Chancellorsville [Hardcover]

Stephen W. Sears (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: October 24, 1996

Sears describes the series of controversial events that define this crucial battle, including General Robert E. Lee's radical decision to divide his small army--a violation of basic military rules--sending Stonewall Jackson on his famous march around the Union army flank. Jackson's death--accidentally shot by one of his own soldiers--is one of the many fascinating stories included in this definitive account of the battle of Chancellorsville.

Editorial Reviews

Amazon.com Review

Many Civil War buffs have called the battle of Chancellorsville Robert E. Lee's greatest victory; Stephen W. Sears doesn't necessarily agree, and in this painstakingly researched book, he offers ample evidence that Lee had luck on his side in the battle. Lee was a great general all right, and his men did fight savagely. But the notion that Union General Joseph Hooker was inept is cast into doubt by Sears, who describes the action of Chancellorsville as most great battle books do--hour by hour. This book is the finest rendition of the battle yet and an interesting thesis for Civil War discussion. Lee's penchant for aggressiveness and his faith in his troops as unbeatable may have worked at Chancellorsville, but Sears argues that these alone couldn't win the war. Lee learned this lesson too, a month later at Gettysburg.

From Publishers Weekly

Chancellorsville was one of the Civil War's pivotal campaigns, a great victory for the South that, however, led directly to the death of top Confederate general Stonewall Jackson. It hasn't generated the amount of literature devoted to most major Civil War battles, largely because John Bigelow's 1910 classic, The Campaign of Chancellorsville, seemed for years to offer the last word. But Sears, employing a mix of published and unpublished primary accounts to buttress secondary studies, manages to offer more than one new word in a thoroughly engaging text. Most notable is his use of Union military intelligence reports to show how General Joseph Hooker was fed a stream of accurate information about Robert E. Lee's troops; conversely, Sears points out the battlefield communications failures that hampered the Union army at critical times. He also examines the roles of Hooker and his corps commanders, finding that half of the latter badly served their commander in the campaign. On the Confederate side, Sears analyzes Lee's faulty intelligence and his relationships with his subordinates. Throughout, he highlights Lee's marvelous good luck, as well as his army's fighting capability. One of the book's three appendices explores several of the battle's "romances"?e.g., Jackson's wounding, Alfred Pleasonton's false stories?while two other appendices present orders of battle and casualties. A model campaign study, Sears's account of Chancellorsville is likely to remain the standard for years to come. Maps and photos not seen by PW.
Copyright 1996 Reed Business Information, Inc.

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Product Details

• Hardcover: 593 pages
• Publisher: Houghton Mifflin; 1ST edition (October 24, 1996)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0395634172
• ISBN-13: 978-0395634172
• Product Dimensions: 9 x 6.3 x 1.6 inches
• Shipping Weight: 2.2 pounds
• Average Customer Review: 4.6 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (56 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #194,570 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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32 of 34 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars A real treat for Civil War enthusiasts, April 21, 2004

By 

B. Morris (Raytown, Missouri United States) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

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This review is from: Chancellorsville (Paperback)

Stephen Sears has earned a reputation as one of the top Civil War authors today and with Chancellorsville he once again shows why with what could be his best book so far. First off, Sears is just a great writer. To many Civil War books are written by authors who know the subject and have done all the right research but simply don't have the writing talents to put the information into a form that is both informative and entertaining. That is not the case with Sears. His writing skills are equel to his research and the result is a book that is both informative and a pleasure to read.

To say this book is about the Battle of Chancellorsville is almost a misnomer. A better description would be that the book is about the Hooker era in the Army of the Potomac. In the book Sears treats us to more than just the Xs and Os of a battle. We hear about Hooker's rebuilding of the Army's moral after the disasterous tenure of Burnside. We learn about army intelligence, how both armies are supplied and how troops passed the winter months. All before we get anywhere close to Chancellorsville. The book does a wonderful job of covering the situation of both the Army of the Potomac and Army of Northern Virginia in the early days of 1863.

As far as the battle goes, the book gives a very complete description. From the opening moves to the death of Jackson, the reader really gets a full and complete picture. This is aided by Sears' inclusion of some very good maps, something that is often missing from Civil War books.

I can think of few Civil War books that I have enjoyed as much as this. The book is 600 pages but Sears is such a good writer that you breeze right through it. Sears has done a lot of good books but for me this could be his best.

28 of 32 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Definitive account of the battle that dispells many myths, February 23, 2005

By 

chefdevergue (Spokane, WA United States) - See all my reviews
(VINE VOICE)   

This review is from: Chancellorsville (Paperback)

Too often, the battle of Chancellorsville has been viewed as merely another of a series of humiliating defeats for the Army of the Potomac at the hands of RE Lee, and that the battle was further evidence of Lee's tactical genius triumphing over the bumbling leadership of his Union counterparts. Certainly Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia came to view it as such, and that misperception in no small measure contributed Lee's defeat two months later at Gettysburg.

What Stephen Sears presents is a considerably different picture, that of a battle which, although a tactical Confederate victory, represented more of a draw in the larger operational sense. Far from being an uncertain leader in the mold of McClellan or Burnside, Joe Hooker is shown by Sears as a leader who has a very clear idea of what his operational objectives, and his battle plan for Chancellorsville cannot fail to impress. Certainly he completely out-generalled Lee, successfully executing an elaborate maneuver which landed the Union army in the rear of the unsuspecting Lee. Lee's unconventional division of his forces is the one element of Chancellorsville that one always hears about, but what is often not emphasized is that Lee was forced to these desperate measures by Hooker's superior maneuvers.

