Customer Reviews

Vital Center the Politics of Freedom

5 star:		(5)
4 star:		(1)
3 star:		(0)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

Lucid, articulate, eloquent. There are long passages that are as timely now as when they were originally written in the late 40's. We desperately need a contemporary leader with this voice.
BUT do not buy the Da Capo paperback edition -- it is missing several pages at the end of one chapter and the beginning of the next.

Read this for graduate American history course. Schlesinger's book, "The Vital Center is habitually cited as a turning point for American liberalism, an unequivocal rejection of extremist politics and an articulation of a new liberal anticommunist political realism." Schlesinger's opening premise was that the industrial revolution put mankind in a state of fear and anxiety, and thus made mankind more apt to turn to utopian and totalitarian forms of government to assuage their fears. Only in the aftermath of the terrible events of WWII were liberals forced to recognize that humankind indeed had the capacity to do evil. This recognition made liberals give up their long held belief in humankind's perfectibility and rationality. Schlesinger realized that the history of appeasing Hitler prior to the war, and the dangers that loomed in making the same mistake with Stalin in the days ahead, made it important to construct a liberal response to Communism that could stand up to the criticism of the political right in America. He wanted to prove that a new liberal doctrine would in fact occupy the vital center in American politics.

He attacked the conservatives for their unwillingness to tackle social reforms during the industrial revolution, and he saw insipid conservative capitalists meeting their responsibilities by hiding behind destructive tariffs and monopolies. Schlesinger observed that historically, conservatives turned their backs on robust men, such as Theodore Roosevelt and Winston Churchill; men who acted masculinely. Instead, conservatives embraced the effeminate Neville Chamberlains of the world, men who traded responsibility for isolationism. Thus, Schlesinger charged conservatives of becoming "impotent" men politically.

On the other hand, Schlesinger ridiculed the progressive left, which he named "Doughfaces," because they were too pliable and "hopelessly and irrevocably feminine." Doughfaces live within utopian beliefs and do not recognize the harsh realities of the world. For Schlesinger, Doughfaces had a genuine concern for the betterment of humankind but could only muster up enough energy to be dreamers and critics; they were not masculine enough to be doers. Thus, "Schlesinger took the progressive's politics as evidence of emotional maladjustment, what the postwar intelligentsia so frequently and indiscriminately called `neurosis'." Schlesinger's conclusion was that the reconstituted postwar liberal leaders would occupy the vital center politically by proving that they were doers and not just complainers. Schlesinger argued that these new leaders were the only people capable of producing "a secure and restored American masculinity."

Despite Schlesinger's effort to masculinize the liberal reform tradition, did not prevent liberals (including Schlesinger himself) from being accused of softness. The hard right's political rhetoric became much cruder and targeted such men as Secretary of State Dean Acheson and presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson as paragons of pompous "eastern establishment liberalism," too soft to stand against the pernicious evils of Communism. Throughout the 1950's, hard right political leaders such as Richard Nixon and Joseph McCarthy successfully put Democrats on the defensive with their accusations that they were soft on Communism and guilty of not working diligently in ferreting out Communists from government agencies. The hard right even had some success in convincing the American public that Communists had a higher propensity than other segments of society to be sexual deviants and homosexuals, and if Democrats were unwilling to go after them hammer and tong, then they must be guilty by association. In the fallout from the 1952 and 1956 presidential elections, the bleeding-heart liberal egghead superseded the image of the pragmatic, educated, manly liberal bureaucrat of earlier years. If Schlesinger and Democrats who believed in his thesis were to prove his point, that liberals were masculine leaders that were hard on Communism, then they would need a new young vigorous standard-bearer to propel their political party to victory in the 1960 presidential election. For the Democrats John F. Kennedy became not just the incarnation of the virile `vital center' liberal whose template Schlesinger had created ten years earlier, but the antidote to the nation's crisis in masculinity.

As a graduate student in philosophy and history, I recommended this book for anyone interested in American history, foreign policy, Cold War history.

