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On Certainty

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A compilation of loosely connected, aphoristic-like statements about the idea of certainty, taking off from G. E. Moore's famous assertion in favour of common sense, Wittgenstein here presents his thoughts, at the end of his life, concerning the question of how sure of anything we can ever be. Dealing with a fundamentally epistemological question, this little book follows the path Wittgenstein had defined for himself in the latter part of his career, concerning itself with language and how we talk about the ideas we have.

Some misread him very badly, which is not surprising given his penchant for cryptic brevity and his own tendency to avoid extensive explication of his ideas in favour of the brief observation or statement reflecting moments of insight. Indeed, insight seems to have been at the very core of his later philosophy . . . it's all about seeing things in a new way.

On the matter of certainty, his claims here, sometimes rambling and seemingly unconnected, seem to boil down to a couple of points, consistent with his general way of seeing things:

1) Being certain of anything, he seems to say, is a matter of what we mean in the context in which we are expressing certainty. That is, he suggests that "certainty" the word has different meanings, depending on the application, and that we can become too readily confused if we try to apply one meaning (or use) in a place where another is required. As a corollary of this, he clearly holds that there is no basic idea of "certainty" to which all can be reduced, but only a range of related uses of the word in our language. This is in keeping with his larger view of the world as "contained" in our knowledge of it, and our knowledge "contained" in the words we use which are, themselves, a function of our language, which last is a part of our behavioural continuum, representing a rule-governed activity in which we are embedded as what he called a "form of life". (There are significant metaphysical implications for this but he does not touch on these, either in this book or more generally elsewhere, since he felt that to do that was often to stray out of the bounds that language made for us.)

2) As an outgrowth of the above, his second insight here tells us that there are some things of which we can be certain in a way that does not require what we would normally expect, i.e., evidence or proof. That is, sometimes a statement is just grounded in the rules of the game itself, i.e., in order to play in the game we must just assert the certainty . . . and believe in it. While such assertions may look the same as assertions of empirical certainty ("there is a bird outside my window") they are not (e.g., "there is an external world," "there are other minds inside other human bodies," etc.). To doubt certain things like this would be to break the rules of the game in which we are operating, in which case everything else collapses and we can no longer play.

In keeping with his usual approach, Wittgenstein does not present an argument for any of this or even make these claims, quite as explicitly as I have just done, in this book but, rather, confines himself to musings and observations, examples and questions. But it is to these two main points that everything he is presenting in On Certainty leads.

A note: some seem to have concluded from Wittgenstein's penchant for aphorisms and indirection that he was saying things quite different than he really was saying. I note someone here who accuses Wittgenstein of solipsism and this is a woeful misreading of him. His philosophical approach, in fact, put paid to the solipsist argument if read aright! Others have thought he was just playing with words or posturing as some kind of faux mystic. I would suggest that such ideas are false but that they arise because he was so unwilling to explicate his thoughts in the usual discursive way and, perhaps because he thought to do that would just lead one in circles.

So when reading Wittgenstein, you have to do it as he thought it and join him in the gnawing of the intellectual bones he displays in his observations. It is a matter of our seeing his point and not of his establishing logically defensible claims and arguments which we can debate with him or ourselves.

Someone else here likened him to a Zen master and I would suggest that that is very apt, indeed. Although his philosophical interests were mainly epistemological and not "spiritual" (defined as trying to place the conscious self in relation to the world in which it finds itself a la Zen), his techniques were not much different from those of Zen and his outcomes, insights into what we really mean when we say things, were on a par with the Zen idea of achieving satori (the moment of enlightenment). Different focal points, indeed, but the same strategy and the same basic understanding of the way introspective knowledge is secured for both.

Still, this particular work is very incomplete, perhaps because he wrote it while ill and apparently died before he could "complete" it . . . . leaving us a very limited look at a very significant epistemological problem with a somewhat spotty analysis and "solution." The Philosophical Investigations, his last (and also incomplete) work written specifically for publication, has much more to offer on his overall view of things and relative to the basic insights he invokes here in understanding "certainty".