Once Jackson begins his massive flanking maneuver, Sears really hits his stride as a writer. The reader is left awestruck at Jackson's skill as a corps commander. Even though the wisdom of this flanking maneuver certainly is open to debate, nevertheless Jackson was able to move a massive number of men a great number of miles largely undetected, and that is no minor accomplishment. Sears then describes the rout and destruction of the XI Corps that is both vivid and coherent. A scene such as that cannot be easy to describe so as to be followed by the reader, but Sears is more than equal to the challenge.

I remember how Chancellorsville was described in Ken Burns' celebrated (but at times flawed) documentary --- "the defeat was total." Well --- not exactly. Certainly the XI Corps was shattered, but by and large the Army of the Potomac gave as good as it took, and possibly could have taken the day had a counter-offensive been launched. Even with the element of surprise, Jackson's corps did not succeed in shattering Hooker's flank. How it came to be that Hooker, despite a significant advantage in numbers and superior maneuvering, failed to achieve his objectives is where Sears devotes the bulk of his energies and where is book is most valuable.

Some reviewers have faulted Sears for being nothing more than an apologist for Hooker, making excuses for Hooker's numerous blunders. Sears definitely does not have the scorn for Hooker that he has acquired for McClellan. While he obviously feels that Hooker's reputation has suffered unfairly, I don't know if I would call Sears an apologist. He makes it clear where the fault lies at Chancellorsville: Howard's complete negligence in fortifying his positions, even though he had an entire day in which to do it; Stoneman's utter failure to make even a dent in Lee's supply lines, despite having more than adequate strength in numbers; and Sedgwick's timid advance against a thinly defended Confederate position, which if pursued more aggressively would have resulted in yet another threatened flank for Lee. How can one argue with this? Hooker couldn't micromanage everything, and presumably these experienced officers should have known how to do their jobs. As far as Hooker's behavior after his concussion, one cannot blame him one way or the other, because that is the way concussions are --- one is disoriented without totally realizing it.

If Hooker is to be faulted, it is for making his battle plan so elaborate that everything had to work just right for it to be a success. If your gadget has too many moving parts, it is only a matter of time before one of those parts breaks. This was a plan that could have worked magnificently, but was just begging for something to go wrong with it. Sears does not really discuss this flaw in Hooker's strategy. As it turned out, virtually every bad turn of luck came to pass, almost unbelievably so. Lee never fully realized just how much of a role dumb luck played in his victory, and his army would soon pay the price for that.

Sears greatest strengths are in his blow-by-blow descriptions of the scenes of battle, and in his wonderful biographies in miniature of the participants. He is by now well-acquainted with the ranks of the Armies of the Potomac and Northern Virginia, and knows where to look in his primary sources for nuggets worthy of our attention. The reader will never be bored, and oftentimes will find it hard to put the book down --- even though we all know how this battle turned out.

15 of 18 people found the following review helpful:

3.0 out of 5 stars So, why did Gen. Hooker lose?, November 7, 2001

By 

Tony DiGiulian (SE PA) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Chancellorsville (Paperback)

I have but little to add to the other reviews of this book, some of which are very good reads in themselves, but I thought that I'd share one thought about it:

Mr. Sears goes to great pains to vindicate Gen. Hooker's handling of the battle, including taking what I consider to be some unnecessary cheap shots at several of his subordinates (excepting Gen. Howard, about whom little good could be said), but, when finished reading it, I had to ask myself, "well, how then DID Gen. Hooker lose this battle?" I felt that Mr. Sears did little to explain just how the greatly outnumbered Confederate Army of Northern Virginia was able to so badly defeat the Federal Army of the Potomac. I also couldn't help but note how any observer's negative comment about Gen. Hooker (see almost any other history of this battle) was purged from Mr. Sears' account yet any favorable comment from those same sources seemed to be included without reservation.

In the end, yes, Gen. Howard's command was a disaster, and, yes, perhaps Gen. Sedgewick could have moved faster - although I have yet to figure out how Gen. Sedgewick with about 22,000 men was supposed to rescue Gen. Hooker's 80,000 - but the fact of the matter is that, even when subtracting all of Eleventh and Sixth Corps from the totals, Gen. Hooker's main army still greatly outnumbered Gen. Lee's at the point of attack, especially during the days when Gen. Lee denuded his lines in order to deal with Gen. Sedgewick.

When faced with a similar situation a year later in nearly the same spot, Gen. Grant took a tactically defeated army and turned it into a strategic victory of surpassing importance. Why couldn't Gen. Hooker have done the same instead of tamely withdrawing across the river? I'm afraid that Mr. Sears leaves us to our own devices in trying to come to a decision in this matter.

In conclusion, let me say that this is a fine book about the battle and I'm glad that I purchased it, but I would recommend Furgurson's "Chancellorsville: Souls of the Brave" as the better book. I would also recommend the Army's Field Guide to the Fredricksburg/Chancellorsville battles. Indispensable if you plan to walk over the area.