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On Certainty: Parallel Text

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A compilation of loosely connected, aphoristic-like statements about the idea of certainty, taking off from G. E. Moore's famous assertion in favour of common sense, Wittgenstein here presents his thoughts, at the end of his life, concerning the question of how sure of anything we can ever be. Dealing with a fundamentally epistemological question, this little book follows the path Wittgenstein had defined for himself in the latter part of his career, concerning itself with language and how we talk about the ideas we have.

Some misread him very badly, which is not surprising given his penchant for cryptic brevity and his own tendency to avoid extensive explication of his ideas in favour of the brief observation or statement reflecting moments of insight. Indeed, insight seems to have been at the very core of his later philosophy . . . it's all about seeing things in a new way.

On the matter of certainty, his claims here, sometimes rambling and seemingly unconnected, seem to boil down to a couple of points, consistent with his general way of seeing things:

1) Being certain of anything, he seems to say, is a matter of what we mean in the context in which we are expressing certainty. That is, he suggests that "certainty" the word has different meanings, depending on the application, and that we can become too readily confused if we try to apply one meaning (or use) in a place where another is required. As a corollary of this, he clearly holds that there is no basic idea of "certainty" to which all can be reduced, but only a range of related uses of the word in our language. This is in keeping with his larger view of the world as "contained" in our knowledge of it, and our knowledge "contained" in the words we use which are, themselves, a function of our language, which last is a part of our behavioural continuum, representing a rule-governed activity in which we are embedded as what he called a "form of life". (There are significant metaphysical implications for this but he does not touch on these, either in this book or more generally elsewhere, since he felt that to do that was often to stray out of the bounds that language made for us.)

2) As an outgrowth of the above, his second insight here tells us that there are some things of which we can be certain in a way that does not require what we would normally expect, i.e., evidence or proof. That is, sometimes a statement is just grounded in the rules of the game itself, i.e., in order to play in the game we must just assert the certainty . . . and believe in it. While such assertions may look the same as assertions of empirical certainty ("there is a bird outside my window") they are not (e.g., "there is an external world," "there are other minds inside other human bodies," etc.). To doubt certain things like this would be to break the rules of the game in which we are operating, in which case everything else collapses and we can no longer play.

In keeping with his usual approach, Wittgenstein does not present an argument for any of this or even make these claims, quite as explicitly as I have just done, in this book but, rather, confines himself to musings and observations, examples and questions. But it is to these two main points that everything he is presenting in On Certainty leads.

A note: some seem to have concluded from Wittgenstein's penchant for aphorisms and indirection that he was saying things quite different than he really was saying. I note someone here who accuses Wittgenstein of solipsism and this is a woeful misreading of him. His philosophical approach, in fact, put paid to the solipsist argument if read aright! Others have thought he was just playing with words or posturing as some kind of faux mystic. I would suggest that such ideas are false but that they arise because he was so unwilling to explicate his thoughts in the usual discursive way and, perhaps because he thought to do that would just lead one in circles.

So when reading Wittgenstein, you have to do it as he thought it and join him in the gnawing of the intellectual bones he displays in his observations. It is a matter of our seeing his point and not of his establishing logically defensible claims and arguments which we can debate with him or ourselves.

Someone else here likened him to a Zen master and I would suggest that that is very apt, indeed. Although his philosophical interests were mainly epistemological and not "spiritual" (defined as trying to place the conscious self in relation to the world in which it finds itself a la Zen), his techniques were not much different from those of Zen and his outcomes, insights into what we really mean when we say things, were on a par with the Zen idea of achieving satori (the moment of enlightenment). Different focal points, indeed, but the same strategy and the same basic understanding of the way introspective knowledge is secured for both.

Still, this particular work is very incomplete, perhaps because he wrote it while ill and apparently died before he could "complete" it . . . . leaving us a very limited look at a very significant epistemological problem with a somewhat spotty analysis and "solution." The Philosophical Investigations, his last (and also incomplete) work written specifically for publication, has much more to offer on his overall view of things and relative to the basic insights he invokes here in understanding "certainty".