SWM

On Certainty is an excellent introduction to Wittgenstein's thought, especially for those who may be turned off by the terseness and impenetrability of the Tractatus. This piece is still terse by any standard but Wittgenstein's, and many statements are just clever one-sentence aphorisms that float by themselves, seemingly disconnected from the main thread of argument. Assertions are often left unproven, and the numbered-statements style can be tiring. Still, some numbered statements are actually several sentences long (!), and many actually go into detail -- this makes it is somewhat unusual among Wittgenstein's works. As is often the case with philosophers' works, a beginning student would be well advised to proceed into Wittgenstein's works in reverse chronological order. The early Wittgenstein -- of perfect edifices of language and logic -- may be better understood in light of the later Wittgenstein, of social constructs and language games.

Where does Wittgenstein come down on the question of epistemological relativism? In classical paradoxical Wittgensteinian fashion, he is both for and against, sort of. He admits that he is certain of some things, and that he often thinks that someone who is not certain of these things (e.g., "This is my hand." etc) as not "reasonable." But he does not go so far as to say there is an objective truth on a Platonic plane. Certainty is more personal than that (a la Michael Polanyi?), and in some deep axiomatic way, has to be taken on faith. We are ultimately certain of things just because we are certain of them, and, as Wittgenstein writes about the statement "this is my hand," any evidence we could muster to support such a statement is not as strong as the original statement itself.

Overall, this is a fascinating look at the interplay of language, belief, and epistemology, from one of the 20th century's master philosophers.

Wittgenstein hastily wrote "On Certainty" in his last days - several places he seemed frustrated that he was unlikely to be able to get his ideas across. However, this work distills most of his work on the foundations of knowledge in a manner that is quite accessible. In fact, this book should have been entitled something like "cutting through centuries of misguided notions" - you only get clarity of vision such as contained in this volume if you are lucky enough to get samadhi from "show me your original face".

Wittgenstein used Moore's (in)famous paper that started with "knowing" his hand and then deduced the universe. Wittgenstein showed the inherent fallacy of this attempt and in the process paraded the naked emperor of metaphysics around in all its dualistic glory. For Wittgenstein really attacked the 'mapping' of what is really psychology into the analytic framework of philosophy.

Wittgenstein pointed out that doubt is a 'game', in the sense that doubting must follow logical rules. The game runs aground when it attempts to doubt the actual framework - such as doubting your own existence. This is no longer part of the 'game' but instead is simply nonsense or, better, psychology.

Wittgenstein wrote the book in his familiar style utilizing short semi-paragraphs to map out his arguments. I find the format quite similar to Eastern philosophy such as Tao Te Ching and the Zen koans and feel it is quite readable. Other people may want to buy Avrum Stroll's excellent "Moore and Wittgenstein on Certainty" for a more 'standard' overview of the argments.

This is essential reading for anyone interested in the future of philosophy.

"On Certainty" represents a much more honed work than the more common "Philosophical Investigations," though the depth of its insights are no less than than that work. OC is, by far, my favorite Wittgenstein book because it focuses so much on epistemological issues. Some examples include showing the error realists _and_ idealists are making (showing the fly the way out of the bottle), why there isn't necessarily a clear division between mathematical certainty and other kinds, and the failures of unchecked skepticism. He does this in a manner similar to the one used in "Philosophical Investigations": by an analysis of how we _normally_ know and doubt things.

The remarkable depth of this technique in highbrow philosophy is a breath of fresh air. Though I am currently investigating phenomenology, I always return to Wittgenstein (quite literally, by rereading passages of this or PI) to get my bearings when I suspect my ideas are getting a little too big for their britches. Wittgenstein sometimes thought philosophy should be therapeutic, and I must say that when I find myself in a muddle, his works or at least his methodology helps me find my way about.

As with his other works, though he spends some time knocking down familiar walls he does not leave you standing in the rubble but instead paves the way for new construction. I have read (not here) many references to Wittgenstein as some kind of postmodern deconstructionist, though even a little time spent trying to understand his points should be sufficient to demonstrate that he would not be satisfied until a problem was _resolved_, not just exposed. It is not enough, for example, to call the realism/idealism debate nonsense (for after all, he comments, to those involved in it the debate is not nonsense, so such a thing, while possibly satisfying, is not sufficient) and show the problem for what it is but instead to show them the way out of the problem they've walked in to.

