidi bou Zid in February 1943. The attack was an incredibly bad plan that was made in the style of Passchendaele in 1917 - without regard to terrain, weather or the enemy - and it failed miserably. The awful plan was also made worse by faulty execution due to very poor coordination between infantry, artillery and engineers. However, there is a tendency to exaggerate the significance of the 36th Division's defeat, which incurred 1,681 casualties in a 48-hour period. While this attack failed, the adjacent 34th Infantry Division successfully carved out a bridgehead on the western side of the Rapido and captured terrain that provided the vital jumping off positions needed to encircle Cassino. Furthermore, while these two US divisions suffered about 4,500 casualties in this first battle, the French Expeditionary Corps (FEC) also seized vital terrain north of Cassino but at the cost of 7,800 casualties (facts omitted by Ford). Put in proper perspective, the 36th Division failure to cross the Rapido was a tactical setback, but the success of the 34th Division and FEC attacks more than outweighed that defeat.

Ford's description of the second and third battles for Cassino has odd omissions, like he fails to note that the third battle was known as Operation Dickens. Readers might also miss the fact from Ford's description that the New Zealanders committed only a handful of their battalions to this set-piece battle and thereby eschewed any kind of numerical advantage over a dug-in defender. Oftentimes, Cassino is presented as an "Italian Stalingrad" but this is just not apt. If Ford had provided casualty figures for the actions around Cassino, they would have been surprised to see that the Allies suffered only 287 killed in action in the third battle, versus 315 German KIA. All told, the Cassino fighting cost the Allies about 25,000 casualties in five months of fighting; significant, but certainly not crippling.

6 of 6 people found the following review helpful:

3.0 out of 5 stars A useful reference for future reading., December 8, 2004

By 

R. J Szasz "Rod Szasz" (Tokyo, Japan Japan) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

Amazon Verified Purchase

This review is from: Cassino 1944: Breaking the Gustav Line (Campaign) (Paperback)

Having walked the battlefield twice this book is something that I will carry with me on my future, third sojourn. The maps in the book, while less numerous than others, are certainly more than you get while reading a general overview of the battle. This book should be read, or consulted when reading some of the old classics of this battle such as Madjalay's, "Cassino."
I had been to the village of Cairo (where the American's successfully crossed the Rapido) and saw the bullet-pocked houses but had no real idea of scale until I read this book.

The fighting was confused to say the least, but with the high ground commanded by the Germans and the allies need to capture it, the strategy is quite straightforward.

The outlines of the four major battles fought here (two on the ridge, the one in the town, and the final crushing overwhelming offensive are outlined and should serve as a jumping off point for later reading.

The one thing that this book does well is to set the battle in its general strategic setting. It well describes Cassino and its relation to Anzio. It also describes the composition of forces for the last offensive.

I think it is balanced with an appreciation of the fighting capabilities of the French and Morrocans, and also details the forces following up the offensive such as the Canadian Armoured Corps, and the Gurhkas -- all of whom are hardly mentioned in the main histories concentrating only on the three forlorn battles to crack the line.

A useful reference for future reading.

2 of 3 people found the following review helpful:

3.0 out of 5 stars Good summary of the Monte Cassino campaign, but..., July 5, 2005

By 

A. McDonald (New York) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: Cassino 1944: Breaking the Gustav Line (Campaign) (Paperback)

This book is a decent summary of the Battle of Monte Cassino -- actually a campaign of four battles, whose strategy interlocked with the landings at Anzio to seize the defensive approaches to Rome. Monte Cassino is where the Germans under the command of Kesselring chose to make a defensive stand, recognizing the defensive advantages given by the ancient monastery. The Allies weren't able to capitalize on the Anzio beachhead to break out behind the German lines - the Allied commanding generals made timid by high initial losses did not press the Germans enough to worry Kesselring into retreating from the Cassino position.

On the Allied side, twelve nationalities fought including Moroccans, French, Algerians, Ghurkas, New Zealanders, and Australians. The Polish II Corps was the unit eventually capturing the monastery proper. The book does a good job covering the efforts of all nationalities, and implies that on occasions the contributions by smaller nations were not only downplayed, but their successes not properly taken advantage of by American and British commanders.

Other than the Anzio landing, there was not much strategy to speak of in this campaign beyond seizing the high ground. The battles were dominated by the defensive advantages given to the Germans by the topography - particularly the high ground of the Monastery (although the Germans were to use rivers defensively as well).

The biggest limitation of the book shows up in the discussion (or lack of it) of the destruction of the monastery. Monte Cassino was a monastery with a rich cultural heritage, having been built in the 8th century AD. Not only was it an important architectural monument, but most critically it housed a library of priceless, unique Latin and medieval manuscripts. The decision by the Germans to defend it places the blame for the loss of this cultural treasure squarely on them. However, the idea that there were other options available to the allies other than saturation bombing of the monastery (for example, bypassing the route by expanding the Anzio beachhead) is what of the great what ifs of the war. It is also unclear that the Allied bombing of the monastery didn't actually make their task far more difficult by turning the building into highly defensible rubble. That this book bears this central question only a passing mention is, I would have to think, a great fault.