SWM

On Certainty is an excellent introduction to Wittgenstein's thought, especially for those who may be turned off by the terseness and impenetrability of the Tractatus. This piece is still terse by any standard but Wittgenstein's, and many statements are just clever one-sentence aphorisms that float by themselves, seemingly disconnected from the main thread of argument. Assertions are often left unproven, and the numbered-statements style can be tiring. Still, some numbered statements are actually several sentences long (!), and many actually go into detail -- this makes it is somewhat unusual among Wittgenstein's works. As is often the case with philosophers' works, a beginning student would be well advised to proceed into Wittgenstein's works in reverse chronological order. The early Wittgenstein -- of perfect edifices of language and logic -- may be better understood in light of the later Wittgenstein, of social constructs and language games.

Where does Wittgenstein come down on the question of epistemological relativism? In classical paradoxical Wittgensteinian fashion, he is both for and against, sort of. He admits that he is certain of some things, and that he often thinks that someone who is not certain of these things (e.g., "This is my hand." etc) as not "reasonable." But he does not go so far as to say there is an objective truth on a Platonic plane. Certainty is more personal than that (a la Michael Polanyi?), and in some deep axiomatic way, has to be taken on faith. We are ultimately certain of things just because we are certain of them, and, as Wittgenstein writes about the statement "this is my hand," any evidence we could muster to support such a statement is not as strong as the original statement itself.

Overall, this is a fascinating look at the interplay of language, belief, and epistemology, from one of the 20th century's master philosophers.

Wittgenstein hastily wrote "On Certainty" in his last days - several places he seemed frustrated that he was unlikely to be able to get his ideas across. However, this work distills most of his work on the foundations of knowledge in a manner that is quite accessible. In fact, this book should have been entitled something like "cutting through centuries of misguided notions" - you only get clarity of vision such as contained in this volume if you are lucky enough to get samadhi from "show me your original face".

Wittgenstein used Moore's (in)famous paper that started with "knowing" his hand and then deduced the universe. Wittgenstein showed the inherent fallacy of this attempt and in the process paraded the naked emperor of metaphysics around in all its dualistic glory. For Wittgenstein really attacked the 'mapping' of what is really psychology into the analytic framework of philosophy.

Wittgenstein pointed out that doubt is a 'game', in the sense that doubting must follow logical rules. The game runs aground when it attempts to doubt the actual framework - such as doubting your own existence. This is no longer part of the 'game' but instead is simply nonsense or, better, psychology.

Wittgenstein wrote the book in his familiar style utilizing short semi-paragraphs to map out his arguments. I find the format quite similar to Eastern philosophy such as Tao Te Ching and the Zen koans and feel it is quite readable. Other people may want to buy Avrum Stroll's excellent "Moore and Wittgenstein on Certainty" for a more 'standard' overview of the argments.

This is essential reading for anyone interested in the future of philosophy.

"On Certainty" represents a much more honed work than the more common "Philosophical Investigations," though the depth of its insights are no less than than that work. OC is, by far, my favorite Wittgenstein book because it focuses so much on epistemological issues. Some examples include showing the error realists _and_ idealists are making (showing the fly the way out of the bottle), why there isn't necessarily a clear division between mathematical certainty and other kinds, and the failures of unchecked skepticism. He does this in a manner similar to the one used in "Philosophical Investigations": by an analysis of how we _normally_ know and doubt things.

The remarkable depth of this technique in highbrow philosophy is a breath of fresh air. Though I am currently investigating phenomenology, I always return to Wittgenstein (quite literally, by rereading passages of this or PI) to get my bearings when I suspect my ideas are getting a little too big for their britches. Wittgenstein sometimes thought philosophy should be therapeutic, and I must say that when I find myself in a muddle, his works or at least his methodology helps me find my way about.