Throughout the work, Moore's work on common sense is used as a platform from which to tackle a great many epistemological issues, so while it does stand in direct contrast to that work, it is not exactly a piece that has nothing else going for it but a criticism.

If you want some ready-made ideas to wrap your mind around, I get the impression from this book that Wittgenstein was heading towards a coherence theory of truth with a side of epistemological relativism, but please be aware that Wittgenstein did not intend to be a theory-builder as he largely felt the problems of philosophy were caused from conceptual mistakes regarding everyday phenomena and did not feel that the proper response to such problems would be "shoring up" a theory in response. This line of thought also lends itself to naturalisms. If that helps you understand what you'll be facing in "On Certainty," then it is worth it for an introduction.

If nothing else, "On Certainty" serves as an excellent response to general skepticism as much as it stands as a response to unabashed assertion. A short, terse, and wonderful read. If you enjoy philosophy, I have no doubt that you will enjoy this book. Please do not rest contented with companion works or other philosopher's assertions regarding the man (Kripke, Searle, etc); his works, while challenging, are not unapproachable in themselves-read them for yourself before you see them through someone else's eyes.

If you are more interested in problems of will, I would suggest Anscombe's "Intention." She uses a style unashamedly like that of Wittgenstein (she came up under Wittgenstein and was greatly influenced by him) in both methodology and writing in that work. Amazon, at the time of this post, carries it:
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On face value, On Certainty is a surprisingly accessible Wittgenstein text, exploring the notions of epistemology (theory of knowledge) and scepticism (idea that true knowledge can be sought but cannot be found) or "knowing" and "doubting", however, the work, on closer examination, cleverly argues these positions in the epistemological tradition from clearly different perspectives, thus On Certainty is more complex than it appears.

Written in the last eighteen months of Wittgenstein's life (the last entry days before his death) it is a response to Moore's articles, `Proof of the External World" and "Defence of Common Sense". According to the editors, Anscombe and von Wright, Wittgenstein told Moore that these were his best articles.

In entry 83, Wittgenstein writes:

"The truth of certain empirical propositions belongs to our frame of reference".

This is a foundationalist argument, proposing that our knowledge of the world and its truth, belongs to our particular frame of reference - context is everything, underlying all our assertions.

Another perspective that Wittgenstein proposes is the position of Relativism: in this view there are no foundations or absolutes, truth changes with the times, circumstances and social conditions. He writes,

65: "When language-games change, then there is a change in concepts, and with concepts the meaning of words change."

Interestingly, relativism is the perfect tool for the sceptic, because knowledge is depended on time and circumstances, and therefore can be sought, but never found.

Doubt itself is depended on certainty, as one must hold a premise in order to reject it.

115: "If you tried to doubt everything you would not get far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty."

In fact this, really, is the core premise of On Certainty that knowledge can only exist if doubt is possible. Doubt relies on content of what we know, our frame of reference that is inherent in all our assumptions regarding existence.

Reading On Certainty is a stimulus for thought, pushing us to analyse our assumptions about knowledge, that truth depends on our concept frameworks through which we view the world.

Recommended to all students of contemporary philosophy.

A very important book for understanding the current debates about the nature of consciousness. W distinguishes between being certain of something because it is certainly true, and being certain of something because nothing would make sense without it.

Very readable, for W.

This work captures some of Wittgenstein's last thoughts. If you are a student of this philosopher's work this is a msut have, I believe. However, it depends on earlier concepts to be understood, especially those found in "Philosophical Investigations". It is a very small book, with almost no commentary besides the origins of the original manuscripts, that Wittgenstein never published. If you are interested in the base text, without any commentary, this is for you. The fact that the original German text is given besides the english translation is also nice, because Wittgenstein's thoughts can easilt be misunderstood if translated badly.

This text provides a very simple, easy to read, and sharp understanding of Wittgenstein's positions. Despite my own personal opinions on Wittgenstein's thoughts, this text provides a very succinct understanding of Wittgenstein than I think can be found elsewhere.

