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Chamberlain and the Lost Peace

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English historian John Charmley has disturbed World War II "establishment historians"--and established myths--by his iconoclastic re-interpretaion of the origins and beginning of the 1939-1945 war. Yet, in a series of closely reasoned studies he makes telling points that reveal a number of missed opportunities, in the months and weeks before and even after the outbreak of war, to have secured a satisfactory resolution of the growing hostility between the UK and Germany. He does not say that this resolution would have been permanent in the long run; indeed, the two powers may have eventually ended up in conflict. Nevertheless, the possibility that Britain could have kept out of a general war for another couple of years, while Germany was expending its resources and materiel in a war in the East, might well have changed the course of history. The "war hawk" party in London, egged on surreptiously by the Roosevelt administration and ideological "anti-fascists," managed to get Britain mired in a conflict for which it was not ready and which in the end totally exhausted it, which ended its role as world power, and that meant the destruction of the "empire." Churchill's vaunted promise to "defend the empire" was made hollow as he presided over the very destruction of that empire--and of historic Britain. Charmley offers ample notes and primary sources for his interpretation. While certainly not a new view--Barnett, Taylor and others have made similar points--Charmley's points deserve respectful consideration--not the "Establishment" condescension (and apparent fear!) that some have exhibited.

Great Britain, like all countries, lives by a national myth. The story every child learns at school is that in its finest hour the country stood alone against Germany and saved the world from an evil creed called Nazism. What is ignored is that the only result of the war was that Eastern Europe was lost to an equally evil creed called Communism. And in case you are thinking "What about the Holocaust?" don't forget that the Holocaust didn't begin until well into the war; Hitler's original plan was to expel the Jews.
In order to make the national myth work, Chamberlain, and anyone who helped him in his attempts to prevent war, must be demonised as weak and stupid. But what was weak and stupid about trying to prevent millions of deaths or recognising that Germany had some legitimate demands?
John Charmley shows Churchill as most people in the 1930s saw him - a war-mongering opportunist with very bad judgement. He presents Chamberlain in his true colours - a decent man doing his best for his people.

John Charmley has a thesis that he has tried to hammer home repeatedly: that Britain should not have intervened in the Second World War and that, by doing so, Winston Churchill succeeded in mortgaging Britain's future to America, losing the Empire, and ushering in decades of social democracy in Britain. In other words, Charmley thinks Britain would have been better off if it had turned an even blinder eye to Nazism.

This book is nominally about Chamberlain, but we see a lot of Churchill and Charmley tries to bring in his arch-villain whenever possible. This visceral dislike for Churchill - combined with a fawning admiration for Chamberlain - is troubling in that it prevents Charmley from acknowledging that one was ever right and that the other was ever wrong. This book is about as partisan as possible.

His ultimate argument, that Nazi Germany posed no threat to Britain is absurd. Charmley does not even bother to examine Hitler's ambitions; had he done so, his argument would have fallen apart. Germany sought to be an Atlantic power, as well as a European power. Ideological bias blinds Charmley from the fact that a triumphant Germany would have effectively emasculated Britain and encouraged Italy and Japan to poach London's colonial possessions. He despises America enough to blind him to the fact that there were far more rapacious powers operating in the 1940s (see some of the letters Charmley has written to the Daily Telegraph)

All in all, this book is best read as an example of modern-day Tory cynicism and contempt for the past. As a chronicle of the years before the war it has little to recommend it.