As with his other works, though he spends some time knocking down familiar walls he does not leave you standing in the rubble but instead paves the way for new construction. I have read (not here) many references to Wittgenstein as some kind of postmodern deconstructionist, though even a little time spent trying to understand his points should be sufficient to demonstrate that he would not be satisfied until a problem was _resolved_, not just exposed. It is not enough, for example, to call the realism/idealism debate nonsense (for after all, he comments, to those involved in it the debate is not nonsense, so such a thing, while possibly satisfying, is not sufficient) and show the problem for what it is but instead to show them the way out of the problem they've walked in to.

Throughout the work, Moore's work on common sense is used as a platform from which to tackle a great many epistemological issues, so while it does stand in direct contrast to that work, it is not exactly a piece that has nothing else going for it but a criticism.

If you want some ready-made ideas to wrap your mind around, I get the impression from this book that Wittgenstein was heading towards a coherence theory of truth with a side of epistemological relativism, but please be aware that Wittgenstein did not intend to be a theory-builder as he largely felt the problems of philosophy were caused from conceptual mistakes regarding everyday phenomena and did not feel that the proper response to such problems would be "shoring up" a theory in response. This line of thought also lends itself to naturalisms. If that helps you understand what you'll be facing in "On Certainty," then it is worth it for an introduction.

If nothing else, "On Certainty" serves as an excellent response to general skepticism as much as it stands as a response to unabashed assertion. A short, terse, and wonderful read. If you enjoy philosophy, I have no doubt that you will enjoy this book. Please do not rest contented with companion works or other philosopher's assertions regarding the man (Kripke, Searle, etc); his works, while challenging, are not unapproachable in themselves-read them for yourself before you see them through someone else's eyes.

If you are more interested in problems of will, I would suggest Anscombe's "Intention." She uses a style unashamedly like that of Wittgenstein (she came up under Wittgenstein and was greatly influenced by him) in both methodology and writing in that work. Amazon, at the time of this post, carries it:

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On face value, On Certainty is a surprisingly accessible Wittgenstein text, exploring the notions of epistemology (theory of knowledge) and scepticism (idea that true knowledge can be sought but cannot be found) or "knowing" and "doubting", however, the work, on closer examination, cleverly argues these positions in the epistemological tradition from clearly different perspectives, thus On Certainty is more complex than it appears.

Written in the last eighteen months of Wittgenstein's life (the last entry days before his death) it is a response to Moore's articles, `Proof of the External World" and "Defence of Common Sense". According to the editors, Anscombe and von Wright, Wittgenstein told Moore that these were his best articles.

In entry 83, Wittgenstein writes:

"The truth of certain empirical propositions belongs to our frame of reference".

This is a foundationalist argument, proposing that our knowledge of the world and its truth, belongs to our particular frame of reference - context is everything, underlying all our assertions.

Another perspective that Wittgenstein proposes is the position of Relativism: in this view there are no foundations or absolutes, truth changes with the times, circumstances and social conditions. He writes,

65: "When language-games change, then there is a change in concepts, and with concepts the meaning of words change."

Interestingly, relativism is the perfect tool for the sceptic, because knowledge is depended on time and circumstances, and therefore can be sought, but never found.

Doubt itself is depended on certainty, as one must hold a premise in order to reject it.

115: "If you tried to doubt everything you would not get far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty."

In fact this, really, is the core premise of On Certainty that knowledge can only exist if doubt is possible. Doubt relies on content of what we know, our frame of reference that is inherent in all our assumptions regarding existence.

Reading On Certainty is a stimulus for thought, pushing us to analyse our assumptions about knowledge, that truth depends on our concept frameworks through which we view the world.

Recommended to all students of contemporary philosophy.

A very important book for understanding the current debates about the nature of consciousness. W distinguishes between being certain of something because it is certainly true, and being certain of something because nothing would make sense without it.