This book could also be could also be titled "the Liberal Manifesto", a dead on pamplet distinguishing American "Cold War Liberalism" as a coherent political philosphy. Schlesinger fuses Niebuhr's views on human naure and power, with Keynes' economics, and his own scholarly interpetation of American history. Schelsinger makes the case for a liberalism that eschews dogma for pragmatism and a cautious embrace of power in the service of self determination and opportunity.

Over 50 years after its original release the book still brims with freshness and clarity.As we become more polarized as a nation, it would do us all well, regardles of poltical stripes heed the arguments put forth in this book and renew our commitment to our Democratic institutions.

As a libertarian-leaning fellow, it is often difficult to find main stream literature aimed squarely at me. Though Schlesinger is a well known liberal I nonetheless found many interesting points in this book that were worth further consideration.

The chief impression that it left on me, reflected on now a year or so since I read it, is the need for a "centrism" in our politics. Schlesinger's recipe for achieving that centrism may be different than my own, but I cannot help but agree that our ends would be the same in this point.

Read this for graduate American history course. Schlesinger's book, "The Vital Center is habitually cited as a turning point for American liberalism, an unequivocal rejection of extremist politics and an articulation of a new liberal anticommunist political realism." Schlesinger's opening premise was that the industrial revolution put mankind in a state of fear and anxiety, and thus made mankind more apt to turn to utopian and totalitarian forms of government to assuage their fears. Only in the aftermath of the terrible events of WWII were liberals forced to recognize that humankind indeed had the capacity to do evil. This recognition made liberals give up their long held belief in humankind's perfectibility and rationality. Schlesinger realized that the history of appeasing Hitler prior to the war, and the dangers that loomed in making the same mistake with Stalin in the days ahead, made it important to construct a liberal response to Communism that could stand up to the criticism of the political right in America. He wanted to prove that a new liberal doctrine would in fact occupy the vital center in American politics.

He attacked the conservatives for their unwillingness to tackle social reforms during the industrial revolution, and he saw insipid conservative capitalists meeting their responsibilities by hiding behind destructive tariffs and monopolies. Schlesinger observed that historically, conservatives turned their backs on robust men, such as Theodore Roosevelt and Winston Churchill; men who acted masculinely. Instead, conservatives embraced the effeminate Neville Chamberlains of the world, men who traded responsibility for isolationism. Thus, Schlesinger charged conservatives of becoming "impotent" men politically.

On the other hand, Schlesinger ridiculed the progressive left, which he named "Doughfaces," because they were too pliable and "hopelessly and irrevocably feminine." Doughfaces live within utopian beliefs and do not recognize the harsh realities of the world. For Schlesinger, Doughfaces had a genuine concern for the betterment of humankind but could only muster up enough energy to be dreamers and critics; they were not masculine enough to be doers. Thus, "Schlesinger took the progressive's politics as evidence of emotional maladjustment, what the postwar intelligentsia so frequently and indiscriminately called `neurosis'." Schlesinger's conclusion was that the reconstituted postwar liberal leaders would occupy the vital center politically by proving that they were doers and not just complainers. Schlesinger argued that these new leaders were the only people capable of producing "a secure and restored American masculinity."

Despite Schlesinger's effort to masculinize the liberal reform tradition, did not prevent liberals (including Schlesinger himself) from being accused of softness. The hard right's political rhetoric became much cruder and targeted such men as Secretary of State Dean Acheson and presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson as paragons of pompous "eastern establishment liberalism," too soft to stand against the pernicious evils of Communism. Throughout the 1950's, hard right political leaders such as Richard Nixon and Joseph McCarthy successfully put Democrats on the defensive with their accusations that they were soft on Communism and guilty of not working diligently in ferreting out Communists from government agencies. The hard right even had some success in convincing the American public that Communists had a higher propensity than other segments of society to be sexual deviants and homosexuals, and if Democrats were unwilling to go after them hammer and tong, then they must be guilty by association. In the fallout from the 1952 and 1956 presidential elections, the bleeding-heart liberal egghead superseded the image of the pragmatic, educated, manly liberal bureaucrat of earlier years. If Schlesinger and Democrats who believed in his thesis were to prove his point, that liberals were masculine leaders that were hard on Communism, then they would need a new young vigorous standard-bearer to propel their political party to victory in the 1960 presidential election. For the Democrats John F. Kennedy became not just the incarnation of the virile `vital center' liberal whose template Schlesinger had created ten years earlier, but the antidote to the nation's crisis in masculinity.