In ON CERTAINTY, Wittgenstein re-visits the age-old question as to whether we actually know that there is world external to our minds. Well, not quite. In this short and quirky, imaginative and profound book, Wittgenstein attempts to turn the tables on the ancient debate between the Skeptic ("you don't know...") and her anti-skeptical interlocutor ("yes, I DO know...").

An anti-skeptic, such as G.E. Moore who claimed to know all sorts of the things about the external world (e.g. This is a hand), does NOT know, according to Wittgenstein, in part because Moore's question-begging response to the skeptic is wholly inadequate. But noting this does not mean that the skeptic wins the battle because, for Wittgenstein, it does not make sense to doubt the existence of the external world. We must affirm certain propositions in order to have inquiry at all, Wittgenstein argues, and among these are those claims which Moore alleges to know, aka 'Moorean facts.' Wittgenstein takes himself to show that we must believe the Moorean facts, but that, contrary to Moore, we do not know them.

As bewitching as the Wittgensteinian effort is, it does strike me that he, in no way, demonstrates his central claim - namely, that we cannot sensibly doubt Moorean facts. Despite this rather damning criticism, I highly recommend delving into this brilliant attempt.

If it's okay to talk about "favorite" philosophy books, On Certainty is on my list. I've come back to it over and over since first reading it about 30 years ago.

Two themes stood out this time, maybe the two themes that I've always thought were most important.

1) Distinguishing "grammatical" propositions from empirical ones
It's hard to talk about this briefly, but, roughly, "grammatical propositions", for Wittgenstein, are statements about how we speak. Elsewhere and here, he remarks on our commonly mistaking the one for the other. For example, he remarks on the physicist Eddington having "discovered" that tables (and other physical objects) aren't really solid, given that they are mostly made up of the space within and between atoms. He says that Eddington is actually proposing a change in the way that we speak, changing how we use the word "solid", rather than simply reporting an empirical observation. The line is blurry -- certainly empirical observations are relevant to the proposed change in the way we speak. Nevertheless, it is a powerful distinction. Wittgenstein is interested in correcting our tendency to be misled by such statements into some sort of false mysterious profundity, as here, in the kinds of skepticism and idealism under examination in his time.

But the distinction may also be useful in more common circumstances -- what about the statement "Life begins at conception (or quickening or birth or . . . )"? Is that statement empirical, or is it more a recommendation about how we should use the word "life"? If the latter, how does that change the debate about the rightness or wrongness of abortion rights? Both sides try to lend their argument more weight by treating such a statement as an empirical one, a "fact". Likewise G.W. Bush saying that "The US doesn't torture." Did that function for him as a factual statement, or a decision about how we are going to use the word "torture"?

2) The "natural history" of human beings
On Certainty responds to Wittgenstein's reading of Moore's "common sense" papers, particularly "Proof of an External World" and "A Defense of Common Sense". Moore in turn was responding to Kant's declaration of a "scandal to philosophy" that we can't (in quasi-ordinary words) prove the existence of a world outside our minds. Moore believed he could provide such a proof. But it's really the picture behind the felt need to provide such a proof that is bothersome and important. It calls up a picture of human beings creating "knowledge" in their minds by observing and reasoning about a world "outside their minds". Wittgenstein's arguments tend toward a less intellectualized and more natural relationship between human beings and the world, something more akin to what gets called "coping" by later writers (e.g., Heidegger).

We don't need to "know" or "prove" the existence of an external world, since we live in the world. In fact, the very attempt to prove its existence makes its existence questionable, now that these propositions (e.g., "There is a world external to my mind") are articulated. The compulsion to ask, now that we've articulated them, whether we know them or knew them before we articulated them, seems already to be a mistake. Such propositions weren't there before articulating them, and what they try to express didn't function as "knowledge" per se. Our situation is much more akin, as Wittgenstein says (jokes?), to a squirrel's apparent knowledge that winter will come and so he'd better store nuts against it -- squirrels don't infer that winter will come from past winters coming. Nor we do we, as Moore tries to do, establish the existence of a "world external to our minds" by inferring its existence from some more primitive facts that we know to be true.