Very readable, for W.

This work captures some of Wittgenstein's last thoughts. If you are a student of this philosopher's work this is a msut have, I believe. However, it depends on earlier concepts to be understood, especially those found in "Philosophical Investigations". It is a very small book, with almost no commentary besides the origins of the original manuscripts, that Wittgenstein never published. If you are interested in the base text, without any commentary, this is for you. The fact that the original German text is given besides the english translation is also nice, because Wittgenstein's thoughts can easilt be misunderstood if translated badly.

This text provides a very simple, easy to read, and sharp understanding of Wittgenstein's positions. Despite my own personal opinions on Wittgenstein's thoughts, this text provides a very succinct understanding of Wittgenstein than I think can be found elsewhere.

In ON CERTAINTY, Wittgenstein re-visits the age-old question as to whether we actually know that there is world external to our minds. Well, not quite. In this short and quirky, imaginative and profound book, Wittgenstein attempts to turn the tables on the ancient debate between the Skeptic ("you don't know...") and her anti-skeptical interlocutor ("yes, I DO know...").

An anti-skeptic, such as G.E. Moore who claimed to know all sorts of the things about the external world (e.g. This is a hand), does NOT know, according to Wittgenstein, in part because Moore's question-begging response to the skeptic is wholly inadequate. But noting this does not mean that the skeptic wins the battle because, for Wittgenstein, it does not make sense to doubt the existence of the external world. We must affirm certain propositions in order to have inquiry at all, Wittgenstein argues, and among these are those claims which Moore alleges to know, aka 'Moorean facts.' Wittgenstein takes himself to show that we must believe the Moorean facts, but that, contrary to Moore, we do not know them.

As bewitching as the Wittgensteinian effort is, it does strike me that he, in no way, demonstrates his central claim - namely, that we cannot sensibly doubt Moorean facts. Despite this rather damning criticism, I highly recommend delving into this brilliant attempt.

TWO LANGUAGE GAMES. The main purpose of the book is to determine the use of the word "to know." This goal is set forth in paragraph 589, "For how does a man learn to recognize his own state of knowing something?" One method for addressing this goal is to contrast to know with to believe.

Here is some late-breaking news. A couple of years after posting this review, I actually published a paper about Wittgenstein. My article concerns Wittgenstein's analysis of the word, "expectation." My article got published early in 2010:

Brody, T. (2010) Obviousness in patents following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision of KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc. in Journal Patent Trademark Office Society 92:26-70.

ON CERTAINTY concerns only two language games, namely, to know and to believe. In contrast the Philosophical Investigations concerns many language games, for example, actual games (board games; card games) (para 66 of PI), games of giving an order, reporting an event, play-acting, making a joke (para 23 of PI), game of interpreting (page 171 of PI), game of obeying a rule (para 199), game of remembering (para 305 of PI), game of recognizing (para 604 and page 169 of PI). Other language games not discussed in ON CERTAINTY are "performatives" or "speech acts," such as promising, christening a ship, or verbal contracts. Performatives are described in Wittgenstein by Robert J. Fogelin (page 158) and in Speech Acts by John Searle.

TO KNOW VERSUS TO BELIEVE. The book ON CERTAINTY obviously concerns what it means to be certain or to believe. W. discloses what it means to know by contrasting it with what it means to believe. The contrast between the two can be set forth by providing Moore's Paradox. Moore's Paradox goes like this: "He believes that it is raining, but it is not raining." The corresponding version in the past tense is: "He believed that it was raining, but it was not raining." The first statement is absurd. But the second statement is reasonable. Moore's Paradox is discussed in para 42 of ON CERTAINTY. Another difference is that it is not absurd to say, "I thought I knew such and such, but I was wrong" but it is absurd to say, "I thought I was certain about such and such (or believed such and such), but I was wrong." (para 12). The difference between to know and to believe is further given, where we are told that it make sense to say, "He is in a position to know such and such," and that it does not make sense to say, "He is in a position to believe such and such" (paras 555-556). We are told, "If someone believes something, we needn't always be able to answer the question `why he believes it' but if he knows something, then the question `how does he know?' must be capable of being answered (para 550).