As a graduate student in philosophy and history, I recommended this book for anyone interested in American history, foreign policy, Cold War history.

Read this for graduate American history course. Schlesinger's book, "The Vital Center is habitually cited as a turning point for American liberalism, an unequivocal rejection of extremist politics and an articulation of a new liberal anticommunist political realism." Schlesinger's opening premise was that the industrial revolution put mankind in a state of fear and anxiety, and thus made mankind more apt to turn to utopian and totalitarian forms of government to assuage their fears. Only in the aftermath of the terrible events of WWII were liberals forced to recognize that humankind indeed had the capacity to do evil. This recognition made liberals give up their long held belief in humankind's perfectibility and rationality. Schlesinger realized that the history of appeasing Hitler prior to the war, and the dangers that loomed in making the same mistake with Stalin in the days ahead, made it important to construct a liberal response to Communism that could stand up to the criticism of the political right in America. He wanted to prove that a new liberal doctrine would in fact occupy the vital center in American politics.

He attacked the conservatives for their unwillingness to tackle social reforms during the industrial revolution, and he saw insipid conservative capitalists meeting their responsibilities by hiding behind destructive tariffs and monopolies. Schlesinger observed that historically, conservatives turned their backs on robust men, such as Theodore Roosevelt and Winston Churchill; men who acted masculinely. Instead, conservatives embraced the effeminate Neville Chamberlains of the world, men who traded responsibility for isolationism. Thus, Schlesinger charged conservatives of becoming "impotent" men politically.

On the other hand, Schlesinger ridiculed the progressive left, which he named "Doughfaces," because they were too pliable and "hopelessly and irrevocably feminine." Doughfaces live within utopian beliefs and do not recognize the harsh realities of the world. For Schlesinger, Doughfaces had a genuine concern for the betterment of humankind but could only muster up enough energy to be dreamers and critics; they were not masculine enough to be doers. Thus, "Schlesinger took the progressive's politics as evidence of emotional maladjustment, what the postwar intelligentsia so frequently and indiscriminately called `neurosis'." Schlesinger's conclusion was that the reconstituted postwar liberal leaders would occupy the vital center politically by proving that they were doers and not just complainers. Schlesinger argued that these new leaders were the only people capable of producing "a secure and restored American masculinity."

Despite Schlesinger's effort to masculinize the liberal reform tradition, did not prevent liberals (including Schlesinger himself) from being accused of softness. The hard right's political rhetoric became much cruder and targeted such men as Secretary of State Dean Acheson and presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson as paragons of pompous "eastern establishment liberalism," too soft to stand against the pernicious evils of Communism. Throughout the 1950's, hard right political leaders such as Richard Nixon and Joseph McCarthy successfully put Democrats on the defensive with their accusations that they were soft on Communism and guilty of not working diligently in ferreting out Communists from government agencies. The hard right even had some success in convincing the American public that Communists had a higher propensity than other segments of society to be sexual deviants and homosexuals, and if Democrats were unwilling to go after them hammer and tong, then they must be guilty by association. In the fallout from the 1952 and 1956 presidential elections, the bleeding-heart liberal egghead superseded the image of the pragmatic, educated, manly liberal bureaucrat of earlier years. If Schlesinger and Democrats who believed in his thesis were to prove his point, that liberals were masculine leaders that were hard on Communism, then they would need a new young vigorous standard-bearer to propel their political party to victory in the 1960 presidential election. For the Democrats John F. Kennedy became not just the incarnation of the virile `vital center' liberal whose template Schlesinger had created ten years earlier, but the antidote to the nation's crisis in masculinity.

As a graduate student in philosophy and history, I recommended this book for anyone interested in American history, foreign policy, Cold War history.