Moore's Paradox is further discussed in para 520 (example of a tree) and para 549 (example of a chair), 550. Wittgenstein writes, "Moore has every right to say he knows there's a tree there in front of him. Naturally he may be wrong. For it is not the same as with the utterance, I believe there is a tree there." (para 520). According to para 569, inner experiences are not relevant to using the term, to know (para. 569). In contrast, inner experiences are the basis of using the term, to believe or to be certain. If to know does not depend on any inner experience, then what is the condition precedent for knowing. The answer lies in Wittgenstein's notion of the "system of evidence." (see below)

A SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE. Commentary on "a system of evidence" is used to define what it means to know something. This system of evidence is not relevant to use of the term, to believe something. Although ON CERTAINTY does not dwell much on mental pictures, as does the Philosophical Investigations, commentary on "a system of evidence" does constitute an argument that knowing does not require any mental pictures. W. discloses the concept of a "system of evidence," family of connections, or a world picture throughout the book. This system of evidence is necessary for us to know something. In other words, if we weren't aware of the elements in this system of evidence, we would not be able to assert that we know anything, we wouldn't be able to use the word, to know. In para. 140, we find, "we are taught judgments and their connexion with other judgments." In para. 144, we find, "the child learns . . . bit by bit there forms a system of what is believed . . . it is rather held fast by what lies around it."

In para. 185, we find "It would strike me as ridiculous to want to doubt the existence of Napoleon . . ." To do so would be "doubting our whole system of evidence." In para. 279, we find, "This system is something that a human being acquires by means of observation and instruction." In para. 518, we find commentary on this system of evidence, "Wouldn't a mistake topple all judgment with it." In para. 572, we learn that to know something means that, "If that is wrong, then I am crazy," in other words, that our entire system of evidence is wrong. In para. 594, we find, "My name is L.W. And if someone were to dispute it, I should straightaway make connexions with innumerable things . . ."

In para. 613, we find that the use of the term, to know, is where "a doubt would seem to drag everything with it and plunge it into chaos."

In para 356, we read that to know means "that I should not understand where a doubt could get a foothold."

In para. 614, we find, "If I were contradicted on all sides and told that this person's name was not what I had always known . . . the foundation of all judging would be taken away from me." In para. 617, we find that "Certain events would put me into a position in which I could not go on with the old language-game any further. In which I was torn away from the sureness of the game."

Elegant descriptions of this system of evidence include, "what I hold fast to is . . . a nest of propositions." (para 225), and "this system is something a human being acquires" (para 410). Wittgenstein tells us that when we are confronted with something that casts doubt on something that we know, we usually react by doubting the doubt (paras 516-517).

PAIN. Further evidence as to the difference between to know and to believe comes from commentary about pain. In short, pain is not something you know, but it is something you believe. "For to say one knows one has a pain means nothing." (para 504) In other words, under ordinary circumstances, saying "I am in pain" makes sense, but saying "I know that I am in pain" does not add anything further and, in fact, it seems like a nonsense statement. (But it does make sense to say, "I know that he is in pain." (para 535)) Thus, it appears that Wittgenstein is saying that "I know that I am in pain" is like uttering, "I believe such and such." Here, the utterance is valid and cannot be questioned, and here it is not relevant to point to the system of evidence, to "connexions with innumerable things," or to "a nest of propositions." Pain is frequently discussed in PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (para 244, 288, 303, 310, 351, 403, 404, 666, 667, of the PI). The value of reading ON CERTAINTY, is that its focused effort in contrasting to know with to believe, as well as its (all-too-brief) commentary about pain, should inspire a better understanding of the PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, especially on the PI's comments about pain.